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1. Introduction
All through recorded history we have seen extreme differences 
between different human societies. Some societies in some periods 
have been warlike and cruel beyond comprehension, while other 
societies in other times and places have been remarkably peaceful and 
tolerant.
Societies that are warlike, hierarchical, and intolerant with strict 
discipline are called regal. Societies that are peaceful, egalitarian, and 
tolerant are called kungic. Many societies are something in between 
these two extremes. The present book offers a new, groundbreaking 
theory that explains this extreme variability in social organization and 
culture based on evolutionary theory.
It has often been discussed whether such dramatic differences in 
human behavior are due to genetic differences or cultural norms. One 
aspect that is often missing in the genes-versus-culture debate is that 
genes may code for flexibility. Our genes enable us to behave differently 
under different conditions. This is called phenotypic plasticity.1
The theory presented here demonstrates that humans have a 
plasticity that enables us to adapt to different conditions of war or 
peace. Warlike or regal behavior has been adaptive under conditions 
of collective danger that were sometimes present in our evolutionary 
past, while conditions of collective security that were present at other 
times and places made peaceful or kungic behavior optimal from an 
evolutionary point of view. In other words, the potentials for both 
warlike and peaceful behavior are present in our genetic makeup. 
1  Bateson and Gluckman (2011, p. 31)
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Nobody is born a devil or a saint. Depending on our living conditions, 
we may become authoritarian and belligerent or peace-loving and 
tolerant. The theory presented here explains a likely evolutionary 
mechanism behind this flexible psychology and analyzes the conditions 
that make us either strident or docile.
This theory, which will be called regality theory, can answer many 
burning questions about both individual and collective behavior: Why 
have so many tyrants fought cruel and unnecessary wars? Why do many 
people support their tyrants? Why do some people hate foreigners 
while other people readily embrace them? Why have people used their 
apparently peaceful religion to justify some of the worst atrocities in 
history? And why have other people dedicated their lives to the most 
unselfish charitable causes based on the very same religions? Why do 
some militants commit acts of terrorism against innocent people? And 
why can a few acts of terrorism that cause a limited amount of harm 
lead to dramatic changes in the political climate, while other events 
that cause much more harm have no noticeable political effect?
The remarkable differences between warlike and peaceful societies 
are reflected in many characteristics of culture, including aspects 
that have no obvious relationship with war and peace, such as art 
preferences and sexual morals. This book explores such side effects as 
well and presents statistical evidence in support of the theory.
1.1. A different kind of social science
‘Scientific genius is extinct’, wrote Dean Simonton in Nature a few years 
ago. In his view, the only kind of scientific progress we see today is 
marginal improvements within old paradigms that have already been 
thoroughly explored. Revolutionary new ideas either do not occur or 
fail to be acknowledged.2 Scientists who are trained in one particular 
paradigm are unlikely to understand and accept a new, radically 
different paradigm.3 While everybody hails interdisciplinary research, 
the reality today is that many scientists guard their own scientific 
2  Simonton (2013)
3  Kuhn (1962, chapter 12)
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territory. Scientists today have little freedom to choose their own 
subjects of research. The highly competitive funding system is more 
likely to support old research areas than radically new ones because it 
is controlled by established scientists through the peer review system.4 
Most scientists start by specializing in one particular scientific 
paradigm and then search for problems that this paradigm can be 
applied to. The present book reflects the opposite approach. It starts 
with a problem and then searches for paradigms that can contribute 
to solving the problem. This includes paradigms from the natural 
sciences, such as evolutionary biology and ecology, as well as from 
the social sciences, such as anthropology, history, political science, 
economics, and cultural studies.
Unfortunately, there is much animosity and little mutual 
understanding between the natural and the social sciences. Many 
regard it as impossible to establish something similar to the laws of the 
natural sciences for social phenomena.5 Evolutionary theories of human 
behavior are rejected by many sociologists on those grounds,6 and 
some particularly fashionable branches of social studies are aversive to 
any search for causal regularities in social and cultural systems.7 This 
is not a good starting point for bridging the gap between the social 
and the natural sciences. Fortunately, authors in other branches of the 
social sciences have strongly defended the study of social phenomena 
based on solid scientific principles.8 We have to rely in particular on 
those social science traditions that explicitly search for regularities; for 
example, comparative historical analysis9 and social systems theory.10
Too many studies of social phenomena have focused on an isolated 
phenomenon, using a single theoretical framework that allows only 
a single type of explanation. Such studies cannot account for the rich 
complexity of human culture and social developments. We need a 
4  Becher and Trowler (2001), Lucas (2006), van Arensbergen, van der Weijden and 
van den Besselaar (2014)
5  Hayek (1967)
6  Horowitz, Yaworsky and Kickham (2014), O’Malley (2007)
7  Beed and Beed (2000)
8  Kincaid (1996, chapter 3)
9  Mahoney and Thelen (2015)
10  Richardson, G. (1991)
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social science that combines the insights of many different scientific 
disciplines to better understand the interactions between individual 
and collective action, between planned and unintended developments, 
between human action and structural causes, between endogenous 
and exogenous factors, and so on. The present book strives towards 
this goal of multicausal explanations.
The large number of different scientific disciplines involved in this 
book makes it impossible to go into deep details for each discipline. 
For example, the text does not go into details with historical examples, 
but instead discusses the specific aspects of historical events that 
are relevant to the theoretical discussion. Readers who want to go 
deeper into a particular subject are referred to the literature references 
(chapter 10).
In sciences like physics and mathematics, a theory is called 
‘beautiful’ if it can solve a broad range of problems using one simple 
formula and if it can be applied to problems other than the one that 
prompted the development of the theory. Regality theory is a beautiful 
theory in this sense. What started as an attempt to explain morals 
by cultural selection ends up as an evolutionary psychology theory 
of collective action that can explain a broad range of phenomena: 
individual characteristics such as authoritarianism, xenophobia, or 
tolerance; social phenomena such as political hierarchy, bellicosity, 
discipline, or egalitarianism; and even cultural phenomena such as 
religiosity, music genres, and architectural style. Regality theory is 
not a ‘grand theory’, though. It can contribute to the explanation of 
many interesting phenomena, but it needs to be combined with other 
theories in order to fully explain these phenomena.
Some branches of social studies readily mix science and ideology. 
That is a dangerous course. Regality theory is useful for explaining 
many different political phenomena, and the theory may be useful for 
guiding political decisions, but this must be a one-way interaction. 
The present book is based on the principle that science may influence 
politics but politics should not influence science. The fundamental 
science should be immune to political and ideological influences even 
if the research should reveal politically inconvenient truths.
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1.2. Overview of the book
This book relies on many different scientific disciplines from both the 
natural sciences and the social sciences. Many concepts are briefly 
explained because one cannot expect the reader to be competent in such 
a broad range of different disciplines, but you should still be prepared 
to look up unfamiliar words and concepts. The good news is that it is 
not necessary to read and understand all the chapters in order to get a 
basic understanding of the theory.
Chapter 2.1 gives a short introduction to regality theory. It is 
necessary to read this chapter first in order to understand the rest of the 
book. You may read the remaining chapters in any way you like. You 
may focus on the chapters that are most relevant to your field of interest 
and skip other chapters or read them later. There are cross-references 
throughout the book where one chapter relates to another.
Chapter 2.2 explains the evolutionary mechanism that regality theory 
is based on. This is the theoretical justification for the theory. Chapters 
2.3, 2.4, and 2.5 contain further discussion of evolutionary aspects of the 
theory. Chapter 2.6 relates the theory to common cultural phenomena.
Chapter 3 and its subsections discuss how regality theory can 
benefit from contributions from other scientific disciplines. Regality 
theory cannot stand alone. We are dealing with social, cultural, and 
psychological phenomena that are influenced by a complex interplay 
of many different causes and mechanisms. Such a complex system 
cannot be described adequately by a single theory. We need to look 
into such diverse disciplines as ecology, demography, anthropology, 
history, political science, economics, social psychology, cultural studies, 
media studies, and many others in order to get a full understanding 
of the complex social phenomena of warlike and peaceful behavior. 
The subsections of chapter 3 discuss relevant findings from a number 
of disciplines that can be combined with regality theory to provide a 
more complete understanding of the social, cultural, and psychological 
phenomena we want to study.
Many different academic traditions have made observations about 
different kinds of societies and cultures or different kinds of personalities 
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and psychological reactions that have important similarities with 
regality theory. However, they have done so without the same degree 
of theoretical understanding of fundamental causes and mechanisms. 
Chapter 3 also discusses how such findings from other areas of study 
can be integrated with regality theory.
Chapter 4 looks at different theories about the causes of war and 
peace as well as the dynamic processes behind different kinds of violent 
conflicts.
Chapter 5 and 6 analyze various aspects of contemporary cultures. 
Chapter 5 looks at a number of economic factors that produce regal 
cultures, perhaps unintentionally, through fear and collective danger. 
The commercial mass media profit from fear. Economic instability 
causes insecurity and conflicts. Changing economic conditions have 
changed the patterns of war and violent conflicts so that proxy 
war, insurgency, and terrorism have mainly replaced conventional 
interstate war.
Chapter 6 looks at cases where fear and conflict are used 
intentionally as strategic weapons by powerful nations as well as by 
smaller insurgent groups.
The psychological plasticity that regality theory describes has its 
origins in a distant evolutionary past, and we cannot be certain that 
it is still adaptive (in the evolutionary sense) in a modern setting. We 
may gain more insight by looking at non-modern cultures that are 
more similar to our evolutionary past. Chapter 7 describes a number 
of ancient cultures, ranging from the most peaceful to the most warlike, 
and living under very different ecological environments. In connection 
with each culture is a discussion of how it relates to the predictions of 
regality theory.
While examples are useful for illustrating a theory, we cannot rule out 
the possibility that the agreement between a theory and a few examples 
is just a coincidence. Chapter 8 contains a number of statistical tests to 
distinguish between random coincidence and significant correlations. 
Various methods are used for testing the predictions of regality theory 
at both the individual level and the level of whole societies in both 
modern and ancient non-industrial societies.
Chapter 9 concludes the book with a discussion and summary of the 
findings and possible applications of regality theory.
2. The Theory of Regal and  
Kungic Cultures
2.1. In a nutshell: ‘regal’ and ‘kungic’ explained
It is easy to observe that some cultures are warlike and totalitarian 
while other cultures are peaceful and tolerant.1 It is more difficult to 
explain why. Regality theory seeks to explain such cultural differences 
as adaptations to the different levels of danger and conflict that societies 
are exposed to.2 Nobody is born belligerent or peaceful, according to 
this theory. Instead, humans have evolved a psychological plasticity 
that shapes our personalities to fit the environments we live in. This 
psychological mechanism makes people prefer a strong leader and strict 
discipline in the event of war or other collective danger.
The mechanism explained here is an interplay between genes and 
culture. The genes code for a flexibility that allows the psychological 
sentiments of each person to respond to the level of war and the need for 
collective action. The zeitgeist and culture adapts to these sentiments in 
such a way that the society becomes well prepared to meet any external 
threats.
Fighting in war is hard and dangerous, and it would be more attractive 
for the individual not to fight and to let others do the fighting. This 
is the well-known collective action problem. Regality theory proposes 
1  Russell (1972)
2  Fog (1999, p. 91)
© 2017 Agner Fog, CC BY 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0128.02
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that the collective action problem can be overcome by installing a 
strong leader who can reward brave warriors and punish defectors. If 
the leader has enough support, then he3 can coerce everybody to fight 
and let everybody benefit from the collective fighting. If no leader has 
enough support, then nobody will fight and everybody will suffer from 
the resulting collective defeat. But in neither situation will an individual 
have to fight alone and let others free ride on the benefits he makes 
for his group. Everybody will benefit from having a strong leader in 
the case of war, and therefore everybody should desire a strong leader 
when facing collective danger. 
However, a strong leader is a disadvantage in the absence of war, 
because a tyrannical leader can exploit his followers and suppress 
their freedom. Therefore, it is advantageous to have a psychological 
plasticity that makes us prefer a strong leader in the event of war, but 
not in the event of peace. Regality theory proposes that such a plasticity 
has evolved by natural selection. People will prefer a strong leader and 
strict discipline when the probability of war or other collective danger is 
perceived to be high, while people will prefer an egalitarian society with 
more lax discipline when there is no collective danger.
If the majority of the members of a tribe or other group desire a 
strong leader and strict discipline, then, surely, this will be what they 
get. They will develop a hierarchical political structure and a very 
punitive system of discipline. It has been observed that this affects not 
only the political structure but many other aspects of the culture as well. 
People will develop a strong feeling of tribal or national identity, and 
their world view will be more polarized between friends and enemies. 
Tolerance of strangers and deviants will go down. Religion will be used 
as a means to keep people in line. And, perhaps most surprisingly, it 
has been observed that styles of art and music will gradually change so 
as to achieve psychological congruence with the sociopolitical structure 
and the world view.
Such a culture is called regal. We will use the word ‘regal’ to denote 
the psychological preferences of the individuals as well as the political 
structure and the culture and artifacts that are characteristic of a 
society with frequent wars, threats of war, or other collective dangers 
3  Chapter 2.5 explains why most war leaders in history were men.
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that require collective action. The opposite of regal is kungic. A kungic 
culture is peaceful, egalitarian, and tolerant. The characteristics of regal 
and kungic cultures will be explained in more detail in chapter 2.6.
The word ‘regal’ comes from the Latin regalis, which means ‘royal’. 
The word ‘kungic’ is coined after the !Kung bushmen, who have the 
most kungic culture found in the present study. War and other collective 
dangers (perceived or real) that push a society towards a more regal 
structure are called regalizing factors, and this process is called regalization. 
2.2. Evolutionary basis for regality theory
It has often been observed that people prefer a strong leader and a 
strong social group in times of crisis,4 and a number of scientists have 
independently suggested that this may be an adaptive response to 
the need for collective action.5 However, so far there has been little 
discussion of why this would be adaptive. 
The new theory proposed here relies on a psychological mechanism 
that makes people prefer a strong leader in times of intergroup conflict 
but not in times of peace and safety. Such a mechanism could be 
adaptive because it reduces or eliminates the free rider problem in 
collective fighting.
Several mechanisms have been proposed to explain the phenomenon 
called parochial altruism—the fact that people are willing to fight 
for their social group despite the fitness costs.6 The most important 
evolutionary explanations that have previously been proposed 
include kin selection,7 group selection,8 reciprocal selection,9 altruistic 
punishment,10 prestige,11 sexual selection (women are attracted to brave 
warriors),12 the opportunity of successful warriors to profit from the 
4  Hastings and Shaffer (2008), Jugert and Duckitt (2009), Ladd (2007)
5  Fog (1997), Navarrete, Kurzban, Fessler and Kirkpatrick (2004), van Vugt (2006), 
Hastings and Shaffer (2008), Kessler and Cohrs (2008), Glowacki and von Rueden 
(2015)
6  Bowles and Gintis (2011), Nowak (2006)
7  Thayer (2004)
8  Crofoot and Wrangham (2010), Lehmann and Feldman (2008), Thayer (2004)
9  Tooby and Cosmides (1988, 2010)
10  Boyd, Gintis, Bowles and Richerson (2003)
11  Glowacki and Wrangham (2013)
12  Van der Dennen (1995), Wrangham (1999), Glowacki and Wrangham (2013)
10 Warlike and Peaceful Societies
spoils and to mate with captured women from the losing group,13 and 
cultural group selection.14
It is a common characteristic of these proposed mechanisms that 
the effects are relatively weak, and perhaps too weak to compensate 
for the extremely high fitness costs of fighting.15 The fitness gain in the 
form of increased mating opportunities does not necessarily go to the 
people that have run the highest risks; and the mechanism of punishing 
defectors involves the additional collective action problem of who 
should bear the costs of being the punisher.16
The alternative explanation proposed here is a mechanism that may 
have been important in the evolution of collective fighting in prehistory. 
In the event of war, or imminent war, the members of a social group will 
show a psychological preference for having a strong leader and a social 
system with strict discipline. If enough members of the group express 
these preferences, then the group will soon develop a hierarchical 
political structure with a strong and powerful leader who can command 
group members to fight, devise a strategy, reward brave warriors, and 
punish defectors.
There is an important difference between being willing to fight for 
one’s social group and being willing to support a strong leader. The 
altruistic individual who volunteers to fight for his group will run a 
high personal risk, while all the non-fighting members of his group will 
benefit from his bravery. As the cost to the individual warrior is likely 
higher than his share of the group-level gain, this behavior will not be 
promoted by simple natural selection. But the strategy of supporting 
a strong leader is different. If only a few members of the group desire 
a strong leader, then there will be no strong leader and no collective 
fighting. If enough group members support a strong leader, then this 
leader will be able to dominate everybody, including the minority that 
do not support him, and command them to fight. Thus, it is possible for 
the group to suppress the fitness advantage of free riding by installing 
a strong leader.17 The individual who shows the preference for a strong 
13  Van der Dennen (1995), Chagnon (1990), Choi (2007), Glowacki and Wrangham 
(2015)
14  Henrich (2004)
15  Bradley (1999)
16  Glowacki and von Rueden (2015), Fowler (2005)
17  Glowacki and von Rueden (2015), Hooper, Kaplan and Boone (2010)
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leader will have to carry the costs of fighting, but he will also enjoy the 
benefits of everybody else fighting. Either everybody fights or nobody 
fights—there is no place for free riders. The group-level benefit of 
everybody fighting in a coordinated way could very well be sufficiently 
high to outweigh the individual fitness costs of fighting, even when the 
benefit is divided between all the group members. 
For promoting a complex task such as fighting, where extraordinary 
above-average skills are particularly valuable, we can expect that a system 
including both reward and punishment will be more efficient than a 
system based on punishment alone. A system based on punishment only 
would make warriors deliver the minimum performance necessary to 
avoid punishment; and defectors might even avoid punishment if they 
could convincingly fake illness. A punishment system could possibly 
evolve by other mechanisms if the costs of punishing are sufficiently 
low.18 However, we would expect rewards to be considerably more 
costly to deliver than punishments and require a higher payback to 
evolve.
We can imagine a Stone Age scenario like this: a tribal people 
experiences frequent conflicts with a neighbor tribe. This makes the 
people prefer a strong leader. Such a leader emerges, and his people trust 
and support him. He will lead the battles, devise strategies, and appoint 
people to various tasks. He may deliver rewards and punishments 
himself, or he may delegate this task to persons of intermediate rank. 
Rewards are particularly important for making it attractive for warriors 
to fight to the best of their abilities. Brave warriors may be rewarded 
with better food, weapons, protection, and other resources and—
perhaps most importantly—with prestige.19 A high prestige gives the 
brave warrior access to an attractive wife and perhaps multiple wives. 
This translates directly to biological fitness. Cowards who do not fight 
wholeheartedly will get a bad reputation and low prestige. This will 
give them a disadvantage in social exchanges and a disadvantage in 
the search for a mate. Such a system gives the best fighters the highest 
rewards and compensates for the risks of injury or death. The chances 
of winning a war against a neighbor tribe are increased as a result. The 
whole group is likely to support the leader, because everybody benefits 
18  Fowler (2005)
19  Glowacki and Wrangham (2013), von Rueden, Gurven and Kaplan (2010)
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from the increased chances of winning wars and there is no way of 
achieving the same result without a strong leader.
There is a trade-off between the benefit of being part of a strong and 
powerful political organization with a strong leader and the cost of 
repression within this organization.20 This balance is likely to be tipped 
in a peaceful environment where the need for collective protection 
is low. The individual would have no reason to submit to a strong 
leader in this case. On the contrary, the individual would most likely 
see his own fitness reduced by a despotic male leader who could take 
advantage of everybody else and even monopolize a large number of 
women.21 Therefore, the optimal strategy for the individual must be to 
have a flexible psychology, showing a preference for strong leadership 
and strict discipline when intergroup conflicts are frequent or expected, 
and a preference for an egalitarian social structure when intergroup 
conflicts are perceived to be unlikely.22 The group-level effect of this 
psychological flexibility is that the higher the level of intergroup conflict, 
the more the group will invest in a strong organization that strengthens 
its ability to organize collective fighting.
This is the basic hypothesis of regality theory. A high level of 
intergroup conflict or perceived collective danger will activate a 
psychological desire for a strong leader in the group members, and the 
group will develop a hierarchical structure as a result. The opposite 
situation is a group living under safe and peaceful conditions where 
there is no neighbor group to fight with. People in this situation will 
not accept a strong leader who limits their freedom. A leader who is too 
strict will lose the support of his people and will not be able to stay in 
power. The group will develop an egalitarian structure as a result.
To recapitulate, a regal group is a group that has developed strong 
organization, discipline, and fighting spirit as a response to conflict or 
danger. A kungic group is a group that has adjusted to a peaceful and 
safe environment. The words ‘regal’ and ‘kungic’ are also used for the 
individual psychological preferences that lead to strong or weak group 
organization, respectively.
20  Summers (2005)
21  Betzig (2008)
22  Gavrilets and Fortunato (2014)
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The regal and kungic forms of social organization can be considered 
the extremes of a continuous scale, where most societies are placed 
somewhere near the middle of this scale. We can call this the regality 
scale or the regal-kungic scale. The regality of a culture is determined 
by the frequency and severity of intergroup conflicts and other dangers 
that require collective action.
It might be problematic to assign numerical values to the regal-
kungic scale when dealing with very different cultures under different 
historical and environmental conditions. In many cases, it is more 
useful to use it as a relative scale. For example, we may prefer to say 
that culture A is more regal than culture B instead of saying that culture 
A is regal or culture B is kungic. Likewise, it can be useful to follow a 
particular culture over time and see if it is getting more regal or more 
kungic.
2.3. An evolutionarily stable strategy
Some scientists have proposed that altruistic punishment may promote 
cooperation in human societies. One or more altruists in the group will 
bear the costs of punishing defectors. A recently published model of 
evolutionary game theory indicates that conformity, cooperation, and 
altruistic punishment in a social group are likely to be stronger when 
the group is under threat than when it is not.23 
Other models in evolutionary game theory show that cooperative 
punishment is more stable than punishment administered by voluntary 
individuals, and it has been suggested that a punishing institution 
(policeman) might be evolutionarily stable in genetic or cultural 
evolution.24 Regality theory proposes that this policeman can be replaced 
by a leader (who may appoint a policeman). The leader is rewarded 
with the fitness advantage of being a leader, and he can punish anybody 
who does not support him. This overcomes the collective action problem 
in the theory of altruistic punishment. Regality theory also allows the 
leader to administer rewards, which would be hard to explain by other 
theories because of the high costs of rewarding.
23  Roos, Gelfand, Nau and Lun (2015)
24  Sigmund, de Silva, Traulsen and Hauert (2010), Jaffe and Zaballa (2010)
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We will now discuss whether a strong leader is necessary to make 
group members fight for their group in times of war. We will first 
consider the hypothetical situation where there is no strong leader but 
where group members are willing to fight for their group because they 
have a genetic predisposition to do so. Members who fight for their 
group are called altruists, while members who do not fight are called 
egoists. A group mostly of altruists is likely to win over a group mostly 
of egoists. This is called group selection. However, there is also selection 
within the group. The altruists have a considerable risk of dying in 
battle, while the egoists survive. Therefore, there will be more and more 
egoists for each generation. A group that contains only altruists and no 
egoists can thrive and grow, but it is vulnerable to invasion by egoists. 
In other words, group selection is not effective if there is more than a 
negligible rate of migration into the group.25 We know from history and 
anthropology that conquered groups are rarely completely massacred. 
Some members of a losing group, especially women and children, are 
likely to survive and join the winning group. If the losing group in our 
hypothetical scenario contains egoists, then some of these egoists will 
survive and enter the winning group and eventually outcompete the 
altruists.
We will now consider a second scenario where there is a strong 
leader supported by the majority of group members. This is the scenario 
that regality theory is based on. The leader can reward brave warriors 
and punish defectors who do not fight for their group. We will assume 
that these rewards and punishments are strong enough to compensate 
for the fitness costs of fighting. For example, we can assume that the 
bravest warriors get the most attractive wives and therefore have many 
children, while the cowards get less attractive wives and therefore have 
fewer children. Or perhaps the bravest warriors get multiple wives 
while the cowards get none. Most warriors will fight to the best of their 
abilities in order to get the most rewards. 
A group with a strong leader who can organize this kind of reward 
and punishment is likely to win battles against less organized groups 
that have no strong leader. The successful group will win more territory, 
which benefits all members of the group. Therefore, it will be attractive 
for all members of the group to support the leader.
25  West, el Mouden and Gardner (2011)
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Our first scenario (group selection) was not stable because it was 
vulnerable to invasion by egoists. We will now discuss whether the 
second scenario (regality) is vulnerable to invasion by individuals who 
do not support the strong leader. If the majority of group members 
support the leader, then the minority that do not support the leader 
will be forced to fight anyway, and they will also be punished for not 
supporting the leader. History is full of examples of tyrannical leaders 
who punish anybody who does not support them. Therefore, there is 
no fitness advantage to not supporting the leader. On the contrary, 
there is likely severe persecution. If the non-supporters form a majority 
strong enough to overthrow the strong leader and put a weak leader in 
his place, then the whole group will be weakened and be less likely to 
win wars. This benefits neither the supporters nor the non-supporters. 
The conclusion must be that a group with a strong leader in wartime is 
not vulnerable to invasion by non-supporters. Therefore, regality is an 
evolutionarily stable strategy in a conflict-prone environment.
The preference for a strong leader is not activated in a permanently 
peaceful and safe environment, according to regality theory. The 
genotype that is not activated in phenotype is not subject to selection 
but only to random genetic drift under these conditions.
The prediction from regality theory is that people will show regal 
psychological reactions in the face of any collective danger that affects 
them directly and that requires collective efforts to overcome. Due to the 
weakness of group selection, we will expect the regal reaction of people 
to be much weaker in the case of dangers that affect only unrelated 
group members.
2.4. The behavior of the leader
So far we have discussed which strategy is most fit for ordinary group 
members. Now we will look at the role of the leader and discuss how 
we can expect the leader to act from a selfish fitness-maximizing point 
of view. It is no surprise that people are willing to be leaders. There is 
a large fitness advantage to being a leader or having a high position in 
the hierarchy of a successful group.26 A powerful leader of a hierarchical 
26  Summers (2005), Betzig (2008)
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organization is typically able to take advantage of everybody else to 
benefit himself and his family.27 Many of the most powerful leaders in 
history have assembled enormous wealth and large numbers of wives or 
concubines. Of course, everything must have been on a smaller scale in 
prehistory, but even among chimpanzees and other social animals there 
is a large advantage to being the alpha male.28
There are also costs to being a leader. The leader may have to take a 
frontline role in battles, and there is a real risk of being killed by an enemy 
group, by a rival for the leadership position, or by rebels who think 
that the leader is too despotic. A leader can be expected to make higher 
sacrifices or take higher risks in intergroup conflicts than low-ranking 
members because he has more at stake.29 Nevertheless, we can assume 
that the fitness benefits of being a leader are much higher than the costs.
Based on this, we can expect the fitness-maximizing strategies of 
leaders to be very different from the strategies of followers. A typical 
survival strategy for a low-ranking individual could involve being an 
agreeable person, making friendships and alliances, and helping friends 
in need in the hope that they will later return the favor.30 In contrast, we 
can expect the optimal strategy for a leader to involve doing everything 
to consolidate and increase his power, to weaken rivals for the position, 
to amass resources and wealth for himself and his family, and to have 
as many wives and concubines as he can get away with. The only thing 
that limits his despotism is the risk of losing the support of his followers. 
A person of intermediate rank or a person with chances of becoming a 
leader will be likely to use any strategy that can enhance his rank.
Psychological research confirms that people of high rank behave 
differently from people of low rank. Wealthy and high-ranking people 
of both sexes behave more egoistically and are more likely to cheat or 
behave unethically than other people.31 They tend to feel entitled to 
their position.32 They tend to take side with other high-ranking people 
27  Anderson and Willer (2014), Padilla, Hogan and Kaiser (2007)
28  Boesch, Kohou, Néné and Vigilant (2006)
29  Gavrilets and Fortunato (2014), Johnson (2015)
30  Kiyonari, Tanida and Yamagishi (2000)
31  Piff et al. (2012), Trautmann, van de Kuilen and Zeckhauser (2013), Bendahan, 
Zehnder, Pralong and Antonakis (2014), Gino and Pierce (2009)
32  Piff (2014)
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in conflicts.33 They have a higher tendency to sexual infidelity,34 they 
are more self-sufficient,35 and they have less empathy for other people.36 
The reduced empathy is not entirely bad, however. It enables the leader 
to make more rational decisions that give higher weight to collective 
interests than to the interests of single individuals.37
A leader can exploit his followers to enrich himself, the more so 
the more power he has. The power of the leader is weakened if the 
followers can easily leave the group and join another group with a more 
agreeable leader. This explains why the most despotic leaders in history 
have appeared in large agrarian societies from which it was difficult for 
peasants to escape.38
The ability of a leader to exploit his followers is higher the more regal 
his group is. We can therefore expect leaders to try to increase the regality 
of their group by exaggerating dangers to the group and by fighting 
unnecessary wars.39 Statistical studies of wars through history show such 
a strong connection between empires and war that we may assume that 
emperors need to fight wars to maintain their empires.40 Powerful leaders 
may even fabricate enemies or fight fictitious dangers to maintain and 
consolidate their power. For example, the Inquisition tried to uphold the 
threatened monopoly of power of the Catholic Church in the Renaissance 
through the persecution of heretics and witches.41 More examples of such 
fabricated dangers are discussed in chapter 6.
2.5. Why are most warriors and chiefs men?
The reader may have noticed that I am referring to warriors and leaders 
as ‘he’. There is a reason for this. Throughout history, most warriors 
have been men and most leaders of warring societies have been men. 
Obviously, culture and tradition plays a role here, but there is more to 
33  Lammers and Yang (2012)
34  Lammers et al. (2011)
35  Vohs, Mead and Goode (Goode 2006)
36  Kraus et al. (2012), Haslam and Loughnan (2014)
37  Côté, Piff and Willer (2013)
38  Price and van Vugt (2014)
39  Price and van Vugt (2015)
40  Eckhardt (1992, p. 184)
41  Ben-Yehuda (1980)
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it than that. A growing amount of research indicates that the traditional 
division of labor between the sexes has biological roots. Many of the 
differences between men and women are connected with the Darwinian 
pursuit of reproductive success. The reproductive success of a man is 
limited mainly by his access to mating with women. There is practically 
no limit to how many children a man can sire if he can get enough 
women to cooperate. The situation for women is very different. The 
number of children that a woman can give birth to is limited mainly 
by her physiology and energy uptake, while the number of sexual 
partners plays only a minor role. Therefore, the reproductive strategies 
of men and women are very different and this leads to many conflicts 
of interest.42
Through most of our evolutionary history, our ancestors lived 
as hunters and gatherers, where more men than women hunted big 
animals, and where more women than men gathered fruits and roots 
and hunted small animals. Investigations of hunter-gatherer societies 
have found that the hunting of big game is not the most efficient way of 
getting food. There may be several reasons why men hunt, but showing 
off appears to be among the most important ones. This can be explained 
by the so-called costly signaling theory. A successful hunt proves that a 
man is strong and smart and therefore an attractive mating partner. 
Successful hunters have higher prestige and status than other men, and 
this translates into reproductive success.43 Anthropologists have found 
that good hunters had higher prestige and more children than other 
men in all of the societies investigated.44 A similar strategy for women 
would probably not increase their reproductive success.
There are similar reasons why men go to war. In the Stone Age, 
fighting and hunting were related activities that required some of the 
same skills and tools.45 Brave warriors have high prestige, and there 
is reason to believe that this gives them a reproductive advantage.46 
The opportunity for capturing women from an enemy group further 
contributes to the fitness of warriors.47 On the other hand, there are 
42  Geary (2010), Chapman (2015)
43  Von Rueden and Jaeggi (2016)
44  Bird, R. (1999), Smith, E. (2004)
45  LeBlanc (2014)
46  Lehmann and Feldman (2008)
47  Van der Dennen (1995, p. 328)
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examples where any advantage to the individual warrior is outweighed 
by the increased mortality.48 If some male warriors die, then there will 
be an excess of women in the group, and this will lead to an increased 
reproductive fitness of the surviving men if polygamy is allowed. The 
total number of children produced by the group will be almost the same 
if a few men are lost. In other words, there is a fitness loss to the unlucky 
warriors who die but a fitness gain to the survivors, so the average 
fitness of the men in the group is almost unaffected by the deaths of a 
few warriors. If all men in a group fight and the deaths are randomly 
and unpredictably distributed among them, then natural selection can 
still favor fighting, because the risk of dying is offset by the chance of 
getting an extra wife if you survive. This would certainly not be the 
case if women were warriors. A woman dying is a lost opportunity 
for reproduction for the whole group, and the fitness of the surviving 
women would not be increased much by polyandry.49
Men are physically stronger than women on average, and the 
differences between the sexes are particularly marked in skills that are 
relevant to hunting and fighting, such as throwing distance. It has been 
suggested that such differences are the result of evolutionary forces that 
have favored these skills in men more than in women.50
It was argued above that social rewards are necessary for making 
people fight for their group. Men are more sensitive than women to 
social rewards because they have more potential for gaining fitness.51 
We can therefore assume that it has been easier to persuade men than 
women to fight throughout our evolutionary history. Psychological 
experiments confirm that men are more willing than women to make 
sacrifices for their group in situations of intergroup conflict, and this 
confirms the so-called male warrior hypothesis.52 Of course, there are 
also practical reasons behind the tradition that war is the domain of 
men rather than women. Women in hunter-gatherer societies often 
breastfeed their babies for several years, and it would be unwise to carry 
an unweaned baby to the battlefield.
48  Beckerman et al. (2009)
49  Van der Dennen (1995, p. 325)
50  Geary (2010, p. 290)
51  Geary (2010)
52  Van Vugt, de Cremer and Janssen (2007), McDonald, Navarrete and van Vugt 
(2012)
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In wartime, it seems logical to choose an experienced warrior as 
leader, and this would normally mean a man. But even in peaceful 
societies we can observe that most leaders are men. There is a large 
fitness advantage to having high status, and this advantage is higher for 
men than for women because the reproductive success of men is more 
variable.53 We can therefore assume that men are willing to work hard 
and make large sacrifices in order to increase their social status, and 
more so than women. This is confirmed by anthropological evidence. 
Almost all known societies have more male than female leaders.54 
The advantage of being a leader is higher in regal than in kungic 
societies. We can therefore predict that regal cultures will be more male-
dominated than kungic cultures. Psychological studies have found that 
people prefer a masculine leader in times of intergroup conflict, while 
they prefer a feminine leader in situations of within-group competition. 
This confirms the traditional roles of men as war leaders and women as 
peace brokers.55
Cultural theorists have often mentioned examples of cultures with 
unusual sex roles to prove their theory that sex roles and male dominance 
are culturally determined. Sociologist Steven Goldberg investigated 
these examples by studying the original ethnographic sources, and 
he found that in all of these cases there are more men than women in 
influential positions. This supports the theory that men are willing to 
sacrifice more to increase their status than women are.56 However, it 
would be foolish to deny the huge cultural differences in the level of 
male dominance. Proponents of cultural explanations have emphasized 
cultural differences, while proponents of biological explanations 
have ignored them. Here, regality theory may actually contribute to 
resolving this long-standing disagreement. Regal societies are generally 
more male-dominated than kungic societies, as the examples in chapter 
7 show. We can therefore confirm that there are some cultures with high 
male domination and other cultures with more equality between the 
sexes, and that these cultural differences can be explained to a large 
53  Von Rueden, Gurven and Kaplan (2010), von Rueden and Jaeggi (2016)
54  Goldberg (1993)
55  Van Vugt and Spisak (2008), Spisak and Dekker (2012)
56  Goldberg (1993, chapter 2)
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extent by differences in the level of war or collective danger, according 
to regality theory.
While women are rarely engaged in direct combat, they may 
contribute to warfare by other means. The outcome of a war is important 
for the entire group, women as well as men. We can therefore expect 
women as well as men to support a strong leader when this is necessary 
for success in war. Regality theory applies to women and men alike, 
and we can expect everybody to desire a strong leader in times of war 
or collective danger.
2.6. Cultural effects of regal and kungic tendencies
Studies have revealed many interesting differences between warlike and 
peaceful cultures. Some of these differences are obvious, others are quite 
surprising. Here we will discuss some of the cultural tendencies that are 
characteristic of regal and kungic cultures, respectively, according to 
regality theory.57
When most or all members of a society desire a strong leader, it 
is hardly surprising that they tend to build a hierarchical political 
system with a powerful leader at the top. We can also predict that 
they will develop a strict system of discipline and punishment. These 
developments may be due to psychological preferences, cultural 
selection, or rational decision making, and most likely a combination 
of all three.
Military success requires a strong morale and group spirit or fighting 
spirit. Regal societies tend to develop a strong feeling of group identity 
and a world view of friends versus enemies, while some of the most 
kungic cultures do not even have a name for their own social group. 
Likewise, regal societies tend to be quite xenophobic and intolerant of 
all kinds of deviants, while kungic groups are very tolerant.
The ideology, philosophy, and religion of regal societies are typically 
used as tools for strengthening the morale and group spirit. For example, 
the ideology of a regal society may state that individuals exist for the 
benefit of the society, while kungic societies tend to have the opposite 
ideology, namely that the society exists for the benefit of the individuals. 
57  Fog (1999, p. 101)
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Political and religious leaders in regal societies often support each 
other to strengthen their power if they are not in fact the same person. 
Emperors often claim to have divine status. Religion is often used as 
a means to discipline people, for example by threatening supernatural 
punishment or promising rewards after death.58 The religious world of 
supernatural beings typically reflects or emphasizes important aspects 
of the social structure of the mundane world.59
Regal societies typically also have strict discipline in the area of 
sexuality. Strict sexual morals may force young people to marry early 
and have many children since alternative (non-reproductive) outlets 
for their sexual drive are prohibited.60 The strict sexual morals do not, 
however, prevent high-ranking men from having multiple wives or 
concubines. Kungic societies typically have more permissive sexual 
morals and lower birth rates.
A possible consequence of the regal ideology that individuals exist 
for the benefit of the society is that the rate of suicide is low. People 
do not have the right to take their own lives. This, of course, does not 
preclude suicide for culturally prescribed reasons, such as shame or self-
sacrifice in battle. We can expect kungic societies to have a higher rate 
of the kind of suicide that Émile Durkheim has called ‘anomic suicide’.61
Interestingly, the differences between regal and kungic cultures in 
social structure and worldview are also reflected in art, fiction, music, 
architecture, and other forms of art. People tend to prefer psychological 
congruence between the different aspects of their culture, and this also 
applies to artistic taste. Various forms of art are efficient means for 
communicating ideological values and cultural unity.62 Musical style, 
in particular, has been observed to correlate with social structure, 
lifestyle, personality, and political preferences.63 It cannot be ruled 
out, though, that some of the observed correlations are due to cultural 
diffusion.64
58  Watts et al. (2015), McNamara, Norenzayan and Henrich (2014)
59  Moor, Ultee and Need (2007)
60  Garcia and Kruger (2010), van Ussel (1970)
61  Durkheim (1897)
62  Sütterlin (1998)
63  Lomax (1968), Delsing, ter Bogt, Engels and Meeus (2008), North and Hargreaves 
(2007), Zweigenhaft (2008)
64  Erickson (1976)
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Regal cultures tend to produce pictorial art that is highly perfectionist 
and embellished with endless repetition of meticulous ornamentation 
and thus reflects the glory of gods or kings. Regal fiction often glorifies 
gods or kings with clear distinctions between good and evil, friends 
and enemies. The architecture of regal societies is often particularly 
conspicuous: large and pompous palaces and religious buildings 
with luxurious ornamentation and oversized gates that make visitors 
feel humble (see figure 1). Regal music is also highly embellished and 
sometimes pompous.
Figure 1. Example of regal architecture. Cologne Cathedral  
 (Kölner Dom). Built 1248–1880. Photo by Tobi 87, 2009.65
65 CC BY 3.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:K%C3%B6lner_Dom.jpg
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The architecture, art, and music of kungic cultures is less rule-bound and 
more individualistic, with appreciation of fantasy and innovativeness 
and a broad range of themes (see figure 2).
Figure 2. Example of kungic architecture. Residential buildings, Bispebjerg 
Bakke, Copenhagen. Built 2004–2007. Photo by Agner Fog, 2017. 
There is a systematic asymmetry in the human cultural heritage. Regal 
societies are sometimes quite intolerant of art that is not congruent with 
their culture, and they may even destroy art from previous more kungic 
periods. For example, the government in Nazi Germany systematically 
destroyed what they called ‘degenerate art’66 and the Taliban in 
Afghanistan destroyed the great Buddha statues in Bamiyan.67 Kungic 
cultures (including our own modern culture) on the other hand, are very 
tolerant and even admiring of foreign art and often go to great lengths 
to preserve the magnificent art and architecture of previous more regal 
times. 
It appears that there was a similar difference between regal and 
kungic art in prehistoric times. Kungic cultures have produced 
smaller artifacts of perishable materials, while regal cultures have 
typically produced large and impressive artifacts of durable materials 
and perhaps destroyed any remaining artifacts of previous kungic 
times. This effect most likely causes a systematic sampling bias in the 
archaeological record.68
66  Goggin (1991)
67  Francioni and Lenzerini (2006)
68  Fog (2006)
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The cultural characteristics that are typical for regal and kungic 
societies are listed in table 1. It has been observed that societies can 
reshape these characteristics, not only as a response to changing threats 
of war but also as a response to other dangers that threaten the social 
group as a whole, such as economic crisis, famine, natural disasters,69 
and even imaginary dangers such as witches and devils.70 It is therefore 
possible that the observed psychological response is a general mechanism 
of adaptation to the level of danger that threatens the social group as a 
whole, or perhaps even to any problem that requires collective effort 
to solve.71 The effects of dangers to the individual may be different, as 
discussed in chapter 3.3.
Regal societies Kungic societies
A hierarchical political system with a 
strong leader A flat and egalitarian political system
Strong feelings of national or tribal 
identity High individualism
Strict discipline and punishment of 
deviants
Lax discipline and high tolerance of 
deviants
Xenophobia Tolerance of foreigners
The world is seen as full of dangers 
and enemies
The world is seen as peaceful and safe 
with little or no distinction between 
us and them
Belief that individuals exist for the 
benefit of society
Belief that society exists for the 
benefit of individuals
Strict religion Religion has little or no disciplining power
Strict sexual morals High sexual freedom
High birth rate Low birth rate
Low parental investment, i.e. short 
childhood and low education Long childhood and education
Low suicide rate (except for culturally 
prescribed reasons) High rate of anomic suicide
Art and music is perfectionist, highly 
embellished, and follows specific 
schemes
Art and music express individual 
fantasy with appreciation of  
individuality and innovativeness
Table 1. Regal and kungic cultural indicators.
69  Ember and Ember (1992), Kirch (1984)
70  Ben-Yehuda (1990, p. 123)
71  Fog (1999)

3. Contributions from Other 
Theories
3.1. Influence of the environment: Contributions 
from ecological theory
In ecology and niche theory, the competitive exclusion principle says that 
complete competitors cannot coexist indefinitely.1 While this principle 
has mostly been applied to the areas of ecology and economics, other 
aspects of niche theory have been successfully applied to eco-cultural 
specialization.2 We cannot expect two social groups in close proximity 
to live in peace if they are adapted to the same environment and depend 
on the same resources. The two competing groups may merge, separate, 
differentiate, or fight. But they may not coexist indefinitely unless 
something prevents them from fighting, such as geographic barriers, 
technical difficulties, or third party intervention.
The competitive exclusion principle applies to humans as well as to 
animals with territorial groups. It has been observed that chimpanzees 
often attack and kill members of neighbor groups and gradually steal 
their territory.3 The intensity of intergroup conflict among chimpanzees 
increases with the population density and the number of males.4 The 
1  Hardin (1960)
2  Banks et al. (2006), Maffi (2005)
3  Boesch (2010)
4  Wilson et al. (2014)
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closely related species, the bonobo, is much more peaceful, although it 
is very similar to the chimpanzee in other respects. The reason why the 
chimpanzee is violent while the bonobo is peaceful may be that there 
is a patchy distribution of food north of the Congo River, where the 
chimpanzees live, but a more scattered distribution south of this river, 
where the bonobos live. A concentration of food or other resources in 
small patches leads to contest competition, where the strongest individuals 
get the most. A more scattered distribution of food leads to scramble 
competition, where the individual that finds a piece of food first will get 
it. There is no reason to fight over access to food in an environment of 
scramble competition.5
Chimpanzees and bonobos are our closest relatives among the 
animals. Humans are equally closely related to both species because 
the evolutionary split between chimpanzees and bonobos occurred 
later than the split between humans and the great apes. This has led 
many scientists to speculate whether human nature is violent like the 
chimpanzee or peaceful like the bonobo.6
Anthropologists have turned to ethnographic and archaeological 
evidence in order to find out whether warfare was common among early 
humans, but the evidence is elusive. The few hunter-gatherer groups 
that have survived long enough to be studied by anthropologists live in 
marginal areas where the population density is too low for large-scale 
warfare and where there are no defendable resources to fight over.7 The 
victims of warfare among prehistoric nomadic hunters and gatherers 
were unlikely to be buried, so archaeological traces of injured skeletons 
may be hard to find.8
Some scientists have claimed that humans are peaceful by nature 
and that the limited evidence of prehistoric violence can be explained as 
small-scale feuds and raids.9 Others claim that lethal intergroup violence 
has been common throughout the evolutionary history of humans.10
5  White (2013)
6  Wrangham (2012)
7  Gat (2006, p. 14)
8  LeBlanc (2014), Lahr et al. (2016)
9  Fry (2009), Ellingson (2001)
10  Keeley (1996), Guilaine and Zammit (2008), Allen and Jones (2014)
 293. Contributions from Other Theories
Figure 3. Prehistoric cave painting showing warfare. Bhimbetka, India. 
Photo by Nikhil2789, 2008.11
An increasing amount of evidence indicates that there might have been 
violent intergroup fighting throughout human prehistory.12 A study of 
nomadic Australian aborigines has found that the level of violence was 
independent of the population density,13 while studies in many other 
areas have found that the level of violence depends on ecological and 
environmental factors such as the concentration and defendability of 
resources.14 Mass killings took place mainly in sedentary cultures and 
most markedly in connection with agriculture or otherwise defendable 
resources.15 Recent archaeological findings show evidence of mass 
killing among hunter-gatherers near a fertile lakeshore in the late 
Pleistocene or early Holocene.16
11 CC BY-SA 3.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Cave_Painting-_War_Bhi 
mbetika_caves.jpg
12  Lahr (2016), Keeley (1996), Guilaine and Zammit (2008), Allen and Jones (2014), Gat 
(2015)
13  Gat (2015)
14  Boone (1992), Thorpe (2003)
15  Boone (1992), Martin and Frayer (1997, p. 334)
16  Lahr (2016)
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Nomadic hunter-gatherers would flee more often than fight, and 
thus rarely die in a battlefield but more likely die from malnutrition 
and diseases after fleeing to an inferior territory. Systematic studies 
of nomadic hunter-gatherer groups show that intergroup violence is 
common. A review of published examples of peaceful hunter-gatherer 
groups finds that most of these cases can be explained by their isolation, 
pacification, or being surrounded by cultures with a different ecology. 
Typically, the peaceful hunter-gatherer groups were surrounded by 
agricultural societies whom they would never attack.17 This confirms the 
competitive exclusion principle: Hunter–gatherer groups surrounded 
by other hunter-gatherers will fight, at least occasionally, while hunter-
gatherer groups living in their own niche surrounded by groups with a 
different means of subsistence can exist peacefully. While the peaceful 
hunter-gatherer societies had little or no intergroup violence, they 
had plenty of interpersonal violence.18 The distinction between group-
internal and external violence is important here.
We can now answer the long-debated question of whether humans 
are violent or peaceful by nature: it depends on the environment. A 
sedentary culture concentrated around defendable resources invites 
conflict, while a nomadic lifestyle in an environment of sparse resources 
leads to scramble competition rather than fighting. Regality theory 
posits that humans have a flexible psychology that allows fast adaption 
to a peaceful or warlike environment and culture.
It may be possible to roughly predict the degree of intergroup 
conflict for a particular culture if we study the ecology, mode of 
subsistence, available technology, and geography. We will expect 
conflicts to be unlikely for a social group that has adapted to its own 
specialized niche, but likely for a group that depends on the same niche 
as a nearby neighbor group. Conflicts can be impeded if traveling is 
difficult because of geographic barriers or if it is technically difficult to 
collect and transport sufficient food and water for supporting a troop of 
warriors.
If food is sparse, and consequently the population density is low, 
then it will be difficult to assemble a sufficiently large group of warriors 
to attack an enemy, the warriors will have a long way to travel, and it 
17  Wrangham and Glowacki (2012)
18  Kelly (2000)
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will be difficult to supply enough food for them. Some people find it 
counterintuitive that low food supply should lead to peace. However, 
we have to distinguish between a low but stable food supply and a 
fluctuating food supply. If the food supply is permanently low but 
stable, then the population density will necessarily be low. Imagine a 
landscape where food is sparsely distributed and people live in small 
villages or camps far from each other. How would it be possible to 
assemble enough warriors from allied neighbor groups to attack an 
enemy, travel together to the distant enemy territory, and provide and 
transport enough food and other necessities for the traveling troops? 
The logistic problems simply make large-scale war impossible in the 
absence of technological means for food preservation and transport. 
In any case, there would be little reason for warfare among nomadic 
peoples in sparsely populated areas, because they would have few 
possessions worth plundering and territories would be too large to 
defend.19
However, if food is plentiful or concentrated in rich and fertile 
patches, then the population density will soon become high, geographical 
distances between enemy groups are likely to be shorter, and it will 
be easier to organize larger political groups. If, furthermore, the food 
supply is fluctuating and unpredictable, then there will be occasional 
periods of famine where contest competition prevails and people fight 
over the insufficient supply of food. Anthropologists and archaeologists 
have found evidence of higher levels of conflict connected with 
settlements in fertile areas such as river valleys. Along with the higher 
levels of conflict came also alliance formation, peacemaking efforts, and 
exchange of prestige goods.20
In conclusion, we predict that the level of intergroup conflict will be 
low in areas where food is sparse or where mountains, dense vegetation, 
aridity, or other environmental factors make traveling difficult. On 
the other hand, we can expect frequent wars where food production 
is efficient and concentrated in defendable patches, and where there 
are efficient means of traveling and food preservation. It has been 
observed that efficient food production and food storage is connected 
19  Roscoe (2014), Fry and Söderberg (2013)
20  Dye (2013)
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with conformity,21 which we may interpret as a sign of regality. The 
predictability of the food supply is also important. Unpredictable 
famine and natural disasters are factors likely to cause war.22
The anthropologist Kirk Endicott has suggested that it might be 
possible to predict whether a population is violent or peaceful based 
on the environment. As an example, he describes the Moriori of the 
Chatham Islands near New Zealand, who changed from violent to 
peaceful after living a few hundred years in isolation.23 We will test the 
feasibility of this kind of prediction in chapters 7 and 8.
3.2. Nature or nurture: Evolution of sociality
Collaboration between biologists, archaeologists, and anthropologists 
has led to new insights into human social behavior. The modern human 
species has evolved a large brain in parallel with a more complex social 
organization. The brain size of our ancestors has tripled over a period 
of two million years. It is generally believed that the increased brain 
capacity has been necessary for dealing with more complex social 
structures, for advanced language, and for developing culture.24
Culture is information that is transmitted from person to person 
through teaching, observation, and imitation. Culture can evolve just 
like genes evolve, but cultural evolution is much more efficient than 
genetic evolution because it can involve goal-directed innovation and 
intelligent problem-solving. New inventions can also be transmitted 
from any person to any other person, unlike genes, which are transmitted 
only from parent to child.25 While many animals are able to learn from 
conspecifics, the human capacity for culture is far more complex than that 
of any animal. The huge advantage that cultural evolution gives has 
only been possible through the evolution of a large and efficient brain.26
Neuroscientists have found that specific regions of the human 
brain are involved in various aspects of social behavior and cognition, 
such as empathy, cooperation, identification with an arbitrary group, 
21  Berry (1967)
22  Ember and Ember (1992)
23  Endicott (2013)
24  Dunbar, Gamble and Gowlett (2010)
25  Richerson and Boyd (2008, p. 60), Fog (1999, p. 52)
26  Richerson and Boyd (2008, p. 7)
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distinction between in-group and out-group, in-group favoritism, 
group competition, and recognition of social status.27 A hormone 
and neurotransmitter called oxytocin, which is involved in many 
aspects of social behavior in animals and humans, has been found to 
increase in-group favoritism in humans.28 These findings support the 
theory that social organization, hierarchy, and intergroup conflict are 
important factors that have influenced human evolution and shaped the 
functioning of our brains. They also show that culture plays an important 
role, because it is demonstrated that humans are able to identify easily 
with an arbitrary group of people of mixed races.29
Several studies have confirmed that test persons show more 
cooperation and in-group favoritism when given oxytocin.30 
Interestingly, the effects of oxytocin are different for men and women. 
The hormone increases the perception of competition in men and the 
perception of kinship in women. This finding throws new light on the 
male warrior hypothesis, according to which men are more adapted for 
fighting and competition than women are.31
However, oxytocin is not unambiguously connected with regality, 
because it does not increase punitiveness.32 It would be naive to think 
that we can find a single biological signal for regality. What the new 
findings of neuroscience tell us, however, is that behaviors that are 
relevant for regality theory, such as group identification, ethnocentrism, 
and intergroup conflict, can be influenced by biological signals without 
the persons being conscious of any such influence. We can therefore reject 
the theory that violent conflict is caused solely by culture and rational 
decision-making.33 While biological processes have a strong influence on 
social behavior, the opposite is also true. There is plenty of evidence that 
social processes and cultural differences can influence the human brain 
and hormonal processes.34 The role of culture in the shaping of regal 
psychological reactions is further discussed in chapter 4.1.
27  Cikara and van Bavel (2014)
28  De Dreu et al. (2011)
29  Cikara and van Bavel (2014)
30  De Dreu (2012), Sheng et al. (2013), Stallen et al. (2012)
31  Fischer-Shofty, Levkovitz and Shamay-Tsoory (2013)
32  Krueger et al. (2013)
33  Durrant (2011)
34  Kim and Sasaki (2014)
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3.3. Fertility: Contributions from life history theory
The regal versus kungic culture dimension has an interesting connection 
with the r versus K strategy dimension in evolutionary ecology, which 
applies to both animals and humans. An r-strategy means that individuals 
start early to reproduce, have many children, and care little for each 
child. A K-strategy means a high age at first reproduction, few children, 
and a high investment in the care and upbringing of each child. The r 
versus K strategy parameter (also called ‘fast’ versus ‘slow’ strategy) is 
a simplification of a more complex set of parameters in biological life 
history theory, but this simplification will be sufficient for the current 
purpose.35
Humans have a typical K-strategy compared with most animals.36 
This strategy is not completely fixed, however. Recent research 
has shown that there is some room for individual differences and 
adjustment to the environment. Several studies have found that humans 
choose a more r-like strategy when they live in an environment where 
the mortality and morbidity of adults is high. A more K-like strategy 
is chosen where the mortality is low, where resources are predictable 
and defendable, and where the population density is near the carrying 
capacity of the environment.37 Economic factors and education also 
influence the strategy.38
While the r versus K life history theory sees reproductive strategy 
from the point of view of the individual, the regal versus kungic culture 
theory is more concerned with a social-level perspective. The optimal 
strategy from the perspective of the social group in times of war is 
to produce many children and to raise them as quickly as possible to 
become fierce warriors. In times of peace, the optimal strategy from 
the group’s perspective is to produce few children in order to avoid 
overexploitation of the environment and ecological collapse. Group 
selection theory has not provided a satisfactory explanation of why 
35  Stearns (1992, p. 207)
36  Mueller (1997)
37  Belsky, Schlomer and Ellis (2012), Ellis, Figueredo, Brumbach and Schlomer (2009), 
Griskevicius, Delton, Robertson and Tybur (2011), Low (1990), McAllister, Pepper, 
Virgo and Coall (2016)
38  Shenk (2009)
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reproduction is limited, but life history theory seems to provide at least 
part of the explanation.
In times of war, mortality is high and individuals will choose an r-like 
strategy. In times of peace and stability, we can expect the population 
density to match the carrying capacity of the environment, and we can 
expect to see a K-like strategy. The interesting observation is that there 
is a fairly good agreement between the interests of the group according 
to regality theory and the interests of the individual according to the 
r/K life history theory. There is some degree of synergy between the 
two mechanisms and we will expect a positive correlation between 
the regal/kungic culture dimension and the r/K life history strategy 
dimension. The names regal and kungic were in fact chosen to reflect 
the resemblance with r/K life history theory, although the analogy 
should not be taken too far.
There is one important difference between the predictions of the two 
theories. Regality theory predicts that fertility will go up as a response to 
collective danger that requires collective action, while the r/K life history 
theory predicts that fertility will go up as a response to any danger, 
including dangers that affect only the individual.
We will return to the connection between regality theory and r/K 
theory in chapter 4.1.
3.4. Contributions from political demography
Political developments, including war and peace, depend on 
demographic factors. Many momentous historical events are related 
to the so-called demographic transition, which is illustrated in figure 4. 
Throughout most of human history, the birth rate and death rate have 
been almost equally high, so that the total population was constant or 
growing only slowly. At a certain time in history, the death rate began 
to decline due to improvements in sanitation, hygiene, medicine, 
nutrition, and living conditions. The higher life expectancy gave parents 
confidence that they did not need so many children, and after several 
decades the birth rate began to decrease as well. In Europe, the birth rate 
began to fall rapidly in the 1960s. In the 1990s, the birth rate had fallen 
to the same level as the death rate, and population growth stagnated 
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in Europe.39 This pattern of demographic transition has since been 
repeated in other parts of the world, including Asia and the Americas, 
and we are now beginning to see a demographic transition in Africa as 
well. We can see in figure 5 that the population size has reached a peak 
in Europe and that the growth rate is tapering off in Asia, America, and 
Oceania. The growth rate has hardly begun to decrease in Africa.40
The fact that the death rate begins to fall first while the birth rate 
decreases only several decades later has the consequence that we see 
a very rapid population growth in the intermediate period, where the 
death rate is low and the birth rate is still high.41
Figure 4. Demographic transition. By Max Roser, 2016.42
The demographic transition can be interpreted as a shift in reproductive 
strategy from r-strategy to K-strategy, relatively speaking, as explained 
in chapter 3.3. It is necessary to have many children as long as the death 
rate is high. As the death rate falls and improvements in living conditions 
make it possible to feed more people, the population grows until the new 
carrying capacity has been reached. Rapid population growth does not 
39  Goldstone (2012)
40  Green (2012)
41  Goldstone (2012)
42 CC BY-SA 4.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Demographic-Transition 
OWID.png
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necessarily lead to violent conflicts,43 but the new situation with a larger 
population and growing urbanization makes life more competitive. 
The optimal strategy for parents in this new crowded environment is 
to have fewer children and to invest more in the education of these few 
children—in other words, a more K-like strategy. When these children 
grow up, they have to spend their most fertile years competing for social 
positions rather than raising large families.44
Figure 5. World population by year. Millions, logarithmic scale.  
By Agner Fog, 2017. Data from UN.45
43  Urdal (2005)
44  Heinsohn (2003, p. 46)
45  United Nations Data Retrieval System. ‘World Population Prospects: The 2015 
Revision’, http://data.un.org/
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A period of rapid population growth leaves a cohort of people that 
is much more numerous than the parent generation. The bulge in the 
population pyramid that is seen when a large cohort reaches maturity 
is called a youth bulge. The young people in a youth bulge are likely to 
have problems finding a suitable social position. If tradition dictates that 
the family inheritance goes to the oldest son, then the subsequent sons 
are likely to feel superfluous and they will have to fight hard to get a 
position that matches their expectations. This causes political instability. 
Disinherited, jobless, unmarried young men are often willing to take 
high risks in their attempts to find their place in life because they have 
nothing to lose.46 Such youth bulges of frustrated young men have fueled 
many violent conflicts in history. In fact, violent conflicts can hardly be 
fought without a surplus of venturesome young men.47
The European population could not have colonized half the world 
if they had not had a surplus of young men. In fact, most of the major 
wars, conquests, and revolutions in European history happened after 
periods of rapid population growth.48
When a large surplus of young people combined with economic 
stagnation leads to underemployment and low wages, the likely 
reaction is social discontent and cycles of rebellion and repression.49 This 
can destabilize any political system. The frustrated young people will 
always be able to find a political or religious ideology that can justify 
their need to fight against a social system that has no place for them.50 
This can lead to revolution and rebellion against a dictatorship, but it 
can just as well lead to rebellion against a democratic system. Statistical 
studies show that civil conflicts are much more likely to break out, and 
democracies to become unstable, in times with large youth cohorts.51
The sharply declining fertility rate in the last stage of a demographic 
transition provides a window of opportunity for economic development 
called a demographic dividend. Savings increase as the number of people 
46  Wilson and Daly (1985)
47  Goldstone (2012), Heinsohn (2003)
48  Heinsohn (2003, p. 72)
49  Urdal (2006), Cincotta and Doces (2012)
50  Heinsohn (2003, p. 40)
51  Cincotta and Leahy (2007), Cincotta and Doces (2012), Weber (2013)
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of working age increases and the number of dependents decreases. This 
is likely to lead not only to economic prosperity but also to political 
stability and democracy.52
We can conclude that a youth bulge can drive political changes in 
any direction, depending on the conditions. Youth bulges have been 
connected with ethnic conflicts53 and even large territorial conflicts such 
as the two world wars,54 but also with rebellions that have their origin in 
social and economic factors, such as the French Revolution, the Iranian 
Revolution, and the Arab Spring.55 It appears that a surplus of fearless 
young people is necessary for the regal process of building an empire as 
well as for the kungic process of breaking it down.
3.5. World view and personality:  
Authoritarianism theory
The psychological characteristics that we call regal have a striking 
similarity with the phenomenon that social psychologists call 
authoritarianism, and in fact many of the findings of the current study 
could possibly be explained with the theory of authoritarianism. 
Authoritarianism was originally regarded as a mainly fixed part 
of a person’s personality that is formed in childhood.56 Later studies 
contradict this and find that authoritarianism is influenced by threats, 
danger, and uncertainty.57 Interestingly, it is found that threats to a 
group that the person belongs to have stronger effect than threats to 
the person as an individual, and that this increases group cohesion, 
exactly as predicted by regality theory.58 However, the evidence is 
somewhat mixed on the question of individual versus collective threat. 
Some studies show no authoritarian effect on the test persons unless 
52  Lechler (2015)
53  Esty et al. (1995), Goldstone et al. (2000)
54  Hvistendahl (2011)
55  LaGraffe (2012), Yair and Miodownik (2016), Apt (2014, chapter 3)
56  Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson and Sanford (1950)
57  Van Hiel, Pandelaere, and Duriez (2004)
58  Jugert and Duckitt (2009), Feldman and Stenner (1997), Duckitt and Fisher (2003), 
Hogg (1992, p. 35)
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they are personally affected by the (collective) threat.59 There are also 
disagreements among theorists about the role of predispositions and 
the direction of causality.60
Given the importance of group threat and collective action, it is 
peculiar that most studies regard authoritarianism as an individual 
phenomenon and only a few studies treat it as a group phenomenon.61 
There are many different theories about how authoritarianism is 
generated. Some of these theories are in accordance with the predictions 
of regality theory, others are not.
A newer version of authoritarianism theory distinguishes between 
two measures called right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social 
dominance orientation (SDO), each of which is connected with certain 
characteristic world views.62 RWA is linked with the view of the world 
as a dangerous place, and SDO is linked with the view of the world as a 
competitive jungle where might is right. RWA leads to social conformity 
and SDO leads to tough-mindedness, according to this theory, and both 
lead to negative attitudes towards out-groups.63
RWA and SDO are often regarded as two different forms of 
authoritarianism, where RWA represents authoritarian submission, while 
SDO represents authoritarian dominance.64 Both lead to discrimination 
against minorities but for different reasons. People with high RWA 
discriminate because of fear, while people with high SDO discriminate 
because this gives them a higher status than those they discriminate 
against.65
The RWA theory is particularly relevant for regality theory because 
the view of the world as a dangerous place in RWA theory can be 
regarded as very similar to perceived collective danger in regality 
theory. People with high RWA make society more hierarchical, while 
people with high SDO use this hierarchy to their personal advantage.
59  Asbrock and Fritsche (2013)
60  Cohrs (2013)
61  Duckitt (1989), Stellmacher (2005)
62  Duckitt (2001), Perry (2013)
63  Duckitt (2001), Sibley, Wilson and Duckitt (2007), Sibley and Duckitt (2008), 
McFarland (2010)
64  Van Hiel, Pandelaere, and Duriez (2004), Altemeyer (1998)
65  Altemeyer (1998)
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Research in these theories has led to results that are in good agreement 
with regality theory because they link social conformity, punitiveness, 
and xenophobia to collective danger. Evidently, authoritarianism theory 
and regality theory are two different paradigms looking at the same 
phenomenon. However, many of the predictions of regality theory that 
are tested in the present study would have been difficult to make from 
authoritarianism theory because the latter has more focus on individual 
psychology than on social and cultural structures.
The area of authoritarianism research is rich in experimental 
studies.66 Many of these studies have found that authoritarian responses 
can be elicited by quite small stimuli, such as making known threats 
more salient or even by asking the test persons to imagine a particular 
threatening scenario. The experimental methods that have been 
developed in the area of authoritarianism research might be useful 
for testing the effects of different kinds of threats in connection with 
regality theory.
My main criticism of authoritarianism theory relates to its poor 
theoretical foundation. Authoritarianism theory has its roots in 
psychoanalytic theories, which are not falsifiable,67 though modern 
versions such as RWA and SDO theories have little or no connection 
to psychoanalysis. The theoretical model behind traditional 
authoritarianism theory has limited empirical support, and the theory 
has often been criticized for political bias.68 The term ‘right-wing 
authoritarianism’ is ill chosen because of its inherent political bias, and 
also because the concept of right-wing ideology makes sense only in a 
certain cultural context. In fact, some studies have found the same kind 
of authoritarianism among communists, who by definition must be 
called left wing.69 One researcher even made the contradictory finding 
that some persons who scored high on the right-wing authoritarianism 
scale also scored high on a ‘left-wing authoritarianism’ scale.70
66  Duckitt (2013)
67  Popper (1963, p. 37)
68  Stellmacher and Petzel (2005), Sibley and Duckitt (2008), Eckhardt (1991), Ray, J. 
(1989)
69  McFarland, Ageyev and Abalakina (1993)
70  Altemeyer (1998)
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While many authoritarianism theorists regard certain political 
ideologies as undesired psychological aberrations, regality theory sees 
the same ideologies as adaptive responses to perceived collective danger 
(or, at least, would-be adaptive in the environment of evolutionary 
adaptation). The evolutionary theory is less likely to lead to biased and 
ethnocentric thinking, and we should bear this in mind in our choice 
of terminology. While authoritarianism theory certainly needs revision 
and a change of terminology, it builds on a research tradition that has 
produced many interesting experimental results that may be valuable 
when reinterpreted in the light of regality theory.71
3.6. Contributions from other social  
psychological theories
There are several other theories that resemble authoritarianism theory 
but avoid some of the problems mentioned above.
The influential realistic group conflict theory finds that hostility 
between groups is likely to occur when their goals conflict or when they 
are competing for the same resources.72 
Integrated threat theory finds that several different kinds of threat can 
lead to hostility towards outgroups. Realistic group conflict is one of 
them, symbolic threat is another. Symbolic threat occurs, for example, 
when immigrants with different values, norms, and beliefs are perceived 
to threaten one’s own culture. Some cases of prejudice are caused 
mostly by realistic conflicts, while other cases are caused mostly by 
symbolic conflicts. Other kinds of threats include negative stereotyping 
and intergroup anxiety, which may be regarded as independent factors 
in some models.73
The theory of group-based control restoration finds that people tend 
to show in-group favoritism in times of social or personal crisis. The 
proposed mechanism requires that the in-group is relevant to the 
problem at hand and that the person feels a lack of personal control.74 
71  Duckitt (2015)
72  Jackson (1993)
73  Riek, Mania and Gaertner (2006), González et al. (2008)
74  Fritsche, Jonas and Kessler (2011) 
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This is in accordance with regality theory in predicting that people 
want to strengthen their group when facing threats that they cannot 
handle alone. An interesting question is whether the discrimination 
against out-groups is directed specifically against a certain out-group 
that is blamed for the threat, or whether there is a more unspecific 
discrimination against any group of deviants. In fact, there is evidence 
for both possibilities.75 For example, the fear of Islamic terrorists has led 
to widespread hostility against Arabs and Muslims in general, but also to 
more punitive attitudes towards perpetrators of totally unrelated crimes 
such as car theft and rape, as well as to more authoritarian parenting.76 
In the light of regality theory, we may see this as an indication that the 
regal psychological response is only partially goal-directed towards 
a specific danger. To some degree, the regal response seems to be an 
unspecific reaction of strengthening the in-group against any type of 
danger. A clear example of an unspecific response is homophobia. 
Many studies have found a strong correlation between authoritarian 
attitudes and hostility towards homosexuals, even though homosexuals 
in general pose no threat to the authoritarian person.77
People who are uncertain about their social identity are likely to look 
for a prototypical leader in order to define their identity, according to 
the social identity theory of leadership.78 People with a high degree of self-
uncertainty are more likely to join radical extremist groups, according to 
uncertainty–identity theory. The essence of this theory is that uncertainty 
about oneself and one’s identity motivates people to join groups with 
high entitativity: clear boundaries, internal homogeneity, and possibly 
a hierarchical structure and strong leadership.79 Most of the literature 
is unclear about what kinds of uncertainties have this effect. All the 
examples of uncertainty mentioned in the uncertainty–identity theory 
literature are threatening uncertainties, such as economic problems, 
ethnic conflicts, and natural disasters.80 A recent study focusing mainly 
75  Greenaway, Louis, Hornsey and Jones (2014)
76  Fritsche, Jonas and Kessler (2011)
77  Basow and Johnson (2000)
78  Hogg, van Knippenberg, and Rast (2012)
79  Hogg (2014)
80  Hogg, Meehan, and Farquharson (2010), Hogg and Adelman (2013), Rast, Hogg, 
and Giessner (2013), Schoel et al. (2011)
44 Warlike and Peaceful Societies
on economic problems finds that both individual and collective economic 
problems have this effect, but the measure of individual uncertainty is 
very coarse.81
This takes us back to the already well-known connection between 
threat and authoritarianism. Uncertainty and threat are known to 
be connected with political conservatism, according to the so-called 
uncertainty–threat model.82 It appears that uncertainty and threat are 
better at explaining conservative and authoritarian extremist groups 
than anti-authoritarian extremist groups. Additional factors that have 
been suggested to explain extremism in minority groups include 
perceived injustice, group threat, perceived illegitimacy of authorities, 
and a feeling of being disconnected from the majority of society.83
Terror management theory is based on the assumption that people 
become anxious when thinking about their own future death. Anything 
that reminds people of their own mortality will provoke a psychological 
defense that emphasizes their social group and a world view which gives 
meaning to life and death.84 Critics of this theory have found that the 
same psychological reaction is seen when threats unrelated to mortality 
are made salient. This supports an evolutionary explanation related to 
group defense (in accordance with regality theory) rather than the terror 
management theory.85 Another study finds that terrorism salience, but 
not mortality salience, invokes a group defense response. This finding 
supports system justification theory, but not terror management theory.86 
A meta-analytical review of the evidence finds that mortality salience 
has the same effect as other threats to the world view, but the effect 
of mortality salience is delayed whereas the effect of other threats is 
immediate.87
A recent theory about the connection between conflict and political 
attitudes is the stress-based model of political extremism. This model is 
based on studies of protracted conflicts such as the Israeli–Palestinian 
conflict and the conflict in Northern Ireland. The studies find that 
81  Kakkar and Sivanathan (2017)
82  Jost et al. (2007)
83  Doosje, Loseman and Bos (2013)
84  Greenberg and Arndt (2011)
85  Navarrete, Kurzban, Fessler and Kirkpatrick (2004)
86  Ullrich and Cohrs (2007)
87  Martens, Burke, Schimel and Faucher (2011)
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a population exposed to political violence will develop symptoms of 
psychological distress. This distress leads to increased perceptions of 
threat, which in turn lead to political extremism and lack of support 
for political compromise.88 The distress and perception of threat is 
particularly strong in cases of terrorism where random civilians are 
victims. This explains why peace negotiations often fail in conflicts that 
involve frequent episodes of terrorism.89 The research also finds that 
the effect can be ameliorated by reassuring messages or aggravated by 
alarming messages.90 The stress-based model contradicts the rationalist 
view, held by many negotiators, that the conflicting parties will be more 
motivated to accept negotiations and compromises when the violence 
becomes intolerable. On the contrary, they will be less compromising 
the worse the violence they experience.91 This model is not based on 
evolutionary theory but on psychological theories of coping. Yet the 
findings are in perfect agreement with regality theory: people become 
more regal and uncompromising the more threatening they perceive 
their situation to be.
3.7. Contributions from social values theories
A network of social scientists have created the World Values Survey, 
which is a research project aimed at measuring people’s values and 
beliefs around the world. Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel have 
analyzed these data and found that most of the variance in cultural 
values can be expressed by two factors:92
1. Traditional versus secular–rational values, reflecting the contrast 
between the relatively religious and traditional values that 
generally prevail in agrarian societies, and the relatively 
secular, bureaucratic, and rational values that generally 
prevail in urban, industrialized societies.
88  Canetti et al. (2013, 2015)
89  Canetti et al. (2015), Hirsch-Hoefler, Canetti, Rapaport and Hobfoll (2014)
90  Hirsch-Hoefler, Canetti, Rapaport and Hobfoll (2014), Canetti-Nisim, Halperin, 
Sharvit and Hobfoll (2009)
91  Canetti et al. (2013)
92  Inglehart and Welzel (2005, p. 48), Inglehart (2007)
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2. Survival versus self-expression values, reflecting an inter-
generational shift from emphasis on economic and physical 
security in the industrial society towards increasing emphasis 
on self-expression and subjective well-being, and the focus on 
rights above duties of a democratic, post-industrial society.
Figure 6 shows the average position of citizens in different countries 
on these two dimensions in 2011 to 2012. The traditional values reflect 
the importance of religion, deference to authority, traditional families, 
moral standards, desire for a large number of children, and resistance 
to abortion. The survival values reflect traditional gender roles, hard 
work, confidence in government, and intolerance of deviants. Inglehart 
and Welzel explain the traditional values on the first dimension by the 
need for collective action in complex agrarian societies. The shift from 
traditional to secular–rational values is connected with the change from 
religious authorities to secular authorities that follows industrialization. 
The survival values on the second dimension express the need for 
physical security in terms of economy and health. The shift from survival 
values to self-expression values reflect a relief from the immediate 
threats of the industrial society to the higher economic security that 
comes with a higher level of education and a modern welfare state. The 
self-expression values also reflect an emancipation from authority and a 
criticism of the risks of technology.93
Inglehart and Welzel’s study does not focus on war or bellicosity, but 
on how people react to changing perceptions of existential security.94 As 
existential security is essential in regality theory, we will expect both 
factors to correlate with regality. The traditional versus secular–rational 
values focus on how to deal with collective survival, while the second 
dimension, survival versus self-expression values, has more focus 
on individual threats. But the self-expression values also reflect an 
emancipation from authority that we can relate to a kungic development.
Some studies described in the next chapter seem to support these 
expected correlations with regality,95 but we should not draw wide-
ranging conclusions because the studies are partially based on the 
same data.
93  Inglehart and Welzel (2005, p. 48ff), Inglehart (2007)
94  Inglehart and Welzel (2005, p. 52)
95  See table 2
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A further study of religious values shows that the transition from 
agrarian to industrial to postindustrial societies is followed by a decrease 
in religiosity.96 This is explained by increasing security. Religion is more 
important to people when they feel insecure. The study shows that basic 
religious beliefs are not easily changed, but the importance of religion 
in people’s lives is higher in societies with poverty, poor education, 
poor health, and high population growth. For example, the importance 
of religion is high in countries with high economic inequality such as 
the USA, Ireland, and Italy. The data do not support other theories of 
religiosity, such as secularization theory and religious market theory. 
Interestingly, both individual threats and collective threats seem to 
increase people’s need to seek comfort in their religion.97
Figure 6. Inglehart and Welzel’s Cultural Map (wave 6).  
World Values Survey Database.98
96  Norris and Inglehart (2011, chapter 4)
97  Norris and Inglehart (2011, chapter 11)
98 Public domain, http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp?CMSID=Findings
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Another study found that religiosity increased after an earthquake 
in New Zealand.99 Religiosity also increased after a financial crisis in 
Indonesia in 1997,100 but not after a financial crisis in Europe in 2008.101 
Regality theory may give a clue why the latter financial crisis did not 
lead to increased religiosity. Regality is predicted to increase when a 
crisis is blamed on external enemies or uncontrollable forces of nature, 
but it is predicted to decrease when a crisis is blamed on one’s own 
despotic leaders. The 2008 financial crisis was frequently blamed on 
greedy bankers and corrupt or incompetent politicians rather than 
on some nebulous external power or economic laws of nature. The 
prediction from regality theory is that this should cause a revolt, and 
indeed there were large protests in the streets in much of Southern 
Europe as a reaction to this crisis. 
Whether personal values reflect shared norms of the surrounding 
society or just personal differences is a matter of debate. One study 
finds that some personal values reflect social norms while other values 
are less culture-bound.102 Chapter 3.8 will look at values at the cultural 
level.
3.8. The theory of tight and loose cultures and 
other culture theories
The distinction between tight and loose cultures is an old idea in 
anthropology that has received renewed attention in the last decade.103 
This theory is very similar to the theory of regal and kungic cultures, 
but the two theories have in fact been developed independently 
without any cross-fertilization. A tight culture is defined as a culture 
with strong norms and low tolerance of deviance from these norms. 
A loose culture has weak social norms and a high tolerance of deviant 
behavior. The tightness of a culture is increased by ecological or 
external threats such as high population density, resource scarcity, 
99  Sibley and Bulbulia (2012)
100  Chen (2010)
101  Healy and Breen (2014)
102  Minkov, Blagoev and Hofstede (2012)
103  Gelfand et al. (2011), Uz (2015), Harrington and Gelfand (2014)
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disease, natural disasters, and external conflicts. These threats 
lead to the development of strong norms for enhancing the social 
coordination needed to effectively deal with such threats, according 
to the theory. The tightness is also provided by and reflected in social 
and political institutions such as the government, media, education 
system, legal system, and religion. People adapt to the strength 
of norms and intolerance of deviance by the psychology of self-
regulation.104 The older definitions of tightness have more focus on 
political organization,105 while later definitions focus more on norms 
and deviance. Both sets of definitions are relevant to regality theory.
The tightness/looseness theory does not go into detail with 
any mechanisms beyond a general functionalist explanation and 
the assumption that cultural evolution somehow brings about the 
necessary norms and institutions. There is agreement between regality 
theory and tightness/looseness theory on the basic claim that collective 
threats lead to strict norms and psychological restriction, but the two 
theories disagree on the chain of causality. The basic model of regality 
theory is:
Collective threats → Psychological adaptation ↔ Cultural norms
whereas tightness/looseness theory says:
Collective threats → Cultural norms ↔ Psychological adaptation 
The available data cannot distinguish between these two models 
because the direction of causality cannot be deduced from statistical 
correlations.
Tightness/looseness theory focuses mainly on ecological threats, 
while the threat of war plays only a minor role and bellicosity is not 
among the psychological reactions mentioned by this theory. While 
tightness and regality are very similar constructs, they are not the 
same. It would be more appropriate to say that tightness is one of 
several indicators of regality and in fact a very important indicator. 
Virtually everything that can be predicted from tightness/looseness 
theory can also be predicted from regality theory, while the opposite is 
104  Gelfand et al. (2011)
105  Pelto (1968)
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not true. We will now look at a number of statistical studies that have 
been made to test tightness/looseness theory and compare them with 
the predictions of regality theory.
In a pioneering study, Michele Gelfand et al. asked people in thirty-
three countries how much they agreed with statements such as ‘People 
in this country almost always comply with social norms’. This was not 
a direct measurement of cultural tightness but rather a measurement 
of perceived tightness. The results were correlated with a number of 
social and cultural variables and the results are shown in table 3.106 
Critics have pointed out that the perceived tightness may not be cross-
culturally comparable, because people may have different kinds of 
norms in mind when answering the questions or they may be judging 
by different standards or frames of reference.107 Later studies have 
used more direct criteria to gauge cultural tightness, and this turns 
out to give better correlations.
Psychologist Irem Uz has calculated three different measures 
of cultural tightness for sixty-eight countries: (1) a domain-specific 
index based on people’s tolerance for various morally debatable 
behaviors, such as prostitution, abortion, divorce, euthanasia, and 
suicide in the 2006 World Values Survey; (2) a domain-general index 
based on people’s endorsement of 124 different sets of values and 
behavioral practices in the World Values Survey. The index is based 
not on the mean but on the standard deviation of the responses. A 
high standard deviation of the responses is taken to indicate a high 
diversity of opinions, while a low standard deviation indicates that 
opinions comply with social norms; (3) a combination index based on 
a factor analysis of values in the domains of work, family, and religion 
in the World Values Survey.108 A strong correlation was found between 
these three measures of cultural tightness, as shown in table 2. The 
correlation with Gelfand’s perceived tightness was not statistically 
significant, but all three measures of tightness correlated significantly 
106  Gelfand et al. (2011)
107  Minkov, Blagoev and Hofstede (2012), Uz (2015), Heine, Lehman and Greenholtz 
(2002)
108  Uz (2015)
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with the secular–rational values and the self-expression values 
described in chapter 3.7. The measures of tightness showed highly 
significant correlations with various measures of collective threat and 
with various measures of tolerance.
A study by Jesse Harrington and Gelfand calculated an index of 
cultural tightness of the fifty US states based on objective indicators 
such as corporal punishment in schools, death penalty execution, 
punishments for marijuana law violations, alcohol restrictions, same 
sex civil unions, religiosity, and immigrant population. This index 
showed high correlations with indicators of collective threat such as 
natural disasters, health, and infant mortality, but not with population 
density. The index also showed strong correlations with various 
measures of law enforcement and attitudes toward regulation and 
deviant behavior.109 The results are shown in table 4.
The findings of these three studies are in perfect agreement with 
the predictions of regality theory indicated in tables 2, 3 and 4. The 
indication > 0 means that a positive correlation is predicted. < 0 means 
that a negative correlation is predicted. 0 means that no correlation 
is predicted or that the prediction is ambiguous. The directions 
of the correlations found in the tightness/looseness studies are in 
agreement with the predictions of regality theory in all cases where 
the correlations are statistically significant (p ≤ 0.05) as well as in most 
cases where the correlations are not significant (p > 0.05). These results 
are very interesting because they demonstrate the predictive power 
of regality theory. The methodology used in these studies can be 
adapted for future studies aimed specifically at testing the predictions 
of regality theory.
Another study by Lazar Stankov, Jihyun Lee and Fons van de Vijver 
found similar results for two factors that they called ‘conservatism 
versus liberalism’ and ‘harshness versus softness’, but their study did 
not investigate the influence of threats.110
109  Harrington and Gelfand (2014)
110  Stankov, Lee and van de Vijver (2014)
Variable Cultural tightness
Domain 
specific 
 (1)
Domain 
general 
 (2)
Combination  
 (3)
Expect from 
regality 
theory
Historical threat .636*** .476*** .685*** >0
Current threat .520*** .326*** .514*** >0
Traditional/industrialized .549*** .405*** .630*** >0
Institutional repression .626*** .402*** .639*** >0
Subjective well-being -.279* -.196 -.376** <0
Feelings of freedom of choice 
and control -.277 -.230 -.314* <0
Willingness to live near dis-
similar others -.426*** -.383*** -.675*** <0
Tolerance for personal-sexual 
deviations -.814*** -.502*** -.723*** <0
Tolerance for violation of legal 
rules -.236 -.447*** -.219 <0
Behavior inhibition .406*** .369* .590*** >0
Inglehart and Welzel factors:
Secular-rational values -.577** -.302* -.448** <0
Self-expression values -.533** -.284* -.557** <0
Hofstede and Minkov factors:
Power distance .242 .038 .332* >0
Collectivism .411** .316* .417** >0
Masculinity -.043 -.141 .028 >0
Uncertainty avoidance .003 -.171 -.061 >0
Indulgence versus self-restraint -.263* -.303* -.382** <0
Stankov, Lee, and Vijver factors:
Conservatism versus liberalism .39 .33 .40 >0
Harshness versus softness .20 .41 .46* >0
Table 2. Correlation of the three tightness measures of Uz with various 
variables, compared with the predictions of regality theory.111 Levels of 
significance: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. The signs of the coefficients 
have been adjusted for clarity.
Variable Perceived tightness
Expect from 
regality 
theory
Percentage of population using left hand -.61* <0
Accuracy of clocks in major cities .60** >0
Justifiability of morally relevant behavior -.48** <0
Unrestricted sociosexuality orientation -.44* <0
Alcohol consumption -.46** <0
Preferences of political systems that have a strong 
leader or are ruled by the army .38* >0
111  Uz (2015), Stankov, Lee and van de Vijver (2014)
Most important responsibility of government is to 
maintain order of society .61** >0
Agreement on ways of life need to be protected from 
foreign influence .57* >0
Would not want to have immigrants as neighbors .43* >0
Percentage of population of international migrants (log) -.32 ?
Agreement on one’s culture is superior .60** >0
Individualism -.47** <0
Power distance .42* >0
Uncertainty avoidance -.27 >0
Masculinity index -.08 >0
Long-term orientation index -.05 0
Harmony -.26 <0
Conservatism .43* >0
Hierarchy .47* >0
Mastery .18 0
Affective autonomy -.23 <0
Intellectual autonomy -.28 <0
Egalitarian commitment -.41 <0
Family collectivism .49** >0
Institutional collectivism .43* >0
Performance orientation .35 0
Power distance .32 >0
Gender egalitarianism -.35 <0
Assertiveness -.29 0
Uncertainty avoidance .32 >0
Future orientation .47* 0
Humane orientation .30 0
Loyalty versus utilitarian involvement .45* >0
Traditional versus secular rational values -.11 >0
Self-expression values -.13 <0
Fate control .44* >0
Spirituality .52** >0
Reward for application .60** >0
Cynicism .14 >0
Flexibility -.20 <0
Vertical sources of guidance .40* >0
Guidance from widespread beliefs .54** >0
Guidance from unwritten rules .18 >0
Guidance from specialists -.18 >0
Guidance from coworkers -.16 <0
Gross national product .05 0
Global growth competitiveness -.08 0
Table 3. Correlation of the perceived tightness measure of Gelfand112 
with various variables, compared with the predictions of regality theory. 
Levels of significance: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.
112  Gelfand et al. (2011)
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Variable Tightness Expect from regality theory
Natural disaster vulnerability .84*** >0
Food insecurity .46*** >0
Parasite stress index .55*** >0
Infant mortality rate .76*** >0
Environmental health: green index -.77*** <0
Percentage of slave-owning families, 1860 .78*** >0
Population density (log) .05 >0
Law enforcement employees .29* >0
Civil liberties -.63*** <0
Attitude towards government control of media .68*** >0
Behavioral constraint index .81*** >0
Relativistic attitude to right and wrong -.38*** <0
Attitude against immoral actions .52*** >0
Desire for strict law enforcement .49*** >0
Support for police use of force .65*** >0
Support for buying US products .78*** >0
Support for import restrictions .51*** >0
Interest in foreign cultures -.58*** <0
Collectivism .37** >0
Gender equality index -.77*** <0
Discrimination charges per capita .61*** 0
Alcohol binge drinking -.29* <0
Illicit drug use -.52*** <0
Murder rate .19 0
Burglary rate .22 0
Table 4. Correlation of tightness of US states with various variables,113 
compared with the predictions of regality theory. Levels of significance: 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
Most studies of culture types refer to modern industrial cultures, but 
a theory of Marc Howard Ross about cultures of conflict explicitly 
refers to non-industrial societies.114 His hypothesis is that psycho-
cultural dispositions for conflict and violence are formed through harsh 
childhood socialization and male gender identity conflict, and the targets 
for the aggressive tendencies can be either group-internal or group-
external depending on structural factors, which he calls ‘cross-cutting 
ties’. The correlation he finds between harsh childrearing practices and 
violent conflict is actually in agreement with the findings of regality 
113  Harrington and Gelfand (2014)
114  Ross (1993)
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theory, but there is disagreement about the direction of causality, which 
cannot be determined from the available statistical data. The idea that 
cross-cutting ties can mitigate conflicts is quite reasonable, but the 
hypothesis that internal and external conflicts form equivalent targets 
for an aggressive disposition is not in accordance with regality theory, 
and Sigmund Freud’s drive-discharge theory of violence has often been 
criticized.115
Theories of culture types have also been developed for organizational 
culture. Geert Hofstede, Gert Jan Hofstede and Michael Minkov have 
defined a number of dimensions based on studies of organizational 
culture. The most important dimensions are:116
• Power distance. This is a measure of hierarchy and the degree 
of inequality between leaders and followers or between 
teachers and students.
• Collectivism versus individualism. This is a measure of the 
degree to which people identify with their organization or 
social network rather than rely on themselves and pursue 
their individual self-interests.
• Masculinity versus femininity. The masculine values include 
strength, competition, care for money and material things, 
and prioritization of economic growth. The feminine values 
include warm relationships, empathy, care for the weak, and 
preservation of the environment.
• Uncertainty avoidance. This is a reflection of fear and stress. 
Uncertainty avoidance includes conservatism, fear of change, 
fear of ambiguity, repression of deviance, need for precise and 
formal rules, nationalism, and xenophobia.
• Indulgence versus self-restraint. Indulgence includes personal 
life control, optimism, happiness, leisure, and individual 
freedom. Self-restraint includes moral discipline, order, and 
pessimism.
• Long-term orientation. This is a focus on perseverance, 
thrift, self-discipline, humility, learning, pragmatism, and 
adaptiveness. The opposite is short-term orientation, which 
115  Sipes (1975)
116  Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov (2010)
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includes a focus on quick results, pride, saving one’s face, and 
respect for tradition. 
These dimensions include many elements that relate to regality theory, 
and we will expect the dimensions of power distance, collectivism, 
masculinity, and uncertainty avoidance to be positively correlated 
with regality, while indulgence should be negatively correlated with 
regality. We can test these predictions by using cultural tightness as an 
approximation for regality. The results in table 2 confirm the predicted 
correlations for power distance, collectivism, and indulgence, while 
there is no significant correlation for masculinity and uncertainty 
avoidance. The basic principle of long-term orientation is not related 
in any obvious way to regality, although both long-term and short-
term orientation have elements that are typical of regality, namely 
self-discipline and respect for tradition, respectively. No significant 
correlation is found for this dimension.
We have now seen that psychological preferences or values can be 
described with many different measures or dimensions, and these can 
be studied both at the individual level as described in chapter 3.7, and 
at the collective level as described in this chapter. The regal-kungic 
dimension seems to be involved in or to interfere with many of the 
other dimensions that have been defined, both at the individual level 
and at the collective level, and the effects are in good agreement with 
the predictions of regality theory. More research is needed to figure out 
which of the many proposed dimensions are most useful, how they 
interact or overlap, and which factors they are influenced by. Regality 
theory is useful here because it identifies a mechanism by which many 
psychological preferences are influenced.
3.9. Contributions from human  
empowerment theory
Christian Welzel has developed a new theory of human empowerment 
based on the findings of the World Values Survey.117 Welzel’s theory 
posits that, as humans get more resources and freedom of action, they 
will give higher priority to principles of freedom and this will lead 
117  Welzel (2013)
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to democracy and other civic institutions that guarantee individual 
freedom. Welzel’s model can be summarized as follows:
Action resources → Emancipative values → Civic entitlements
The concept of action resources defines the resources necessary for 
existential security, including material resources (equipment, tools, 
and income), connection resources (networks of exchange and contact), 
and intellectual resources (knowledge and skills). Under a shortage 
of action resources, people will give priority to survival values, as 
explained in chapter 3.7. When people have plenty of action resources 
so that existential security is no longer a concern, they will give higher 
priority to emancipative values. Welzel has replaced the factor named 
‘self-expression values’ in the previous study with a very similar index 
named ‘emancipative values’. The latter index is composed in a way 
that puts more emphasis on theoretical relations and less on statistical 
coherence (Cronbach’s α is lower). Emancipative values give people 
the impetus to organize collective action against tyrannical overlords, 
replace an authoritarian government with a more democratic rule, and 
implement civic institutions that guarantee individual freedom. This 
model explains the growing democratization in the world during the 
last several centuries, according to Welzel’s theory.118
Welzel’s theory aligns neatly with regality theory, although it is seen 
from the opposite perspective. Regality theory is based on the model:
Collective danger → Psychological preference for a strong leader → 
Authoritarian political structure
Welzel’s theory is expressed in the opposite terms:
Existential security → Psychological preference for emancipative values 
→ Democratic political structure
The two theories are not perfectly equivalent, though: Welzel does 
little to explore the effects of danger, which is central to regality theory; 
Welzel’s theory does not distinguish between individual and collective 
danger; and war plays hardly any role in Welzel’s theory. Studying a 
phenomenon from a different perspective is likely to lead to different 
118  Welzel (2013)
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discoveries, and Welzel’s theory throws new light on the processes 
during peaceful development.
A very important outcome of Welzel’s study is that he finds evidence 
for the direction of causality by means of statistical analysis of time 
series over ten years or more. His analysis shows that the direction of 
causality is as indicated by the arrows above, whereas there is much 
less causal influence in the opposite direction. A similar study has not 
yet been carried out for regality theory because it would require the 
collection of large amounts of data over a prolonged period of time.
We may notice that democratic institutions come at the end of the 
causal chain rather than the beginning. This explains why many political 
attempts at forced democratization have failed. Political initiatives that 
aim at spreading democracy should focus on existential security before 
doing anything else.
The first link in Welzel’s model, existential security, depends 
on external geographic factors. The most important factors can be 
summarized in what Welzel calls the cool-water condition.119 This includes:
• A relatively cold climate, which makes work less physically 
exhausting, reduces the danger of infectious diseases, and 
reduces soil depletion.
• Permanently navigable waterways, which facilitate trade and 
democratic market access.
• Continuous rainfall all year round. This makes irrigation 
unnecessary so that farmers are autonomous and independent 
of a centrally controlled irrigation system.
These conditions are found in particular in Western Europe and Japan. 
Historically, farmers living under cool-water conditions had high 
productivity, autonomy, and existential security. This made it rewarding 
to switch from a strategy of maximizing fertility to a strategy of improving 
skills (from an r-strategy to a K-strategy). This demographic transition 
was a necessary condition for technological progress and economic 
growth, according to unified growth theory.120 Artisans and urban markets 
came into being. The workforce was small and its quality high. The high 
119  Welzel (2013, p. 15)
120  Galor (2011)
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cost of labor was an incentive to search for technologies that save labor. 
Technological advances and higher productivity contributed further to 
existential security. Democratization and individual economic freedom 
made it profitable to invest in technological inventions. This explains 
why technological innovation was particularly strong in Western 
Europe, according to Welzel.121
If we want to compare the predictions of Welzel’s theory of human 
empowerment with regality theory, we have to take war into account. 
Environmental factors that facilitate high productivity and easy transport 
are also factors that facilitate war. According to regality theory, we will 
expect to see wars, empires, and tyrannical kings in such an area rather 
than human emancipation. An authoritarian rule is not conducive to 
individual inventiveness, but the ruler may command the development 
of a large and efficient infrastructure, including cities, roads, ships, and 
harbors, which is a precondition for technological progress. Empires 
wax and wane for reasons explained in chapters 4.1 and 4.2, and there 
may be a window of opportunity for inventiveness and technological 
progress when a government is too weak to confiscate the profits of 
individual enterprise but not too weak to protect the private property 
of inventors.122 Inventiveness and technological progress is also possible 
in remote areas that are less regal or when war is prevented by factors 
such as economic interdependence, alliances, or deterrence. It is no 
coincidence that the industrial revolution started in England, which had 
fewer enemies to fear than central Europe at the time. Technological 
progress brought prosperity and democracy, in accordance with 
Welzel’s theory.
3.10. Moral panics: Contributions from the 
sociology of deviance
The human mind is notoriously bad at making rational decisions in the 
face of uncertainty and low probabilities.123 Some people buy lottery 
tickets even though the average losses are higher than the average 
121  Welzel (2013)
122  Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, chapter 3)
123  Tversky and Kahneman (1992)
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gains, and some people have an extreme fear of terrorism even though 
the risks of dying in a traffic accident or from a lifestyle disease are 
many thousand times higher. Sometimes we ignore serious risks, and 
sometimes we overreact to even the smallest risks. Often, a certain 
group of people are blamed for causing danger and they are labeled as 
deviants, such as criminals or terrorists.
As already mentioned, the regal reaction to collective dangers 
depends not on the objective risk but on the perceived risk. An 
exaggerated perception of a minor or unlikely danger can have a strong 
regalizing effect. A highly emotional and exaggerated collective fear 
is called a ‘witch hunt’ or a ‘moral panic’. The fear is likely to lead to 
strong reactions against a group of deviants who are seen as threatening 
the social order.124
The longest witch hunt in history—and the one that gave the 
phenomenon its name—took place in Europe around the period of 
the Renaissance. The Catholic Church needed scapegoats in order to 
consolidate its dwindling power, and the scapegoats were first heretics 
and later witches. The witches were accused of worshipping the devil 
and causing all kinds of evil. People who were accused of witchcraft were 
tortured until they confessed, and they were forced to inform against 
other witches so that the process could continue.125 The dangers that 
the Church was fighting against may have been completely imaginary, 
but the social effects of the witch hunts were real. The regal effect of the 
witch hunts strengthened the authority of the Church and enabled it to 
defend its power against the threat of secularization.
Invisible dangers are particularly effective in witch hunts and moral 
panics because it is easier to exaggerate a danger when it cannot be seen 
and its objective magnitude cannot easily be estimated. This is also the 
case today. In modern society, the fears of many people have changed 
from a concern about how to get food to a concern about technological 
risks. Ulrich Beck calls this the ‘risk society’.126 Many risks are more 
or less invisible, such as pollution, nuclear radiation, and genetically 
modified foods. These risks—or rather the perception of these risks—
can be manipulated up or down to serve the interests of various actors. 
124  Cohen (2011), Goode and Ben-Yehuda (2009)
125  Ben-Yehuda (1980)
126  Beck (1992)
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Environmental protection organizations claim that the risks of pollution 
are high, while the polluting industries claim that the risks are small. 
This contest over defining the risks is also a power game where the 
winner will gain more control of the situation.127
Governments and powerful elites often use witch hunts in order 
to consolidate their power. Well-known modern examples include 
McCarthyism, the ‘war on drugs’, and the ‘war on terror’.128 Take the 
‘war on drugs’ in the United States as an example. Opinions are divided 
over whether this campaign has actually reduced the consumption of 
illegal drugs, but the intense focus on the dangers of drugs has fueled 
a ‘tough on crime’ attitude. The pursuit of drug criminals has led to 
many secondary crimes, such as economic crimes to pay for drugs, 
gang violence, weapons proliferation, corruption, vigilantism, and 
social deterioration. These secondary menaces have led to still more 
punitive sentiments and erosion of the standards of justice.129 This self-
amplifying process has driven the whole society in a more regal and 
punitive direction, which is part of the explanation why the USA has the 
highest incarceration rate in the world.
There is no clear distinction between a witch hunt and a moral panic. 
The term ‘witch hunt’ is used mainly when the fear and persecution 
of deviants is controlled by a powerful elite, while the term ‘moral 
panic’ usually describes a more spontaneous collective fear generated 
by gossip and mass media without any central control. An example 
of a moral panic is the child abuse panic, which began in the USA 
in the early 1980’s and spread to large parts of the world. This panic 
was started by social workers, physicians, psychologists, and child 
protection organizations. The initial focus was on physical abuse and 
neglect of children,130 but the focus gradually changed to sexual abuse, 
which was even more emotionally touching.131 While child abuse is 
certainly a real problem, the reactions were highly emotional and many 
innocent people have gone to jail because of overreactions and disregard 
127  Altheide (2014, p. 118)
128  Schack (2009)
129  Duke and Gross (1994)
130  Nelson (1984)
131  Best (1990)
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for common standards of justice.132 This is typical of a moral panic. The 
most characteristic symptoms of a moral panic include:
• There is a highly emotional collective reaction to a problem 
that has hitherto been largely ignored. The issue itself has high 
emotional appeal.
• Exaggerated claims are made about the incidence and effects 
of the problem.
• A group of scapegoats is stigmatized as responsible for the 
problem.
• The phenomenon is considered so dangerous that common 
standards of evidence and due process are violated.
• The definition of the deviance is unclear and expanding. The 
limit between normal and deviant shifts so that more and more 
people or behaviors can be defined as deviant and dangerous.
• If any experts contradict the claims, they are accused of being 
deviants themselves or allied with the deviants and therefore 
persecuted. Soon, there is hardly anybody left who dares to 
contradict the claims, and the new consensus allows even 
stronger claims to be made.
• A group of often self-appointed experts appear who claim to 
understand the problem and get resources to fight it.
The regal effect of a moral panic is obvious, but it is not always 
obvious who benefits from it. The experts who are allowed to define 
the problem and devise a strategy to fight it benefit in several ways. 
They get money and resources; they gain prestige and respect for 
their profession; and they gain power by being allowed to redefine 
the norms for the society and ultimately change social structure and 
laws in their own interest.133 The problem is sometimes fought with 
means that have little connection with the problem.134 Often, there 
is a competition between different professions over who ‘owns’ 
the issue, in other words, over which people are recognized as the 
132  Eberle and Eberle (1986)
133  Ben-Yehuda (1990, p. 97), Foucault (1980, chapter 6)
134  Keen (2006, p. 98)
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experts allowed to define the problem.135 The ‘issue owners’ may 
be priests, psychiatrists, psychologists, social workers, police, legal 
experts, economists, military figures, industry figures, grassroots 
movements, politicians, etc. The social structure and power balance 
of a society may change profoundly when the ownership of social 
problems is transferred from one group of experts to another. Such 
societal changes are not necessarily the result of a planned strategy 
on the part of the persons involved, but a witch hunt or moral panic 
provides a convenient perpetual source of enemies to keep the 
hysteria going.136 Those who gain power and prestige from fighting 
a social problem are indeed likely to keep promoting and expanding 
the fight. 
Moral panics are characterized by exaggerated claims and 
exaggerated reactions. Many sociologists have discussed whether 
it is possible to determine that a claim is exaggerated if we have no 
objective standards to judge it by. Typically, we have to involve a 
different branch of science that deals with the subject matter of the 
problem. Erich Goode and Nachman Ben-Yehuda have proposed a list 
of simple criteria for judging exaggeration,137 and Michael Schetsche 
has proposed an analytical framework that tries to separate the subject 
matter of the problem from its social construction.138 
Conflicts about the definition of a social problem occur all the 
time, for example when environment protection organizations and 
industry lobbyists disagree over how dangerous a certain technology 
is. These conflicts rarely escalate into genuine moral panics with all 
the symptoms listed above. The less intense conflicts have little or 
no regalizing effect, but they are still important for defining social 
boundaries.
The kinds of deviance that cause strong emotional reactions are 
often of a religious or sexual nature.139 Attempts to suppress sexual 
deviance are typically seen in connection with regal reactions. We 
may speculate why. It is hard to find a rational reason why anybody 
135  Gusfield (1989)
136  Schack (2009)
137  Goode and Ben-Yehuda (2009, p. 101)
138  Schetsche (2000, p. 29)
139  Goode and Ben-Yehuda (2009, p. 18)
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is concerned about, for example, homosexual activities carried out 
in private. The following hypotheses are possible explanations why 
concern over sexual deviance is so common:
• Controlling the sexual behavior of others may have important 
consequences for biological fitness. It is possible that a 
psychological tendency for controlling the sexual behavior 
of others has been shaped in our prehistory by selection 
mechanisms that are not yet fully understood.
• A social group under threat needs to produce many children. It 
is therefore likely that the regal reaction includes an impulse to 
suppress non-reproductive sexual behavior (see chapter 3.7).
• Elite members may control people by suppressing their 
sexuality.140
• Stories about sexuality have pornographic value regardless 
of whether the story is positive (about pleasure) or negative 
(about danger). A discourse about sexual deviance may 
be titillating because it appeals to the person’s hidden, and 
perhaps repressed, desire to do the same.141 
• Titillating stories are more likely to be retold. In other words, 
they have memetic fitness.142
• The mass media have an economic interest in telling titillating 
stories.143 This is further discussed in chapter 5.1.
• Stories about sexual deviance have political consequences and 
may be promoted by groups with a certain agenda, such as 
feminists or religious groups.144
More research is needed to find out which of these effects are most 
important.
140  Foucault (1978)
141  Adams, Wright and Lohr (1996)
142  Brodie (1996, p. 103)
143  Greer (2012, chapter 5)
144  Plummer (1995, chapter 2)
4. Different Kinds of War in  
Human History
4.1. The rise of empires: Contributions from 
cultural selection theory
Regality is a self-amplifying phenomenon. Regal groups tend to grow 
bigger by conquering the territory of neighboring more kungic groups 
and become city states, kingdoms, and finally large empires. After a 
long period of growth, the empire becomes unable to grow any further 
and finally collapses. Reasons for the collapse are discussed in chapter 
4.2. For now, we will concentrate on explaining the growth.
Figure 7. Charge of the Light Cavalry Brigade, 25th October 1854, under Major 
General the Earl of Cardigan. Painting by William Simpson, 1855.1
1 Public domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:William_Simpson_-_Charge_
of_the_light_cavalry_brigade,_25th_Oct._1854,_under_Major_General_the_Earl_of_
Cardigan.jpg
© 2017 Agner Fog, CC BY 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0128.04
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The growth of a regal society is a cultural process, and we may seek 
explanations for this in the theory of cultural evolution and other 
cultural theories (see chapter 3.2). 
One widely known version of cultural evolution theory is memetics. 
Cultural traits, called memes, are seen as heritable units analogous to 
genes.2 Memetics can be explained by the example of a new food recipe. 
People will share a recipe with their friends if they find the new dish 
tasty. The friends will share it with other friends, and so on. The best 
recipes will be the ones that are shared the most. Such recipes may 
‘mutate’ or be combined with other recipes to produce new, even better 
recipes.
A big problem with the theory of memetics is that it does not 
always make sense to divide culture into discrete and inherited units 
of information.3 Some theories avoid these problems by allowing 
more fuzzy cultural phenomena without a single identifiable cultural 
parent.4 Another variant includes the selection of quantitative traits. For 
example, big companies often have a competitive advantage that allows 
them to grow still bigger. This is an example of a selection process, 
but the selected trait is quantitative rather than qualitative.5 The latter 
theory has the main focus on the dynamic structure of the whole social 
system rather than on individual actors. It is related to systems theory6 
and to the mathematics of feedback systems.7 
Positive feedback can make a system unstable, while negative 
feedback can make a system approach equilibrium under certain 
conditions. An example of negative feedback in a social system is the 
economic law of supply and demand, which tends to drive a market 
towards a stable equilibrium. Positive feedback in social systems is 
often seen in the so-called Matthew effect: whoever has the most power 
and money can use their influence to manipulate the system in such a 
way as to allow themselves to gain still more power and money.8 This 
2  Tyler (2011)
3  Richerson and Boyd (2008), Edmonds (2005)
4  Sperber (1996, chapter 5)
5  Fog (1999, p. 64)
6  Laszlo and Laszlo (1997), Luhmann (1995)
7  Richardson, G. (1991)
8  Rigney (2010), Pierson (2015)
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phenomenon is often seen in weak democracies where the president 
makes new laws that give more power to himself.
Both versions of cultural selection theory can explain some important 
aspects of the growth of regal societies. If a group of people invents 
a more efficient method for food production—for example, a form 
of agriculture—then they can produce more food per unit area. This 
allows them to feed more children and increase the population density. 
A bigger population can make a bigger army, and this enables them to 
win wars and incorporate neighbor groups under their rule. The new 
food production technology is now adopted by the newly assimilated 
population. This allows the population to grow still bigger and make still 
bigger armies, and so on. There is plenty of evidence that the growth of 
large civilizations and empires through history has been connected with 
the spread of agriculture.9 Efficient weapons technology and transport 
technology may have been spread by a similar mechanism: the groups 
with the strongest weapons and highest mobility have been likely to win 
wars over other groups with inferior weapons. DNA studies show that 
the most prolific male lineages originate from areas with agriculture or 
pastoralism and domesticated horses.10
As the groups grow bigger and stronger, they also become more 
warlike in accordance with regality theory. A large-scale war with 
firearms is probably much more deadly than anything our ancestors 
saw in the evolutionary prehistory that shaped the regal response 
pattern. We can regard such a war as a supernormal stimulus leading 
to an extremely regal response. This allowed populations to accept 
the very hierarchical political structure and tyrannical leaders of the 
historical empires.
Certain religious memes may have spread in a similar way. 
A systematic study of Austronesian cultures shows that beliefs in 
supernatural punishment precede the evolution of larger, more complex, 
societies. People who believe that they are somehow punished for 
clandestine misdeeds or rewarded for bravery are more likely to obey their 
government and social norms, thereby making their society stronger.11
9  Eckhardt (1992, p. 178)
10  Balaresque et al. (2015)
11  Watts et al. (2015)
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We can conclude that the growth of warlike societies and empires in 
history has involved the selection of qualitative cultural traits, such as 
agricultural technology, weapons technology, and religious beliefs, as 
well as quantitative parameters, such as food production, population 
size, and territory size. These factors have all supported and amplified 
each other in a positive feedback process.12 A systematic study of 
civilizations through history shows a strong correlation between 
agriculture, territorial expansion, weapons technology, political 
centralization, social and economic inequality, slavery, strict discipline, 
authoritarianism, and warlikeness.13 
A recent DNA study shows evidence of an extreme variance in male 
reproductive success around 5,000 to 7,000 years ago. In other words, 
a few men had many children and many men had none, while no such 
variance was seen for women. This is evidence of a wave of extreme 
polygamy, occurring first in Asia and the near East and later in Europe 
and Africa. This observation is explained by cultural factors connected to 
the spread of agriculture.14 It is likely that agriculture and other cultural 
innovations allowed kings and emperors to rule over larger numbers 
of people and to have more wives. Cultural and religious norms later 
limited the amount of polygamy.
It has been proposed that the distinction between r—and K-strategies 
in biological evolution (see chapter 3.3) can be applied somewhat 
analogously to cultural selection, though the analogy is far from 
perfect. A selfish meme—or rather a selfish complex of memes—can 
use different strategies for utilizing the resources of its hosts (that is, 
the persons holding the memes) to produce either a great quantity or 
a high quality of cultural offspring. A cultural r-strategy is a strategy 
where the meme complex makes its hosts spend a lot of resources on 
propagating their culture and beliefs to others. This is seen, for example, 
where a warring group impose their culture on the people they conquer, 
and also where a religious sect spends a lot of resources on winning 
new converts or competing with other religious groups. The opposite 
is a cultural k-strategy (written with a small k), which allocates few 
resources to winning new hosts and more resources to making its hosts 
12  Gat (2006, chapter 12)
13  Eckhardt (1992)
14  Karmin et al. (2015)
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satisfied so that they will not choose competing memes. This is typically 
seen in times of peace, when ideals of individual freedom become more 
popular than ideals of patriotism and unity.15
This theory predicts that the cultural r-strategy will be most efficient 
in times of intergroup conflict, while the cultural k-strategy will be 
most efficient where there is no culturally different neighbor group to 
compete with. Interestingly, the predictions of this cultural r/k theory 
are so similar to the predictions of the theory of a psychological desire 
for a strong leader in times of intergroup conflict that any of these two 
theories would provide a logical explanation for the same cultural 
effects. It can be argued that psychological responses to intergroup 
conflict are likely to be much faster than cultural r/k selection and 
therefore more effective, but the cultural r/k mechanism probably has 
at least some effect as well. For now, it is assumed that there is synergy 
between the two mechanisms, perhaps as the result of some kind of 
gene/culture coevolution16 and we will use the terms regal and kungic, 
regardless of which of the two mechanisms is implied.
4.2. The fall of empires: Contributions from 
historical dynamics theory
Ethnic groups that are incorporated one by one into an empire as 
it grows often preserve some of their culture, ethnicity, religion, and 
language. Empires that are created in this way have an inhomogeneous 
population. It requires a great deal of power and discipline to prevent 
internal conflicts and to keep such an empire together. In terms of 
regality theory, an empire must be regal in order to stay together. The 
regality is built up and maintained mostly through territorial wars at 
the borders. We can predict that an empire will fall apart and split into 
smaller ethnic groups when it becomes unable to expand further and 
unable to make wars with its neighbors, and therefore unable to maintain 
the high regality. This can happen when the empire has become so big 
that communication between the center and the warzone at the border 
15  Fog (1997)
16  Lumsden and Wilson (1981)
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is difficult. Inhabitants at the center lose interest in what happens at the 
faraway border and lose the will to defend their country.17 
Peter Turchin has given a very similar explanation of the rise and 
fall of empires based on the theory he calls historical dynamics.18 
Turchin explains the rise of empires by the historical observation that 
group solidarity, loyalty, and military strength grow in a conflict zone 
between culturally different peoples, such as a frontier between farmers 
and nomadic pastoralists. Such a conflict zone can form the nucleus of 
a growing empire. Turchin uses the word asabiya, borrowed from the 
fourteenth century Arab historian Ibn Khaldun, to denote these forces 
of social cohesion. The cohesive force, or asabiya, decreases when the 
borders are far removed from the political center and the state or empire 
stops growing due to logistic problems, internal competition, and 
economic collapse.
The main weakness of Turchin’s theory is that his concept of asabiya 
is poorly defined and it is not very clear how it is generated. Obviously, 
it is very similar to the concept of regality in the theory of the present 
book. Regality theory offers the causal link that is missing in Turchin’s 
historical dynamics. Turchin’s explanation of the rise and fall of empires 
has so much in common with the explanation based on regality theory 
that a synthesis of the two theories seems natural.
Turchin has made a comprehensive study of empires through 
history and found several typical factors that are involved in the 
disintegration of empires.19 The economy becomes unstable when the 
territorial expansion stops while the population keeps growing. The 
overpopulation and shortage of land in an agrarian economy leads 
to increases in the prices of land and food while the price of labor 
decreases. Impoverished farmers are forced to sell their land and go 
into unpayable debt. Elite landowners profit from this situation as they 
become able to extract more surplus from the peasants. The elite not 
only become richer at the expense of everybody else, they also become 
more numerous. The luxurious lifestyle of the growing elite is paid for 
through heavy taxation or debt.20 There is growing inequality, not only 
17  Fog (1999, p. 111)
18  Turchin (2006), Turchin and Gavrilets (2009)
19  Turchin and Nefedov (2009, chapter 10)
20  Gat (2006, p. 371)
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between the elite and commoners, but also within the elite, where strong 
competition for the most attractive positions leads to conflict. 
The starving population makes uprisings and food riots against the 
extravagant elite. The elite is split between competing factions, some 
of which may form alliances with the rebellious commoners and start 
a revolution or civil war. Suppressing the rebellion is so expensive 
that the government, which is already spending most of its surplus on 
external wars, goes into debt and starts to lose control. Banditry spreads, 
and farmland far from the cities is abandoned because it can no longer 
be protected against raids. The economy collapses and the state goes 
bankrupt. The weakened state becomes unable to defend its borders 
and is attacked, perhaps by nomadic pastoralists, perhaps by another 
growing empire.
This kind of downturn is sometimes ended by dramatic events 
such as a major war or pestilence. The increasing poverty, famine, and 
urbanization make breeding ground for disease epidemics, and such 
epidemics have wiped out large parts of the population several times 
through history. The survivors inherit the property of deceased family 
members, and a new cycle of prosperity and growth begins. An empire 
may go through several such cycles of growth and decline before it 
completely disintegrates. Each cycle may take one or more centuries. 
Combining regality theory with cultural selection theory and 
historical dynamics, we may summarize the main factors leading to the 
rise and fall of empires. The growth of an empire can be explained by 
a positive feedback process involving war, growing regality, increasing 
food production, population growth, improved weapons technology, 
military strength, and expanding territory. The decline may involve the 
following factors:
• loss of regality when the empire has reached the limits to its 
growth
• overpopulation, poverty, and famine
• a growing elite, growing inequality, and conflicts between 
elite and commoners as well as between different factions 
within the elite
• collapse of the economy and weakening of the state.
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4.3. General theories of war and peace
Studies of conflict and peace have produced many different theories of 
the causes of war. This chapter will review some of the most influential 
theories.
Political realism theory is based on the premise that the international 
system is anarchic. The international situation is determined by the 
distribution of power, where the stronger states are able to conquer 
territory from weaker states.
Every state needs to have a military power or build alliances in order 
to protect itself against attacks. A state that sees its neighbor increase 
its military power is often unable to know whether the intentions are 
offensive or defensive, so it must increase its own military power to at 
least the same level in order to assure its security. Such an arms race can 
leave both states in a less secure situation than before. This paradox is 
known as the security dilemma. Deterrence does not always work, and a 
war may result if one of the states launches a preemptive strike in order 
to remove the perceived threat from its neighbor.21 The probability 
of war is increased when there is a change in the power balance, for 
example caused by an economic crisis or a revolution.22 The same states 
often wage war against each other repeatedly in enduring rivalries.23
The steps to war model describes the process of conflict escalation 
that may lead to war. The first step is a disagreement over some issue 
such as a disputed territory. Both parties in the conflict may use various 
strategies, such as coercive threats, military build-ups, and forming 
alliances. Each step in this conflict spiral increases the probability of 
war. Leaders who plan for war are likely to build up military power, 
mobilize nationalism, and reduce democratic rights before initiating a 
war. The observed nationalism, etc. is thus not the ultimate cause of the 
war but part of the steps to war.24
The bargaining theory assumes that it is possible in most cases to 
negotiate a peaceful settlement that is less costly to both parties than 
21  Gat (2006, p. 97), Levy and Thompson (2010, p. 30), Cashman (2013, chapter 7)
22  Cashman (2013, chapter 11)
23  Levy and Thompson (2010, p. 56)
24  Levy and Thompson (2010, p. 60)
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a violent war. The conflict will only escalate into war if some factor 
prevents the parties from reaching a negotiated settlement. Such factors 
can include inaccurate information about the opponent’s strength, lack 
of trust that the opponent is truly committed to accepting the negotiated 
agreement, or inability to reach a compromise over an indivisible issue.25
The theory of liberal peace argues that democratic structures, 
free international trade, and international institutions can promote 
cooperation, mitigate the effects of international anarchy, and prevent 
war.26 Democracies are widely believed to be inherently more peaceful 
than non-democratic states. Democratic states almost never attack other 
democratic states, but peace researchers cannot agree why. Every theory 
of democratic peace has been met with counterarguments or contradicting 
examples, and statistical studies fail to confirm that democracies are 
less likely to wage war than autocracies.27 Azar Gat argues that it is not 
democracy itself that leads to peace but other aspects of modernization 
that are typically seen in democratic states, such as economic prosperity, 
welfare, absence of hard work, non-violent domestic culture, sexual 
liberation, and lower population growth.28
Historically, peace has almost always come before democracy. 
Recent studies have found that states do not develop democracy until 
after all border disputes have been settled. In other words, there is 
strong evidence that peace causes democracy but little evidence that 
democracy causes peace.29 Regality theory can easily explain this 
observation. Contested borders or other external threats to a state will 
activate regal reactions in the population, who will be likely to support 
a strong, autocratic leader. Peace and collective security, on the other 
hand, will make the population prefer democracy.
Politicians are well aware that the population shows more support for 
their government in cases of war or national insecurity. The diversionary 
war hypothesis supposes that state leaders sometimes take advantage 
of this effect and wage war in order to divert attention from internal 
25  Levy and Thompson (2010, p. 63)
26  Levy and Thompson (2010, p. 70)
27  Cashman (2013, chapter 5)
28  Gat (2017, chapter 6)
29  Owsiak (2013), Gibler and Owsiak (2017)
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problems and to make their population rally around the flag and support 
their leader. This is not a general cause of war, but it appears that leaders 
in some cases have escalated a threatening situation in order to rally 
support for themselves.30 This phenomenon, which obviously relates to 
regality, is further discussed in chapter 6.3.
The interests of leaders and external actors are often decisive for the 
onset of conflicts. The instrumental model of conflict assumes that leaders 
manipulate their populations by emphasizing and amplifying public 
perceptions of ethnic or religious differences in order to rally support 
for a fight that mainly serves the interests of the leaders.31
Many wars are fought mainly for economic reasons. The liberal 
economic theories of war assume that state leaders want to maximize 
economic utility for their country. They will start a war only if the 
expected gains exceed the expected costs. A high level of international 
trade will make war unprofitable because the costs of disrupting 
the trade will be too high. Thus, this theory predicts that economic 
interdependence between countries will deter war.32
A different line of thought, called the economic realist theory, makes the 
opposite prediction. A high dependence on international trade makes a 
state vulnerable. State leaders are concerned that their access to export 
markets and foreign investments might be reduced by adversaries and 
that crucial imported goods, such as oil and other raw materials, could 
be cut off. They want to reduce their vulnerability and to control what 
they depend on. This will increase the probability of militarized conflict 
as states that depend on external raw materials will scramble to secure 
access to these raw materials and try to control or colonize countries 
that can supply these raw materials.33
The international relations researcher Dale Copeland has developed 
these theories further. His trade expectations theory confirms that 
economic interdependence between states can either increase or 
decrease the probability of war, depending on their economic prospects. 
Great powers need a strong and growing economy in order to sustain 
30  Cashman (2013, chapter 6)
31  DeRouen (2014, chapter 4), McCauley and Posner (2017)
32  Cashman (2013, chapter 5), Copeland (2015, chapter 1)
33  Copeland (2015, chapter 2)
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their positions in the international system. This requires a high level of 
trade. They need to buy many different raw materials and they need to 
sell products to many different countries. This makes them vulnerable 
to cutoff of markets and investments or supplies of raw materials. Their 
rivals may explore this vulnerability in coercive diplomacy.
Great powers are primarily driven by a desire to maximize their 
economic security and not by other goals such as welfare maximization, 
social cohesion, glory, or the spread of their ideologies, according to 
Copeland’s research. Their foreign policy is driven mainly by the desire 
to reduce economic vulnerabilities and secure access to critical raw 
materials and markets. They may use military means to secure their 
access to vital raw materials, such as oil or minerals, if they see a risk 
that this access may be cut off in the future.
Copeland found that regime type and other domestic factors 
have much less influence than previously thought for the decision of 
great powers to make war or maintain peace. By studying the actual 
decision-making processes of various governments, he found that trade 
expectations often drove the patterns of peace and conflict even in 
cases that, on the surface, appeared to be about something else, such as 
ideology or religion. The conflicts over capitalism versus communism, 
or one religion versus another, may just be psychological rallying foci 
that hide more important underlying economic motives.34
Copeland also found that the economic security dilemma was just 
as dangerous as the military security dilemma. Attempts to improve 
the economic security of one state will decrease the economic security 
of its rivals, who are likely to respond with similar countermeasures. 
State leaders are aware of this danger of escalation. They need to signal 
their commitment to trade agreements in order to avoid escalation of 
economic conflicts.
The theories mentioned here are mostly concerned with 
‘conventional’ wars between two sovereign states. This kind of 
symmetrical war has become rare since World War II. Instead, we are 
now seeing insurgencies, asymmetric wars, proxy wars, and other kinds 
of conflicts. This is explained in chapter 4.4.
34  Copeland (2015, chapter 8)
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4.4. Changing patterns of war
There have always been violent conflicts between humans, but patterns 
of war have changed throughout history. Prehistoric hunters, gatherers, 
and nomads fought over territory, domestic animals, and other material 
possessions—and over women as well. The level of conflict was 
determined mainly by geographic and environmental factors. This will 
be explained further in chapter 7.
The introduction of agriculture and the settlement into cities led 
to larger concentrations of people and a more centralized political 
organization. The cities and agricultural fields had to be protected, and it 
became possible to assemble larger armies of warriors. Horses, wheeled 
vehicles, and large boats made it possible to transport the armies to 
distant battlefields where they could conquer more territory. The 
growing territories and growing wealth made it possible to assemble 
still larger armies and conquer still more territory. Improvements in 
weapons technology, transport, communication, and food storage 
contributed to this process. Cities grew into states, kingdoms, and finally 
large empires by means of this self-amplifying process. An ever more 
regal political organization was necessary for keeping large numbers of 
troops disciplined and keeping the empire together. An empire could 
continue growing until problems of transport, communication, logistics, 
and economics prevented further growth. The stagnation of growth 
started a kungic development and the empire began to disintegrate, 
until a new empire started to grow from a new center. The cyclic process 
of rise and fall of empires continued for thousands of years, as explained 
in chapters 4.1 and 4.2. The type and intensity of warfare in large parts 
of the world was ultimately determined by this dynamic process of the 
growth and collapse of empires.
Throughout history we have seen different kinds of political units that 
strived to expand their territories, such as dynasties, city states, nation 
states, and superpowers. Likewise, we have seen different motives or 
justifications for the expansive urge, such as prestige, religion, ideology, 
or alliances.35
35  Luard (1986, p. 133)
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The end of World War II was a turning point in the history of warfare. 
Large-scale interstate wars became rare, while intrastate (civil) wars 
became more frequent. This development is shown in figure 8.
There are several reasons for this sharp decline in the frequency and 
scale of interstate wars. The improvement in weapons technology is a 
major factor in this development. The ever more advanced weapons 
and defense systems also became extremely expensive. The arms race 
was a large economic burden for even the biggest superpowers. The 
destructive capacity of the new nuclear weapons and other advanced 
weapons grew to alarming heights. The prospect of another large 
interstate war had become so frightening that it could deter any potential 
aggressor. Not only would such a war be so expensive that it would ruin 
the economy of both parties, it would also destroy large parts of the 
infrastructure and kill large numbers of people, not only in the attacked 
state, but in the aggressor state as well.36
Figure 8. Historical development in different types of conflicts since World 
War II. Data from Uppsala Conflict Data Program. By Agner Fog, 2017.37
36  Mumford (2013, p. 2)
37  Data from Uppsala Conflict Data Program (2017), Pettersson and Wallensteen 
(2015)
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The decline in interstate wars is also driven by the modern lifestyle, 
welfare, urbanization, lower population growth, non-violent attitudes, 
democracy, and other aspects of development.38 Increasingly globalized 
trade has made most countries so dependent on both import and 
export that they cannot bear the disruptive effects of large wars on their 
trade and industry. The development of international law is also an 
important factor. The norms against war of aggression, promoted by the 
United Nations and other international organizations, will damage the 
reputation of any violator.39 The Gulf War of 1990–1991 following Iraq’s 
invasion of Kuwait was a crucial signal to potential aggressors that the 
international community will punish territorial aggression.40 
While analysts have no problem describing the decline of international 
wars, there is more uncertainty when it comes to describing the kinds 
of conflicts that have replaced them. The new kinds of conflicts have 
variously been called irregular warfare, unconventional warfare, low-
intensity warfare, fourth-generation warfare, asymmetric wars, new 
wars, and various other designations.41
The conventional theories of war developed over centuries are based 
on the perception of war as a symmetric conflict between two or more 
sovereign states, each with central control and a monopoly of force. 
Battles traditionally had clear beginnings and endings, clearly located 
battlefields where uniformed soldiers fought against each other, and 
clear winners and losers.
The new kinds of conflicts are very different. Violent conflicts are now 
often fought by decentralized insurgent groups or by guerillas against a 
state power. The insurgents may have a diffuse organization with many 
autonomous or semi-independent subgroups. The distinction between 
combatants and civilians is often blurred. The guerillas mostly use light 
or relatively cheap weapons. This kind of conflict has more similarities 
with the old forms of warfare that were common before the strong 
nation states were formed than with the kind of interstate war that we 
now call conventional warfare. In fact, insurgence and guerilla warfare 
38  Gat (2017, chapter 6)
39  Münkler (2005)
40  Snow (2015, p. 203)
41  St. Marie and Naghshpour (2011), Rid and Hecker (2009), Münkler (2005), Hughes 
(2012)
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is more common in weak states that lack a strong central government 
and a strong centralized military power. Some historians regard this 
as a return to old forms of warfare, while the modern kind of warfare 
based on heavy weapons has become too costly in terms of both money, 
casualties, and destruction of infrastructure.42
But modern conflicts are not only fought with old-fashioned guns. On 
the contrary, sophisticated methods, such as cyberattacks, propaganda, 
public relations smears, and economic undermining have become 
increasingly important in both local and global contests of power. The 
distinctions between civilians and combatants, between permissible 
and off-limits targets, and between economic and military targets seem 
to vanish when conventional warfare is replaced by such new tactics. 
These power games have been characterized as low-intensity conflicts 
because they never mobilize sufficient amounts of military power to win 
territory. Instead, we have seen prolonged conflicts that ebb and flow 
without ever reaching a definite resolution. The political and economic 
costs of increasing the level of conflict to the point where a clear victory 
is possible are simply too high.43
Insurgents and guerillas rely on many different sources of finance 
to sustain their operations. Robbery, plundering, and extortion are 
frequent sources of finance. Production and trade of psychotropic 
drugs is a very profitable source of finance for many insurgent groups. 
Other groups rely on the extraction of oil, minerals, and other natural 
resources. Even though involvement with organized crime initially 
seems unattractive for many insurgent groups, they quickly become 
dependent on it. Organized criminals involved in illicit trade depend 
on armed guerillas and local warlords for protection, while the guerillas 
rely on the illicit trade for finance. Once this symbiosis is established, it 
is difficult to break, and many of the actors involved have an interest in 
continuing the conflict.44 The reliance on criminal sources of funding has 
a demoralizing effect on the guerillas. The high ideological principles 
that prompted their resistance in the first place are undermined by the 
42  Münkler (2005, p. 24)
43  St. Marie and Naghshpour (2011, p. 3)
44  Münkler (2005, p. 15), Adams (1986)
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necessary involvement with crime, and many groups have deteriorated 
into marauding gangs of bandits.45
Support from external sources is often crucial. Many insurgent 
groups rely on external sources of funding, either from a diaspora of 
emigrants and refugees or from foreign states.46 Support from foreign 
states is very common but mostly secret. The clandestine support is 
typically provided by a secret service and channeled through some 
seemingly independent organizations in order to hide the original 
source. This principle is commonly known as plausible deniability: the 
donor can deny any involvement or responsibility when the support 
is channeled through an untraceable chain of intermediaries. Foreign 
support for insurgent groups often involves money, weapons, training, 
logistics, and intelligence.47
Support from foreign states and secret services never comes for 
free—there are always strings attached. Foreign donors use insurgents 
as proxies for promoting their own political and military goals in 
pursuit of their own geopolitical interests or trade interests. Insurgents 
often become so dependent on foreign sponsors that they lose their 
ideological purity. Foreign powers have often supported small and 
insignificant opposition groups and promoted them into powerful 
insurgents or even fabricated opposition groups where none existed.48
Such proxy wars often have two external stakeholders. This may be 
two rival superpowers or two coalitions of powerful nations competing 
to expand or defend their zones of geopolitical influence in the area. 
For example, one party may sponsor insurgents or coup makers 
while the other party supports the incumbent government. Instead of 
battling against each other directly—which would be too costly—the 
superpowers support their proxies in a war on a distant battlefield, 
conveniently avoiding any destruction in their own homelands.49
The party that supports the government of the troubled country 
may openly supply troops or air forces to support the government in 
the battle against what they consider illegitimate rebels.50 This kind 
45  Münkler (2005, p. 14)
46  Mumford (2013, p. 65), Hughes (2012, p. 38)
47  Hughes (2012, p. 15)
48  Bale (2012)
49  Mumford (2013, p. 3)
50  Mumford (2013, p. 14)
 814. Different Kinds of War in Human History 
of interventionism has become much more frequent in recent years, 
as figure 8 shows. The yellow curve labeled ‘Intrastate with external 
troop support’ covers only those conflicts where external intervention 
or support includes official foreign troops. Less visible forms of 
external support on one or both sides is no doubt more frequent, so 
that in fact the majority of violent conflicts today can be characterized 
as proxy wars.
External sponsors can have many reasons for supporting a conflict in 
a faraway country. First of all, it is very cheap compared to traditional 
warfare. Proxy wars are fought mostly in poor countries where the living 
costs for the native fighters are low and the fighters mostly use small 
light weapons. The sponsor states can avoid large casualties from their 
own forces and reduce the risk of escalation by using proxy fighters, 
drones, mercenaries, or private military contractors.51 The politicians of 
the sponsor countries seek to avoid political resistance from their own 
constituencies and also to avoid international opprobrium by hiding 
their support behind plausible deniability. In many cases, they have 
been able to escape accountability to their own jurisdiction as well as 
to international law by leaving the dirty work to irregular groups or 
mercenaries in a more or less lawless country and by making their own 
influence on these groups difficult to trace.52
A sponsor state can harm a militarily strong enemy, without 
engaging in direct conflict, by supporting insurgents in the enemy 
state or in a third state that is allied with their enemy. This enables 
the sponsor to divert their enemy’s resources toward the intrastate 
conflict and away from external conflict.53 It is often a big problem 
for the sponsor state, however, that its proxy fighters may be weak, 
incompetent, uncontrollable, and disloyal, and may have their own 
political or ideological agendas.54
Proxy wars can be very long-lasting because the external sponsors 
are never completely defeated, they do not easily run out of resources, 
51  Mumford (2013, p. 4), O’Brien (2012)
52  Mumford (2013, p. 42), Carter (2014), Hughes (2012)
53  Hughes (2012, p. 38)
54  Hughes (2012, p. 47)
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and the devastating consequences of the war mostly affects a distant 
country rather than themselves.55
Today’s conflicts are mostly asymmetric conflicts between unequal 
parties—typically insurgents or separatists against a state government 
or an external occupying force. Peace negotiations are often tried but 
rarely successful. Obviously, the two parties in an asymmetric conflict 
have very different positions in the situation of a peace negotiation. A 
negotiation between unequal parties with unequal negotiating powers 
will naturally lead to a result that is more favorable to the stronger 
party than to the weaker party. The insurgents will almost unavoidably 
perceive the negotiation result as unfair. A negotiation result that 
addresses the grievances of the weaker party in a way that they perceive 
as fair can hardly be achieved without strong external pressure from a 
third party.56
The leaders or negotiators for the insurgents may be committed to 
accepting an unfair negotiation result because they see no alternative, 
but the negotiated peace remains fragile as long as the grievances are not 
resolved. The insurgents typically have no strong central organization 
that can enforce the negotiated peace agreement. Even small frustrated 
subgroups with uncompromising attitudes can easily break the peace 
and make the conflict flare up again.57
Growing regality is another reason why intrastate conflicts and 
asymmetric wars are difficult to end. The insurgents become regalized 
and radicalized because of the prolonged conflict. Insurgent leaders also 
deliberately promote a radical ideology in order to justify their cause 
and to unify their supporters. Leaders on both sides of the conflict will 
often manipulate religious feelings and identities in order to mobilize 
their population.58
Insurgent groups often use radical religion in their fight against 
corrupt and kleptocratic regimes. They see corruption as a result of poor 
morality, and the most obvious remedy against amorality is religion.59 A 
process of selection occurs in countries where protesting is difficult: the 
55  Mumford (2013, p. 107), Cummins (2010)
56  Cummins (2010, p. 6), Rouhana (2011)
57  Münkler (2005, p. 13), Rid and Hecker (2009)
58  DeRouen (2014, chapter 4), McCauley and Posner (2017), Toft (2007)
59  Chayes (2015, p. 64)
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less radical protest groups are easily crushed by a suppressive regime, 
while the most regal groups are more likely to have enough strength 
and courage to survive. Some governments have even deliberately 
suppressed moderate protest groups while allowing more radical 
groups to continue. The existence of radical insurgent groups gives 
the incumbent government a convenient justification for their hardline 
policy.60
The leaders of insurgent groups face a tactical dilemma here. They 
can promote a very radical ideology in order to maximize the zeal of a 
small group of supporters, or they can express a less radical ideology 
in order to get support from the broader population.61 The most radical 
insurgent groups are often out of touch with the sentiments of the 
majority of the population they want to represent, because the perceived 
level of danger is not high enough to justify their high level of regality. 
For this reason, the regality of an insurgent movement is likely to fizzle 
out after a victory. For example, the Iranian Revolution of 1979 led to 
a strict theocratic rule, but even though the subsequent war with Iraq 
also contributed to the regality, more kungic sentiments soon began to 
spread in the population, as evidenced by the fact that the Arab Spring 
gained considerable support in Iran in 2011.
Insurgents and guerillas have a tactical advantage because of their 
flexibility and their ability to hide. The state military often lacks this 
flexibility because it has a big, hierarchical organization that cannot 
adapt as quickly to changing situations. Traditional militaries have a 
problem of balancing hierarchy against innovation, or discipline against 
creativity.62 The costs to the counterinsurgent force of maintaining order 
and legitimacy are much higher than the costs to the insurgents of 
undermining it.63
Guerillas and paramilitary forces are mostly found in weak states 
without a strong central military. While a strong military under central 
governmental control is taken for granted in modern first world 
countries, such an organization of power is less common in third world 
countries. A strong, centralized military organization has historically 
60  Chayes (2015, p. 69)
61  Rid and Hecker (2009, p. 44)
62  Mumford and Reis (2014, pp. 4–17)
63  Rid and Hecker (2009, p. 3)
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been formed in European countries because it was the format most 
suited for traditional interstate war. States that failed to build a strong 
military have long since been defeated by stronger and more militant 
neighbors.64
Third world countries have different organizations of their forces due 
to their different histories. Many of these countries have been formed 
not by interstate wars but by colonial wars. States that were decolonized 
through negotiation have inherited bureaucratic military organization 
from the departing colonial powers, but states that were formed through 
violent rebellion have tended to approbate the local guerillas that were 
active in the process of decolonization and to convert them into pro-
state militias. These states do not need a strong central military if they 
are not threatened by their neighbor countries or if they are protected 
by the international community. Relying on paramilitary forces can be 
an advantage for a state government if they can use the local militias 
as proxies to quell insurgents and rebels while denying responsibility 
for any brutality and human rights violation in the counterinsurgency 
campaign.65
Weak states without sufficient centralized power are more susceptible 
to intrastate conflicts—and intrastate conflicts tend to weaken the state. 
This is a vicious circle. It is necessary to strengthen the state if you want 
peace, but international initiatives to support state building have often 
had little or no success.
The opinion of the population is essential to the outcome of an 
asymmetric conflict. Insurgent movements have an advantage over 
a foreign occupying force in this regard, because they often have the 
support of the local population while it is difficult or impossible for an 
external force to win the hearts and minds of the people. The insurgents 
have an enduring commitment to the cause and they can rely on steady 
recruitment from the local population, whereas an external occupying 
force often lacks the patience and political commitment to a long-lasting 
and expensive conflict.66
The importance of mass communication has increased dramatically 
as the types of conflicts have changed and new electronic media have 
64  Ahram (2011, p. 8)
65  Ahram (2011, p. 4)
66  Rid and Hecker (2009, p. 3)
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made mass communication accessible and affordable to even small 
insurgent groups. These groups have gradually learned to use electronic 
communication to their advantage. Insurgent groups can publish news, 
images, and political statements immediately after a violent event due 
to their decentralized structure, while a bureaucratically structured state 
force typically responds more slowly because they need verification, 
declassification, and political approval before they can issue a press 
release. This asymmetry in information handling can give insurgents 
a leading edge towards the highly competitive news media, hungry for 
breaking news.67
All in all, there are many obstacles that prevent weak states from 
obtaining internal peace and from establishing a stable central 
government and economic autonomy. The decisive factor for the outcome 
of asymmetric conflicts is often psychology rather than violent victories 
and losses on a diffuse battlefield. Both parties in the conflict need 
support from their constituency or home base. They cannot continue the 
battle if they become unpopular with the people they represent or claim 
to represent. Both parties will try to disseminate information favorable 
to their cause. Obviously, disinformation and selective information 
abound in modern conflicts. It has become common for military forces 
to invite selected journalists to travel with them and report from the 
battlefield. These embedded journalists live with the troops and 
depend on them for protection. Obviously, their reports will reflect 
a one-sided view of the situation. Insurgents and guerillas may have 
less access to journalists and rely more on electronic communication 
and social media. This information war is important for consolidating 
their support. International opinion is particularly important. If one 
party wins the undivided sympathy of the international community, 
then they have almost won the conflict. The best chance that insurgents 
have of winning an asymmetric conflict is actually to sway international 
opinion in their favor and call for sanctions against their opponent.68
Democracy cannot prevent symmetric wars, but it may reduce the 
probability of civil war and insurgencies because it gives minorities a 
forum where their grievances can be heard.69
67  Rid and Hecker (2009, p. 131)
68  Münkler (2005, p. 25), Kellner (2011)
69  DeRouen (2014, chapter 4)
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Terrorism and accusations of terrorism are often significant elements 
in psychological warfare. The weaker party in an asymmetric conflict 
may turn their violence against civilians if there are no military targets 
that they can meaningfully attack, or if they consider that this is the 
only tactic that has any effect on their enemy. However, terrorism can 
be a very counterproductive strategy, as explained in chapter 6.1. The 
definition of terrorism is unclear and contested. It is easy to accuse 
someone of terrorism in a situation where the distinction between 
combatants and non-combatants is blurred or where there are no 
obvious military targets that can be attacked. The concept of terrorism 
is so vaguely defined, yet so highly laden with psychological, political, 
and legal significance today, that it has become common practice to 
accuse one’s enemy of terrorism—with more or less justification.
Asymmetric wars and guerilla wars often generate many refugees 
because civilians are more directly affected than in conventional 
interstate wars. A massive flow of refugees can have significant 
effects—intended or not—on psychological and strategic warfare for 
several reasons: (1) the flow of refugees can attract the attention of the 
international community; (2) massive migration can destabilize the 
region that receives the refugees; (3) refugee camps can be hotbeds for 
recruiting new fighters; and (4) humanitarian aid to refugee camps often 
finds its way to the fighting insurgents.70 
If we want to examine the regal effect of insurgencies and 
asymmetric conflicts we should look not only at the casualties but also 
at the psychological effects. These low-intensity conflicts typically have 
fewer casualties than interstate wars, but they pose more dangers to 
civilians and they can be quite long-lasting. Therefore, they have a very 
significant regalizing effect and they often lead to political or religious 
radicalization. Even the smallest ethnic or religious differences are 
amplified in this process. Ethnicity is a result of conflict as much as a 
cause of it.71
The regal effect is of course concentrated in the conflict zone, while 
the distant sponsors of a proxy war may be unaffected if their population 
pays no attention or has no knowledge of the clandestine sponsor 
activities of their governments. The sponsor countries may be affected, 
70  Münkler (2005, p. 18)
71  Turton (2003), Francis (2009)
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however, if they are hit by terrorist attacks or other forms of retribution 
or if they receive a massive influx of refugees from the conflict zone. 
The violence may spill over the boundaries of the initial conflict, and 
we may see blowback effects when radicalized proxy fighters become 
enemies of their former sponsors, as in Afghanistan, Syria, and several 
other countries (see chapter 5.5).72
A proxy war may be cheap for the external sponsors but devastating 
for the country that serves as battleground for the proxy war. The 
infrastructure is often severely damaged; powerful crime organizations 
do not disappear when the conflict ends, and a proxy may continue to be 
dependent on its sponsor.73 The country cannot easily escape the vicious 
circle of lawlessness, corruption, instability, poverty, and economic 
chaos that follows after a prolonged conflict. Such a failed state can be 
very difficult to recover. It can continue for years to be an international 
center for drug production, organized crime, and a training ground for 
insurgents from other countries.74
The international community has been very slow in coming to terms 
with the new forms of conflict. The traditional understanding of civil 
war does not fit the new pattern of low-intensity warfare.75 Analysts are 
using a variety of names for these conflicts suggesting that it is something 
exceptional. Research on asymmetric conflicts has mostly relied on the 
paradigms of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism based on the 
strategic interests of the stronger party in the conflict. This research is 
often sponsored by state actors who are parties to the conflict,76 and 
there has been less research by neutral observers analyzing this as 
the ‘new normal’ kind of conflict.77 International relations theory and 
international law and norms have not yet adapted to the new pattern of 
non-state actors and decentralized violence.78
The poor understanding of asymmetric conflicts has also led to 
ineffective responses. Many strategies aimed at ending the conflicts have 
72  Mumford (2013, p. 78), Hughes (2012, p. 47ff), Williams (2012), Carment and Samy 
(2014), Anderson (2016, chapters 2 and 11)
73  Mumford (2013, p. 105), Münkler (2005, p. 75)
74  Williams (2012), Carment and Samy (2014), Münkler (2005, p. 128)
75  Münkler (2005, p. 135)
76  Speckhard (2012, p. 467), Richardson, L. (2006, p. 11), Bale (2012)
77  Arreguin-Toft (2012)
78  Keen (2006, chapter 1), Geiss (2006)
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even been counterproductive. A highly militaristic approach is likely 
to escalate the conflict and make the population more regal and less 
inclined to accept a peaceful compromise. Prompted by the proclivity 
of the mass media to personalize conflicts and focus on individual 
leaders, politicians, and military strategists have often put the blame on 
tyrannical heads of state and individual terrorist leaders as responsible 
for the violence. These media phenomena are explained in chapter 5.1. 
The strategies have quite often had a narrow focus on removing ‘evil 
dictators’ or hunting down terrorist leaders.79 Such a strategy ignores 
the regal psychology that brought these militant leaders to power in the 
first place. A strategy that removes a militant leader by violent means 
is likely to make the affected population still more regal and make 
sure that his successor will be even more militant. Attempts to create 
democracy by violent means have failed time and again.80 
The international community will not be able to deal appropriately 
with asymmetric conflicts until it develops a better understanding of the 
root causes and grievances behind these conflicts and develops norms 
to regulate external sponsorship.
Attempts to establish peace, stability, prosperity, and democracy 
in third world countries have often been sabotaged by wealthy elites 
and foreign actors, especially in resource-rich countries. This will be 
explained in chapter 5.4.
4.5. Theories of revolution
Regality theory predicts that rebellion or revolution is likely to happen 
when there is an overly repressive regime and no external conflict or 
other dangers that can justify such a strong regime. In other words, a 
regal regime with a kungic population will be unstable. We will now 
look at existing theories of revolution to see if this is a likely path from 
a regal to a kungic society.
Early theories have often interpreted revolutions as manifestations 
of a class war where peasants and workers fought against a capitalist 
elite. However, this view had to be revised when historical studies 
79  Keen (2006, chapters 2 and 5)
80  Keen (2006, chapter 2)
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found that members of a divided elite play a leading role in revolutions, 
and that some revolutions were not based on class issues at all but on 
other political or religious issues.81
The sociologist and political scientist Jack Goldstone has studied 
revolutions through history and found that they have a number of 
factors in common. The most important condition for a revolution to 
be possible is that the government is weakened or unstable. There is 
a remarkable similarity between the factors that make a revolution 
possible and the factors that make an empire collapse, as discussed in 
chapter 4.2, even though a revolution is not necessary for an empire to 
disintegrate. Economic crises and conflicts between members of the elite 
are typical factors that make a state weak and vulnerable to revolution.82
Elite members who lose their privileges, see their wealth being 
undermined, or are excluded from influence will not support a weak 
regime with economic problems. A regime can also lose the allegiance 
of the elite if it squanders its wealth, wastes human lives in wars that it 
cannot win, or fails to respect the culture and religion of the people. A 
government must provide effectiveness and justice in order to maintain 
popular support.83
Revolutions happen more often in periods of high population growth. 
Overpopulation may lead to falling wages and rising prices for food 
and land. Inequality grows and the economy becomes unstable. There is 
growing competition for elite positions and increasing conflict between 
different factions of the elite. A critical event such as international 
pressure, military defeat, state bankruptcy, or famine—which a healthy 
state would be able to withstand—may trigger a revolution.84
Another consequence of high population growth is the youth bulge 
effect, discussed in chapter 3.4. A combination of high population 
growth and a growing and divided elite can produce a surplus of well-
educated and resourceful, but frustrated, young people who have both 
the skills and the motivation to lead a revolutionary movement.85 A 
large popular mobilization around a common ideology, and an alliance 
81  Skocpol (1994, p. 273), Goldstone (2001)
82  Goldstone (2001)
83  Goldstone (2001)
84  Goldstone (2003)
85  Heinsohn (2003)
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between commoners and frustrated elite members is necessary for a 
revolution to succeed. A dissatisfied and impoverished population is 
not enough to start a revolution. A strong and stable government with a 
loyal elite can always crush a rebellion.86
Sociologist John Foran has studied revolutions in third world 
dependent states where the interplay of internal and external factors is 
decisive. Colonial rule or a government that depends heavily on foreign 
support and foreign interests will always cause structural problems, 
inequalities, political exclusion, and repression. A political culture 
and ideology of resistance may develop, but this is not sufficient for a 
successful revolution. A revolutionary movement can only succeed if 
the state is weakened by economic problems, lack of loyalty from parts 
of the elite, and changes in the international situation.87
A revolutionary movement can often be seen as a kungic reaction 
against a regal and tyrannical government, but this is not always the 
case. Revolutions can happen for other reasons as well. An autonomous 
ruler who excludes the country’s elite from influence is vulnerable to 
rebellion because he lacks the support and loyalty of the elite. This 
was the case in the Iranian Revolution of 1979, for example, which 
happened because the Shah failed to respect the religion and culture of 
the population.88
Democracy is often the goal of a revolution, but rarely the result. It 
is difficult for a new revolutionary regime to establish the political and 
economic stability and safe living conditions that the old regime lacked. 
The failure of the new regime to create stability and welfare may lead 
to continued conflicts where the moderate reformists are replaced by 
more radical forces. The youth bulge adds fuel to internal conflicts that 
can last for years. In order to deal with these conflicts, the new regime 
may end up being more centralized, bureaucratic, and repressive than 
the one it replaces.89
The more violent a revolution is, the less likely it is to produce 
democracy. Democracy is more likely to emerge by gradual reform 
or by non-violent ‘velvet revolutions’ or ‘color revolutions’ than by 
86  Goldstone (2003)
87  Foran (2005, chapter 6)
88  Skocpol (1994, chapter 10)
89  Cincotta and Doces (2012), Goldstone (2001, 2003)
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violent overthrow of a despotic ruler.90 The outcome of a revolution also 
depends on whether important resources can be monopolized. Where 
industrialization has produced great concentrations of economic power 
in the form of large factories, mines, oil fields, and heavy infrastructure, 
a revolutionary regime is likely to seize these resources in its drive 
for power and create an autocratic regime. But when the sources of 
wealth are widely dispersed in the form of farmland, small shops, and 
artisan businesses, the revolutionary regime cannot seize control of the 
economy. In such cases, the likely result is a less centralized regime.91 
These historical findings confirm the theory of contest competition 
versus scramble competition discussed in chapter 3.1. Concentrated 
resources that can be monopolized and defended by a group are more 
likely to lead to a centralized government and a regal society than 
widely dispersed resources.
90  Pop-Eleches and Robertson (2014)
91  Skocpol (1994)

5. Economic Determinants of 
Conflict and Fear
5.1. Fear is profitable:  
The economy of the mass media
We have learned that the regality of a society depends on the perceived 
level of collective danger. Now we will look deeper into the factors that 
shape people’s perception of their surrounding world as either safe or 
full of dangers. If we can identify the most important factors that make 
people perceive their world as dangerous or safe then we may be able 
to predict whether a society will move in the regal or kungic direction.
A very obvious factor is the mass media. People can directly observe 
only what happens in their immediate vicinity. They have to rely mainly 
on the mass media for information about the political processes in their 
country, social problems, international conflicts, and almost everything 
else that happens in society at large. 
Before we look at the factors that influence the contents of the mass 
media, we will look at the theories of how the mass media influence 
people’s opinions. We need to incorporate the scientific disciplines of 
media effects theory and social cognition theory in order to understand how 
the mass media affect people’s perception of their social world. The 
mass media affect their audience in several different ways, including:1
1  Bryant and Oliver (2009), Iyengar and Kinder (2010)
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• Selection: for example, selective reporting of good or bad 
news about a particular subject, or preferential treatment of 
opinions for or against a controversial issue.
• Agenda setting: telling people what topics are important and 
what issues to think or be concerned about.
• Framing: telling people how to look at a particular issue. For 
example, nuclear power may be framed either in terms of 
(1) technological progress, (2) environmental hazards, or (3) 
a strategy for making the energy supply independent of oil 
from unstable foreign countries.
• Priming: making particular aspects of a phenomenon salient, 
for example, the criteria by which a politician is evaluated.
• Cultivation: the long-term effect of repeated exposure to 
similar stories.
The effects of framing and priming can be further explained in terms 
of social cognition theory: in modern society, people are bombarded 
with such a large amount of complex information that it is impossible 
to digest it all. We have to economize the use of our cognitive brain 
capacity. We do this by fitting new information that we receive into 
existing mental structures or models. Such a mental structure or model 
is variously called a cognitive schema,2 interpretive frame,3 social script,4 
or paradigm.5 For example, if news media report a home robbery, 
readers or viewers will immediately activate their cognitive schema 
for a home robbery. This schema includes a catalogue of objects that 
are typically involved, such as a house, stolen goods, weapons, vehicle, 
etc. and the roles of people involved, such as robber, victim, police, 
and witness. The cognitive schema also includes information about the 
supposed actions, motives, and emotions associated with each of these 
roles. The reader will easily understand what happened, even if some 
information is missing in the news report. Information that does not fit 
into the schema is likely to be ignored. The priming effect may influence 
2  Dimaggio (1997), Graber (1993, chapter 8)
3  Schetsche (2000, p. 109)
4  Abelson (1981)
5  Nersessian (2003)
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which schema is activated for a particular story when more than one 
fitting schema is available.
If people read or hear a story about a new phenomenon for which 
they have no appropriate cognitive schema, they may either: (1) lose 
interest and ignore the story; (2) apply a less appropriate schema and 
thereby misunderstand the story; or (3) build a new cognitive schema. 
The last reaction requires a lot of mental effort and is therefore less 
common. We will expect the framing effect to be particularly strong and 
possibly long-lasting in this situation, but this is an under-researched 
area.6 
A person’s world view is based on cognitive schemas (also called 
schemata), shaped by the mass media and by other information sources. 
People with different world views and different cognitive schemas 
are very likely to disagree on political issues. Cognitive schemas also 
influence the decision of political leaders about war and peace.7
With these theories in place, we will now look at the factors that 
influence the contents of the mass media. Scholars of media studies 
have listed a number of influential factors that determine the contents 
of the media:8
• journalists 
• editors 
• media owners 
• information sources 
• audience preferences 
• advertisers 
• technology 
• economic constraints 
• economic market forces
We need not go into detail about all these factors here, but the economic 
factors are particularly important. Commercial mass media in our 
6  Tewksbury et al. (2000)
7  Rosen (2005, chapter 2)
8  Shoemaker and Reese (2014), Wahl-Jorgensen and Hanitzsch (2009, p. 59), Ericson, 
Baranek and Chan (1989)
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modern society operate in a very competitive market. The media compete 
not only for readers or viewers but also for advertisers. In the view of 
many economists, the primary business of a commercial TV station is 
not selling news to its viewers, but selling the eyeballs of the viewers 
to the advertisers.9 The competition in the advertising market forces TV 
stations to produce entertaining programmes that appeal to the broadest 
possible audience in order to get as many viewers as possible to watch 
the commercials. The media appeal to our emotions to such a degree 
that the competition between the media has been called an emotional 
arms race.10 The result is trivialization and a blurring of the boundaries 
between news, entertainment, and advertisement. Controversial and 
complicated issues are avoided, while emotionally touching topics such 
as sex, violence, and danger get maximum coverage.11
Most economists believe that free competition in the media market is 
a guarantee that the most diverse range of topics, interests, and opinions 
is covered.12 However, many studies contradict this. The media shape 
the cognitive schemas of their audience. Once these cognitive schemas 
are formed, the audience will be less receptive to messages that do 
not fit into the already formed schemas. People prefer to hear uniform 
opinions rather than a diversity of opinions.13
The unrestrained competition has another unintended consequence: 
It gives the media fewer resources to produce quality content. In a 
monopoly situation where a country has only a single TV station, this 
station will have plenty of resources for investigative journalism and 
for producing a diversity of programmes of high quality. But if there 
are many commercial TV stations competing for the same advertising 
money, then there will be less money for each TV station to spend on 
the production of programmes, and consequently it will be unable to 
produce the same level of quality as in a less competitive market. This is 
a consequence of the fact that the fixed costs are high while the variable 
costs are virtually zero. The costs of producing a TV programme are 
the same whether there is one viewer or a million viewers.14 With few 
9  Meyer (2004)
10  Fuller (2010, p. 71)
11  McManus (2009)
12  McManus (2009)
13  McManus (2009), Gunther and Mugham (2000, chapter 12)
14  Berry and Waldfogel (1999, 2001)
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resources for investigative journalism, political news broadcasts are 
often reduced to an uncritical relaying of statements from leading 
politicians.15
The consequences of the fierce competition in the media market 
include: trivialization and tabloidization; more entertainment and less 
information; more gossip, celebrity scandals, sex, violence, crime, and 
disaster; less controversy, and less detailed analysis of complicated 
problems; and more focus on persons and less focus on principles and 
issues.16
This trivialization leads to a dumbing-down of the audience. People 
who have been fed this kind of news all their lives will lack the cognitive 
schemas necessary for understanding complicated issues, and they will 
be less likely to pay attention to alternative information sources that 
provide detailed discussion of complicated issues.17
Humans have an innate tendency to pay attention to danger because 
this has always been important for survival. This tendency makes 
us pay attention to all kinds of media stories about violence, crime, 
deviance, and disaster.18 The news media in a competitive market take 
advantage of this human tendency by presenting an extraordinary 
amount of bad news. Fear is profitable. Dramatic stories about crime 
and disaster make people buy the newspaper or watch the TV news. 
If nothing bad is happening then the media may even report people’s 
fear of bad things that might happen. The intense media focus on fear-
provoking stories has created a ‘culture of fear’, as Barry Glassner calls 
it.19 All too often, the media make us afraid of the wrong things. Minor 
dangers are hysterically blown out of proportions, while much more 
serious dangers in society go largely unnoticed.20 The exaggerated fears 
often lead to moral panics, unnecessary precautions, poor legislation, 
and ‘gonzo justice’.21
15  McManus (1995), Picard (2004)
16  Fuller (2010, chapter 7), Picard (2004), Esser (1999)
17  Baek and Wojcieszak (2009), Bennett and Iyengar (2008)
18  Fuller (2010, chapter 6), Shoemaker (1996)
19  Glassner (1999)
20  Altheide (2014), Glassner (1999)
21  Goode and Ben-Yehuda (2009), Altheide (1995, p. 97; 2002, p. 196)
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The effect of receiving a constantly high dose of crime and violence 
from television has been called the mean world syndrome.22 Heavy TV 
viewers come to perceive the world as a gloomy and dangerous place. 
Fearful people take drastic measures to protect themselves and their 
children—measures that are out of touch with the objective risk. As 
predicted by regality theory, fearful people become authoritarian and 
easy victims of political manipulation.23
The person-centered framing of issues makes people blame social 
problems on individuals rather than on political principles or social and 
economic structures.24 We see the effects of person-centered framing in 
several areas:
• Crime stories focus on perpetrators and victims. They focus 
more on violent crime and less on property crime. They 
report individual cases rather than statistics. Crime is blamed 
on moral defects in the perpetrator rather than on structural 
causes. The political consequence of this type of crime 
reporting is more prisons and fewer preventive measures,25 
even though most experts agree that crime prevention is more 
effective than punishment.26 
• Political news focuses more on the personalities and strategies 
of politicians and less on issues and ideologies. This makes 
voters cynical and disinterested.27 
• Social problems are blamed on individuals who are seen as 
responsible rather than on the underlying social or economic 
structures. This lack of focus on root causes undermines 
society’s problem-solving capacity.28 
• International conflicts are blamed on the ‘evil’ leaders of 
enemy states rather than on political and economic structures. 
This has led to many attempts to solve international conflicts 
by removing foreign leaders and governments by force. Such 
22  Signorielli (1990)
23  Signorielli (1990), Hetherington and Suhay (2011), Reith (1999)
24  Altheide (2014, p. 122), Iyengar (1996)
25  Altheide (2002; 2014, p. 144)
26  Welsh and Pfeffer (2013)
27  Capella and Jamieson (1997)
28  McManus (2009), Fuller (2010, chapter 7)
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coups and assassinations have often exacerbated the problems 
by leading to chaos and by making the conflict zones even 
more regal than they already were.
All in all, the implacable dependence of the commercial mass media on 
economic market forces has led to a framing and public perception of 
social problems that is superficial and out of touch with the root causes. 
At the national level, this has in many cases led to a very punitive and 
inefficient strategy against crime. At the international level, it has led 
to chaos, escalation of conflicts, and general regalization. Among the 
unintended consequences of market forces is that the mass media make 
people perceive the world as more dangerous than it is. This ‘mean 
world syndrome’ makes the whole culture more regal. Mass media 
competition is thus a root cause of one of the most important—and also 
most neglected—forces of regalization in our modern age. These media 
effects are seen most strongly in countries that have a very competitive 
media market and where non-commercial news media have a very low 
market share.29
This situation may change as the internet is radically changing the 
media landscape these years. It has become so cheap to disseminate 
information that even small political groups and grassroots organizations 
can afford to have their own website, blog, Facebook page, or Twitter 
account. Several states and governments are financing non-commercial 
news media with a worldwide target audience. Some of these media 
purvey partisan views and propaganda, while others are dedicated to 
presenting a diversity of opinions. However, in many countries it is still 
not possible to receive non-commercial local news of high quality.
The alternative or non-commercial news media are slow to penetrate 
the market. People do not easily switch to watching a new and unfamiliar 
kind of information source. They have to get used to different formats 
and learn new cognitive schemas before they can appreciate the less 
sensation-seeking alternative news media. 
But social media also make a contribution here. A message from 
even the most obscure source can be spread all over the world in a 
matter of days through Facebook and other social media if people find 
it sufficiently interesting. This mechanism makes it very difficult for 
29  Fog (2013)
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governments and powerful elites to cover up serious wrongdoing and 
scandals.
Messages are disseminated through social media according to 
the laws of memetics. The study of memetics tells us that messages 
are particularly likely to be spread through social media if they are 
interesting, important, easy to understand, and emotionally touching.30 
The social media can be regarded as a new ‘marketplace of ideas’ no 
less competitive than the commercial mass media, but controlled by 
different mechanisms of competition with different criteria. The theory 
of memetics tells us that a message can spread equally fast whether it 
is true or false, as long as no proof or disproof is immediately available. 
People soon realize that messages on social media are not always reliable 
unless it can be verified that they come from a trustworthy source. This 
weakens the role of social media as an information source.
The media landscape is changing fast and we have yet to see which 
way it is pushing our culture and world views. Different people follow 
different media, and the internet has niches for virtually any kind 
of special interest. The diversity of media also means a diversity of 
cognitive schemas and opinions. People who follow different media will 
have different cognitive schemas and therefore different interpretations 
of political events. We can predict that this will lead to a wider diversity 
of political opinions and ideas.31
The commercial media are shaped by anonymous market forces, 
and social media are shaped by the equally uncontrollable forces of 
memetic competition. The whole media landscape can be seen as 
a headless monster that nobody is able to control. Which way is this 
headless monster taking our culture and our world view? The answer 
is anybody’s guess.
5.2. Economic booms and busts
A stable economy is important for people’s existential security. This 
makes us predict that economic stability and security will stimulate 
a kungic climate, while an unstable economy or crisis will have a 
30  Tyler (2011), Berger (2013)
31  Bennett and Iyengar (2008)
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regal psychological effect. In fact, conflict studies have found a strong 
connection between affluence, peace, and democracy.32
People want to strengthen their nation or their social group when 
they experience a collective threat, and several studies show that 
economic crises can have such a psychological effect, just like other 
collective threats.33 The regal effect is strongest if the crisis is perceived 
as a collective threat. There is little or no regal effect if a bad economy is 
perceived as an individual problem. This does not mean that individual 
insecurity is inconsequential, but the consequences of individual 
insecurity are better explained by biological r/K theory (see chapter 3.3) 
than by regality theory (see chapter 2.2).
Economic insecurity and poverty mean poor living conditions and 
higher mortality. The r/K theory predicts that this will lead to higher 
fertility, which in turn may lead to overpopulation, epidemics, and war. 
Economic insecurity also means poor education, which may lead to 
youth crime, conflicts, and political radicalization. It is well-known that 
economic inequality can lead to political instability.34
A good, stable economy, on the other hand, will foster a more K-like 
strategy involving good education, which promotes the demographic 
transition (see chapter 3.4). These phenomena have obvious effects on 
regality. We can therefore expect that individual economic insecurity 
leads to a number of social problems which may lead to regality, while 
collective economic insecurity also leads to regality directly without 
these intermediate steps.
Here, we will first look at some of the mechanisms that cause economic 
instability. After this, we will look at historical examples of economic 
booms and busts and discuss their psychological consequences.
Some theories of economic instability
Economic activity in society goes up and down due to many factors, 
both endogenous and exogenous. High economic activity involves high 
employment, consumer optimism, and high consumer spending, while 
an economic downturn involves unemployment and less consumption. 
32  Gat (2006, p. 587)
33  Fritsche, Jonas and Kessler (2011), Inglehart and Welzel (2005, p. 161), Rickert (1998)
34  Galbraith (2012), Turchin (2012)
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Fluctuations in wages, public spending, interest rates, inflation, credit, 
savings, investment, and speculative bubbles are all factors that 
complicate the equation. Consumers and investors react to changes in 
the market, but the effects of these reactions are delayed, and the delays 
can cause fluctuations. Markets are also influenced by many external 
factors, such as varying crop yields, changes in international markets, 
shortage of natural resources, technological changes, national and 
international political changes, and violent conflicts.
These fluctuations in economic activity are traditionally called 
business cycles, but in reality they are random fluctuations with no 
predictable time periods. It may be argued that, if the fluctuations were 
predictable, then people would speculate against them and the effect of 
such speculation would cancel out any predictable changes. There are 
many different theories of business cycles—too many to review here—
where the different theories have their main focus on different factors.
While these short-term fluctuations appear to be relatively small and 
random, there are various mechanisms that may explain major long-
term effects and more dramatic changes. In chapter 4.2, we saw how the 
dynamics of empires in agrarian societies can lead to state bankruptcy 
and political collapse with periods of a hundred years or more.
A further explanation of the rise of despotic empires and kleptocratic 
regimes is provided in the theory developed by economist Daron 
Acemoglu and political scientist James Robinson.35 Political and 
economic institutions can be either inclusive or extractive, according to 
their theory. Inclusive institutions are institutions that give rights and 
protection to all members of a society, which is typical for a democracy. 
Extractive institutions are institutions that extract income and wealth 
from common people to serve the interests of a small elite. Extractive 
political institutions can facilitate the consolidation of extractive 
economic institutions, and vice versa. This positive feedback creates a 
Matthew effect that tends to stabilize such institutions and make them 
quite durable, as discussed in chapter 4.1. The opposite situation is seen 
when inclusive political and economic institutions mutually consolidate 
each other to create a democratic society that makes individual 
entrepreneurship attractive and generates a thriving economy.36
35  Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 80)
36  Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 81)
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The situation in most Western democracies today is that economic 
institutions and market forces are gaining more and more de facto 
power and influence, while the options available to politicians are 
limited by economic constraints. The nation state has lost much of its 
autonomy and territorial sovereignty to globalized economic market 
forces. Economic power is also becoming increasingly impersonal and 
anonymous.37 There is no longer any identifiable king or government 
who controls the economy. Instead, economic influence is concentrated 
around a group of major international banks who own shares in each 
other.38 The banks are formally controlled by their shareholders, but 
when these shareholders are other banks, and so on, it is hard to claim 
that any identifiable persons are in control at the top of the economic 
pyramid. It looks like the economy is controlled, to a large degree, by 
the impersonal market forces. The banks are required to maximize the 
returns on investment for their shareholders. This means that they are 
extractive economic institutions. We are facing the paradoxical situation 
today that Western society is based on inclusive political institutions 
(democracy) but extractive economic institutions (banks). The gradual 
shift in power from inclusive political institutions to extractive 
economic institutions is part of the reason why economic inequality is 
now growing fast nationally as well as internationally despite a political 
desire for more equality. A few extremely rich people now own as much 
as the poorest half of the world’s population.39 This growing inequality 
is likely to cause both political and economic instability.
The inequality and instability is driven to a large degree by 
globalization. Free trade across borders has led to widespread 
competition between countries for attracting industries and cheap labor. 
Many countries use low corporate tax rates, poor working conditions, 
and poor environmental regulation as methods for attracting profitable 
industries in this so-called race to the bottom.40
Another important reason why severe economic crises and collapses 
continue to happen is the inherent instability of the money system. 
Most countries have a fractional reserve banking system that allows 
37  Bauman and Bordoni (2014, chapter 1)
38  Vitali, Glattfelder and Battiston (2011)
39  Credit Suisse (2015), Oxfam (2017)
40  Buzbee (2003), Zodrow (2010), Duanmu (2014), Verschueren (2015), OECD (1998)
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banks to provide loans for more than they hold in reserves. This process 
sets electronic money in circulation that is not backed by any material 
wealth. Most of the money in circulation in the world today originates 
from debt to private banks.41 As this debt accumulates interest, there 
is much more debt in the world than there is money in circulation, as 
shown in table 5.
Money US$ trillion
Coins and banknotes (M0) 5
Narrow money (M1 = M0 + checkable deposits) 29
Broad money (M2 = M1 + savings, time deposits, 
and money market accounts)
81
All debt (government and private) 199
Derivatives (estimated) 630
Table 5. World money supply and debt in 2014.42
As this debt is repaid with money originating from new debt, the total 
debt keeps spiraling and there is no realistic chance that it can ever be 
repaid with the available money. The inevitable consequence is that 
somebody will be unable to pay their debt, even if nobody is culpable. 
It may be individuals who default on their debts and lose everything 
they own, or it may be companies, banks, or entire countries that go 
bankrupt. This unfortunate flaw in our money system has remained 
in obscurity for centuries,43 but today it is widely discussed among 
economists and political organizations.44
Economists have proposed many different explanations of 
long economic cycles (or Kondratiev cycles). A particularly useful 
explanation is Carlota Perez’s theory of technological revolutions.45 
Important technological breakthroughs such as the industrial revolution 
or electronic information technology can start a boom of investment, 
41  Werner (2014), McLeay, Radia and Thomas (2014)
42  Data sources: Desjardins (2015), Dobbs, Lund, Woetzel and Matafchieva (2015), 
CIA, “The World Factbook” (2016), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/
the-world-factbook
43  Zarlenga (2002)
44  Benes and Kumhof (2012), Mellor (2010)
45  Perez (2002, 2010)
 1055. Economic Determinants of Conflict and Fear
development, and economic growth. As new technology matures and 
the market for new products begins to saturate, capital investments 
begin to move from material wealth to paper wealth in the form of 
complex financial products. Those products generate a virtual growth 
that becomes more and more decoupled from the real economy. Such 
a decoupling of paper wealth from the real economy is evident in the 
amount of derivatives in table 5.
The boom ends when one or more asset bubbles collapse and the 
political need for regulating the wayward financial market becomes 
obvious. Some of the excess capital that was accumulated during the 
period of rapid growth is likely to be invested in new inventions that 
may start the next technological revolution. The whole cycle may take 
half a century or more.46
Most of the money in circulation originates from bank credit, as 
explained above. Today, only a small part of this bank credit is invested 
in new production equipment or other things that could benefit the real 
economy. Instead, most of the credit is used for changing the ownership 
of existing assets, such as real estate, factories, and intellectual rights. 
This process inflates asset prices. Housing costs are increased by 
inflated real estate prices, while the costs of production are increased by 
the inflated prices of the means of production. The consequence is that 
an increasing amount of money is extracted from the real economy and 
into the financial economy, where it serves to enrich a small financial 
elite. The result is rising inequality, instability, and insecurity. We have 
seen many examples of severe austerity, poverty, and destitution when 
asset bubbles burst and the spiraling debt can no longer be repaid.47
We have now looked at some—perhaps unorthodox—theories that 
seek to explain economic instability. It must be emphasized that there 
are many other theories of economic booms and busts. Whether one 
subscribes to one theory or another, it is a historical fact that economic 
crises, crashes, and collapses occur from time to time, and that economists 
and politicians have been remarkably bad at predicting them.48
46  Perez (2002, 2010)
47  Bezemer and Hudson (2016)
48  Reinhart and Rogoff (2009)
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Booms and busts in the twentieth century
World War II was a characteristic example of the connection between 
economic crisis and regality. The Great Depression of the 1930s was one 
of the worst economic crises in modern history, and many historians 
believe that this crisis played an important role in the outbreak of the 
war. Other factors that contributed to the war are discussed in chapter 6.4.
However, an economic crisis does not necessarily lead to regality and 
conflict. It depends on whether it is perceived as a collective threat or 
an individual threat. It also depends on whether the threat is perceived 
as coming from an external enemy. It is remarkable that the 2008 
financial crisis had little or no regal effect, while the Great Depression 
had a dramatic effect. The difference between these two crises requires 
an explanation. The earlier crisis was worse, but this is not the whole 
explanation for their remarkably different effects. How people perceive 
a crisis is important for its psychological effect. Many banks were bailed 
out by national governments in the 2008 crisis. Even though this was 
a controversial move, it gave the population an impression that the 
governments were in control of the situation. The bank runs in the 
1930s, on the other hand, gave an impression of chaos with nobody in 
control. Many people lost their savings. A large surplus of poor and 
unemployed young people served as fuel for the war (see chapter 6.4).
An important question in relation to regality theory is who is 
blamed for a crisis. If a crisis is blamed on foreign enemies or on general 
misfortune, then people will seek protection in collective action and 
desire to strengthen the government and the state. In other words, a 
regal reaction. But a crisis that is blamed on one’s own leaders may have 
the opposite effect, namely a kungic rebellion against leaders perceived 
as incompetent and despotic. 
In Germany in the 1930s, the massive propaganda of the Nazi regime 
blamed the crisis on Jews and other foreigners and there was hardly 
space for any counter-propaganda. The 2008 crisis, in contrast, was 
mostly blamed on ‘greedy bankers’ and inept political regulation. In 
other words, the latter crisis was blamed on an internal elite. A kungic 
reaction against the political and economic elite was seen in 2011 in the 
form of street protests in southern Europe and in the Occupy Wall Street 
movement, which was a protest against plutocracy.49
49  Bauman and Bordoni (2014, chapter 1)
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Between the two busts there was a boom. In the 1960s, we experienced 
extraordinary prosperity and economic growth. The climate of existential 
safety led to fast cultural changes in the kungic direction, epitomized 
by the student protests in 1968 and the ‘Flower Power’ movement. 
The kungic trends were particularly strong in Northern Europe. The 
Nordic countries had made it through the war in a relatively benign 
way compared to other European countries. Their strong traditions of 
social welfare were further developed into what is known as the Nordic 
welfare state with a strong social safety net, free education, and free 
universal healthcare. The existential security that the welfare state 
provided to all members of society had a strong kungic effect. It is no 
coincidence that the Nordic countries have a strong reputation as peace 
brokers. Despite their small size, the Scandinavian countries have been 
among the avant-gardes with respect to social security, sexual liberation, 
women’s liberation, and environment protection. However, the Nordic 
welfare state is now being undermined by globalization and the race to 
the bottom.
5.3. Greed or grievance:  
Economic theories of civil war
In the late 1990’s, a group of economists at the World Bank and the 
University of Oxford set out to investigate whether economic factors 
could explain civil wars. They found that the risk of civil war was 
correlated with various economic variables, while the relationship 
between the onset of civil war and ethnic diversity was non-significant 
or non-monotonic.50 The economists interpreted these findings as an 
indication that insurgent leaders were motivated by economic profit 
rather than by grievances such as ethnic discrimination.
A later modification of this theory focused more on opportunities 
and less on greed. The revised theory claims that predictions whether 
there will be conflict or peace cannot be based on the presence of 
grievances because grievances can be found (or invented) everywhere. 
The distinguishing factors that determine whether an insurgency breaks 
out or not are the economic and other factors that make insurgency 
financially and militarily feasible. The study portrays rebel leaders as 
50  Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2004)
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sadistic predators and their followers as irrational.51 A group of political 
scientists at Stanford University made similar findings, supporting 
the theory that civil wars depend on economic factors rather than on 
grievances.52
These publications sparked a long debate about whether insurgents 
were motivated by greed or by grievance. Critics argued that the 
economic studies had no relevant measures of grievances other than 
some very broad measures of ethnic diversity and income distribution.53 
In the initial study, the economists actually found a correlation between 
civil war and ethno-linguistic fractionalization, but they used this 
variable as an indicator of transaction costs rather than possible ethnic 
discrimination.54 Similarly, the economists used the size of an ethnic 
diaspora as a measure of external economic support but ignored the 
alternative explanation that the size of the diaspora might indicate the 
number of people who fled because of ethnic discrimination or other 
grievances.55
The distinction between greed and grievance may be an over-
simplification, and some studies have found mixed results for the 
influence of resource wealth on civil wars.56 It appears that lucrative 
economic resources have more influence on the duration of armed 
conflicts than on their onset.57 Case studies of a number of individual 
conflicts have revealed more complex causal mechanisms that defy the 
distinction between political and economic motives for conflict.58
The publications that explain insurgencies in terms of economic 
factors rather than grievances are widely cited and quite influential 
despite their admitted methodological weaknesses and poor data. 
Perhaps the popularity of the ‘greed’ explanation is due to the fact that it 
is politically convenient. It legitimizes the continued repression of ethnic 
51  Collier, Hoeffler and Sambanis (2005), Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner (2009)
52  Fearon and Laitin (2003)
53  Cramer (2002), Cederman, Gleditch and Buhaug (2013, chapter 2), Keen (2012, 
chapter 2)
54  Collier and Hoeffler (1998)
55  Collier and Hoeffler (2004)
56  De Soysa and Neumayer (2007), Weinstein (2005)
57  Ballentine and Sherman (2003, p. 267)
58  Ballentine and Sherman (2003, p. 259), Collier and Sambanis (2005)
 1095. Economic Determinants of Conflict and Fear
minorities by making their grievances irrelevant and by portraying 
insurgents as greedy, irresponsible, and irrational.59
A different group of conflict researchers collected more detailed 
and reliable data related to the grievances of ethnic groups. They found 
strong evidence that the onset of civil war is related to grievances such 
as economic inequality and political exclusion of ethnic groups.60 Such 
conflicts are particularly frequent in sub-Saharan Africa, where the 
boundaries of former colonies are not aligned with cultural and ethnic 
boundaries.61 Another group of political scientists found that the regime 
type and degree of democracy is the most important determinant of 
conflict, while economic conditions, geography, and demography are 
less important.62
It is useful to distinguish between factors that influence the onset of 
civil wars and factors that influence their duration. Conflict researchers 
have found that strong rebel groups who can pose a credible challenge 
to the government tend to fight shorter wars and are more likely to see 
an outcome favorable to them, while weak and peripheral groups with 
strong grievances but little power are likely to see long and intractable 
conflicts. Negotiated settlements are unlikely in the highly asymmetric 
conflicts between a state power and an excluded minority group.63 
There is general agreement among scientists that external support or 
intervention tends to lengthen intranational conflicts.64
Part of the disagreement in the greed-versus-grievance debate stems 
from different interpretations of the data. For example, conflicts are 
more frequent in areas rich in oil, minerals, or other valuable resources. 
This may be interpreted as greed when the insurgency is financed by 
these resources, or as grievance when the insurgents protest against the 
government’s exploitation of resources in a territory that they perceive 
as theirs.
Just as it is misguided to ignore grievances as a cause of insurgencies, 
it would be equally misguided to ignore the economic and other factors 
59  Keen (2012)
60  Cederman, Gleditch and Buhaug (2013, p. 206), Cederman, Wimmer and Min 
(2010), Buhaug (2006)
61  Cederman, Gleditch and Buhaug (2013, chapter 4)
62  Goldstone et al. (2010)
63  Cederman, Gleditch and Buhaug (2013, chapter 8)
64  Collier and Hoeffler (2004), Cederman, Gleditch and Buhaug (2013, p. 189)
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that make insurgency possible and feasible. Violent insurgencies cannot 
take place if the potential rebels have insufficient funding sources or 
insufficient access to weapons, no matter how strong their grievances.65 
On the other side of the conflict, the interest of a powerful elite to 
suppress democratic rebellion or to support anti-democratic coups is 
often based on strong economic motivations.66
Civil wars are more likely to break out when the state is weak, when 
the insurgents are strong and well financed, and when they have an 
ample supply of young recruits. A mountainous terrain also seems to be 
favorable to insurgents.67
There are inconsistent findings on the influence of education 
on conflicts. One study finds that ethnic conflicts are more likely 
when people have money but no education, while class conflicts and 
revolutions are more likely when people are educated but poor.68 
Education is a resource that can help rebels organize, build alliances, 
analyze political dynamics, and make propaganda, while lack of access 
to education can contribute to the grievances that motivate people for 
conflict. Education is associated with advancement of the demographic 
transition, lower population growth, and higher welfare—all factors 
that promote peace.69
Finally, we should not ignore the influence of third parties who profit 
from a conflict70 or depend on the export of critical resources from the 
conflict area.71 In chapter 4.3, we saw that economic factors and access to 
critical resources are often the root causes of symmetric wars. The same 
factors may be decisive in asymmetric wars, especially as motivating 
factors for the strong part in the conflict. This is further discussed in 
chapter 5.4.
65  Regan and Norton (2005)
66  Acemoglu and Robinson (2005)
67  DeRouen (2014, chapter 4), Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner (2009), Fearon and Laitin 
(2003), Hegre and Sambanis (2006), Buhaug and Lujala (2005)
68  Besançon (2005)
69  Lechler (2015), Collier and Hoeffler (2004), Cincotta, Engelman and Anastasion 
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5.4. The resource curse
Natural resources are becoming increasingly scarce and expensive 
as a consequence of the insatiable demand for growth in the modern 
economic system. Many third world countries have rich occurrences 
of natural resources in high demand such as oil, minerals, and fertile 
land. Paradoxically, these valuable resources have often turned out to 
be a curse rather than a blessing because they give rise to conflicts and 
corruption rather than enriching the country.
In chapter 3.1, we saw how a concentration of resources in small 
defendable patches leads to contest competition and a higher level of 
conflict. This still applies in the modern world even though the conflicts 
are no longer over food patches but over oil wells and mineral mines.
An important economic study at the Peace Research Institute Oslo 
has found that many resource-rich countries are poorly developed 
because of the way the rents from the resources are spent. Entrepreneurs 
often use the profit from resource extraction in a way that economists 
call ‘unproductive rent extraction’ or ‘grabbing’, rather than productive 
activities that benefit the country. Countries with weak government 
institutions are more ‘grabber friendly’ as these economists express it. 
The grabbing entrepreneurs spend a significant part of their profit on 
supporting a corrupt and grabber-friendly government that allows them 
to export most of the profit out of the country rather than benefiting 
local industry. Countries with strong and transparent government 
institutions, on the other hand, are able to avert the resource curse 
and use their resources in a way that benefits local industry and the 
country’s economy.72
Oil is no doubt the number one cause of resource curse problems 
today, but other important resources such as food, water, land, timber, 
and minerals are also frequent sources of conflict.73 International investors 
actively buy land and mining rights, for example, in order to secure their 
future access to resources that are expected to become scarce.74
72  Mehlum, Moene and Torvik (2006)
73  Ross (2012), Carmody (2011)
74  Jacur, Bonfati and Seatzu (2015)
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Extractive industries have little or no interest in establishing 
democracy. The voters in a democratic country will want to distribute 
the wealth produced by extraction of natural resources to purposes 
that benefit the country’s population, while a dictatorial government 
can be manipulated or bribed by transnational companies to allow 
large amounts of wealth to be exported. There is plenty of evidence 
that foreign actors have secretly supported or promoted undemocratic 
forces in resource-rich countries although they purportedly support 
democracy.75 For example, the coup in Iran in 1953 that brought the 
Shah to power was led by US and British secret services in order to 
reverse Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh’s nationalization of 
oil.76 Even today, the USA is stepping up military operations in almost 
all African countries in order to defend its security interests.77 By doing 
this, the USA may inadvertently be impeding progress and supporting 
kleptocratic and grabber-friendly regimes.
The resource curse can be a serious impediment to economic 
development. For example, the Republic of Niger currently has the 
lowest development index of all countries in the world despite—or 
rather because of—a rich export of uranium and oil. Frequent conflicts 
over the valuable resources have destabilized the country, which has 
seen four coups and several coup attempts since its independence in 
1960.78 A similar fate has befallen the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
which holds more than half of the world’s reserves of the mineral coltan 
that is important for the electronics industry.79 The poor development 
of resource-rich countries can be explained by a combination of vicious 
circles involving both political, social and economic effects. The rent 
from oil extraction, mining, or other extractive industries benefits a small 
elite but produces few jobs for the local population. The elite have an 
interest in shaping policy to secure their own advantageous position by 
investing in security rather than in the development of other productive 
sectors. A surplus of labor and subsidized unproductive employment 
leads to poor development and delayed demographic transition.80
75  Hiatt (2007, chapter 1), Looney (2012, chapters 3, 6, 12, 14 and 24)
76  Ross (2012, chapter 2)
77  Turse (2015)
78  Carmody (2011, chapter 6)
79  Carmody (2011, chapter 6), Keen (2012, chapter 2)
80  Auty (2012)
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Rich resources can lead to conflicts between national and foreign 
actors, and between different foreign actors such as the USA, Europe, 
and China, who compete for access to the resources of third world 
countries. There are also frequent conflicts between insurgents and 
a government that squanders wealth rather than spending it for the 
benefit of the people. Secession conflicts can arise when different groups 
compete for resource wealth that is concentrated in a particular part of a 
country. For example, a conflict over oil resources in Sudan led to a split 
of the country in 2011, and the conflict continues.81
Rich resources can often fuel and escalate conflicts that may have 
started for reasons unrelated to the resources. Governments of resource-
rich countries are likely to use their riches to finance military operations 
in internal as well as external conflicts, but resource wealth may also 
end up in the hands of insurgents, so that both parties in a civil war are 
financing their operations from the same resource.82 There are several 
ways in which insurgents can use resources as a means of financing their 
operations. Resources that are easy to loot and smuggle are particularly 
useful for insurgents, as we have seen with diamonds in Sierra Leone.83 
The lawlessness and chaos in a civil war makes it possible for guerillas 
to profit from the production of drugs and other illegal trade. Finally, 
insurgents can profit from an existing industry by stealing the product 
and by extortion. Oil extraction and mining in remote areas are 
particularly vulnerable to extortion because of the large sunk costs that 
are invested in the industry and because the industry cannot easily be 
moved to another place.84
After World War II, the global oil market was dominated by a cartel 
of oil companies, commonly known as the Seven Sisters. The behavior 
of the Seven Sisters became so intolerable that, in the 1970s, most oil-
rich countries nationalized their oil production. However, government 
institutions in many of these countries were not strong enough to handle 
the windfall of new wealth accountably. The lack of oversight enabled 
autocrats to consolidate their power by increasing spending, lowering 
taxes, buying the loyalty of the armed forces, and concealing their own 
81  Ross (2012, chapter 5), Peck and Chayes (2015, p. 6), le Billon (2004)
82  Ross (2012, chapter 1)
83  Le Billon (2004), Wilson, S. (2013)
84  Ross (2012, chapter 1), Clarke (2015)
114 Warlike and Peaceful Societies
corruption and incompetence.85 Many of the oil-rich countries also used 
their new wealth to finance wars and conflicts.86 Oil prices are quite 
volatile because the market is inelastic, and extreme price fluctuations 
have caused political instability.87
When the economy of a country is dominated by a single sector, other 
sectors are likely to suffer. This is known as the Dutch disease. The high 
income from oil production leads to an increase in the real exchange rate 
of the oil-rich countries. This makes other sectors such as agriculture 
and manufacturing less profitable. The export of other products goes 
down and the import of food and other products outcompetes much 
of the domestic production. The result is lack of investment in other 
sectors, lack of development, unemployment, economic inequality, and 
further political instability.88
The low demand for labor in these countries has consequences for the 
role of women in society. While men may find jobs in the construction 
industry, there are fewer jobs in export-oriented industries, such as 
textile production, which typically hire more women. Statistically, 
women who work at home have more children than women who make 
a career outside of the home. This leads to higher population growth 
and less economic development, whereby the demographic transition 
is thwarted. The patriarchal values of countries in the Middle East have 
often been explained with reference to Islam, but statistical studies 
show that oil production explains the low status of women better than 
does religion.89
Resource conflicts are not always fought by violent means. 
International actors often use more subtle economic weapons to gain 
access to valuable resources. A quite common strategy used by the 
international extractive industry is to control resource-rich countries 
by imposing unpayable debt on them. The countries are offered large 
infrastructure projects to be financed through loans from international 
banks, the World Bank, or the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Most 
of the borrowed money goes to international contractors rather than to 
local businesses. The profits from the finished projects are invariably 
85  Ross (2012, chapter 1)
86  Peck and Chayes (2015)
87  Ross (2012, chapter 2)
88  Ross (2012, chapter 2)
89  Ross (2012, chapter 4)
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less than estimated and insufficient to service the debt. Unable to 
pay back the debt, the countries are required to implement so-called 
structural adjustment reforms as a condition for debt relief. The structural 
adjustment reforms include privatization and deregulation of industry 
as well as lowering of taxes and trade barriers. These reforms are 
supposed to improve the economy of the country by attracting foreign 
investment, but often the paradoxical consequence of these reforms has 
been to allow international companies to expand the extractive industry 
that benefits mostly foreign investors and suppresses or outcompetes 
local industry.90
The economic mechanisms that lead developing countries into 
growing debt are poorly understood by contemporary politicians. The 
common system of fractional reserve banking creates more debt than 
money, as explained in chapter 5.2. Private banks earn rents simply 
because most of the money in circulation originates from debt. The 
privileged status of the US dollar as a reserve currency and the role of 
the dollar in international trade increase the demand for dollars and 
allow American banks to extract rent from the international circulation 
of dollars. Of particular importance is the fact that the international oil 
trade is based on US dollars. This so-called petrodollar system gives the 
dollar a privileged status and generates rent for US banks at the cost of 
oil-producing countries and oil consumers. 
Some analysts believe that the American desire to uphold the 
petrodollar system has played an important role in conflicts with oil-
producing countries. For example, the seemingly groundless war against 
Iraq and its leader Saddam Hussein makes more sense when we know 
that Hussein decided prior to the war to switch to euros as the currency 
for the country’s oil exports.91 In the same vein, analysts suspect that 
the US-led wars against Libya and Syria, and the tensions with Iran and 
Russia, are connected with attempts to control the oil market and the 
desire of these countries to trade oil in currencies other than the dollar.92 
It must be emphasized, though, that this is an unproven theory and that 
both sides in a conflict are likely to spread deceptive propaganda.
90  Hiatt (2007, chapters 1, 9, 11 and 12), Shiva (2013, p. 31), Babb (2005), Hudes (2009), 
Münkler (2005, p. 89)
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5.5. Example: Proxy war in Afghanistan
Now we will look at the history of Afghanistan and discuss how a long 
series of conflicts and proxy wars has made this one of the most regal 
countries in the world.
The landlocked country of Afghanistan is rugged with high 
mountains and sparse vegetation. It has a typically continental climate 
with extreme variations in temperature. People have lived for several 
thousand years as herding nomads and farmers in this area. Many 
villages are concentrated at plateaus and along rivers where irrigation 
of the fields makes high agricultural production possible.93
The geography of the country makes violent conflicts likely. The 
fertile, irrigable spots of land are likely to be coveted, and warriors are 
able to travel far with few obstacles. Until the introduction of modern 
technology, however, the sizes of traveling armies were limited by the 
poor roads and the sparsity of food. The influences of environmental 
factors on the level of conflicts in a geographic area are discussed in 
chapter 3.1 and chapter 7.
Afghanistan has a strategically important position in Central Asia. 
Historically, the Silk Road and other important trade routes have gone 
through this area. Afghanistan has often been called ‘the graveyard of 
empires’. Throughout more than a thousand years, the area has been a 
border zone of one empire after another that tried to conquer the land 
from all directions. The shifting empires were unable to fully control the 
land, however, with its many autonomous villages separated by large 
areas of infertile land.94
In the mid-eighteenth century, the area gave rise to its own empire, 
the Durrani Empire, with its capital in Kandahar. The Durrani dynasty 
ruled for almost a century until a series of wars with Great Britain that 
started in 1839.95 The present-day Afghanistan became independent in 
1919 after the Third Anglo-Afghan war.96
Starting in 1956, Afghanistan developed increasingly strong ties with 
the Soviet Union. The country received large amounts of economic and 
93  Barfield (2010, chapter 1)
94  Barfield (2010, chapters 2 and 4), Rashid (2002, p. 7)
95  Abbas (2014, p. 23)
96  Barber (2008, p. 44)
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military aid from the Soviets. A communist government was established 
in 1978 after two violent coups. The anti-religious ideology of the 
communists was very far from the traditions of the deeply religious 
Islamic population, and soon a revolt against the government started in 
the town of Herat. Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan in 1979 to crush 
the rebellion. This became the start of a series of civil wars. Millions of 
Afghans fled the country during the following years. A large part of 
them ended up in refugee camps in Pakistan.97 
A growing resistance movement of Islamic warriors, known as the 
Mujahideen, received billions of dollars in aid as well as training and 
weapons from the USA, China, Saudi Arabia, and several other states. 
Most of this aid was channeled through Pakistan’s intelligence service, 
the ISI, which played a major role in the conflict.98
Thousands of radical Muslims from forty-three Islamic countries 
joined the Mujahideen guerillas to support the fight against the ungodly 
communists. The US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) actively 
supported the recruitment of Muslims for the Mujahideen because they 
did not want to see the Soviet empire expanding. The war lasted until 
1989, when Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev ordered a withdrawal 
of Soviet forces. A million Afghans had been killed and six million had 
become refugees.99
The Afghan infrastructure was totally demolished by the long war. 
Roads, fields, livestock, and irrigation canals had been bombed by the 
Russians to destroy the villages where the Mujahideen guerillas were 
hiding. The Mujahideen were poorly educated and hardly able to 
govern a state. Chaos, lawlessness, and banditry prevailed. Large parts 
of the country were controlled by local warlords who had got hold of 
the many weapons left from the war.100
A group of leaders in local religious schools—the so-called 
madrassas—took action against the lack of security and started to 
punish warlords and bandits for stealing, raping, and bullying the 
population. This became the start of the Taliban movement. The Taliban 
quickly became popular because they established order and security 
97  Rashid (2002, p. 13), Abbas (2014, p. 32), Nojumi (2002, p. 197)
98  Abbas (2014, p. 54), Nojumi (2002, p. 83), Murshed (2006, p. 33), Abbas (2005, p. 110)
99  Rashid (2002, p. 19, 129), Nojumi (2002, p. 95), Abbas (2005)
100  Rashid (2002, p. 21), Abbas (2014, p. 55), Murshed (2006, p. 39)
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in the lawless country. Local military commandos switched sides and 
brought weapons with them to the Taliban. The movement grew as 
returning refugees joined them. The Taliban interpreted their success 
as a sign that it was God’s will that they should prevail, and within a 
few years they controlled large parts of the country. The Taliban finally 
captured the capital Kabul in 1996 and established the Islamic Emirate 
of Afghanistan, which ruled almost ninety percent of the country. They 
received support from Pakistan, and from Saudi Arabia and other Arab 
countries.101 The northern part of Afghanistan was still under Russian 
influence and against the Taliban. The Northern Alliance was formed in 
1997 to fight against the Taliban. It received support from Russia, Iran, 
and India.102
The Taliban rule was based on their own extremely strict interpretation 
of Sharia law. Women were not allowed to work outside the home and 
were required to cover their faces in public. Girls were not allowed to 
go to school. Music, dancing, and games were banned. Music tapes, 
videos, and televisions were destroyed. The strict religious discipline 
that had enabled the Taliban to establish order in the lawless country 
came at a high price. The Taliban were vigilante militias with a religious 
education, but they were not educated for governing a country and they 
made many mistakes. In 1998, they killed ten Iranian diplomats, and 
this forced Iran to go into conflict with the Taliban.103
Many of the people who joined the Taliban were young Afghan 
refugees who had grown up in refugee camps in Pakistan. The only 
education they had been able to get was in the madrassas. Pakistan’s 
ruler Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, who had come to power by a military 
coup in 1977, supported the expansion of the network of conservative 
madrassas in his country. Zia was not a religious extremist himself, but 
he supported the conservative religious forces for strategic reasons. He 
probably understood that a deeply religious population would be less 
likely to demand democracy than a more secular population.104 The 
madrassa students were recruited from deeply religious people, poor 
101  Rashid (2002, p. 21), Abbas (2014, p. 62), Murshed (2006, p. 42), Richardson, L. (2006, 
p. 89)
102  Murshed (2006, p. 49)
103  Rashid (2002, p. 204), Abbas (2014), Nojumi (2002, p. 168), Murshed (2006)
104  Abbas (2005, p. 100)
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refugees, and orphans. The education in the madrassas was aimed at 
religious work rather than trade or other occupations. Whether the 
madrassa leaders realized it or not, they were educating loyal cannon 
fodder for the civil wars in Afghanistan, Kashmir, and elsewhere.105
The Taliban attracted Islamic extremists from many countries, and the 
areas under Taliban control became a sanctuary for radical international 
Islamist groups. One of those Islamists who sought protection under 
Taliban was Osama bin Laden. In 1989, bin Laden became the leader of 
al-Qaeda—an Islamist network, mainly Salafist, which was fighting for 
a caliphate and against Western interference in the Islamic countries. 
Al-Qaeda fought along with the Taliban in the Afghan civil war, but they 
also had a more international focus. Allegations that the CIA supported 
bin Laden cannot be confirmed, but the Pakistan Inter-Services 
Intelligence (ISI) had recruited bin Laden, and the CIA supported the 
ISI as well as the Taliban.106
Al-Qaeda was linked to the first terror bombing of the World Trade 
Center in New York in 1993 and was actively involved in the bombing 
of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. The USA switched 
sides when they discovered that the anti-Russian forces they had so 
generously supported and armed were also anti-American. US forces 
bombed targets in Afghanistan and Sudan in retaliation and started a 
hunt for bin Laden.107
The terror attacks against New York and Washington on 11 September 
2001 were a turning point for Afghanistan. The US administration 
immediately named al-Qaeda and bin Laden as the culprits behind 
these dramatic terror attacks. The USA demanded that the Taliban 
expel al-Qaeda and extradite bin Laden. The Taliban refused to comply 
with these demands until they had received evidence that al-Qaeda was 
responsible for the terror attacks. They were not satisfied with the weak 
evidence provided. Less than a month after the terror attacks, the USA 
went to war with Afghanistan, with the aim of removing the Taliban 
from power, destroying al-Qaeda, and hunting down bin Laden. 
Rebuilding the nation had low priority. A coalition led by the USA and 
NATO fought for thirteen years in Afghanistan. The coalition forces 
105  Butt (2012), Bird and Marshall (2011, p. 167)
106  Rashid (2002, p. 131), Abbas (2014, p. 73)
107  Rashid (2002, p. 134)
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withdrew in 2014, but conflicts continued. The chaos and insecurity that 
had led to the formation of the Taliban twenty years earlier plagued the 
country once more, and the Taliban has grown again, though they do 
not rule the country.108
The introduction of drones has changed the way of fighting. The USA 
focuses more on drone-killing leading members of Taliban and al-Qaeda 
and less on the reasons why these organizations exist. The death toll 
may be smaller in a drone war than in other kinds of war, but there 
are still many civilian casualties. Drone strikes are frightening to the 
general population because they are seen as an uncontrollable external 
force that kills randomly without warning. The US drone strikes have 
led to increased recruitment for the Taliban, and we can conclude that 
this new military technology has a regalizing effect comparable to other 
ways of fighting.109
Both the Northern Alliance and the Taliban have relied heavily on 
drug production as a funding source. There is a strong symbiosis between 
guerillas and drug producers. The guerillas need the drug money, and 
the producers need the guerillas for protection and smuggling. As a 
consequence of this self-sustaining cycle, Afghanistan has become the 
world’s largest producer of heroin and hashish, with hundreds of drug 
laboratories.110 It appears that the USA did nothing to stop this booming 
drug industry.111
Another factor in the conflict was the large unused resources of oil 
and minerals in Central Asia. There was intense competition between 
two oil companies, the US-based Unocal and the Argentinian Bridas, 
for permission to build a gas pipeline through Afghanistan. Access to 
the oil resources was an important focus for the US involvement in the 
conflict prior to 2001.112
Afghanistan has been the battleground for many simultaneous 
conflicts within this period: a contest between the two superpowers USA 
and the Soviet Union; a conflict over oil and other natural resources; 
conflicts between the many ethnic groups in the country; the illegal 
108  Rashid (2002), Abbas (2014, p. 117), Murshed (2006, p. 294), Bird and Marshall 
(2011, p. 111)
109  Abbas (2014, p. 166, 201)
110  Scott (2003, p. 31), Peters, G. (2011)
111  Risen (2006, p. 154), Scott (2003)
112  Rashid (2002, p. 160)
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drugs trade; conflicts between Muslims and anti-religious communists, 
Sunni and Shia Muslims, moderate Sufis and the more fundamentalist 
Salafists and Wahhabis; conflicts between Iran and Pakistan; and a 
central focus in the USA’s global war on terror. At the same time, 
Afghanistan has been a training ground for fighters in the conflict 
between Pakistan and India over Kashmir as well as for al-Qaeda’s fight 
against US dominance in the Middle East. 
These conflicts have been fought to a large extent by local militias 
with poor education but with large amounts of external support from 
each of their sponsor. All warring parties used local militias as proxies 
because local knowledge of the rugged terrain was essential for 
military success. Arming local militias whose loyalty could change was 
a dangerous strategy.113 The USA, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and several 
other countries have supported the Taliban with billions of dollars as 
well as with weapons, training, and logistics. Russia, Iran, and India 
have supported the Northern Alliance on the other side. Everyone 
supported their local proxies based on the dubious logic that my 
enemy’s enemy is my friend. The external support has enabled these 
impoverished tribespeople to fight on a much larger scale then they 
would have been able to do otherwise. The casualties, the number of 
refugees, and the destruction of infrastructure have been much higher 
than any ‘natural’ conflict would bring without external support. 
This is why the regal effect of this conflict has been so high and why 
Afghanistan under the Taliban was one of the most regal societies we 
have seen in modern times.
Regal influences from neighbor countries also played a significant 
role. The political climate in Pakistan had been radicalized by the 
conflict with India over Kashmir and East Pakistan—now Bangladesh—
while Zia-ul-Haq actively supported radical Islamic groups for strategic 
reasons.114 At the same time, the Islamic revolution in Iran and the war 
with Iraq had given Iran strict religious rule. Pakistan and Iran both 
contributed to the conflict in Afghanistan by supporting their chosen 
sides.
The extreme regality of the Taliban showed itself in many ways. The 
Taliban gained momentum initially by punishing rape, homosexuality, 
113  Giustozzi (2012)
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and other sexual crimes. Culprits were publicly punished and often 
killed and hanged in the streets for everybody to see. The regality was 
also reflected in cultural life, as predicted by our theory. Music, dance, 
paintings, and most games were banned, but all this returned quickly 
when the Taliban was removed from power.115 Ancient pieces of art 
from before the Islamic period were destroyed in the National Museum 
in Kabul. International condemnation was universal when the Taliban 
destroyed two giant Buddha statues from the sixth century.116
A very conspicuous sign of regality was the seclusion and complete 
veiling of women under the Taliban. Before the Taliban rule, there was 
a diversity of opinions about the liberation of women and whether 
they should be veiled. Women were free to go with or without the veil, 
and some even wore miniskirts when this was in fashion in the 1960s 
and 70s (compare figures 9 and 10).
The majority of women lived in villages where veiling was 
incompatible with the hard work. Rich women in the cities carried a 
veil as a status symbol to show that they did not have to work hard. 
Many women put on the veil during the war with the Russians as 
a symbol of their cultural difference from the Russians. But under 
the Taliban there was no choice. Women had to cover themselves 
completely, including the face.117
Many commentators have described the Taliban as a Frankenstein’s 
monster. After US support had helped them come to power, the Taliban 
and its associated organization al-Qaeda became bitter enemies of the 
USA.118 The US administration and the CIA have not learned from 
their mistakes in Afghanistan. They are doing the same thing in Syria 
right now. The USA and its allies have supported opposition groups 
in Syria in an attempt to topple President Bashar al-Assad, while 
Russia supports Assad.119 Opposition groups became powerful with US 
support, only to grow into one of the most brutal and feared ‘terrorist 
organizations’, variously known as Islamic State, ISIS, ISIL, or Daesh. 
115  Rashid (2002), Baily (2015)
116  Rashid (2002, p. 76), Abbas (2014, p. 71)
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There are presently many rumors about who is supporting whom in 
Syria but little reliable evidence. It is too early to write the history books 
as events are still unfolding, but we can already see the signs of a new 
proxy war between the USA and Russia in Syria.
Figure 9. Students at the Higher Teachers’ College, Kabul, Afghanistan, 
1967. Before the war, the religious dress code was not always observed. 
Photo by William (Bill) F. Podlich, 1967.120
Figure 10. Afghan women wait outside a USAID-supported health care 
clinic, Afghanistan, 2003. The increased regality is clearly reflected in 
the women’s dress. Photo by Nitin Madhav, 2003.121 
120 All rights reserved, reproduced with permission, http://www.pbase.com/qleap/
image/120404891
121 Public domain, https://no.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fil:Group_of_Women_Wearing_
Burkas.jpg

6. Strategic Uses of Fear
6.1. Terrorism conflicts
Terrorism often leads to a significant regalization of the attacked 
society. This leads to further repression of the political interests that 
the terrorists are fighting for and therefore more terrorism. The current 
chapter explains this vicious circle.
There is no common agreement on how to define terrorism or on 
deciding who should be called terrorists. It is often said that one man’s 
terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter. Some definitions of terrorism 
focus on the terrorization of people through shocking acts of violence. 
Other definitions point at political violence against civilians. And some 
definitions regard terrorism as a form of political communication where 
the intended audience is broader than the immediate victims of the 
violent acts. The word ‘terrorism’ was originally used about tyrannical 
leaders who terrorized their population, but today the word is mostly 
used about rebels fighting against a government—many definitions 
explicitly exclude government actors as terrorists.1
All attempts to reach a common definition of terrorism have failed 
because the main use of the words ‘terrorist’ and ‘terrorism’ has been to 
delegitimize one’s enemies. Politicians and professionals have generally 
been careful to tailor their definition of terrorism so that it fits their 
enemies but not their friends.2 The power of words and definitions has 
1  Richardson, L. (2006, p. 20), Ganor (2002), Reid (1997), Jackson, Breen-Smyth, 
Gunning and Jarvis (2011), Lutz (2008, p. 9)
2  Reid (1997), Jackson, Breen-Smyth, Gunning and Jarvis (2011)
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long been recognized,3 and there is no neutral ground in this war on 
words.4 The one who succeeds in applying the label of ‘terrorists’ to his 
enemies has won the moral battle.
The present book will not contribute to the futile attempts to reach a 
precise definition of terrorism. Instead, the word will be used in a more 
interpretive and historical meaning to describe any kind of political 
violence that is considered terrorism by the surrounding society.
Today, terrorism is mostly seen in asymmetric conflicts. It makes no 
sense for a small group of rebels with few resources to use conventional 
weapons when fighting against an immensely more powerful state or 
government.5 Terrorism is used as a last resort when other strategies fail. 
For example, Palestinian terrorists say that they have tried everything 
else.6 This logic was explained with remarkable clarity by the French 
philosopher Jean Baudrillard after the terror attacks against the USA on 
September 11, 2001: ‘It is the system itself that has created the objective 
conditions for this brutal retort. By taking all the cards to itself, it forces 
the other to change the rules of the game’.7 The playing cards that 
Baudrillard metaphorically refers to include the superior military and 
economic power of the USA, as well as the discursive power. Most of 
the international news media are US-owned, and the USA dominates 
the academic discussions as well. The much weaker group of Islamists 
has strong grievances against the USA, but they would get nowhere if 
they chose to fight by more conventional means. However, terrorism is 
difficult to justify morally or ideologically, and some terrorists have left 
their organizations when they realized how much they had hurt their 
innocent victims.8
There is a strange relationship between terrorists and the mass 
media. Fear is profitable for the media, as explained in chapter 5.1. 
The more shocking and scary the event, the more profitable it is for the 
media to report about it. Insurgents complain that the only time the 
media want to talk with them is when they have carried out a terror 
3  Foucault (1980, chapter 6)
4  Rid and Hecker (2009, 45)
5  Richardson, L. (2006, p. 28)
6  Speckhard (2012), Adams (1986, p. 48)
7  Baudrillard (2001)
8  Moghadam (2012)
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operation.9 Terrorism is a form of political communication, aided by the 
mass media, but terrorists pay a high price for this media attention.
The mass media prefer a simple picture of good guys versus bad 
guys because moral ambiguity is bad for the media.10 The media tend 
to frame terrorism stories with a focus on current episodes of violence 
rather than on the underlying political conflicts; and terrorists do not 
always regard media coverage as beneficial to their cause.11 The media 
often rely heavily on government sources when reporting terrorism 
incidents, and they tend to support the government’s position on the 
conflict.12 In this way, the mass media amplify the asymmetry of the 
conflict and thereby block the road to peace. Peace negotiations have 
been more successful in situations where the media have diminished 
the asymmetry by representing the negotiators of the two parties as 
equals.13
The media coverage of terrorism since 9/11 shows all the signs of 
a moral panic described in chapter 3.10: the talk is highly emotional; 
the reaction is exaggerated, in the sense that other dangers with much 
higher death tolls get much less attention; a group of scapegoats 
is stigmatized (such as Muslims after 9/11); common standards of 
justice are undermined; the definition of terrorism is unclear and ever 
expanding (eco-terrorism, narco-terrorism, cyber-terrorism, etc.); and a 
large number of experts claim to know the motives and modus operandi 
of the terrorists without ever meeting a terrorist.14
Social scientists have discovered that the threat of terrorism can 
have profound effects on public attitudes and sentiments towards a 
variety of issues.15 There is a general ‘rally around the flag’ effect, with 
increased trust in the government and support for the president, and 
increased social identification, nationalism, and patriotism.16 There is a 
9  Speckhard (2012)
10  Weimann and Winn (1994)
11  Paletz and Schmid (1992, pp. 41, 67), Cooke (2003)
12  Brinson and Stohl (2009)
13  Shinar and Bratic (2010)
14  Jackson, Breen-Smyth, Gunning and Jarvis (2011), Rothe and Muzzatti (2004), 
Altheide (2009), Keen (2006, p. 98)
15  Woods (2011)
16  Chowanietz (2010), Nacos, Bloch-Elkon and Shapiro (2011, chapters 1 and 2), 
Schmid and Muldoon (2015), Huddy, Feldman and Weber (2007), Olivas-Luján, 
Harzing and McCoy (2004)
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tendency towards a more hierarchical orientation and authoritarianism 
in political debates.17 Democratic principles, civil liberties, and human 
rights are undermined,18 freedom of the press is limited,19 and there are 
more hate crimes and scapegoating.20 There is more war, militarism, 
and armament, and more state crimes after terrorism campaigns.21 All 
these effects are indicators of the strong regalizing effect of terrorism.
We may wonder why the psychological effect of terrorism is so 
strong compared to other dangers. A major reason is that terrorism lends 
itself to coverage in the mass media. It offers very dramatic and graphic 
images with opportunities for person-centered stories of victims, heroes, 
and villains. People pay attention to these stories because terrorism can 
hit anybody.22 Political entrepreneurs have worked effectively in many 
cases to boost the rallying effect by skillfully using the media to whip 
up public emotions and by organizing big mourning ceremonies for 
the victims.23 Terrorism events are often followed by tough legislation 
implemented hastily in the highly emotional atmosphere after the 
event, and this legislation is not always rolled back when the peaceful 
atmosphere returns.24 Common standards of justice are typically eroded 
by this process, which spills over into other areas of justice unrelated to 
terrorism.25
There is a long-standing debate about how effective terrorism is as 
a weapon.26 The political scientist Robert Pape has found that suicide 
terrorism may be successful in achieving at least some proximate goals,27 
while his colleague Max Abrahms maintains that terrorism is generally a 
counterproductive strategy.28 The disagreement boils down to different 
definitions of terrorism and different criteria for measuring success. 
17  Olivas-Luján, Harzing and McCoy (2004), Perrin (2005)
18  Rothe and Muzzatti (2004), Huddy, Feldman and Weber (2007), Welch (2006, 
chapter 9), Human Rights Watch (2014), Amnesty International (2004)
19  Simon (2002)
20  Welch (2006, chapter 5)
21  Huddy, Feldman and Weber (2007), Carnagey and Anderson (2007), Welch (2006, 
chapter 7), Mayer, J. (2008)
22  Hirsch-Hoefler, Canetti, Rapaport and Hobfoll (2014)
23  Oates, Kaid and Berry (2010)
24  Lynch (2012), Douglas (2014), Carlile and Owen (2015)
25  Donohue (2012)
26  Compare Dershowitz (2002) and Abrahms (2006)
27  Pape (2003)
28  Abrahms (2011)
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Terrorist groups have in some cases had success in the short-term goals 
of strengthening their organization and their political position, but 
rarely in their ultimate strategic goals of gaining national independence 
or expelling a foreign regime.29 Historically, terrorism has sometimes 
been successful in colonial wars.30
A considerable number of statistical studies have found that rebel 
groups who attack civilians practically never win a conflict, and only 
rarely are they able to obtain a negotiated settlement,31 while guerilla 
groups that attack only military targets have success in some cases.32 
In the few cases where terrorists have had some success, this success 
may be due to factors other than their tactic of attacking civilians.33 
The Madrid bombings have often been mentioned as an example of a 
successful terrorism action because they influenced an election result 
and political decisions. However, this success was mainly due to the fact 
that the Spanish government had lied about the terror incident and that 
the lie was exposed on the day of the election (see chapter 6.3).
Asymmetric conflicts tend to be long-lasting,34 and conflicts that 
involve terrorism often become intractable. Statistical studies show that 
conflicts where civilians are attacked can be very long-lasting.35 There 
are several reasons why terrorism is such an unsuccessful strategy. 
Government negotiators are mostly unwilling to negotiate with terrorists 
for fear that their concessions might inspire more terrorism.36 The rebels 
have no chance of winning by means of conventional warfare, yet their 
motive for fighting persists as long as their grievances are not resolved.
The political scientist Max Abrahms uses attribution theory to 
show that people very often misinterpret the intentions of terrorists by 
confusing the consequences of their actions with the motives behind 
them. The targeted population believes that the terrorists want to 
destroy their society and their values and create chaos, while the real 
goal of the terrorists may be, for example, to gain independence, or to 
29  Krause (2013)
30  Münkler (2005, p. 103)
31  Abrahms (2006), Abrahms and Lula (2012), Abrahms and Gottfried (2014), Fortna 
(2015)
32  Abrahms and Lula (2012)
33  Abrahms and Lula (2012), Cronin (2009)
34  Thies (Thies 2001)
35  Fortna (2015)
36  Richardson, L. (2006)
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end occupation of their land. This misinterpretation leads to hardline 
and uncompromising responses. The negotiators of the targeted country 
assume that concessions will lead to more terrorism not less.37
The rebels may use violence in order to get media attention, but 
the media coverage they get is almost completely negative, with a 
focus on the violence and not on the grievances of the terrorists. This 
does not lead to more sympathy for the terrorists or understanding 
of their grievances.38 Instead, we see a spiral of hate, violence, and 
political extremism where the attacked country implements draconian 
countermeasures that lead to new violent reactions.39 This spiral of 
violence makes both parties more regal and less willing to make 
concessions or to negotiate a compromise. Ethnic, religious, or cultural 
differences between the two conflicting parties are amplified by this 
process and used strategically by the leaders.40 If the conflicting parties 
have no important cultural identities to hinge their conflict on, they will 
invent them. For example, both the Palestinians and the Israelis have 
strengthened their nationalism and sense of identity as a consequence 
of the conflict between them. Before the conflict, the inhabitants of 
present Palestine were likely to idenfity as Jordanians or Arabs, while 
‘Palestinian’ was not a strong or important identity.41
We may ask why terrorism is used at all as a political strategy when 
it is so clearly counterproductive. We would expect rebel groups to learn 
from history and realize that the strategy of violence against random 
civilians only benefits their enemy. Analyzing the situation, we may 
suggest several hypotheses for explaining why terrorism exists at all:
• Some terrorists are simply bad strategists. Their minds are 
occupied with other things, such as political, ideological, or 
theological discussions, internal hierarchy, organizational 
matters, security, rallying ceremonies, fundraising, recruiting 
new members, and propaganda.42 
37  Abrahms (2006)
38  Abrahms and Lula (2012)
39  Canetti et al. (2013), Chowanietz (2010)
40  Richardson, L. (2006, p. 188)
41  Brand (1995), Peretz (1996)
42  Kassimeris (2008)
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• Terrorists are generally driven by strong grievances. They 
become radicalized by seeing great injustice being committed 
against a group that they identify with, and they want 
revenge. Influenced by a supportive group and a legitimizing 
ideology, they may resort to terrorism when other strategies 
seem useless. They see themselves as altruists fighting for a 
just cause, while their enemies see them as evil psychopaths.43 
• Rebel groups are generally unable to cause any significant 
damage to their enemy if they fight with conventional 
weapons against a superior military power. Attacking civilian 
targets is perceived as a last resort.44 
• Rebel groups are unable to get media attention unless they 
commit shocking acts of violence. They are encouraged by 
the intense media coverage they get when they commit acts 
of terrorism.45 
• Rebel groups are inspired by similar groups in other countries. 
They imitate the groups that get the most coverage in the 
international news media rather than the groups that are most 
successful. 
• Terrorists overestimate their chances of victory, because they 
draw a false analogy with guerrilla successes.46 
• Usually, the ultimate goal of a rebel group is to win a strategic 
victory over their enemy, but at the same time they are 
pursuing the more proximate goals of strengthening their own 
organization, recruiting new members, gaining adherents and 
supporters, fundraising, and strengthening their position vis-à-
vis rival groups within the same movement. While the strategy 
of terrorism does not help them reach the ultimate goal, it may 
be effective in reaching the other proximate goals. In several 
cases, more radical and violent groups have outcompeted 
relatively moderate groups fighting for the same cause.47 
43  Speckhard (2012), Richardson, L. (2006, p. 63)
44  Speckhard (2012), Richardson, L. (2006)
45  Richardson, L. (2006)
46  Abrahms and Lula (2012), Richardson, L. (2006)
47  Richardson, L. (2006, p. 105), Krause (2013)
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• The conflict may have side effects that are beneficial to certain 
stakeholders on one or both sides of the conflict. Leading 
members of the rebel groups, government officials of the 
attacked country, and, of course, weapons dealers may have 
little incentive to end the conflict because of the political, 
economic, and psychological payoffs it provides for them. 
These payoffs include cover for suppression and abuse of the 
population, exploitation of natural resources, protection for 
the drugs trade and other criminal economic activity, profit 
for the weapons industry, profit for the mass media, uniting a 
population around the psychological need for a strong leader, 
warding off democracy, and the opportunity for the military 
to interfere in politics.48 
• In some cases, rebel groups are manipulated by their enemies 
into using counterproductive tactics. This is explained in the 
next chapter. 
• Spiraling violence causes both parties in a conflict to become 
more regal. This causes people to act more emotionally, to use 
a more radical and uncompromising rhetoric, and to become 
more violent or to support the more violent groups.
The strong psychological impact of terrorism makes the attacked 
population more regal and more likely to react with draconian 
countermeasures. The rebel group feels that the counter-attacks against 
them are disproportionate and unfair, and this is ground for further 
radicalization. Their civil rights and access to a fair system of justice are 
often undermined. This gives the rebel group still more grievances and 
reasons to fight. For example, during the conflict in Northern Ireland, 
the republican rebels were often more focused on fighting against the 
lack of due process and other injustices against them than on fighting 
for their original cause.49 In Palestine, many people feel that their life 
conditions in the conflict zone are so intolerable that they would rather 
die an honorable death as martyrs or suicide bombers than continue 
their hopeless lives.50
48  Keen (2006, chapter 3)
49  O’Day (1993), Soule (1989)
50  Speckhard (2012, chapter 8)
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This vicious circle is further aggravated by the widespread policy 
of never negotiating with terrorists. The rebels may conclude that their 
only option is to use more violence when they experience that their 
enemies are unwilling to negotiate with them or make any concessions.51
Such a vicious circle is not easily ended. An escalating conflict may 
end with complete victory for the strongest party when no third party 
intervenes. This was the normal outcome of asymmetric conflicts in 
ancient times. Today, however, the international community will not 
accept the genocide that such an outcome would entail. The intervention 
of third parties or international organizations has often been strong 
enough to prevent a genocide but not strong enough to stop the conflict 
and enforce a negotiated solution. Conflicts that involve terrorism may 
end if the rebels lose their support and funding,52 but the conflicts may 
flare up again unless the grievances are resolved.
The international community may facilitate a more lasting solution 
to an asymmetric conflict by putting enough pressure on the stronger 
party to deal with the grievances of the weaker party. This is what 
happened in South Africa when apartheid was abolished. However, 
many rebel groups lack sufficient resources to influence international 
opinion in their favor. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Northern 
Ireland did indeed have a strong propaganda strategy, but they had 
little luck in bypassing British censorship and the self-censorship of the 
British media.53 News media in other countries simply relayed reports 
from the British news agencies without informing their audience that 
they were purveying censored news. The impetus for any kind of 
third party intervention that might have facilitated the negotiation 
of a compromise solution was therefore missing. The IRA eventually 
changed their strategy and ended the violence when they realized that 
they lacked public support and that the strategy of terrorism was futile.54
While the tactics of terrorism are mostly counterproductive, so are 
attempts to combat terrorism. Politicians often respond with extreme 
measures and rhetoric, fueled by media hysteria in the aftermath of a 
51  Richardson, L. (2006)
52  Cronin (2009), Clarke (2015)
53  Kingston (1995), Cooke (2003)
54  Alonso (2001), Phayal (2011)
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terrorism event.55 The regal reaction to terrorism events often includes 
infringements on civil liberties and lowered standards of justice.56 
This is fuel for the ideology of the terrorist organizations and their 
claims that they are victims of oppression and injustice. In this way, 
counterterrorism measures work against their purpose; they contribute 
to radicalization of terrorist organizations and help them to recruit new 
members. The Dutch historian Beatrice de Graaf has shown that there is 
a positive correlation between the amount of dramatic counterterrorism 
measures and the radicalization of rebels.57
Those who fight against terrorism often ignore the more fundamental 
but less visible causes of terrorism and focus on something tangible such 
as specific persons and organizations.58 Much of the counterterrorism 
literature ignores the importance of grievances. Rebels will still be 
motivated to fight as long as they have strong grievances. Any attempt 
to suppress them by brute force will only add to their grievances. The 
strong asymmetry of power makes it unlikely that negotiations can lead 
to a compromise that is acceptable to the rebels. The politicians of the 
attacked country face a serious dilemma. If they make concessions to 
the terrorists they may be encouraging more terrorism. But if, on the 
other hand, they employ a hard-line policy, they may exacerbate the 
grievances and contribute to further radicalization of the terrorists. 
Even the most dovish politician of a country struck by terrorists would 
refrain from making concessions to terrorists for fear that he or she 
might be accused of being ‘soft on terrorism’ and rewarding terrorists 
when the population is panicked by the attacks.
Attempts to combat terrorist organizations are often focused on 
eliminating specific leaders, who are portrayed as evil. Arresting the 
leader of a terrorist group may be an effective strategy only if the group 
depends on a single charismatic leader. In other cases, it will lead to 
further radicalization, especially if the leader is killed under dramatic 
circumstances.59 Attempts to eliminate specific terrorist organizations 
with militaristic means have only contributed to escalation of the conflict 
55  Altheide (2006), Mueller, J. (2006)
56  Amnesty International (2004), Simon (2002), Carlile and Owen (2015), Norris, J. 
(2016)
57  De Graaf (2011)
58  Keen (2006, chapter 2)
59  Inglehart and Welzel (2005, p. 297), Richardson, L. (2006, p. 12)
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and radicalization of the terrorists, while the defeated terror cells are 
continually replaced by new ones.60 It may be an efficient strategy to 
target the funding sources of the terrorists, but this does not remove 
the grievances.61 In most cases, the grievances can be dealt with in a 
way that the weaker party perceives as fair only when a third party 
mediates in the conflict and puts pressure on the stronger party to make 
concessions. 
While terrorism is not a winning strategy for the rebels, it may be 
quite useful for the government of the country that is being attacked. 
Terrorism often produces a strong sense of patriotism, rallying around 
the flag, support for the incumbent government, and tolerance of quite 
repressive measures of justice. These effects are so strong that the 
governments of terror-ridden countries may have an interest in letting 
an ongoing terrorism campaign continue. They may even provoke terror 
attacks against their own countries. It has happened many times in 
modern history that governments have instigated, or deliberately failed 
to prevent, terror attacks against their own countries. Whether this is 
intended or not, terror attacks give the government the advantage of a 
regal climate that strengthens the power of the leaders. The paradoxical 
phenomenon that political leaders may somehow be complicit in 
terror attacks against their own population is described in the next two 
chapters.
6.2. The strategy of tension in Italy and elsewhere
Italy was hit by a large wave of terror attacks in the period from the 
late 1960s to the early 1980s—the so-called Years of Lead (named so 
after bullets made of lead). The situation in Italy in those years was 
very complicated but also very interesting from a theoretical point of 
view. The political landscape was chaotic, and political violence was 
widespread. There were frequent clashes between neofascists and left-
wing activists in the streets, and the violence escalated into political 
assassinations, kidnappings, terrorism, and attempted coups.62 
60  Keen (2006, chapter 11)
61  Adams (1986), Clarke (2015)
62  Bull, M. (1992), Weinberg (1995)
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A particularly notorious series of terror events occurred on 12 
December 1969. A terror bomb exploded in front of a bank on Piazza 
Fontana in Milan, killing sixteen people and wounding eighty-eight. 
Three bombs exploded in other Italian cities on the same day, and one 
more bomb was left unexploded. The bombings were initially blamed 
on a small anarchist group, and twenty-seven left-wing activists 
were arrested under intense media coverage. After several years of 
investigation, it was found that among the approximately ten members 
of the anarchist group were two infiltrators: a neofascist activist and a 
police agent. They had produced false evidence against the group. New 
evidence pointed to the neofascist organization Ordine Nuovo, which 
was also responsible for several other terror bombings.63 
There were hundreds of terror bombings committed by various 
neofascist groups in these years, and quite often they were blamed on 
left-wing groups. Sometimes, right-wing terrorists left false leads to 
implicate left-wing groups. Corruption at all levels of the state apparatus 
was evident. The police would often follow the so-called ‘red track’ 
(left-wing suspects) and ignore the more likely ‘black track’ (right-wing 
suspects). Police investigations were obstructed, evidence disappeared, 
false evidence was fabricated, witnesses were murdered, and processes 
at one court were interrupted and moved to another court with another 
judge. A general pattern was that suspects were convicted only to be 
later acquitted at a higher court. This happened to both right-wing and 
left-wing suspects. Thirty-three years of trials, re-trials, and appeals 
ended with acquittals for most of the suspects.64
Some left-wing groups became radicalized as a response to the 
neofascist violence, the political situation, and the illegitimate behavior 
of the state apparatus. A particularly militant left-wing group was Brigate 
Rosse (the Red Brigades), who committed a series of assassinations 
and political kidnappings. The former Prime Minister Aldo Moro was 
kidnapped by Brigate Rosse in 1978 and killed after fifty-five days in 
captivity. The kidnapping happened at a time when Moro, as president 
of the Christian Democrats, was negotiating a historical compromise to 
include the Italian Communist Party in a coalition government. Those 
plans died with Moro. Preventing the communists from entering the 
63  Ferraresi (1996, p. 9)
64  Cento Bull (2007, p. 24), Willan (1991, chapter 7), Bale (1996), Ferraresi (1996)
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government was perhaps not the most logical thing for a left-wing 
group to do, but it appears that they were against the revisionist, or 
compromising policy of the Communist Party.65
The population was confused over whether left-wing or right-wing 
groups were behind the many terror attacks, and there was much 
suspicion that the secret service, clandestine paramilitary groups, 
the CIA, and other foreign agencies were involved.66 Research has 
confirmed many of these suspicions as more and more evidence has 
been uncovered through the following decades. It is now evident that 
the terrorism in Italy in these years was instrumental in the so-called 
strategy of tension, with the purpose of preventing a communist 
takeover of power in Italy.67
The strategy of tension can be traced back to a symposium on the 
topic of revolutionary warfare in 1965, organized by the obscure Alberto 
Pollio Institute of Military History. The Pollio Institute was set up by 
an agent of the secret service with money from companies interested in 
winning defense contracts. Present at the meeting were leading members 
of various neofascist organizations and future terrorists, as well as high-
ranking members of the secret service and the armed forces.68
There are many different interpretations of the strategy of tension, and 
each of the involved groups and organizations had their own agenda. 
Italy had the strongest Communist party in Western Europe at the 
time, and many were afraid of a communist takeover of power in Italy. 
The supporters of the strategy of tension deliberately fueled political 
violence in order to create psychological tension in the population. They 
wanted to ‘destabilize in order to stabilize’. By creating insecurity, they 
hoped that people would seek security in a strong government and 
that this would pave the way for a more authoritarian government or a 
neofascist coup.69 
The groups that were most active in the strategy of tension were Ordine 
Nuovo, Avanguardia Nazionale, and the masonic lodge Propaganda 
Due, all with a neofascist ideology and with links to the secret service. 
65  Amara (2006)
66  Hajek (2010)
67  Ferraresi (1996, p. 86), Cento Bull (2007, chapter 4)
68  Weinberg (1995), Ferraresi (1996, p. 71), Cento Bull (2007, p. 57), Willan (1991, p. 40)
69  Bull, M. (1992), Cento Bull (2007, chapter 4), Willan (1991), Bale (1996), De Lutiis 
(1998, chapter 4)
138 Warlike and Peaceful Societies
Propaganda Due included high-ranking and influential members of 
the police, military, and secret services, as well as industry leaders and 
politicians. The secret services were dominated by neofascists and anti-
communists, and the connections between all these groups made cover-
ups and the systematic obstruction of justice possible.70 Secret documents 
from the Italian military intelligence service SIFAR reveal that they were 
very afraid that the communists would win elections and that the SIFAR 
was actively working against the socialists and communists.71
The Brigate Rosse and other radical left-wing groups in Europe 
were infiltrated by right-wing activists and secret service agents, who 
manipulated them and made them more radical and more violent in order 
to use them as tools in the strategy of tension.72 The kidnapping of Moro 
was carried out with the highest degree of military professionalism—
far beyond the capabilities of a small group of political activists. It is 
unknown whether they were helped by undercover agents from the 
secret services or by some paramilitary group.73 However, we can be 
certain that the secret services could have stopped the Brigate Rosse at 
any time if they wanted to, given the information available to them from 
infiltrators.74 During the period of Moro’s captivity, the police messed 
up or failed to follow obvious leads that could have taken them to the 
hiding places of the Brigate Rosse.75
Historians have been debating for years about who were the masters 
pulling the strings in the strategy of tension. Were the various groups 
acting autonomously, were they controlled by some powerful elite in 
the country, and did they receive support from abroad? Some historians 
believe that the CIA and NATO played a major role76 while other 
historians disagree.77
There is evidence of strong connections with Aginter Press in 
Portugal, a press agency that served as a cover for an anti-communist 
mercenary organization that trained its members in covert action 
70  Ferraresi (1996, p. 89), Cento Bull (2007, chapters 3 and 4), Willan (1991, chapters 2 
and 3), Amara (2006, chapter 3)
71  Ferraresi (1996, pp. 63, 77)
72  Weinberg (1995), Willan (1991, chapter 10), Bale (1996)
73  Amara (2006)
74  Willan (1991, chapter 10)
75  Pellegrino (1997), Amara (2006, chapter 1)
76  Feldbauer (2000), Rowse (1994), Ganser (2005)
77  Davies (2005), Nuti (2007)
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techniques including infiltration and counterinsurgency. Members of 
the Aginter Press participated in the Pollio Institute meeting, and there 
are close similarities between the strategy promoted by Aginter Press 
and the Italian strategy of tension.78
The possible involvement of the CIA is difficult to prove because that 
organization routinely hides covert actions behind other organizations 
so that its involvement can plausibly be denied.79 Nevertheless, there 
are many indications that the CIA and NATO supported the strategy of 
tension because they wanted to limit communist influence in Western 
Europe and because of the strategic importance of US and NATO 
military airbases in Italy.80 It is well documented that the CIA had 
secretly been interfering in Italian elections since 1948 in order to keep 
the Italian Communist Party from power.81
The CIA, the National Security Council (NSC), and the US Joint Chiefs 
of Staff (JCS) were involved in a plan called Operation Demagnetize, 
whose purpose was to reduce the strength of the Communist Party, 
according to secret documents that have since been declassified.82 The 
US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger strongly criticized Moro’s policy, 
and a US intelligence official warned Moro of serious consequences if 
he continued his policy of dialogue with the communists. Moro was so 
shocked by this direct threat that he feared for his life.83 However, there 
is no direct proof of active support from the CIA for the violent actions, 
and some historians argue that the terrorism was determined mainly 
by internal forces within Italy.84 Still other theories suggest that KGB, 
Mossad, and other foreign secret services were also involved.85
If we want to analyze the motivations of the terrorists, it is clear that the 
right-wing and left-wing terrorists had very different motivations. The 
right-wing, or neofascist, terrorists followed a carefully planned strategy, 
the strategy of tension. The neofascist groups were anti-intellectual, and 
78  De Jesus (2012, chapter 2), Ferraresi (1996, p. 61)
79  Agee (1975)
80  De Lutiis (1998, chapter 4), Cento Bull (2007, chapter 4), Willan (1991), Pellegrino 
(1997)
81  Corson (1977)
82  Cento Bull (2007, chapter 4), Willan (1991, p. 27), Ferraresi (1996, p. 76), De Lutiis 
(1998, p. 133)
83  Willan (1991, chapter 11)
84  Coco (2015)
85  Fasanella, Pellegrino and Sestieri (2000)
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their members were not very concerned with strategy. They were more 
moved by feelings, group spirit, rituals, marches, group loyalty, and 
orders from their leaders.86 The organizational culture and hierarchy 
of these neofascist groups clearly matched their regal ideology. We 
can assume that the actions of the low-ranking members were more 
determined by authoritarian or regal sentiments and orders from above 
than by individual rationality. The higher-ranking decision makers, on 
the other hand, had clearly thought out a strategy. 
The strategy of tension definitely makes sense in the light of regality 
theory. Evidently, those who devised this strategy had a theory that 
people would support a more authoritarian government if random 
violence and terror created psychological tension. The plan was that 
this should pave the way for a neofascist coup. However, the strategy of 
tension was not very successful. The Italians still remembered the cruel 
fascist rule under Benito Mussolini and there was no general support 
for returning to a fascist dictatorship. The only success of the strategy 
of tension was that the murder of Aldo Moro thwarted plans to include 
the Communist Party in the government. Such a coalition government 
would probably have been quite unstable anyway.87
The failure of the strategy of tension can be explained by the fact 
that the chaos and political violence was blamed on internal rather than 
external factors. A threat from external powers would have increased 
the support for a more authoritarian government, according to our 
theory, but the main cause of the chaos and violence was the obvious 
corruption, which of course did not increase people’s trust in the 
government.
The motivation for the left-wing activists was quite different. They 
had long discussions about theory and ideology, and their motivation for 
using violence was defense against the violent fascists and the corrupt 
state apparatus.88 Their strategy was, of course, even more unsuccessful, 
as they were manipulated to serve interests opposite to their own. We 
cannot predict what Italy would have looked like without the political 
violence, but it appears that the political climate in the country was more 
86  Ferraresi (1996, pp. 156, 194)
87  Willan (1991)
88  Ferraresi (1996, p. 193), Amara (2006)
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influenced by economic progress and by the democratic developments 
in the neighboring countries than by the strategy of tension.
Figure 11. Aldo Moro in captivity, 1978. The kidnappers published this 
photo, which made sure that everybody associated the action with the 
left-wing group Brigate Rosse.89
The strategy of tension in Italy was extreme in its range and magnitude, 
but far from unique. In a classic study of counterrevolution, Arno Mayer 
describes the deliberate fabrication of violence and chaos as a common 
counterrevolutionary strategy.90 The Aginter Press was not only active 
in Italy and Portugal, but also in Algeria, Congo, Biafra (part of current 
Nigeria), and other African countries. It is uncertain whether it used 
similar strategies in those countries.91 A mysterious organization, 
the Hyperion language school in Paris, delivered weapons to Brigate 
Rosse, making it appear that the weapons originated from the Palestine 
Liberation Organization (PLO). There were claims that Hyperion also 
delivered weapons to the Red Army Faction (RAF) in Germany, to 
the Basque separatist group Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) in Spain, 
89 Public domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Aldo_Moro_br.jpg
90  Mayer, A. (1971, chapter 3)
91  De Jesus (2012)
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and to the IRA in Ireland,92 but this has not been verified. The Italian 
investigators initially believed that the Hyperion school was a cover 
organization for the CIA, but it might have been more than that. Later 
investigations have led to the theory that Hyperion was a networking 
point for Eastern and Western secret service organizations, with the 
purpose of maintaining world stability by preserving the balance of 
powers that was established in the Yalta agreement of 1945. Therefore, 
the Hyperion people fought against anybody who threatened to sway 
this balance of powers, including the new left, Aldo Moro, Olof Palme, 
and many others.93
Heads of police from European countries decided at a meeting in 
Cologne in the early 1970s to implement a common strategy of infiltrating 
terrorist groups at the leadership level. Their undercover agents had 
to be the bravest and cruellest members of the groups.94 In Belgium, 
undercover intelligence agents were heavily involved in a series of false 
flag terrorism attacks that claimed more than thirty lives in the 1980s.95 
Turkey had a particularly powerful secret service that infiltrated left-
wing groups with agents provocateurs, massacred whole villages and 
blamed it on the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), and created general 
chaos before a coup.96
The situation in West Germany (the Federal Republic of Germany) 
and the later united Germany was particularly complex. The undercover 
agent Peter Urbach infiltrated several left-wing groups. He delivered 
Molotov cocktails to an otherwise peaceful demonstration, he delivered 
bombs to a Marxist organization, and he supplied weapons to the 
infamous RAF.97 Other undercover agents failed to infiltrate the RAF 
but delivered weapons to other radical groups and even attempted to 
create a new terrorist organization.98
The RAF had three generations of militant activists. The first 
generation received some support from the Stasi, the secret service of 
East Germany (the German Democratic Republic), but they did not 
92  Willan (1991, chapter 10), Feldbauer (2000, p. 66)
93  Fasanella, Pellegrino and Sestieri (2000, part 3), Igel (2012, p. 136ff)
94  Amara (2006, p. 22)
95  Jenkins (1990)
96  Çelik (1999)
97  Rosenfeld (2014), Winkler (1997), Peters, B. (2004)
98  Gössner (1991, pp. 183–215)
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want to be controlled by the Stasi. The second generation received 
paramilitary training from the Stasi, and many RAF members fled to 
East Germany, where they became involved in international terrorism 
as paid agents of the Stasi.99 However, the relationship between the Stasi 
and the RAF appeared to be ambivalent, and western agents and double 
agents were also involved.100 
The third generation of the RAF showed hardly any signs of being 
an autonomous organization. Some researchers claim that the third 
generation was nothing more than a phantom organization created 
by Western security forces,101 while later research reveals a heavy 
involvement of the Stasi.102 But if we assume that the third generation of 
the RAF was controlled by the Stasi, then we have a problem explaining 
why the RAF continued its activities for almost a decade after the fall 
of the Berlin Wall, when the Stasi no longer existed. Regardless of who 
was behind the later generations of the RAF, it was able to carry out 
bombings and assassinations with military professionalism, and most 
of its crimes remained unsolved.103 The similarity with Italy is obvious, 
but there is so far no evidence of involvement of western secret services.
There is evidence of cooperation between the RAF in Germany 
and Brigate Rosse in Italy. The German industry leader Hanns Martin 
Schleyer was attacked by the second generation RAF. Schleyer and his 
safety escort were stopped on a road in September 1977. His chauffeur 
and three bodyguards were shot while he was abducted alive. He was 
killed after forty-three days in captivity. Six months later, exactly the 
same happened to Moro in Italy. There is evidence that some of the 
RAF militants traveled to Italy and assisted in Moro’s abduction.104 If 
the RAF was controlled by the Stasi, then why did they cooperate with 
Brigate Rosse, which was almost completely controlled by right-wing 
and Western security forces at that time? On the other hand, if the 
RAF was controlled by right-wing or Western forces in the same way 
as Brigate Rosse, then why did they kill Schleyer? There were obvious 
right-wing and Western motives for killing Moro but not for killing 
99  Igel (2012, p. 214), Müller and Kanonenberg (1992), Schmeidel (1993)
100  Bale (2012), Igel (2012, p. 288), Müller and Kanonenberg (1992)
101  Wisnewski, Landgraeber and Sieker (2008)
102  Igel (2012, p. 159)
103  Schmeidel (1993), Wisnewski, Landgraeber and Sieker (2008)
104  Igel (2012, p. 173)
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Schleyer. Was he killed in order to delegitimize left-wing movements 
in a strategy of tension?
There are many unanswered questions. What we know so far is 
that both Eastern and Western security services and paramilitary 
forces were heavily involved in terrorism in Western Europe in those 
years. It seems that the Western security forces relied on the theory 
that terrorism can incite authoritarianism and harm the apparent 
supporter, as evidenced by the strategy of tension. The Stasi, on 
the other hand, appeared to be more concerned with ideology and 
prestige.105 Perhaps the Eastern security forces simply relied on the 
belief that terrorism would harm its victim.
6.3. Fabrication of threats and conflicts
The economist and conflict researcher David Keen has studied many 
violent conflicts around the world and made the surprising observation 
that, in many cases, the fighting parties appear to prolong the conflict 
rather than trying to win and end it. For example, they often use tactics 
known to be counterproductive, or they provoke an enemy to attack, 
and in some cases they even sell weapons to their enemy. Keen suggests 
that some participants deliberately engage in endless conflicts because 
it gives them certain advantages. Economic advantages include the 
weapons trade, but also the extraction of valuable resources such as oil 
in Iraq, minerals in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, or opium in 
Afghanistan. The advantages can also be of a political nature. A violent 
conflict can justify the suppression and exploitation of people, sabotage 
an emerging democracy, create national unity, and create the need for a 
strong leader. Keen suggests that such conflicts can be self-sustaining—
intentionally or not—because certain key players benefit from the 
continued conflict.106 
Regality theory can contribute to the explanation of the paradoxical 
behavior of deliberately protracting a violent conflict. Continuous 
fighting is not in the interests of the general population, of course, but 
it may be in the interests of the leaders because it helps them sustain 
105  Schmeidel (1993)
106  Keen (2012; 2006, chapter 11)
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a regal culture. We saw in chapters 2.4 and 2.5 how a regal culture 
increases the biological fitness of the leader. Let us look further at this 
phenomenon.
Throughout history, we have seen that many of the leaders of great 
empires had large numbers of children and provided luxury and 
advantages for themselves and for their relatives. In other words, the 
leaders of regal societies had a huge advantage in terms of reproductive 
fitness. The more regal the society, the greater the fitness of the leader 
at the expense of his followers. DNA evidence shows that a large 
fraction of the modern human population is descended from a few 
successful emperors. Genghis Khan is the record holder with millions 
of descendants.107 It is therefore obvious that any behavior that makes a 
leader more powerful could be promoted by natural selection.
The diversionary theory of war, mentioned in chapter 4.3, suggests 
that leaders may wage unnecessary wars for the sake of creating a 
‘rally around the flag’ effect that will consolidate their own status. The 
extreme fitness advantage of powerful leaders leads us to the prediction 
that leaders could be inclined to deceive their followers and make their 
society more regal than necessary, for example by fighting unnecessary 
wars, or by exaggerating or fabricating dangers to their own society. We 
can expect this strategy to be employed when leaders, or prospective 
leaders, see a chance to expand their power, but also when leaders see 
their power threatened by subversive or rebellious movements.
In this chapter, we will search for historical examples of such 
deceptions in order to find out how far leaders are willing to go in terms 
of spreading fear and fabricating unnecessary threats and conflicts 
against their own group.
In chapters 3.10 and 5.1 we saw how leaders and the mass media 
can benefit from witch hunts and moral panics. Terrorism threats are 
particularly efficacious for boosting regality, because, as we have seen, 
they produce strong emotional effects while causing much less damage 
than regular intergroup wars. There are many ways in which a leader 
and his government can consolidate their position by manipulating 
terrorism threats and other dangers, possibly in collusion with the mass 
media, including the following:
107  Balaresque et al. (2015)
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• opportunistic exploitation of an unpredicted attack by creating 
maximum publicity around the event, showing leadership in 
fighting the attackers, showing empathy for the victims, and 
implementing stricter legislation 
• exaggerating an existing threat by massive media coverage, by 
overstating the capabilities of potential enemies, by excessive 
security measures, or by setting national alert levels higher 
than necessary 
• blaming actual terrorism attacks on the wrong culprits 
• making false or exaggerated reports about terrorism plots that 
have been thwarted 
• exaggerating the danger of a relatively weak adversary and 
fighting it with dramatic means 
• using undercover operations to lure somebody into planning 
an attack and arresting them when they are about to carry out 
these plans (entrapment)108 
• fabricating and staging a victory over an insignificant or 
imaginary adversary 
• provoking a potential enemy to attack, or deliberately 
escalating a low-level conflict 
• infiltrating peaceful protest groups with violent agents 
• selectively eliminating moderate leaders of rebel groups while 
more radical leaders remain at large 
• deliberately failing to avert known terrorism plots 
• paving the way for known terrorists by removing obstacles to 
their plans, disabling surveillance, alarm, and rescue systems, 
or actively increasing the damage they are causing 
• infiltrating potential terrorist groups with undercover agents 
who help them with advice, intelligence, logistics, training, 
108  Altheide (2014, pp. 38, 68), Norris, J. (2016)
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weapons, money, and so on, and induce them to attack a 
particular target or use particularly dramatic tactics 
• fabricating a violent attack and blaming it on a convenient 
enemy (false flag attack).
Manipulations at the beginning of this list are very common, while the 
more serious deceptions at the end of the list are probably less common 
but also more difficult to document. Let us look at some notable 
historical examples.
Shelling of Mainila
On 26 November 1939, the Russian village of Mainila, near the Finnish 
border, was hit by seven explosions. The Russians claimed that Finland 
had attacked Russia with artillery, killing four and wounding nine. A 
Finnish border guard who had watched the incident from a distance of 
800 meters reported that the shots were fired from the Russian side. He 
did not see any bodies being carried away from the scene.109 Russian and 
Finnish historians later found documents confirming that there were no 
casualties and that the Russians had staged the incident as a pretext for 
attacking Finland.110 The Soviet Union renounced the non-aggression 
pact with Finland and started the Winter War between the two nations 
four days later.
Gulf of Tonkin incident
On 2 August 1964, the US destroyer USS Maddox was on a secret 
intelligence gathering mission in the Gulf of Tonkin near the North 
Vietnamese coast when it was approached by three North Vietnamese 
torpedo boats. Fire was exchanged and there were losses on the North 
Vietnamese side but only minor damage on Maddox. The United States 
Congress was misinformed about the incident and told that Maddox 
was on a routine patrol in international waters when it was attacked by 
the torpedo boats. The truth is that Maddox fired first and pursued the 
torpedo boats. Two days later, two US destroyers misinterpreted radar 
109  Edwards (2006, p. 105)
110  Sokolov (2000), Aptekar (2001), Leino (2009)
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signals and reported that they were being attacked by torpedo boats, 
when in fact there were no other boats in the vicinity. Congress was 
informed that boats had been attacked again, which was not true. This 
led Congress to pass the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which allowed 
the US military to engage armed forces in Vietnam and escalate the 
Vietnam War. While some of the misinformation was due to human 
error rather than deliberate deception, the mistakes were covered up 
and the false information was used as a pretext for attacking North 
Vietnam.111
Sendero Luminoso
During the 1990s, President Alberto Fujimori of Peru gained popularity 
through his uncompromising fight against violent insurgent groups 
such as the Sendero Luminoso, or Shining Path. Even at a time when 
the insurgents were effectively defeated, Fujimori kept fighting them 
in dramatic military actions without completely eradicating them. 
These highly publicized actions helped Fujimori and his increasingly 
autocratic government to stay in power. When the opposition 
protested the inauguration of Fujimori for his third term in 2000, the 
regime infiltrated a group of peaceful protesters with violent agents 
who set fire to the National Bank. The attack, which took the life of 
four bank guards, was blamed on the protesters in order to discredit 
the opposition.112
Madrid bombing
The Spanish Partido Popular lost the election in 2004 when it was 
revealed that it had deliberately deceived the population and blamed a 
terror bombing on the separatist group ETA, when in fact the Islamicist 
group al-Qaeda was responsible. The Partido Popular would probably 
have won a landslide victory had the deception not been revealed on the 
early morning of the election day.113
111  Moïse (1996), Hanyok (2001)
112  Burt (2008)
113  Jordan and Horsburgh (2008)
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Operation Mongoose and Operation Northwoods
During the Cold War, the US government tried to destabilize and 
overturn Fidel Castro’s government in Cuba in many ways. A campaign 
of psychological warfare, known as Operation Mongoose, tried to build 
an opposition within Cuba.
In the 1960s, the CIA covertly funded private radio stations inside 
and outside of Cuba, including Radio Swan on the Swan Islands, which 
sent propaganda messages from anti-Castro Cubans into Cuba. A radio 
station in Mexico City promoted a press campaign about epidemics of 
hoof and mouth disease and smallpox in Cuba. A CIA radio station in 
Zambia was spreading misinformation about the conduct of Cuban 
troops in neighboring Angola in the 1970s. Among the false stories 
was a fictitious scene in which Cuban soldiers raped fifteen-year-old 
girls. The station even disseminated faked photographs of the trial and 
executions of the Cuban soldiers.
In 1961, CIA planes bombed targets in Cuba and pretended that the 
pilots were Cuban defectors. Many other operations of misinformation 
and sabotage were proposed or planned, some of them quite bizarre, 
but most of these plans were never carried out.114
One set of plans, known as Operation Northwoods, included false 
flag attacks on US and Cuban soil. For example, it was proposed to blow 
up a US ship in Guantanamo Bay and blame Cuba. Other plans were to 
blow up an unmanned vessel in Cuban waters, or a civil airplane, and 
to conduct funerals for the non-existing victims. False evidence would 
be fabricated to blame those terror attacks on Cuba. There were also 
plans of false flag terror attacks in Florida and Washington, or attacks 
on Cuban refugees blamed on Cuba. The intention was that such actions 
should strengthen the opposition in Cuba and serve as justification for a 
US military intervention there.115
114  Elliston (1999)
115  National Security Archive (2001)
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The strategy of tension in Italy and elsewhere
The period from the late 1960s to the early 1980s brought a sharp 
increase in terrorism to Italy. Both right-wing and left-wing terrorists 
were involved. This story is told in chapter 6.2 above.
The Italian terrorists are classified as elite-sponsored terror groups, 
according to a typology developed by Jacob Ravndal.116 However, if we 
try to identify the elite that controlled or masterminded the strategy 
of tension, we get a very confusing picture of freemasons, various 
neofascist and paramilitary groups that were supported or even created 
by the secret services, and high-ranking persons within the military, 
possibly with international support. These were powerful people 
within the state apparatus but not within the official government. A 
government commission to investigate the corruption even saw this as 
a dual government or dual loyalty.117 Whoever orchestrated the strategy 
of tension, it certainly included the most serious kinds of deception on 
our list.
The strategy of tension, in our interpretation, might look like this: 
powerful actors wanted to create political violence, indiscriminate terror, 
and chaos, in the hope that this would create public support for a more 
authoritarian government and a neofascist coup. In particular, they 
wanted to make their opponents look more violent in order to delegitimize 
them. This was done by deliberately failing to stop left-wing violence, 
by infiltrating and manipulating left-wing groups to make them more 
radical and violent, and by staging false flag terror attacks. However, as 
discussed above, this plan did not really achieve its goal.
Russian apartment bombings and other terror 
attacks in Russia
A series of explosions hit four apartment buildings in the Russian towns 
of Moscow, Buynaksk, and Volgodonsk from 4 to 13 September 1999, 
killing 293 people and injuring 651. Quite remarkably, foreknowledge 
of these attacks was apparent in a document that was leaked in Moscow 
a few months before the incidents. This document talked about terror 
116  Ravndal (2015, p. 21)
117  Pellegrino (1997)
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attacks that would be blamed on the mafia and Chechen criminals.118 In 
another leak of plans, a speaker at the Duma announced that a building 
in Volgodonsk had been blown up, three days before it actually 
happened.119
The attacks were in fact blamed on Chechen terrorists, but the 
evidence against the suspected terrorists was nebulous. Historians and 
independent investigators have presented a strong case supporting 
their theory that the Federal Security Service (FSB, formerly KGB) was 
behind the attacks.120 A fifth attack against an apartment building in 
the town of Ryazan was averted by vigilant residents who reported 
suspicious behavior to the police. The police found a bomb consisting 
of 150 kg of the advanced explosive RDX (called hexogen in Russia), 
a detonator, and a timer. Two suspects were apprehended when they 
tried to leave the town. They were not Chechen terrorists but FSB agents. 
An intercepted telephone call was also traced to the FSB, and identical 
explosives were discovered in a military depot 30 km from the town.
The incident in Ryazan was also initially blamed on Chechen terrorists, 
but after the media had published the leads pointing to the FSB, the FSB 
claimed that it was an exercise and that the bomb was only a dummy 
containing sugar. This explanation has been convincingly refuted.121 The 
police, who had analyzed the contents, maintained that it was RDX. The 
investigations of all five incidents were characterized by massive cover-
ups, perversion of justice, coerced confessions, intimidation of witnesses 
and journalists, and assassination of independent investigators.122 The 
FSB was also behind the other four apartment bombings, according to a 
confession by FSB major Vladimir Kondratiev as well as large amounts 
of circumstantial evidence.123
The terror attacks in September 1999 helped a previously unknown 
former KGB officer, Vladimir Putin, attain the presidency. The attacks 
also served to justify the invasion of Chechnya on 1 October 1999 in 
the Second Chechen War. Historians believe that an independent 
118  Litvinenko and Felshtinsky (2007, chapters 5 and 6)
119  Dunlop (2012, p. 248)
120  Dunlop (2012)
121  Litvinenko and Felshtinsky (2007, chapter 5), Dunlop (2012)
122  Litvinenko and Felshtinsky (2007), Dunlop (2012, p. 184ff), Satter (2003, chapter 2)
123  Litvinenko and Felshtinsky (2007, chapter 6), Dunlop (2012)
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investigation of the attacks will not take place as long as Putin is in 
power.124
The FSB is suspected of being involved in several other terror attacks 
that were blamed on Chechen terrorists, including a railway bombing 
in Moscow in 1994 before the First Chechen War, the Moscow theater 
hostage crisis in 2002, and the Beslan school siege in 2004.125 One of 
the worst terrorist acts in modern Russian history was the siege of a 
school in Beslan in 2004, in which more than a thousand people were 
held hostage, most of them children. Many of the terrorists were Ingush 
criminals who had been released from prison a few months prior to 
the incident or who had mysteriously escaped imprisonment. At least 
some of these terrorists had to carry out certain operations for the 
FSB as a condition of their release. One of the terrorists was a double 
agent. Weapons had been brought into the school before the attack, and 
it appears that the FSB had prior knowledge of the attack but did not 
prevent it. Rather than negotiating with the hostage takers, the police 
stormed the school and killed most of the terrorists. Several hundred 
hostages died as well.126 Some historians have argued that there was 
collusion between the Russian government and the Chechen rebels to 
stage the terrorism incidents and to keep the civil war going.127
Terror attacks of September 11, 2001
The topic of 9/11 is difficult to avoid in this context, even though we 
do not really know what happened. The official account says that 
Islamic terrorists led by Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan flew hijacked 
airplanes into the Pentagon and the two towers of the World Trade 
Center, and that the towers collapsed because of the ensuing fire.128 
Important parts of this explanation are contradicted by large amounts 
of technical evidence. Independent investigations have found evidence 
that the collapse of the towers was induced by explosives and thermite 
which was placed inside the buildings.129 We do not know who placed it 
124  Dunlop (2012), Satter (2003, p. 46)
125  Goldfarb (2007), Dunlop (2006)
126  Goldfarb (2007), Dunlop (2006, p. 29ff), Kesayeva (2008)
127  Keen (2006, p. 63), Dunlop (2006, p. 104)
128  National Institute of Standards and Technology (2005, 2008)
129  Harrit et al. (2009), Jones et al. (2008)
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there or why. Theories range from insurance fraud to the involvement of 
the CIA or foreign intelligence agencies. A large number of publications 
of varying quality, too many to review here, have tried to prove or 
disprove various accounts of what happened on 9/11. In the present 
situation, neither the official account nor any of the alternative theories 
are supported by convincing evidence.
It may seem odd to write about an incident here when we do not 
know what happened. The point is, however, that the regalizing effect 
does not depend on what happened, only on what people believe 
happened. 
Initially, most people believed the official account, but later many 
people doubted it. In one opinion poll in 2006, 16% of US respondents 
found it very likely and a further 20% found it somewhat likely that 
‘People in the federal government either assisted in the 9/11 attacks or 
took no action to prevent the attacks because they wanted the United 
States to go to war in the Middle East’.130 Many other polls show 
widespread disbelief of the official account. In some polls, the majority 
of respondents believed that the Bush administration was not telling 
the whole truth about the event. (These poll publications are no longer 
available, but the results are summarized with archive references on 
Wikipedia.)131
There can be no doubt that the US government took advantage 
of the psychological tension after 9/11 to get support for the wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. Many people believe that the US government did 
more than that and used some of the more severe forms of deception 
further down the list on page 146 (chapter 6.3), but this remains a 
matter of speculation.
Weapons of mass destruction in Iraq
Prior to the Iraq War in 2003, the US government claimed that it had 
evidence that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction (that is, 
nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons) in violation of a UN 
resolution, and accused the Iraqi government, led by Saddam Hussein, 
130  Stempel, Hargrove and Stempel (2007)
131  Wikipedia. “Opinion Polls about 9/11 Conspiracy Theories”, https://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Opinion_polls_about_9/11_conspiracy_theories
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of involvement with the militant organization al-Qaeda and in the 
terror attacks of 9/11. The US administration had put strong pressure 
on the CIA to produce intelligence reports that supported these claims. 
Much of the purported evidence relied on misinterpretations, some was 
knowingly false, and some was even fabricated by an Italian agent.132 
The media and populations in the USA and its allied countries mostly 
believed the propaganda, and this was the basis for going to war in 
Iraq.133 The former UN weapons inspector, Scott Ritter, had already 
asserted before the war that the weapons had been destroyed in 1991 
and that the production facilities had also been destroyed.134 Ritter 
later revealed that the UN-sanctioned weapons inspection programme 
was manipulated and compromised by the CIA to create the illusion 
that Iraq was resisting disarmament, when in fact Iraq had already 
disarmed.135 The award-winning journalist James Risen claims that the 
CIA deliberately ignored reports from some thirty spies in Iraq who all 
said the same thing: that the nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons 
programmes had all been abandoned in 1991.136
Whistleblowers in three other countries later confirmed that there 
was no conclusive evidence of any banned weapons.137 Iraq claimed 
that the weapons had been destroyed in 1991, and for all that we know 
following intensive searches before, during, and after the war, this claim 
appears to be basically true.138 The purported alliance with al-Qaeda 
did not exist. On the contrary, the Iraqi government was an enemy of 
al-Qaeda.139
The US government supported coup attempts against Saddam 
Hussein in 1992 and 1996.140 The decision to wage war against Iraq 
was made by US President George W. Bush and his staff in 2001.141 
This decision was not based on any rational evaluation of available 
132  Blix (2004), Eisner and Royce (2007), Pillar (2011, chapter 2)
133  Pillar (2011, chapter 3), Wilkie, A. (2010, p. 95), Calabrese (2005)
134  Ritter and Pitt (2002)
135  Ritter (2005, p. 288)
136  Risen (2006, p. 563)
137  Wilkie, A. (2010), Aagaard (2005, p. 75, 90), “Profile: Dr David Kelly”. BBC News, 
January 27, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/3076869.stm
138  Blix (2004)
139  Pillar (2011, p. 43), Ritter and Pitt (2002, p. 45)
140  Ritter (2005, p. 161), Woodward (2004)
141  Woodward (2004, p. 38)
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information and options but, according to several analysts, on motives 
relating to oil supply, geopolitics, revenge for Hussein’s attempt to 
assassinate Bush’s father, and a naive belief that it was possible to 
spread democracy in this way.142 The accusations of weapons of mass 
destruction and terrorist connections served mainly as pretexts for 
justifying the war. While the decision to attack Iraq lacked in rationality, 
the deception that was used to justify the war was definitely the result 
of deliberate planning, although an element of self-deception was also 
present.143
Conclusion
Fabrication of dangers and unnecessary conflicts has occurred repeatedly 
throughout modern history, and many leaders and contenders for 
leadership have deceived their own populations into believing that their 
society was more endangered than it actually was. The above accounts 
are just examples. These examples show that the fabrication of dangers 
towards one’s own population has occurred primarily in the following 
situations:
• Before a war, in order to justify the war and create psychological 
support for the war. There are many examples of this, including 
World War II (see below), the Russian-Finnish Winter War, the 
Vietnam War, the Chechen Wars, the Iraq War, and possibly 
the Afghanistan War.
• Before an undemocratic coup or in general to facilitate a 
transition to a less democratic form of government. This 
strategy achieved its goal in Germany (under Hitler, see 
next chapter) and Russia (under Yeltsin and Putin), and was 
attempted without success in Italy.
• To strengthen a government when its power is dwindling. 
This strategy was used in Peru and attempted in Spain. 
• To defame an enemy, as in the case of Cuba.
142  Pillar (2011, chapters 2 and 3), Wilkie, A. (2010, p. 62), Woodward (2004)
143  Pillar (2011, chapters 2 and 3), Wilkie, A. (2010)
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Terrorism provokes strong psychological reactions because it makes 
civilians feel threatened, even though the casualties are much lower 
than in conventional war.144 In other words, terrorism is a cheap way 
of creating regality. Even warnings about possible terror attacks have 
a regal effect. For example, it has been found that terror warnings have 
increased the approval ratings for the incumbent US president.145
Beliefs in ‘conspiracy theories’ are quite common.146 After almost 
every major terror attack in recent years, especially since 9/11, there have 
been rumors and suspicions in the social media that it was a false flag 
attack. It is quite logical to entertain such suspicions when it is observed 
that terror attacks are almost always counterproductive. The suspicions 
and rumors of false flag attacks are quite often false, of course, but they 
can in fact be true, as we have seen in this chapter. The often-used term 
‘false flag attack’ is actually somewhat misleading. The leaders do not 
want to use their own forces to make the deceptive attacks, but prefer to 
manipulate others to do it. In many cases, such as the Red Brigades in 
Italy, some of the terrorists involved were actually ‘true flag’ militants, 
who honestly believed that they were fighting against the political 
system, unaware that they were being manipulated by infiltrators to 
work against their own interests.
Deceptions like these are obviously difficult to study and document, 
and many cases may have gone undetected. Objective and reliable 
information is hard to get, and many information sources are tainted by 
deception, propaganda, and political bias. We must keep this caveat in 
mind and consider that there is often more than one interpretation of a 
situation, and that the above accounts may be inaccurate.
The deceptive fabrication of threats to one’s own population is 
predicted by regality theory, as discussed at the beginning of this 
chapter. The leader simply gets a personal fitness advantage by boosting 
the regality of his society. Some of the great emperors in history have 
fathered hundreds of children, but such extreme levels of fecundity 
belong to the past. Powerful leaders today do not in general have many 
children, due to the widespread norm of monogamy. Many leaders 
have mistresses, but they rarely get their mistresses pregnant because 
144  Hirsch-Hoefler, Canetti, Rapaport and Hobfoll (2014)
145  Willer (2004)
146  Stempel, Hargrove and Stempel (2007)
 1576. Strategic Uses of Fear
of the use of birth control. It is hard to demonstrate that the powerful 
leaders who live in modern society today have any fitness advantage. If 
there is any raise in the fertility of powerful leaders at all, it is probably 
offset by the risk of being killed in a violent overthrow. One of the most 
powerful evolutionary forces that has driven political leaders to strive 
for grandeur, majesty, and power has disappeared, but the psychological 
predisposition for this behavior remains. The behavior of strong leaders 
and warlords today is a strange mixture of rationality and irrationality. 
Military strategies, as well as strategies of psychological warfare, are 
often carefully planned with the use of the best available experts, while 
the ultimate motive behind the wars and imperialism is hidden in 
psychological predispositions that evolved in a distant past, driven by 
fitness advantages that no longer exist today.
6.4. Example: Why World War II started
A war generally depends on a spiral of increasing regality, and we have 
to look at the factors that contribute to this spiral of regality in order to 
explain a war. This chapter will not review or explain the whole history 
of World War II but will focus on only a few key factors that started the 
spiral of regality that drove the war.
Many psychologists have tried to explain World War II by analyzing 
the peculiar psychology of Adolf Hitler, and a long list of diagnoses 
have been postulated.147 Such an approach gives only a very limited 
understanding of the causes of the war. I will venture the theory 
that all countries have a potential Hitler, and that—under different 
circumstances—Hitler could have remained a painter, as he once was, 
rather than a warmaker.
Regality theory allows us to go beyond the explanation of the war as 
a consequence of Hitler’s postulated psychopathology and try to answer 
some more basic questions such as: why was Hitler bellicose? Why did 
the Germans vote for him? Why did they not replace him with someone 
more peaceful and agreeable? Why did they allow him to abandon 
democracy and make himself a dictator? How did he manipulate his 
people to make them support his war? 
147  Redlich (1998, pp. 255, 333)
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If we want to know why Hitler was bellicose, we may try to start 
with the same focus as psychologists habitually employ. Psychologists 
like to analyze people’s childhoods, and it cannot be denied that 
childhood experiences have a strong influence on people’s personalities. 
Hitler lost his father and a brother while he was a child, and later lost 
his mother. Three older siblings had died before Adolf was born.148 
These and other traumatic events may have had an influence, but other 
people with similarly traumatic childhoods have grown up to become 
peaceful adults. Hitler played war games when he was a child, but this 
is something that most normal boys do.
At the age of twenty-five, Hitler volunteered for a Bavarian regiment 
to fight in World War I. He was a brave soldier and was promoted to the 
rank of corporal. He was wounded twice, but survived many dangerous 
episodes. Thousands of men in his regiment were, however, killed.149
These experiences during World War I are sufficient to explain 
Hitler’s regal disposition, although childhood experiences may have 
laid the foundation. This regal disposition can explain his passion for 
war and his disdain for democracy. It also explains why he was so 
receptive to anti-Semitic ideas, which were common in Germany at the 
time.
A study of Hitler’s personality may explain the behavior of one 
person, but it does not answer the more important question of why the 
German people supported him and his ideas. We have to look at the 
general political, social, and psychological climate of the time.
The first half of the twentieth century was a period with many wars 
in Europe. The Ottoman Empire was in decline, and other countries 
with imperial ambitions were eager to fill the power vacuum. Shifting 
alliances, contests of power, and arms races led to World War I, which 
ended with total humiliation of Germany.
Europe was not a peaceful place after World War I. There were many 
wars and violent uprisings all over Europe that contributed to a general 
insecure and warlike climate.
The Great Depression of the 1930s hit Germany particularly hard, 
with unemployment rates over 30%. The population was relatively 
young due to a high rate of population growth. The combination of a 
148  Redlich (1998, p. 5)
149  Redlich (1998, p. 36)
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youth bulge and a high unemployment rate is a dangerous cocktail. It 
was easy to mobilize the large surplus of unemployed and frustrated 
young people by means of a violent ideology.150 The psychological 
consequences of economic crises were discussed in chapter 5.2.
The aftermath of World War I and the economic crisis provided 
fertile breeding ground for the nationalist and racist ideology called 
National Socialism, or Nazism. This ideology was promoted by the 
National Socialist German Workers’ Party, led by Hitler. There is general 
agreement among historians that the economic crisis contributed to the 
rise of Nazism. A study of Germany in the interwar years has found 
significant correlations between economic indicators and various 
measures of authoritarianism. The strongest correlation was between 
the unemployment rate and the votes for Hitler.151
The Nazi ideology was promoted by massive propaganda, organized 
by the Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda, headed by 
Joseph Goebbels. The most powerful mass media at the time were radio 
and cinema films. The Nazis promoted the distribution of radios and 
the sale of cheap radios so that, by 1938, 60% of all households owned 
a radio receiver. Radio broadcasting in Germany was initially intended 
to be an apolitical cultural institution with the purpose of educating the 
population. Nationalist sentiments were common on radio programmes 
in Weimar Germany, but this was not perceived as controversial. 
When the Nazis came to power, they used the radio for propaganda 
purposes and broadcast political speeches. The radio propaganda 
must have had a strong influence on the German population, since 
they were unaccustomed to organized propaganda at this scale, while 
counterpropaganda was only available from foreign media. The Nazi 
propaganda promoted an ideology of racial superiority and territorial 
expansion (Lebensraum) and blamed the economic crisis on Jews and 
other foreigners.152
Fabrication of threats, as discussed in chapter 6.3, was used both for 
suspending democracy and as a pretext for starting the war. In February 
1933, the Parliament building (Reichstag) in Berlin was set on fire. A 
young, homeless, visually impaired Dutchman, Marinus van der Lubbe, 
150  Heinsohn (2003, p. 23), Weber (2013), Moller (1968)
151  Padgett and Jorgenson (1982)
152  Von Saldern (2004), Zimmermann (2007)
160 Warlike and Peaceful Societies
was arrested inside the burning building. Van der Lubbe, a communist, 
readily confessed that he had set the fire for political reasons, and he 
was sentenced to death.153
Figure 12. Burning German Parliament, 1933. Bundesarchiv.154
The German government, led by Hitler, blamed the attack on the 
Communist Party and arrested a large number of communists including 
all of the communist members of the parliament. The Nazi party now 
had an absolute majority in the parliament, which allowed them to 
suspend democracy and civil liberties under the pretext of preventing a 
communist uprising. This key event made Germany a dictatorship until 
the end of the war and allowed Hitler to rule without opposition. 
153  Hett (2014)
154 CC BY-SA 3.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Reichstagsbrand.jpg
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However, technical evidence indicates that van der Lubbe could not 
have started the fire alone, and Nazi leader Hermann Göring admitted 
that he was responsible for the fire, according to one witness testimony.155
In 1939, the Germans made a propaganda campaign to justify an 
invasion of Poland. This campaign, known as Operation Himmler, 
involved various false flag operations that simulated Polish attacks on 
Germany. On 31 August that year, German soldiers dressed in Polish 
uniforms attacked a number of buildings in Germany, including a radio 
station, and left behind dead bodies, most of them in Polish uniforms 
to make it appear that Polish attackers had been shot down. The dead 
bodies were in fact not Polish soldiers but prisoners from concentration 
camps that had been killed for this purpose. Hitler made a public speech 
the next day, claiming twenty-one alleged attacks as justification for 
military invasion of Poland. This was the start of World War II.156
155  Hett (2014), Shirer (1960, p. 191)
156  Whitehead (2008)

7. Regality Theory Applied to 
Ancient Cultures
In this chapter we will look at a number of ancient, non-industrial 
civilizations and see whether the predictions of regality theory fit these 
cultures. A statistical study of the results follows in chapter 8, but the 
discussions of each of these cultures can also be read as interesting and 
illustrative examples in themselves.
In chapter 3.1, we saw how the ecology and the environment can 
determine the level of violent conflict between groups or determine 
whether war is possible at all. Conflicts are likely if multiple groups are 
competing for the same ecological niche, according to the competitive 
exclusion principle, while conflicts are less likely for groups that have 
adapted to their own unique niche. Using the distinction between 
contest competition and scramble competition, we found that conflicts 
are more likely where food or other valuable resources are concentrated 
in patches that can be monopolized and defended, while conflicts will be 
rare where food is sparsely distributed. Logistic factors such as weapon 
technology, ease of travel, efficient food production, and storage and 
transportation of food must also be taken into account.
To summarize, we can predict that the level of violent intergroup 
conflict in a non-modern culture will be high when the following factors 
are present:
• An ecology and technology that enables a high food production 
per unit area and thus a high population density. 
© 2017 Agner Fog, CC BY 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0128.07
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• Food and other important resources are concentrated in 
patches that can be monopolized and defended by the group 
rather than sparsely distributed. 
• Neighbor groups with similar ecology are competing for the 
same resources.
• Efficient means for transportation of warriors to enemy 
territory are available. 
• Efficient means of communication over distance are available. 
• Efficient means of food storage and transportation are 
available. 
• Efficient weapons are available. 
• The climate is favorable.
In contrast, intergroup conflict is likely to be impeded or prevented 
when these factors are reversed, specifically when
• Food is sparsely distributed and the population density is low. 
• Geographical barriers or logistic problems make travel 
difficult.
• A group has specialized in a unique niche that neighbor 
groups are unable to exploit.
• Extreme climate conditions make work and fighting more 
difficult. 
It must be noted that these assumptions do not hold in modern industrial 
societies, where international economic interdependence or third party 
intervention can prevent war.
The next step in our prediction is that a culture will be regal when 
intergroup conflicts are frequent and severe, while we will expect to 
find a kungic culture where the level of intergroup conflict is low. We 
will predict an intermediate level on the regality scale when some 
factors point in one direction and other factors point in the opposite 
direction. Other environmental factors that threaten a sociocultural 
group, such as natural disasters and unpredictable food shortages, 
may also have an influence in the regal direction. The level of regality 
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will be reflected in a number of social, political, and cultural indicators, 
as discussed in chapter 2.6.
The relevant predictions of regality theory can be summarized as 
follows: 
• People will show a preference for a strong leader and a social 
structure with strict discipline in cases of a high level of 
intergroup conflict or other collective danger. They will show 
a preference for an egalitarian social structure in the absence 
of collective danger. 
• These individual preferences will influence the social and 
cultural structure in the directions called regal and kungic, 
respectively, as reflected in the indicators listed in table 1 
(chapter 2.6). 
• A society with a high level of intergroup conflict will use both 
reward and punishment of its members to enhance its military 
strength (see chapter 2.2). 
• Individual danger and intragroup conflict will not have 
the same effect on social structure as collective danger and 
intergroup conflict have. However, both kinds of danger will 
have the same effect on fertility. 
• The level of intergroup conflict will depend on the geographic 
environment, the ecology, and the available technology, as 
described above.
We will now study a number of non-modern and non-industrial cultures 
to see how well they fit these predictions. Each of these cultures can be 
seen as an interesting case study illustrating the application of ecological 
theory and regality theory.
The methods used for theory testing in the social sciences can roughly 
be divided into two categories: (1) statistical testing on a large number 
of cases, and (2) comparative historical analysis where a small number 
of cases are compared and analyzed in more detail. 
In the statistical method, you look at the input variables and the 
output variables, but rarely at what happens inside the ‘black box’ 
causing the input to affect the output. In the comparative historical 
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method, you open the black box and look at the chain of events that 
is responsible for the causal relationship. The comparative historical 
analysis allows methods such as studying whether events are happening 
in the temporal order predicted by the theory, and looks for events that 
should or should not happen according to the a priori theory but not 
according to alternative theories.1
A combination of statistical testing and comparative historical 
analysis is the best method we have to test a causal theory of social 
phenomena. The political scientist Evan Lieberman recommends a 
method that starts with a correlational analysis on a large number of cases 
and then studies a few cases in more detail.2 However, a correlational 
analysis can only confirm a relationship between variables that are 
already known to be relevant—it is unlikely to lead to the discovery 
of new interesting variables or relationships. Therefore, the present 
study uses case studies before statistical analysis. A number of ancient 
and non-industrial societies are analyzed below. A statistical summary 
and discussion of the results is provided in chapter 8.3. These cultures 
are selected according to a number of predefined criteria, explained in 
chapter 8.3, in order to avoid selection bias.
7.1. Andamanese
The Andamans is a group of islands in the Bay of Bengal, totaling 
6,400 km2. The islands are volcanic mountains with dense vegetation. 
The temperature is between 17°C and 36°C all year round. At the time 
of the first anthropological studies, the islands were populated by 
twelve tribes of Negritos speaking different languages. They lived from 
hunting, fishing, and gathering and had sufficient food at all times. Their 
only vehicles of transportation were canoes, which were used for fishing 
and traveling along the coasts of the islands. The canoes were unable to 
sail in open sea. The Andaman Islands had very little contact with the 
surrounding world until the mid-nineteenth century.3 The Andamanese 
1  Mahoney and Thelen (2015)
2  Lieberman (2015)
3  Man (1883), Radcliffe-Brown (1922)
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are one of the oldest and most isolated human populations outside of 
Africa.4
Based on the geographic variables, we would expect the Andamanese 
culture to be moderately kungic. The mountains and dense jungle 
make traveling on land very difficult, and the available means of 
transportation by sea were insufficient for large-scale war. The natives 
had no knowledge of any people living more than 32 km away. The 
favorable climate and abundance of food can be expected to allow a 
moderately high population density, which would weigh in the regal 
direction. The possibility of natural disasters, such as cyclones, volcanic 
eruptions, and earthquakes, might also have a limited regal influence, 
but the mountains would offer some protection, at least against the 
cyclones. 
The frequency of warfare is listed in the standard cross-cultural 
sample as continual or once every one to two years. However, this 
listing is very misleading due to a vague definition of war. There is no 
evidence that large scale fighting has ever taken place on the Andaman 
Islands. The literature agrees that the only evidence of fights is of ‘brief 
and far from bloody skirmishes’ where ‘only a handful of warriors were 
engaged on each side and rarely more than one or two were killed’. These 
skirmishes were usually feuds between neighbor groups, belonging to 
the same or different tribes. The feuds may be ended after some time 
with a peace-making ceremony. No weapons of war have been found 
other than the bows and arrows used for hunting.5
While no evidence of large-scale war has been found, some inferences 
can be made. The many different tribes living in close proximity would 
quite possibly lead to conflicts over territory. One of the tribes, the 
Jarawa, who live on the South Andaman Island, are believed to be 
invaders from Little Andaman Island, because their language is similar 
to that spoken on Little Andaman. It is possible that the Jarawa took 
territory from the original inhabitants in a more serious conflict in a long 
forgotten past. The Jarawa are in constant conflict with their neighbors.
It is remarkable that so many tribes were able to coexist in a small 
area for as long as it took to develop different languages. This is indirect 
evidence that traveling was limited and that the Andaman tribes were 
4  Thangaraj et al. (2003)
5  Man (1883, pp. 44, 135), Radcliffe-Brown (1922, p. 50ff)
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willing to maintain peace and respect territorial boundaries, with the 
exception of the Jarawa.
The Andamanese were hostile to foreigners and have systematically 
killed all shipwrecked sailors who entered their land. In particular, the 
Jarawa were so hostile to foreigners that it has been impossible to study 
them. The Jarawa have survived for the very same reason, while most of 
the other tribes have perished after contact with modern settlers.6
Figure 13. Andamanese hunting turtles, ca. 1900. Photo by Bourne 
& Shepherd photographic studio. Smithsonian Institution, National 
Anthropological Archives.7
The Andamanese had no political organization above the local group. 
There were influential older men and women but no leaders with 
authority. There was no penal system, and neither children nor adults 
were punished for wrongdoing.8
Religious beliefs were fluid, flexible, and incongruent. The 
Andamanese believed in spirits and other supernatural beings who 
control diseases, weather, and other natural phenomena. E. H. Man 
found several similarities with Christian beliefs,9 but these were 
6  Pandya (2000)
7 Public domain, https://siris-archives.si.edu/ipac20/ipac.jsp?uri=full=3100001~!57153~!1
8  Man (1883, p. 25ff), Radcliffe-Brown (1922, pp. 22–77)
9  Man (1883, p. 89)
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convincingly refuted by Alfred Radcliffe-Brown as projections of Man’s 
own faith.10 All other observers agree that no supernatural beings ruled 
the Andamanese or punished their misdeeds in life or in the afterlife.11
The relationships between neighbor tribes were friendly, except in 
times of feuds and except with respect to the Jarawa. Intermarriages 
occurred, as well as adoption of children across tribes. 
Fertility was low, possibly because children were breastfed for three 
to four years. There was no birth control or infanticide. Mortality was 
high, and nobody lived longer than fifty years. Suicide was unknown. 
Children started to help their parents with various work from about the 
age of ten. Children as well as adults played many games.12
The marrying age was approximately 16 to 20 for women and 18 to 
22 for men. Betrothals in childhood occurred, but in most cases young 
people were free to choose their spouses. There was no polygamy. 
Divorce was very rare. Sexual morals were lax. Premarital sex was 
almost universal, and adultery was frequent. Syphilis has spread fast.13
Men and women had almost equal status and influence. Children 
were named before birth, and the same names were used for boys and 
girls. The most important of their gods was described as female more 
often than as male.
Their art was simple. They adorned themselves with necklaces, 
body paint, and scars. The body painting consisted of simple patterns 
such as parallel lines or zigzag lines, with variations due to individual 
taste or changing fashions. The same adornments were used for men 
and women. Tools and canoes were decorated with similar painting 
or cuttings. Singing and dancing occurred on many occasions, often 
for ceremonial reasons. The songs were about everyday activities, not 
religion. Each singer had his own songs, while dancing was communal.14
The conclusion for the Andamanese is that most observations fit the 
expectations for a kungic culture. The observations regarding political 
organization, discipline, religion, fertility, sexual morals, marrying age, 
length of childhood, art, and music are in agreement with a kungic 
10  Radcliffe-Brown (1922, pp. 141–197, 370)
11  Radcliffe-Brown (1922, p. 48), Cipriani (1966, p. 43), Ganguly (1961)
12  Man (1883, pp. 31, 43, 109), Radcliffe-Brown (1922, p. 78)
13  Man (1883, pp. 13, 67), Radcliffe-Brown (1922, pp. 50, 70), Cipriani (1966, p. 22), 
Nippold (1936), Pandya (1993, p. 15)
14  Man (1883), Radcliffe-Brown (1922), Cipriani (1966, p. 54), Portman (1888a)
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culture. The absence of suicide, the absence of divorce, and especially 
the hostility towards strangers point more in the regal direction.
One explanation for the xenophobia of the Andamanese is their 
belief that dangerous spirits have a lighter skin color than themselves. 
They regard all light-skinned strangers as dangerous spirits.15 However, 
this is just a proximate explanation with little theoretical value. The 
belief in dangerous light-skinned spirits is likely to have a historical 
origin in encounters with foreigners with firearms. Indeed, history 
gives the Andamanese ample reason to fear foreigners. Malay and Arab 
slave traders, shipwrecked sailors, and European and Indian settlers 
have all treated the Andamanese with deadly violence;16 and the latest 
reports indicate that violent confrontations with the Andamanese have 
continued until the present time.17 They were friendly to foreigners in 
previous times, according to some reports.18
The frequent feuds between neighbor groups, whether they 
belonged to the same or to different tribes, are easily explained by the 
absence of any political system for resolving conflicts. The fact that the 
Jarawa appear to be more hostile than the other Andaman tribes has 
no immediate explanation, since almost nothing is known about their 
history.
7.2. Arrernte
The Arrernte (Aranda, Arunta) tribe of Australian aborigines were a 
semi-nomadic people living in the desert-like areas near Alice Springs 
in Central Australia. They had no means of transportation other than 
walking naked and barefoot. The few navigable rivers sometimes dried 
out, and there was no timber suitable for making boats. The relatively 
flat land with sparse vegetation did not constitute any serious barrier 
to traveling, but the lack of efficient means for carrying water made it 
impossible to travel too far away from water sources except in occasional 
wet periods. The climate is dry with large variations in temperature. 
Day temperature can exceed 40 °C, and night temperature can go below 
15  Man (1883)
16  Cipriani (1966, p. 3), Portman (1888b)
17  Pandya (2000)
18  Cipriani (1966, p. 4)
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freezing point. They lived as hunters and gatherers and had no metals, 
no pottery, and no efficient means for food storage.19
Based on this information, we can expect the culture to be fairly 
kungic, because the population density must be low and because mass 
traveling was limited by lack of drinking water for the Arrernte as well 
as for the neighboring tribes. However, the droughts that appeared at 
unpredictable intervals constituted a significant collective danger that 
occasionally killed significant parts of the population. This may have 
pushed the culture somewhat in the regal direction.
Figure 14. Arrernte rain ceremony, ca. 1900.  
Photo by W. B. Spencer and F. J. Gillen.20
Large-scale war was absent at the time of the first studies, but war was 
reportedly more common in earlier days before the spread of European 
diseases decimated the population. Deadly clashes could occur when 
droughts forced people to migrate into enemy territory. The political 
structure was very simple. Decisions were taken by deliberation among 
19  Spencer and Gillen (1927, p. 1), Tindale (1974, p. 50)
20 Public domain, http://spencerandgillen.net/objects/50ce72e9023fd7358c8a8534
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the old men. Some men had leadership status, but none had absolute 
power. There was no leader at the level of the whole tribe.21
Men often beat their wives. Physical punishment was common, and 
the death penalty was prescribed for several offences, including some 
rather trivial ones. The literature is not clear on how often the death 
penalty was actually executed in practice. Vendettas were very common.
Beliefs in life after death were weak or absent. Women became 
pregnant and gave birth as a result of totemic ancestors entering their 
body. The father played little or no role in this process, according to 
Arrernte beliefs. There was no supreme being ruling over the humans. 
Sickness, death, and misfortune were blamed on taboo violations, evil 
spirits, and, most commonly, on magic performed by enemies. Witch 
doctors had some political influence but no strong power. There were 
many painful rituals. Many religious traditions and objects were 
monopolized by men and kept hidden from women and children.22
People’s identity was defined in terms of totem group and a 
complicated system of marriage classes. Tribal unity was not a strong 
factor. Foreigners were not allowed into their territory unless they 
had a peaceful purpose such as negotiation or barter. However, there 
were often friendly relations between neighbor tribes, and intertribal 
marriages were common.23
Fertility was sufficiently low to keep the population size stable. 
Abortion was known and infanticide was common. Twins were always 
killed at birth. Suicide was unknown. Children were breastfed for 
several years.24
The Arrernte had little or no idea of biological fatherhood and 
consequently no notion of illegitimate children. A man might therefore 
lend his wife to other men for a number of reasons, with or without 
her consent. There were plenty of rituals and traditions that allowed, 
or even prescribed, extramarital sexual contacts in certain situations. 
Premarital sex, however, was generally not tolerated. Homosexuality 
has been reported for both men and women. Girls married around 
21  Spencer and Gillen (1927, p. 9), Tindale (1974, p. 33), Basedow (1925, p. 183)
22  Spencer and Gillen (1927, pp. 36, 443), Tindale (1974), Strehlow, T. (1947, pp. 5, 52, 
93)
23  Spencer and Gillen (1927), Tindale (1974, pp. 35, 75), Strehlow, T. (1947, p. 41)
24  Spencer and Gillen (1927, p. 221), Strehlow, C. (1907–20, IV:I–II)
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puberty, boys much later. Promises of marriage were often made for the 
expected future daughters of a woman, even before she got pregnant. 
Polygamy was common. Divorce occurred.25
Children were treated kindly, and much time was devoted to them. 
Punishment of children is not mentioned in the literature.26
Artistic expression was simple. Religious objects were embellished 
with lines, dots, and circles. Body adornments included necklaces, nose 
piercing, scarification, etc. Objects adorned with feathers and paintings 
were used in ceremonies. There were songs and dances for many 
occasions, but only few and very simple music instruments. Marriage 
ceremonies were rather simple, while initiation ceremonies were more 
elaborate, especially for young men.27
The conclusion for the Arrernte is that most observations fit the 
expectations for a kungic culture. The political organization, religion, 
group identity, fertility, sexual behavior, treatment of children, and 
art are all as expected for a kungic culture. The possible occurrence of 
severe punishment, intolerance of strangers, absence of suicide, and the 
strong male dominance point more in the regal direction. The marrying 
age is low for girls but high for boys. The amount of war before the 
spread of European diseases is difficult to estimate.
7.3. Babylonians
The alluvial plains along the rivers Tigris and Euphrates in what is 
now Iraq were the seat of many city-states and empires that waxed 
and waned over many thousands of years. We are considering only the 
period before the advent of monotheism, with the main focus on the 
era of King Hammurabi. The climate was dry and hot in the summer 
months, and the temperature went below freezing point in the winter. 
The fertile river plains were surrounded by desert. Boats of various 
sizes were available for transportation of goods and people along the 
rivers and the many canals that were dug. For transportation on land, 
the Babylonians had donkeys, camels, horses, and wheeled vehicles. 
Cuneiform writing was used for communication over long distances. 
25  Spencer and Gillen (1927, p. 473), Strehlow, C. (1907–20, IV:I)
26  Basedow (1925, p. 69)
27  Spencer and Gillen (1927), Strehlow, C. (1907–20)
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The Babylonians practiced intensive agriculture with a well-organized 
irrigation system. They had metals for tools and weapons.28
There are strong regal factors here. Nothing hindered the mobility 
of the people. They had means for storing and transporting food and 
water, and they could travel far by land as well as on the rivers. The 
intensive agriculture could sustain a high population density, and the 
area that could be traveled was large enough for including multiple 
states that could wage war against each other with efficient weapons. 
The only kungic factors we can find are the hot climate in the summer 
and the low population density in the surrounding desert. Since the 
regal factors are much stronger than the kungic factors, we can expect 
to find a rather regal culture here.
The political system was a monarchy where the king was the 
supreme ruler, though the priests also had a considerable influence. 
The religion was polytheistic, with a high number of gods and demons. 
Humans were created by gods for the sole purpose of doing service to 
these gods. Humans were thus servants of the gods, represented by the 
king. Humans were punished by the gods for their sins.29
Figure 15. Babylonian cylinder seal showing the king making an animal 
offering to the Sun God Shamash. Hjaltland Collection.30
28  Contenau (1954, p. 62), Nemet-Nejat (1998, p. 12), Saggs (1962, pp. 4, 158)
29  Saggs (1962, pp. 162, 300; 1965, p. 181)
30 CC BY-SA 3.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=31696169
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War was frequent and the army was one of the most important 
institutions in Babylon. Armies numbered thousands of men, probably 
more than a hundred thousand, and war casualties were high.31
Slavery and slave trade were widespread. A man could be reduced 
to slavery if unable to pay a debt. Political and economic matters, as 
well as marriage and divorce, were regulated by a detailed set of laws 
written by the king. Discipline was harsh. The law prescribed the death 
penalty or mutilation for many common crimes. It is unknown whether 
legal practice followed the laws or whether law-breakers could get 
away with paying a fine. It is certain, however, that slaves and prisoners 
of war could be treated harshly, and there is ample evidence of torture.32
The cuneiform scripts and other archaeological sources tell us little 
about the life of children. Children were set to work and subjected to 
strict discipline, but the presence of toys indicates that there was also 
time for play. Children could be lent out as slaves for three years, 
perhaps longer, in order to pay their father’s debt.33
Little is known about the fertility of the Babylonians. On average, 
between two and four children per family survived into adulthood. 
The marrying age has been estimated at 14 to 20 for women and 26 
to 32 for men, though these estimates are uncertain. The sexual morals 
gave men more freedom than women. Girls were supposed to marry as 
virgins. Adultery between a married woman and a man was punished 
by drowning both, according to the law, while a man was free to have 
concubines and to visit prostitutes. Prostitution was widespread and 
regulated by law and by religion. Homosexuality was tolerated.34
Babylon had a large production of art, mainly under the patronage 
of the state and the priesthood. The numerous temples and palaces were 
highly embellished with bas-relief and monuments glorifying gods and 
kings. Favorite motifs were royal hunting scenes and battle scenes, 
supplemented with stylized religious symbols. Geometric patterns 
31  Saggs (1965, p. 112), Delaporte (1970, p. 69)
32  Nemet-Nejat (1998), Saggs (1962), Pallis (1956, p. 556)
33  Contenau (1954, p. 18), Nemet-Nejat (1998, p. 130), Saggs (1962), Delaporte (1970, p. 
80), Stol (1995, p. 490)
34  Nemet-Nejat (1998, p. 127ff), Saggs (1962, p. 185), Stol (1995, p. 488), Roth (1987)
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reflecting a horror vacui tendency were common embellishments. 
Likewise, song, poetry, and literature often glorified gods and kings.35
The conclusion for the Babylonian culture is that the political 
organization, the discipline, the religion, the treatment of children, 
and the art all show typical regal characteristics. The sexual morals are 
ambiguous. We have insufficient information about the fertility.
7.4. Chiricahua Apache
The Chiricahua Apache Indians originally lived in Southern Arizona 
and New Mexico. They belong to the Na-Dene language group, 
having migrated from the Beringia later than the Amerind speakers.36 
The Apache had been displaced to reservations at the time of the 
anthropological studies. What is known about their original lifestyle is 
therefore based mainly on the recollections of elderly informants.37
The environment included semiarid plains and mountains. The 
Indians lived a seminomadic lifestyle and they were able to travel far, 
especially since the acquisition of horses in the seventeenth century.
We would expect a plains culture to be more regal than a mountain 
culture. The Apache culture is a mixture of these two.38 The access to 
easy traveling on the plains and the possibility of simple communication 
by smoke signals makes war possible and likely. However, the relative 
scarcity of food sets a limit to the population density and to the scale 
of war. The maximal possible size of a war party was limited by the 
availability of food rather than by political factors.39 We can therefore 
expect the culture to be moderately regal, though the scale of war is 
limited by the sparseness of food.
The tribe was divided into four autonomous bands at peace with 
each other. The bands were divided into camps, and each camp might 
include several families. There were leaders at the camp level and the 
band level, but there was no leader of the whole tribe. Leadership 
was based on common recognition. While the position of leader was 
35  Contenau (1954), Nemet-Nejat (1998, pp. 66, 167), Delaporte (1970, p. 182), Pallis 
(1956), Galpin (1955)
36  Schurr and Sherry (2004)
37  Gifford (1940), Opler (1937, 1941) 
38  Gifford (1940, p. 187)
39  Opler (1937, p. 177)
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often inherited from father to son, it was not necessarily so. The leader 
was generally obeyed, especially in times of war, but his power was 
not absolute. An unpopular leader could always be replaced without 
violence.40
Discipline was strict, especially for children. Young children were 
strapped to a cradleboard where they could hardly move. Older 
children were taught obedience, and they might be subjected to 
physical punishment, including whipping, if their wrongdoing was 
severe. Adults were occasionally punished harshly, especially for such 
crimes as marital infidelity or murder. Deviants were often accused of 
witchcraft. Suspected witches might be tortured until they confessed, 
and then killed.41
Religious practices and shamanism were based on individual 
revelations with no orthodox teaching. Everybody could have 
supernatural powers and perform magic rituals. People could specialize 
in different rituals for different purposes. There were many supernatural 
beings, but none of these had a supreme position. The supernatural 
beings were much involved in human affairs. They gave power and were 
prayed to, and they could punish people with sickness and misfortune, 
but there was no punishment in the afterlife.
The most important ceremony was the girls’ puberty rite. This was 
a very elaborate and expensive ceremony lasting for four days, where 
neighbors were invited for dancing and feasting. The initiation rite for 
boys was very different. The boy had to go as a novice on four raids or 
war expeditions before he was considered a man. He was trained to 
endure all kinds of hardship.42
Raiding and war was an integrated part of Apache life. They went 
on raiding expeditions to enemy tribes several times a year for the 
purpose of stealing horses and cattle or for avenging the deaths of lost 
warriors. They might take prisoners of war, who were tortured and 
killed. Captured boys might be adopted and raised to become warriors. 
Women were not captured.43
40  Opler (1941, pp. 73, 174), Schroeder (1974, IV)
41  Gifford (1940), Opler (1937, p. 191; 1941, p. 14)
42  Gifford (1940, p. 76), Opler (1937, p. 226; 1941)
43  Gifford (1940), Opler (1937, p. 230; 1941, p. 334), Schroeder (1974:VD)
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Girls married at age 18 or 19, boys a little older. Marriages were 
arranged, but in most cases in agreement with the wishes of the young 
people. Sororal polygyny was practiced. Children were breastfed for 
three years. No information is available on the fertility or birth rate. 
Birth control was practiced by supernatural means and occasionally by 
abortion or infanticide. Suicide occurred.
Sexual morals were strict. Social contact between the sexes was 
limited. Nudity was not allowed, even when no members of the opposite 
sex were present. Masturbation was unknown. Girls were guarded for 
chastity. There was more sexual freedom for divorced women and 
widows than for married women and unmarried girls. 
Art was elaborate. Clothing and utensils were decorated with 
colorful patterns or figures. Music and dance was used for ceremony as 
well as for social gatherings. It was the girls who chose their partners at 
social dances.44
The conclusion for the Chiricahua Apache is that this culture shows 
a mixture of regal and kungic signs. The cultural importance of war, the 
strict discipline, and the strict sexual morals are definitely regal signs. 
However, the political system was less hierarchic and dictatorial than 
one would expect for a regal culture. The low population density made 
it impossible to incorporate a large number of people under a single 
leader. Political leaders did not have absolute power, and there were no 
religious authorities either. The realm of supernatural beings also lacked 
a supreme ruler. It seems, nevertheless, that religion had a disciplining 
function in the sense that people feared supernatural punishment and 
witchcraft accusations.
There is no reliable information about fertility or family size, but the 
fact that birth control was practiced or attempted seems to indicate that 
the population size was controlled by the availability of food as much 
as by war. On the other hand, the practice of capturing young boys 
from enemy tribes indicates a clear desire to raise as many warriors as 
possible.
Art, body adornment, and ceremonial paraphernalia were elaborate, 
embellished, and so expensive that this may be interpreted as a 
moderately regal sign.45
44  Gifford (1940, p. 63), Opler (1937, p. 200; 1941, p. 131)
45  Opler (1941, p. 379)
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Conflicts with white settlers and the availability of horses since the 
seventeenth century has no doubt increased the possibilities for war and 
raids, but the earliest available historical sources seem to indicate that 
the Apache had frequent conflicts with other tribes before the arrival of 
Europeans.46
7.5. Copper Inuit (Eskimo)
The Inuit, previously called Eskimo, are a nomadic people living in the 
Arctic regions. The focus in the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample is on 
the group that anthropologists have called Central Eskimo or Copper 
Eskimo, who live north of the tree line in Canada in the area around 
Coronation Gulf and Victoria Island. The environment is arctic tundra 
covered with snow most of the year and with very little vegetation. 
There are polar nights in the winter. The natives eat mainly fish, seals, 
and caribou, but hardly any vegetable food. Fuel is scarce and meat is 
often eaten raw. The native copper is hammered with stones to make 
tools such as spearheads, fishing hooks, and knives. Iron is sometimes 
found on shipwrecks or obtained by trade. People live in tents made of 
caribou skins in the summer. In the winter, they live on the ice in snow 
houses. People can travel far, but quite slowly, using dog sleighs.47
We can expect the culture to be kungic because food is sparse with 
no defendable resources (scramble competition) and because of the 
extreme climate. It is possible to travel very far, but people have to 
stop often and hunt for food during the travel, and this would make 
war difficult.
The concept of organized warfare is completely unknown to the 
Copper Inuit. There is no organized system of justice. Most crimes go 
unpunished. Murder may be revenged by the relatives of the victim, 
and this often leads to feuds unless the offender flees to another 
district. Theft is rare. There is no chief and no political system beyond 
the family unit.48
46  Schroeder (1974:IV)
47  Stefánsson (1914, p. 7), Boas (1964, p. 11), Jenness (1923, p. 13)
48  Stefánsson (1914, p. 131), Boas (1964, p. 173), Jenness (1917; 1923, pp. 93, 235; 1928, 
p. 85), Condon and Ogina (1996, p. 79), Rasmussen (1932, p. 68)
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Figure 16. An Inuit family, 1917. Photo by George R. King.49
The fertility is low. Children are breastfed for at least two years and 
sometimes even up to six or seven years.50 Infanticide is common. The 
total population in the area has probably remained at a stable level of 
below a thousand individuals for centuries. There is high mortality due 
to occasional famines and harsh living conditions. Infectious diseases 
were rare prior to European contact. Suicide is allowed and accepted, 
including assisted suicide.51
The population had no name for their own tribe until foreigners gave 
them the name Eskimo (of uncertain origin), or Inuit, which simply 
means ‘human’ in their language. Subgroups are named according to 
their home area, but an individual can belong to more than one home 
area. People have little interest in their own ancestry.52
The religion is animist, with many taboos that vary from place to 
place. Shamanistic séances are used for divination and for influencing 
the weather and hunting luck. Animals have souls just like human 
beings, and a shaman may just as well be possessed by the spirit of an 
animal as by the ‘shadow’ of a dead person. People are uncertain about 
what happens in the afterlife.53
49 Public domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Eskimo_Family_NGM-
v31-p564.jpg
50  Stefánsson (1914, p. 255), Boas (1964, p. 158), Jenness (1923, p. 163), Dodwell (1936)
51  Boas (1964, pp. 172, 207), Jenness (1917; 1923, pp. 91, 166), Condon and Ogina 
(1996), Rasmussen (1932, pp. 17, 46), McGhee (1972, p. 116)
52  Stefánsson (1914), Jenness (1923), Condon and Ogina (1996)
53  Stefánsson (1914, p. 126), Jenness (1923, p. 177), Condon and Ogina (1996, p. 86), 
Rasmussen (1932, p. 72)
 1817. Regality Theory Applied to Ancient Cultures
The sexual morals are lax. Polygyny and polyandry occur. Temporary 
wife swapping is a common way of building alliances, and it is not 
uncommon for a visiting man to be offered a woman for the night. 
Marriage appears to be based more on practical considerations than on 
love, with no elaborate ceremony to consolidate it. There are no love 
songs or other expressions of romanticism. Divorce is easy. Girls marry 
at the age of 14 to 16, boys somewhat later.54
The sex roles are not rigid. While hunting is the job of men and 
sewing is the job of women, it is not shameful to do a task that belongs 
to the opposite sex. There is no distinction between boys’ names and 
girls’ names.55
Children are treated with affection: they have toys, they are never 
punished severely, and they do not have to work hard.56
The most important form of art is singing and dancing. The only 
music instrument is a drum. People take turns singing and dancing, 
while the remaining people sit or stand in a circle around the dancer. 
Often, each person has his or her own songs and dancing style. The song 
texts are mostly about everyday occurrences and hunting events.57
People have tattoos identifying their home area. Tools and clothes are 
sometimes embellished with simple patterns.58
We can now conclude that all the cultural markers of the Copper Inuit 
fit the predictions for a kungic culture, except for the low marrying age.
7.6. E De (Rhadé)
The E De are one of several tribes that live in the highlands of southern 
Vietnam. The present study will focus mainly on the time before 
colonization. The mountain environment consisted of forests, dense 
bush and grasslands. They grew rice and other crops using slash and 
burn and shifting cultivation. Irrigation of rice fields was used only 
where the environment was favorable. They were herding buffaloes 
54  Boas (1964, p. 171), Jenness (1923, 1925, 1928), Condon and Ogina (1996, p. 85), 
Rasmussen (1932, p. 50), Dodwell (1936)
55  Stefánsson (1914, p. 102), Boas (1964, p. 204), Jenness (1923, p. 167), Condon and 
Ogina (1996, p. 85), Rasmussen (1932, p. 42)
56  Stefánsson (1914, p. 154), Boas (1964, p. 163), Jenness (1923, p. 169)
57  Stefánsson (1914), Jenness (1923, 1925, 1928), Rasmussen (1932, pp. 16, 130), Dodwell 
(1936)
58  Boas (1964, p. 153), Jenness (1923, p. 117; 1946)
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and several other animals, including a limited number of horses and 
elephants. They had tools of iron and other metals.59
The environment presented many obstacles to travel but, given the 
availability of horses and elephants, we would expect the E De people 
to travel far. An efficient means of travel combined with efficient food 
production makes us predict a regal culture.
The E De people lived in villages consisting of several longhouses. 
Each longhouse was the home of a matrilineal group of up to 300 people. 
The level of political integration varied considerably. The villages were 
often partially or fully autonomous under the leadership of a village 
chief. In some cases, a group of several villages formed a mini-state. 
In one period, the E De paid tribute to the closely related Jarai tribe. 
The E De were part of the Champa kingdom and paid tribute to the 
Champa king for a period of possibly several hundred years, although 
the Champa influence appears to have been very limited. Intervillage 
raids and wars were common.60
The E De society was highly stratified. The village chief and other rich 
people were very powerful, while up to two-thirds of the population 
lived in slavery or debt dependence.61
The justice system was based on a large set of orally transmitted laws. 
Prescribed punishments ranged from payment of fines and religious 
offerings to enslavement and (rarely) death. The animist religion 
supported the social stratification and the socially unequal justice 
system by the beliefs that wealth was sanctioned by the spirits and that 
misdeeds must be expiated by expensive offerings to the spirits. Unable 
to pay for these offerings, many people ended up in the possibly lifelong 
slavery-like conditions of debt dependence.62
Families typically had five to six children, and the population 
appears to have been growing. Infanticide was not allowed. Boys were 
married at age 16 or older, girls perhaps younger. Child marriage had 
been practiced in the past. Premarital sex was tolerated if the couple 
entered a secret marriage. The wedding ceremony was very simple. 
59  Donoghue, Whitney and Ishino (1962, p. 3), LeBar, Hickey and Musgrave (1964, p. 
251), Schaeffer (1979, p. 9), Special Operations Research Office (1965, p. 2)
60  Donoghue, Whitney and Ishino (1962, p. 38), LeBar, Hickey and Musgrave (1964, p. 
254), Schaeffer (1979, p. 15)
61  Schaeffer (1979, p. 3)
62  Schaeffer (1979, p. 94), Sabatier (1940)
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Extramarital sex might have been punished but was often tolerated 
as long as it did not have economic consequences. Polygyny was rare. 
Divorce was disapproved of. Children started helping their parents 
from age 7 to 8 and working in the fields from age 10 to 13.63
Little has been published about old E De art and music. Buildings 
and woven clothes sometimes had rich ornamentation. Rich people 
collected jewelry, decorated gongs, and other prestige items.64
Though the available data for precolonial E De are sparse, we can 
conclude that the cultural indicators are in accordance with a moderately 
regal culture, though not quite as regal as expected.
7.7. Ganda
The Ganda or Baganda are a Bantu people still living in the kingdom of 
Buganda, which comprises 50,000 km2 of land to the north and west of 
lake Victoria in East Africa. Buganda is now part of the state of Uganda. 
The environment consists of flat hills, savanna, swamps, rivers, lakes, 
and forests at an elevation of 1,000 to 1,400 meters above sea level. The 
position on the equator provides a climate with only small seasonal 
variations. The average day temperature is between 25 °C and 28 °C all 
year round. There are two rainy seasons a year and no completely dry 
season.
The area of Buganda is very fertile and more suited for agriculture 
than the neighboring areas. The staple food is bananas or plantains, 
which are harvested all year round. Other crops are harvested twice 
a year. The diet is supplemented with protein from domestic animals, 
hunted game, fish, and insects.65
The traditional Baganda had good roads that were traveled by foot. 
They had no wheeled vehicles, and they did not use animals for work or 
transport. They had canoes for sailing the lakes and those of the rivers 
that were navigable. They used iron for making spearheads, hoes, and 
other tools.66
63  Donoghue, Whitney and Ishino (1962, p. 26), LeBar, Hickey and Musgrave (1964, p. 
253), Schaeffer (1979, p. 136), Sabatier (1940)
64  Schaeffer (1979), Special Operations Research Office (1965, p. 9)
65  Kottak (1972), Roscoe, J. (1911, p. 4)
66  Roscoe, J. (1911, p. 239), Rusch (1975, p. 37)
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Based on these facts, we can expect the culture to be regal. The 
population density was high, due to the fact that they had plenty of 
food all year round. They were able to travel far through the savannah 
and grassy hills as well as on rivers and lakes. Their range of movement, 
however, was limited by their inability to build bridges across large 
swamps and rivers.67
Buganda was the strongest military power in the region. Their power 
is generally attributed to the efficient production of plantains and to 
the availability of iron. They attacked and plundered the neighboring 
peoples on regular raids where they captured cattle, women, and slaves 
and killed as many men as they could.68
The political system was a highly hierarchical system of chiefs headed 
by the all-powerful king. The king ordered large numbers of men to be 
killed. Some were killed for minor offenses, some were sacrificed to the 
gods, and some were killed to honor the ancestor kings; but most of all, 
the king killed men just to confirm his power to kill.
All crimes and signs of disloyalty were severely punished. Theft, 
disobedience, adultery, and other crimes were punished by death, by 
cutting off a limb, or by heavy fines. The fines were to be paid in bark 
cloth, goats, cows, and women. The culprit might enslave himself or his 
relatives to pay the penalty. The question of guilt could be tried by a 
system of courts that might hear testimony and use divination, ordeals, 
or torture to reach a verdict.69
The Baganda worshipped various gods, most of whom were spirits 
of men who had served previous kings well while they were alive. Dead 
kings were worshipped in almost the same way as gods, but the living 
king did not have god status, and he could be killed and overthrown by 
rival princes. Anthropologists have discussed who was most powerful, 
the king or the gods. The king, and nobody else, could punish the gods 
by killing their priests and plundering their temples. The gods, in turn, 
could punish the king with disease and misfortune. There appears to be 
no clear winner in this contest of power. Most of the time, however, the 
king made rich sacrifices to the gods, and the gods in turn supported the 
king and gave him advice through mediums.
67  Roscoe, J. (1911, p. 319)
68  Kottak (1972), Roscoe, J. (1911, p. 4)
69  Roscoe, J. (1911), Kagwa (1934, p. 80)
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The gods did not punish undetected sins, but some sins led to 
automatic punishment. For example, a child would die if its father 
committed adultery during the breastfeeding period. There was no 
punishment in the afterlife, except for the belief that a person who had 
had a limb cut off as punishment would continue to be maimed in his 
afterlife or next incarnation.70
The members of the kingdom were generally loyal and willingly 
sacrificed their lives in the frequent wars against neighboring peoples. 
In some cases, hostility towards strangers was an obstacle to trade, but 
for the most part they welcomed Arab traders.71
Polygamy was widespread. The later kings had hundreds, perhaps 
thousands, of wives and concubines. High-ranking chiefs had many 
wives as well. Such a degree of polygamy was possible because of a sex 
ratio of three women to one man. The surplus of women was due to the 
loss of men in war, the king’s mass killings of men, and the capture of 
women in war. No fertility data are available for the period prior to the 
introduction of Christianity and the abandonment of polygamy in the 
late nineteenth century. By the mid-twentieth century, the birth rate was 
three to four children per mother. The common opinion of the natives is 
that fertility was higher in the old times, and this is in accordance with 
the few individual genealogies that have been reconstructed.72 Suicide 
was probably rare. The only reports of suicide refer to the motive of 
shame.73
Girls married at age 13 or later, boys at 15 to 16. The marrying age 
increased after the introduction of Christianity. A man had the right 
to beat his wife and could even kill her with impunity. Divorce was 
relatively common, especially in connection with polygamy. Women 
were guarded carefully to preserve their chastity. It brought great 
shame on a girl to become pregnant before marriage. The punishment 
for adultery was severe, but even the risk of the death penalty was 
apparently not sufficient to completely deter this crime.74
70  Roscoe, J. (1911, p. 273), Kagwa (1934, p. 124), Ray, B. (1991, p. 42), Rusch (1975, p. 
361), Southwold (1969, p. 90)
71  Roscoe, J. (1911, p. 346), Mair (1934, p. 191)
72  Roscoe, J. (1911, p. 83), Kagwa (1934, p. 69), Klein (1969, p. 135), Richards and 
Reining (1954)
73  Roscoe, J. (1911, p. 20)
74  Roscoe, J. (1911), Southwold (1969, p. 108), Mair (1934, p. 78)
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Babies were sometimes nursed by maids so that their mothers 
were free to work. Children were often placed with relatives or chiefs 
so that they could receive a stricter upbringing. Children were taught 
politeness, etiquette, and cleanliness. Boys had time to play while they 
were herding animals, whereas girls spent their time making mats and 
baskets.75
The Ganda had very little material culture. All that people needed 
was a grass hut to live in, bark cloth for clothing, and a few tools for 
harvesting and cooking. The early kings did not even have chairs to sit 
on. Palaces, temples, and shrines were built of reed.
Figure 17. Kasubi Tomb, Uganda, nineteenth century. Royal buildings were 
large, but not as embellished as might be expected. Photo by Agner Fog, 2007.
Ganda art was more decorative than representational. High-ranking 
persons had some decoration and pomp to signify their status, and 
religious artifacts were embellished. These decorations were typically 
made of plant material, cowry shells, ivory, and bird feathers. Such 
embellishments may have impressed the natives, but they were quite 
simple compared to other cultures. The Ganda had many different 
75  Roscoe, J. (1911), Southwold (1969, p. 107), Mair (1934, p. 31)
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musical instruments, but we do not have sufficient information to 
evaluate the degree of embellishment in Ganda music and dance.76
The conclusion for the Ganda is that the observations regarding their 
political system, discipline, religion, fertility, marriage, sexual morals, 
and length of childhood are in agreement with a highly regal culture. 
The prediction fails, however, on the question of art. Regal cultures 
typically make impressive pieces of art and architecture of durable 
materials. The Ganda culture has none of this. No royal or religious 
buildings, monuments, or sculptures were made of stone, brick, or 
metal. The fact that the art was non-naturalistic and the architecture 
perfectionist is in accordance with the theory, but it did not have 
the degree of embellishment that other regal cultures have. The low 
sophistication of their material art may be connected with the low 
sophistication of their material culture in general. There appears to have 
been very little impetus to technological innovation, because food was 
available everywhere for a minimum of work.
The lack of highly embellished art makes one suspect that the 
extremely regal political system was not fully internalized in the 
psychology of the people. While most of the cultural indicators are 
relatively regal, they are not fully on the same level as the political system. 
There were songs about military events, but no systematic glorification 
of kings, heroes, or gods in Ganda music and art. The religion supported 
the king by sanctioning the mass killings that his power depended on, 
but the disciplining function of the religion was less effective than we 
have seen in other regal cultures.77 It is worth noting that sub-Saharan 
Africa is dominated by kungic cultures because of the dense vegetation 
that impedes traveling and a climate that is too hot for hard work. As 
a regal enclave, the Ganda culture may not have been able to evolve 
a cultural ethos that was too different from the surrounding cultures. 
We can thus observe a mixture of typically African traits with typically 
regal traits. We may speculate that the king had to compensate for this 
slight discrepancy in his culture by consolidating his power with mass 
killings of his own men.
76  Roscoe, J. (1911, p. 285), Kagwa (1934, pp. 90, 170), Rusch (1975), Mair (1934, p. 193), 
Lugira (1970)
77  Roscoe, J. (1911), Ray, B. (1991, p. 167), Mair (1934, p. 25), Kagwa (1934, p. 141)
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7.8. Gilyak
The Gilyak lived in east Siberia along the river Amur and on the island 
of Sakhalin. Their main means of subsistence was fishing. The climate 
was very cold in winter. The vegetation was primarily taiga (primeval 
forest), which was difficult to penetrate. The means of transportation 
were limited to dog sleighs and snowshoes in the winter and rowing 
boats in the summer. The boats were unable to sail on the open sea.78
We can expect to find a kungic culture based on the facts that the 
means of transportation were too inefficient to make war likely and that 
the environment could not sustain a high population density.
The Gilyak culture had a moderately high level of internal conflict 
but no external wars. The Gilyak did not keep records of their own 
history and had no memories of any war. According to one source, there 
had probably been a conflict between the Gilyak that lived along Amur 
and those that lived on Sakhalin, as well as a conflict with the Russians. 
However, no solid information about these conflicts is available. Internal 
conflicts were relatively common. The main reason for such conflicts 
was rivalry over women.79
The Gilyak had no political system beyond the family or clan. There 
was no chief or ruler. Common decisions and resolution of disputes, if 
necessary, were made through deliberations where the most respected 
men had the most influence. Sources of respect were age and experience, 
as well as wealth and bravery. Crime was rare, and there was no formal 
system of policing. Punishments for wrongdoing were generally mild. 
Corporal punishment and capital punishment occurred only rarely.80
The religion was mainly based on beliefs in spirits and animals. 
There was no orthodox teaching, and not even the shamans were able 
to explain their beliefs to the level of detail that the explorers expected. 
The prophecies and teachings of the shamans were readily disputed or 
doubted. The Gilyak had a weak concept of a good god that they may 
have learned from Buddhists or Christians, but they did not pray, and 
this belief was completely void of influence on their daily life. There was 
no opposition to other religions. Some Gilyak even worshiped a few 
78  Schrenck (1881, p. 655), Seeland (1882, p. 245)
79  Schrenck (1881), Seeland (1882)
80  Schrenck (1881, p. 663), Seeland (1882, p. 227), Shternberg (1933, p. 15)
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church bells that they had found as well as the ruin of an old Buddhist 
temple.81
The Gilyak had no word for their own tribe other than the word for 
humans. The name Gilyak is used only when talking with foreigners. 
They had regular barter trade with the Chinese, Japanese, and Russians. 
The Gilyak were highly tolerant of foreigners and readily mixed with 
the neighbor tribes.
The fertility rate was consistently described as low, but there are 
no accurate accounts beyond the observation that there were no child-
rich families. Children were breastfed for two to five years. Suicide is 
often mentioned in the literature on the Gilyak. No specific rates can be 
inferred, but at least it seems safe to conclude that the suicide rate was 
not low.82
The literature contains discrepant accounts of the sexual morals 
of the Gilyak. Leopold von Schrenck characterizes the sexual morals 
as strict, while Nicolas Seeland describes them as fairly lax, and L. 
Sternberg reports that the Gilyak were quite promiscuous.83 We must 
recognize that sexual behavior is particularly difficult to study. There 
may be considerable differences between what people say and what 
they do. Sternberg’s accounts are quite detailed and appear to be the 
most reliable. Schrenck mentions sexual morals only briefly and is more 
concerned with describing physical objects. Apparently, Schrenck was 
unable to penetrate through the initial facade of modesty that Sternberg 
described. It seems safe, therefore, to conclude that the sexual morals 
of the Gilyak were quite lax. The marrying age was variable. Bachelors 
aged 23 to 25 were commonly seen, but child marriages were also 
reported. Divorce was easy.
The Gilyak produced very little art. The most common products of 
art were small religious figures carved in wood. These wooden figures 
were quite simple and could be made by any member of the tribe. 
Women’s clothes were often embellished with small brass plates and 
other adornments. Knives and other tools were sometimes embellished 
with inlaid pieces of brass, copper, or silver. These adornments were 
81  Schrenck (1881, pp. 678, 739), Seeland (1882, p. 239)
82  Schrenck (1881, pp. 99, 641), Seeland (1882, p. 129), Shternberg (1933, p. 126)
83  Schrenck (1881, p. 638), Seeland (1882, p. 226), Chard (1961), Shternberg (1933, p. 
124)
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used as signs of wealth. Musical instruments were very primitive. 
Songs were simple and often improvised. It was quite common for 
each singer to have his own song. Dance was not observed, except for 
shamanic acts.84
The conclusion for the Gilyak is that the culture was quite kungic, in 
accordance with the geography, climate, and means of transportation. 
The predictions for a kungic culture are in excellent agreement with the 
observations of level of external conflict, political system, discipline, 
religion, tribal identification, tolerance of foreigners, fertility rate, 
suicide rate, sexual morals, art, and music. The occurrence of child 
marriages is in disagreement with the expectation of a high marrying 
age. The amount of adornment on clothes and tools is somewhat higher 
than expected. This adornment served the need to display wealth, which 
was an important source of political influence.
Figure 18. Gilyak wooden figures. From Schrenck (1881).85
84  Schrenck (1881, pp. 387, 681), Seeland (1882, pp. 109, 126, 234)
85 Public domain
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Figure 19. Gilyak decorated tools. From Schrenck (1881).86 
7.9. Hausa
The Hausa are a sedentary people living south of the Sahara in northern 
Nigeria and south-eastern Niger. The climate is hot and dry half of the 
year with a rainy season from May to September. The environment 
is mostly savannah, with patches of scrub and wooded watercourses 
infested by tsetse flies. Occasional droughts, famines, and epidemics 
have limited the population.87
The Hausa grow sorghum, millet, and several other grains and 
vegetables in the rainy season and store them for the dry season. They 
have various domestic animals, including horses and donkeys. The dry 
season is used for practicing many different crafts, including ironwork 
and long distance trade.88
86 Public domain
87  Smith, M. G. (1960, p. 1; 1965, p. 121)
88  Smith, M. G. (1965)
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Based on this information, we can expect the Hausa to be quite regal. 
Intensive agriculture in defendable fields, food storage, no geographical 
obstacles to travel, horses and donkeys for transportation, and iron for 
making weapons are all factors that point in the regal direction. The 
only kungic influence is that shortage of water and intense heat may 
impede traveling armies.
For more than 1,500 years, the Hausa have lived in seven states, 
united by a common language. In early times, these states were ruled 
by kings or queens. Islam reached Hausaland in the mid-fourteenth 
century, and the kingdoms gradually became emirates. The Fulani, a 
pastoral people, waged jihad (holy war) on the Hausa from 1804 to 1810 
for the purpose of purifying Islam in the population. Since then, most of 
the ruling class have been Fulani, though the majority of the population 
were Hausa. The population includes several other ethnic minorities. 
Slavery was common until Nigeria was colonized by England in the 
early twentieth century.89
There has been war more often than peace in the region from the 
earliest times and until the English colonization. Each kingdom or 
emirate was independent in some periods, at other times paying tribute 
to another state or empire. The majority of the population lived in cities 
surrounded by walls for protection.90
The political system was hierarchical and bureaucratic. A well-
organized legal system suppressed internal conflicts. After Islamization, 
punishments were determined by Islamic law. Serious crimes were 
punished by death, theft and robbery by cutting off a hand. Suspected 
criminals might be whipped until they confessed. It is difficult to 
determine to what degree these severe punishments were actually 
carried out, because the old literature rarely mentions specific cases 
of punishment.91 Many folktales tell of tricksters who got away with 
immoral behavior or who received lenient treatment.92
The literature is full of references to prostitution and other 
extramarital sexual affairs. Punishment for sexual crimes is rarely 
mentioned in the literature. Girls were supposed to be virgins at their 
89  Smith, M. G. (1955, p. 91; 1978, p. 33), Palmer (1928)
90  Smith, M. G. (1955, p. 102; 1960, p. 2; 1978), Hogben and Kirk-Greene (1966)
91  Smith, M. G. (1960, p. 42; 1978, p. 39), Smith, M. F. (1954, p. 183), Palmer (1928)
92  Edgar and Skinner (1969), Tremearne (1913, p. 48)
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first marriage, but premarital petting was often tolerated as long as 
pregnancy was avoided. Girls were married at the age of 13 to 14 (some 
say 18), boys at around 20 to 21. The first marriage was preferably 
between cousins, but these marriages rarely lasted. There were certain 
customs of avoidance and formalized speech between husband and 
wife. These customs also contributed to making marriages unstable and 
encouraging husbands to seek intimacy with prostitutes. It was normal 
for women to be divorced and remarried several times through their 
lives. Polygamy was widespread and desired. Rich men preferred to 
hold their wives in seclusion in their homes (purdah). Eunuchs served 
the ruler. No statistics for fertility before colonization are available, but 
many families mentioned in the literature were child-rich. The firstborn 
child was normally given away for adoption after weaning at the age 
of two, and there was formalized avoidance between parents and the 
firstborn child. This sometimes applied to subsequent children as well. 
Boys were circumcised and girls clitoridectomized.93
Children were expected to work, but they also had plenty of time for 
play. Some children earned money for themselves by selling things at 
the market.94
Suicide is not mentioned in the literature, except for a few cases 
where the reason was shame rather than anomie.95
The urban population was mostly Muslim, while some of the rural 
population preserved their indigenous religion and engaged in rituals 
of spirit possession. However, both groups were characterized by 
syncretism. The spirits in the ‘pagan’ beliefs were regarded as identical 
to the jinn (genies) mentioned in the Quran, and Allah was their king. 
The supernatural world of the urban Muslims was hierarchical, while 
the pagan spirits were organized around clans, where each clan 
worshipped their own local spirits. The spirits were responsible for 
disease and misfortune, but they were not perceived as agents of moral 
punishment. The Muslims believed in supernatural punishment—at 
least in theory—but apparently they did not fear hellfire much.96
93  Smith, M. G. (1955, p. 21; 1965, p. 139; 1978, p. 43), Smith, M. F. (1954, pp. 15, 60), 
Tremearne (1913, p. 77; 1914), Greenberg (1946, p. 16), Nicolas (1975, p. 182)
94  Smith, M. F. (1954, p. 55), Dry (1949)
95  Hogben and Kirk-Greene (1966, p. 286), Tremearne (1914, p. 143)
96  Tremearne (1913, p. 109; 1914), Greenberg (1946, p. 27; 1947), Nicolas (1975)
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Individual feelings of identity were a mixture of clan membership, 
ethnicity, membership of a kingdom or emirate, and the general Hausa 
identity. Each of the ethnic groups was mostly endogamous.97
The most important form of art was praise singing. Formalized 
speeches and songs of praise were required at all major religious and 
political events. There were several different kinds of praise singers 
extolling artisans as well as the nobility. The oral tradition with pre-
Islamic heritage is bombastic, boastful, and highly formalized, and 
it usually follows regular schemes for meter and rhyme. Written 
poetry follows Islamic tradition with mandatory doxologies.98 The 
art of embroidery was also developed to perfection. Various objects 
were decorated with fine geometric patterns. Architecture was less 
developed. Royal palaces and mosques were beautiful and impressive, 
but their decoration lacked precision.99
Figure 20. Old Hausa building in traditional Tubali style.  
Photo by Dan Lundberg, 1997.100
97  Smith, M. G. (1960, p. 2; 1978, p. 31)
98  Hiskett (1975)
99  Smith, M. G. (1978, p. 99), Tremearne (1913)
100 CC BY-SA 2.0, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:1997_277-10A_Agadez.jpg
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We can conclude that the Hausa were regal, but perhaps not quite as regal 
as expected. In particular, the sexual morals were more permissive than 
expected. This may be due to the custom of avoidance between husband 
and wife that made the man seek warmth and intimacy elsewhere. The 
seclusion of women, clitoridectomy, and the use of eunuchs, however, 
point in the direction of strict sexual morality.
7.10. Inca
The Inca Empire had its center in the town of Cuzco in the Andes. 
During the hundred years prior to the Spanish conquest in 1533, the 
empire grew fast to reach the size of several million km2, stretching from 
present Ecuador to Chile and part of Argentina. This vast area covered 
a wide variety of environments, including coastal areas, mountain 
plateaus, deserts, and rain forest. The day temperature in the Cuzco 
area was 21–22 °C all year round, while night temperature occasionally 
fell below freezing point. There are plenty of rivers running down 
the mountains, but these are not navigable.101 Transportation by boat 
was possible only along the coast and in the lakes. The territory was 
connected by an elaborate system of roads totaling at least 23,000 km 
and probably more. Relay runners were placed along major roads for 
fast communication. The Incas had llamas for transportation of goods, 
but no animals capable of carrying humans were available. Wheeled 
vehicles were not available.102 Agriculture and animal husbandry have 
been practiced in the mountain plains and basins for 3,000 to 4,000 years. 
Terraces and large irrigation systems were built to intensify agricultural 
production.103
Based on the geography alone, we would not expect to find a very 
regal culture in the Andes because of the many barriers to travel. 
However, knowing that water for irrigation, efficient food production 
technology, and communication technology were available, the 
prediction is a different one. The main crops—quinoa, potatoes, maize, 
and beans—provided highly nutritious and storable food in high yields. 
The environment and available technology therefore provided all the 
101  Baudin (1961, p. 1), Mason (1957, p. 1), Means (1931, p. 3)
102  Mason (1957, pp. 140, 167), Means (1931, p. 329), Hyslop (1984)
103  Mason (1957, p. 137), Bauer (2004, p. 25)
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factors necessary for developing a highly regal culture: efficient food 
production for sustaining a high population density, a concentration of 
food production in defendable irrigated areas, efficient transportation 
and communication, a climate that was suitable for hard work, and 
highly different environments leading to trade and wars between 
different cultures and different lifestyles.
The political system of the Inca Empire was highly centralized. 
Everything was planned and controlled by a large bureaucratic system. 
People had hardly any choice about where to live and what kind of 
work to do. At the same time, the administration took great care to 
make sure everybody had what they needed. Discipline was strict 
and punishment was severe. The worst crimes were punished by the 
death not only of the culprit but also of his entire village.104 The religion 
justified the dictatorial rule by making the emperor a direct descendant 
of the sun. Rich sacrifices were made to the gods, occasionally including 
the sacrifice of humans.105 Sinners were punished in the afterlife in a 
hell. Suspected witches might be tortured to confession and killed. 
Religious ceremonies were plentiful and more pompous than puberty 
rites, marriages, or burials.106
The Inca rule did not enforce total cultural uniformity, but they 
moved conquered people around to prevent rebellion. The different 
groups were allowed to maintain some of their cultural characteristics.107
Large families were desired, but infant mortality was high. Abortion 
was known but illegal; other means of birth control were unknown. 
Infants were strapped to a cradle day and night and were breastfed 
only three times a day for one or two years. They were never held in 
the arms or on the laps of their mothers but were breastfed by their 
mothers bending over them. Larger children were confined to a hole 
dug in the ground. Children were required to contribute to household 
and agricultural work as soon as they were able to do so.108
104  Baudin (1961, p. 34), Mason (1957, p. 170), Means (1931, p. 347), Brundage (1963, pp. 
121, 151)
105  Mason (1957, p. 202), Malpass (1996, p. 101), Wilson et al. (2007)
106  Means (1931, p. 367), Brundage (1963, p. 57), Malpass (1996, p. 106)
107  Mason (1957, pp. 119, 197), Malpass (1996, p. xxvi)
108  Baudin (1961, p. 100), Mason (1957, p. 147), Means (1931, pp. 313, 363), Malpass 
(1996, p. 75)
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Girls married at age 16 to 20 and boys in their mid-twenties. Some 
girls were selected for a religious life in celibacy or were given as 
rewards to high-ranking men. Most boys were probably able to choose 
their wife, but staying unmarried was not an option.109 Polygamy was 
common among the nobility. Divorce from the first or principal wife 
was impossible, while divorce from secondary wives or concubines was 
easy. Trial marriages were possible in some areas, and the marriage 
ceremony made a distinction based on whether the bride was a virgin. 
Except for the institution of trial marriages, fornication and all other 
sexual sins were severely punished.110
Elaborate art was common. The Inca made large and impressive stone 
buildings, such as the famous Machu Picchu. Festive and ceremonial 
clothes were finely woven and richly decorated. The decorations on 
cloth and pottery were typically highly repetitive, with geometric 
patterns or stylized figures. Immense riches of gold and silver added to 
the glory of the empire.111
Figure 21. Inca carved gold leaf wall coating.  
Photo by Manuel González Olaechea, 2007.112
109  Baudin (1961, p. 24), Means (1931, p. 358), Brundage (1963, p. 149), Malpass (1996, 
p. 37)
110  Mason (1957, p. 150), Brundage (1963, p. 225), D’Altroy (2002, p. 191)
111  Baudin (1961, p. 187), Mason (1957, pp. 144, 231), Means (1931, p. 105), Malpass 
(1996, p. 87)
112 CC BY 3.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Muro_de_oro.JPG
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The conclusion for the Inca Empire is that the observations regarding 
political system, discipline, religion, fertility, sexual morals, length of 
childhood, and art are in agreement with a highly regal culture. There 
is no mention of suicide in the literature except in connection with war. 
The marrying age did not differ markedly from that in kungic cultures.
The observation that the Inca Empire could grow only because of the 
elaborate road system and the intensive agriculture raises a question: 
was the empire built because they had good roads and efficient food 
production, or did they build roads and irrigation systems because 
the power of the empire enabled them to do so? The answer is, of 
course, that the causality went both ways in a self-amplifying process. 
The area is more suited for a sedentary life than for nomadism, and 
the population had sufficient time to develop an advanced agriculture 
and a relatively high population density. The availability of water for 
irrigation and efficient crops such as potatoes and maize were also 
important factors. The first regal developments may have taken place 
in the coastal areas where the ocean provided ample food and means 
of transportation, or it may have taken place in fertile areas near rivers. 
There was trade as well as frequent wars between the coastal people and 
the mountain people for centuries. Numerous chiefdoms and kingdoms 
had waxed and waned at the coast as well as in the mountains for 
more than a thousand years before the Inca Empire flourished.113 Our 
theory predicts that empires will collapse when they have reached the 
maximum manageable size, which is indeed what appears to have 
happened several times in this area. Each new empire may have grown 
bigger than the previous ones due to improved technology or political 
skills. The Inca Empire, too, was probably on the verge of collapsing at 
the time of the Spanish conquest.114
7.11. !Kung
The !Kung bushmen, also called San, have lived in the Kalahari Desert 
of southern Africa for many thousands of years, representing one of the 
oldest living human races.115 They speak an old language containing 
click sounds; the ‘!’ in their name is a click sound.
113  Means (1931, p. 47), Brundage (1963, p. 121), Malpass (1996, p. xxiii)
114  Means (1931, p. 47)
115  Chen et al. (2000)
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The Kalahari Desert is dry for long periods of the year. The !Kung 
depended during the dry season on a few permanent water holes and 
on water-containing roots and melons. They traveled long distances 
on foot and had no more possessions than they could carry. No other 
means of transportation were part of !Kung tradition.
Our theory predicts that the !Kung culture must be kungic because 
the low population density, lack of water, and lack of efficient means 
of transportation make war impossible. The neighboring tribes had 
no desire to conquer their land because it was unsuitable for herding 
and agriculture. The !Kung adapted to the dry climate and were able 
survive the frequent droughts without starving. At the time of the first 
studies in the 1950s and 60s, they were happily unaware that their entire 
culture was threatened and that bushmen in more fertile areas had 
been exterminated. The !Kung were not refugees expelled from other 
territories.116 Had they been refugees, they might have been more regal.
Figure 22. A !Kung bushman sucks up underground water through a 
straw and stores it in an ostrich eggshell. Photo by Jens Bjerre, 1958.117 
The !Kung never engaged in war. They would usually run away and hide 
if foreigners entered their territory. The traditional means of subsistence 
116  Lee (1979, p. 33)
117 All rights reserved, reproduced with permission
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was hunting and gathering. At the time of the studies, some !Kung had 
started to work for neighboring black farmers who treated them well. 
Others worked for white farmers under slave-like conditions.118
The political organization of the !Kung is consistently described as 
fiercely egalitarian. There was no political unit beyond the individual 
settlements with fluid membership. Various observers disagree on 
whether settlements had chiefs. There was obviously some degree of 
leadership based on kinship, age, experience, and personal qualities.119
Sharing was very important in !Kung life. Anybody who had food 
was required to share with others. Hunting tools, clothes, and other 
possessions circulated widely through systematic gift exchange. Any 
attempt at boasting, self-promotion, or accumulation of wealth was 
despised and effectively prevented through social pressure.
There was no formal system of justice and punishment. Even the 
worst cases of wrongdoing could go unpunished, for children as well as 
for adults. Theft did not occur. Murder was occasionally revenged—in 
most cases as an outburst of rage, but in a few cases in a planned way. 
Severe conflicts were more likely to result in the social group splitting up 
than in any kind of disciplining. The most severe punishment described 
by the observers was that somebody sang a song about the misdeeds of 
the culprit. The need for social acceptance was sufficient to keep people 
in line. When the first schools were set up in the area, the !Kung did not 
accept the fact that corporal punishment was practiced in the schools.120
The !Kung beliefs were fluid, ambiguous, and incoherent. They 
had no clear distinction between natural and supernatural, between 
human and divine, or between human and animal. Their legends 
included traces of Bantu religion, Christianity, and even European 
fairy tales. Several observers have equated the most powerful of their 
mythological characters, the creator of everything, with the Christian 
God. But this god had few similarities with this monotheistic God. 
He was, in a mythological past, a vulgar trickster displaying all the 
immoral behaviors that humans abhor. The gods and spirits interacted 
with humans in good and bad ways but were not concerned with 
upholding human morality. Rather, they manipulated humans for their 
118  Lee (1979, p. 77), Thomas (1959)
119  Lee (1979, p. 244), Thomas (1959), Marshall (1976, p. 181)
120  Lee (1979, p. 24), Thomas (1959), Marshall (1976, p. 289), Draper (1975)
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own obscure purposes. The religious beliefs were used in storytelling, 
in the use of oracle discs, and in trance dances and healing. The exercise 
of these rituals was not monopolized by any religious authorities, 
although some people were obviously better healers than others.121
Anthropologists disagree on what to call the !Kung because they 
themselves had no clear name for their tribe or race. They did not 
recognize as tribe fellows other people that spoke the same language. 
They readily mingled with and worked for neighboring people of 
different races. Mixed marriages were common.122
The fertility of the hunting and gathering !Kung was so low that 
overpopulation was avoided and the natural resources were not 
overexploited.123 Children were breastfed for three to four years, and 
birth spacing was three to five years. Infanticide occurred at a reported 
rate of 1–2%. No other means of birth control were used. Children did 
not work but were free to play all day. The average marrying age was 
14 to 17 for women and 22 to 30 for men, according to some observers, 
but child marriages are also reported to have been common. Polygamy 
occurred, and a single case of polyandry was reported in a neighbor 
tribe. Divorce was easy. Suicide was rare.124
The frequency of premarital and extramarital sex is difficult to 
estimate. Lorna Marshall reports that illegitimate sex was rare because 
it was impossible to hide, but she also notes that spouse swapping was 
allowed. M. G. Guenther notes that their marriages were ‘loose’. I. Eibl-
Eibesfeldt writes that they were fairly liberal in sexual matters, but open 
promiscuity was not tolerated. G. Silberbauer reports for a neighbor 
tribe that people often could get away with adultery. R. Lee reports that 
gonorrhea was spreading fast. Rape was rare.125
The !Kung rarely produced pictorial art, because it didn’t fit into 
their nomadic lifestyle. The main art forms were song, dance, and 
storytelling. Women and girls decorated themselves lavishly with strings 
of beads. Men were tattooed as an element of hunting magic. They used 
121  Thomas (1959), Guenther (1999), Biesele (1976), Marshall (1962, 1999)
122  Thomas (1959)
123  Lee (1979, p. 44), Silberbauer (1981, p. 286), Marshall (1976, p. 146)
124  Lee (1979, pp. 265, 310), Thomas (1959), Marshall (1976, p. 166; 1999, p. 320), 
Silberbauer (1981, p. 149)
125  Marshall (1976, p. 279), Guenther (1999, p. 237), Eibl-Eibesfeldt (1978, p. 136), 
Silberbauer (1981, p. 156), Lee (1979, p. 417)
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bows as musical instruments. Other simple musical instruments were 
introduced during the twentieth century. They appreciated individual 
inventiveness in art and readily borrowed elements of art from neighbor 
cultures. There were no big ceremonies, not even at marriage or burial. 
The most important socially unifying ceremony was the frequent trance 
dance.126
Figure 23. !Kung bushmen telling stories around the fire.  
Photo by Jens Bjerre, 1958.127 
The conclusions for the !Kung are that the culture was very kungic, 
in accordance with the geography, lack of efficient transportation 
means, and niche specialization that prevented territorial conflicts with 
neighbor tribes during the times of early observations. The predictions 
for a kungic culture are in excellent agreement with the observations of 
a low level of conflict, an egalitarian political system, lax discipline, non-
authoritarian religion, low degree of group identification, tolerance of 
foreigners, low fertility rate, long childhood, and flexible art and music. 
126  Marshall (1976, p. 34, 363; 1999, p. 63), Guenther (1999, p. 165)
127 All rights reserved, reproduced with permission
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The expected high suicide rate has not been found. The sexual morals 
appear to be fairly liberal for a people without birth control.
Fertility has recently been increasing and egalitarian ideals decreasing 
for those !Kung who have changed to a settled lifestyle based on herding 
or farming, as can be expected from our theory.128
Previous literature uses the word ‘kalyptic’ for the opposite of regal.129 
As this word sounds somewhat awkward and may be misinterpreted as 
an abbreviation of ‘apocalyptic’, it was decided to replace it with the 
new term kungic in commemoration of the !Kung culture. There is no 
circular reasoning in the observation that !Kung culture is kungic, as the 
decision to use this term was made ex post facto. 
7.12. Maasai
The Maasai are a seminomadic pastoral people living on the semiarid 
plains and plateaus of the Great Rift Valley in Kenya and Tanzania. They 
have migrated from the north since the fifteenth century and displaced 
other tribes as they expanded. Their territory reached its maximum size 
in the mid-nineteenth century. The population was decimated in the 
late nineteenth century due to rinderpest and other epidemics among 
their livestock, as well as smallpox and drought.130
They have large herds of cattle and goats and a smaller number of 
donkeys used as pack animals. Their diet consists almost entirely of 
milk, meat, blood, and honey. They avoid meat from wild animals. They 
have metal-headed spears which they use in warfare.131
To make a prediction for the Maasai, we first note that the ease of 
travel on the plains makes war possible. Their donkeys are useful for 
transport of material but not for war. The population density must be 
relatively low, due to the limited and periodic rainfall and frequent 
droughts. However, the use of cattle as a food source allows groups 
of several hundred people to live together. Scramble competition for 
grazing land points in the kungic direction, while contest competition 
for important water sources points in the regal direction. We will predict 
128  Lee (1979, pp. 48, 324), Draper (1975), Katz and Biesele (1986)
129  Fog (1997)
130  Coast (2001, p. 24), Fosbrooke (1948), Huntingford (1953, p. 105)
131  Huntingford (1953, p. 107), Merker (1904, p. 157)
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a moderately regal culture, since there are more regal than kungic 
factors in their environment and ecology.
The social and political organization of the Maasai is based on a 
peculiar age set system. When an age group of boys reach maturity, 
they are collectively circumcised and soon afterwards included in the 
class of warriors (moran). This event also initiates them into the age set 
system. A new age set is formed every fifteen years, while the members 
of the preceding age set mature and get married and a new group of 
warriors is formed. The cohort of men belonging to the same age set 
forms a lifelong political unit with its own leaders and spokesmen. The 
fifteen-year age span allows the warrior group to be big enough to form 
a strong military force.132
Figure 24. Maasai warriors. The patterns on their shields indicate their 
group and age set. Photo by Walther Dobbertin, 1906–1918.  
Bundesarchiv, Bild 105-DOA0556.133
The Maasai have no paramount chief. The political power above the 
division into age sets resides with leaders selected among the elders. A 
particularly powerful man is the medicine man and diviner, the laibon, 
who has many wives. Nobody can go to war or make other important 
decisions without first asking the laibon for ritual directions.134
The non-migratory ironsmiths form a separate caste, despised by the 
pastoralists.135
132  Fosbrooke (1948), Merker (1904, p. 70)
133 CC-BY-SA 3.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_105-
DOA0556,_Deutsch-Ostafrika,_Massaikrieger.jpg
134  Fosbrooke (1948), Merker (1904, p. 18), Krapf (1860, p. 362), Whitehouse (1933)
135  Huntingford (1953, p. 109), Merker (1904, p. 110), Fokken (1917)
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The entire life of the pastoral Maasai revolves around the accumulation 
of wealth in the form of livestock. The warriors make regular raids 
against neighboring tribes in order to steal livestock. Indeed, this is the 
main occupation and the raison d’être of the warrior group. Raids and 
wars against other Maasai sometimes occur. The Maasai have a strong 
sense of tribal identity and they despise all other tribes.136
There is a well-defined system for punishment of crimes against 
other Maasai. Most crimes, including murder, are punished by the 
payment of fines in the form of livestock. Revenge killing occurs, but 
is mostly prevented. Children work from an early age, and they can be 
punished with beating if they fail to do their work properly.137
The religion of the Maasai is monotheistic. Their god, Engai, is 
identified with the sun, rain, and other natural phenomena. Nobody 
knows or speculates about what Engai looks like. The Maasai believe 
that they are Engai’s chosen people. Engai has given livestock to them 
and nobody else, and this gives them the right to attack other tribes and 
steal their livestock.138
The Maasai have little or no beliefs in spirits or an afterlife. Dead 
people are rarely buried—they are just left in the wild to be eaten by 
scavengers.139 Ritual curses are used as a means of disciplining people. 
A person who breaks a curse by misbehaving or by failing to fulfill a 
duty will be punished by misfortune.140
The sexual morals of the Maasai are lax. Premarital and extramarital 
sex is allowed and considered normal as long as certain rules are 
obeyed.141 This is unexpected for a moderately regal culture and 
requires an explanation. The social organization of the Maasai into age 
sets serves the function of generating a large group of young unmarried 
warriors with high prestige who can devote their time to warfare and 
raids without having to care about family life and children. It is unlikely 
that these powerful young men can be disciplined into spending the 
136  Huntingford (1953, p. 107), Merker (1904), Krapf (1860, p. 354), Baumann (1894, p. 
163)
137  Coast (2001, p. 32), Merker (1904, p. 203), Spencer, P. (1988, p. 51), Sankan (1971, p. 
11), Saitoti (1986, p. 7), Hollis (1905, p. 203)
138  Merker (1904, p. 195), Krapf (1860, p. 360), Fokken (1917), Baumann (1894, p. 163), 
Spencer, P. (1988)
139  Fokken (1917), Baumann (1894, p. 164), Hollis (1905)
140  Spencer, P. (1988, p. 219), Saitoti (1986, p. 3)
141  Coast (2001, p. 115), Merker (1904, p. 44)
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most virile years of their lives without access to women. This would 
have undermined any strict sexual morals that may have existed in a 
distant past.142
Men do not marry until they advance into the group of elders, while 
girls marry at a much younger age. Girls cannot marry before they 
have been clitoridectomized, which is a rite of passage analogous to the 
circumcision of boys.143 
Most men will acquire additional wives as they grow older, if they 
can afford it. One may suspect that the economic aspects of marriage are 
more important than the romantic aspect. The society is patriarchal, and 
inheritance is patrilineal. The children that a woman bears belong to 
her husband, regardless of who the biological father is. Divorce is rare 
and difficult for a woman who has children. Due to the age difference 
between husband and wife, there are many widows, and widows rarely 
remarry although they may continue to have children. It is even possible 
to marry a dead childless man in order to give him a son that can inherit 
his property.144
Figure 25. Young married Maasai woman wearing iron spirals and other 
ornaments. Photographer unknown, ca. 1900.  From Hollis (1905).145 
142  Fosbrooke (1948)
143  Coast (2001, p. 80), Merker (1904, p. 44), Krapf (1860, p. 363)
144  Coast (2001, p. 86), Fosbrooke (1948), Huntingford (1953, p. 115), Sankan (1971, p. 47)
145 Public domain
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The Maasai desire to have many children, and the fertility is high. They 
have a strong taboo against mentioning the name of a dead person. 
For this reason, it is very difficult to gather information about the 
occurrence of infanticide and suicide, though these are known to occur. 
The casualties of war are high.146
The conclusion for the Maasai is that most of the cultural markers fit 
the predictions for a moderately regal culture, with the exceptions of the 
political structure, which is less hierarchical than expected, the sexual 
morals, which are unusually permissive, and the late marrying age for 
men. The Maasai have developed a unique sociopolitical structure that 
has brought them military success, despite being different from the 
highly hierarchical and centralized political structures of other militarily 
strong societies.
7.13. Mbuti
Mbuti is a name for several groups of pygmies who lived in the Ituri 
forest, a tropical rain forest in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
near the equator. The average day temperature was around 27 °C all 
year round. It was possible to pass through most parts of the forest 
on foot because of limited undergrowth. Rivers and swamps formed 
barriers to the movement of the Mbuti, who did not make boats. The 
Mbuti were nomads with a peculiar lifestyle alternating between two 
different cultures. For periods of several months, they lived in the forest, 
where hunting and gathering formed their subsistence. At certain times 
of the year, they lived near villages at the edge of the forest, where they 
traded meat for vegetables and tools with slash and burn agriculturalists 
of Bantu and Sudanese origins. The villagers had bound the Mbuti into 
a kind of serfdom, which was inherited on both sides—at least in the 
imagination of the villagers. However, the Mbuti could easily escape 
and change their allegiance, because the villagers were afraid to enter 
the forest. The relationship between Mbuti and agriculturalists has 
lasted for so long that the Mbuti have lost their original language but 
146  Coast (2001, p. 135), Merker (1904, p. 333)
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not their genetic uniqueness.147 The only evidence that the pygmies ever 
lived independently in the forest is archaeological.148
Figure 26. Mbuti men hunting with net. Photo by Paul Schebesta, n. d. 
Bildarchiv Austria, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, Nr. 10819171.149 
To make a regality prediction for the Mbuti, we first note that the 
population density in the forest was low. Walking through the forest 
was slow, and there were rivers that the Mbuti could not cross. The 
environment was healthy and dangers were few. The forest provided 
good protection from the villagers, who would never pursue the Mbuti 
into the forest. These are factors that point in the kungic direction. Other 
factors point in the regal direction. The nomadic lifestyle could lead to 
territorial conflicts. The territory of the Mbuti was shrinking as forest 
was converted to agricultural land. Furthermore, the Mbuti were heavily 
influenced by the village culture, which we would expect to be more 
147  Cavalli-Sforza (1986, p. 18), Harako (1976, p. 39), Schebesta (1938, p. 54), Turnbull 
(1961, p. 17; 1965, p. 23)
148  Bailey (1989), Mercader et al. (2000), Wilkie and Curran (1993)
149 All rights reserved, reproduced with permission
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regal than the forest culture. Nevertheless, we will expect the kungic 
factors to dominate, because the Mbuti could escape any conflict with 
the villagers, who were unable to penetrate their niche. Consequently, 
the prediction is that the Mbuti culture would be moderately kungic.
The Mbuti had very little political organization. Some people, mostly 
older men, took leading roles in the camps, but egalitarian principles were 
held in high regard and everybody had a say in discussions. Conflicts 
were handled collectively. Everybody in a camp was responsible for 
avoiding or stopping conflicts between camp members. Young bachelors 
sometimes played a key role in handling conflicts between the older 
married people by means of mockery and ridicule. Conflicts were often 
diverted or dissolved into ridicule rather than settled with a formal 
decision. Retaliation for wrongdoing was common, but organized 
punishment was very rare. Serious wrongdoing could lead to the flight 
or ostracism of the perpetrator, but the banished person might return 
after a few days of hiding in the forest, where somebody had secretly 
brought him food. No case of permanent banishment is known.150
The Mbuti abhorred physical violence. They have been engaged by 
the villagers as scouts in wars with other tribes, but there is no evidence 
that the Mbuti have ever themselves taken any part in war beyond 
killing a few trespassers.151
The religious beliefs of the Mbuti varied considerably and lacked 
precision and dogmas. Different observers disagree on even the most 
fundamental aspects of Mbuti beliefs, such as the names and nature 
of their supernatural beings, whether they prayed and sacrificed, 
whether they performed witchcraft, and whether they believed in an 
afterlife. The villagers involved the Mbuti in their rites of passage in an 
attempt to exercise supernatural control over them. The Mbuti willingly 
participated in these rituals and pretended to share the beliefs of the 
villagers, which they could use to their own advantage. The villagers 
believed that the forest was full of malevolent spirits, and the Mbuti 
actively worked to reinforce such beliefs among the villagers in order to 
keep them out of the forest. When no villager was watching them, the 
Mbuti would ridicule the beliefs of the villagers and deliberately violate 
150  Harako (1976, p. 89), Schebesta (1948, p. 332), Turnbull (1961, p. 102; 1965, pp. 26, 
178; 1983, p. 44), Putnam (1950)
151  Schebesta (1948, p. 534), Turnbull (1965, p. 220), Putnam (1950)
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the religious taboos of their villager hosts. When in the forest, the Mbuti 
had few religious rituals. It is uncertain whether the Mbuti honestly 
believed in any form of supernatural punishment, but we can say with 
reasonable confidence that religion was not a strong disciplining force 
in Mbuti life.152
Different Pygmy groups considered themselves as belonging to 
the same tribe, even if they spoke different languages (the languages 
of their respective village hosts). They did not allow trespassers. They 
were fearful of foreigners but also friendly toward them, and they 
were open to foreign cultural influences. They regarded the villages as 
hunting grounds and saw the villagers as ‘animals’ to exploit for their 
own advantage.153
Sexual morals were liberal among the Mbuti. Premarital intercourse 
was sanctioned in certain puberty rituals. Marital infidelity was not 
a rare occurrence, and divorce was easy. Polygamy occurred. They 
married after puberty with little or no ceremony. The average age of first 
marriage was 18 for boys, 16 for girls. A marriage was not considered 
fully established until the first child was born.154 
Children were breastfed for at least one to three years. Birth spacing 
was three to four years. Birth control was obtained by a postpartum sex 
taboo and probably by other, unknown means. Abortion was known 
but rare. Infanticide was practiced after twin births. The fertility was 
low according to some accounts, higher according to others, but the 
total population size was stable. Suicide occurred.155
Children were treated with affection. They had considerable 
freedom, were rarely punished, and did not have to do hard work.156
The most important art forms were singing and dancing. The singing 
of the Mbuti and related Pygmy tribes is characterized as polyphonic. 
Everybody could join in or contribute in turns with possibly improvised 
harmonies in no predefined order and with no apparent hierarchy of 
voices. The result was a rich complexity of different voices to a common 
rhythm. The dances often formed mimicry of daily events. Erotic dances 
152  Schebesta (1950, p. 14), Turnbull (1961, p. 75; 1965, p. 29)
153  Schebesta (1948, p. 512), Turnbull (1965, pp. 37, 82)
154  Cavalli-Sforza (1986, p. 37), Schebesta (1948, pp. 297, 359), Turnbull (1961; 1965, pp. 
63, 122; 1983, p. 34)
155  Cavalli-Sforza (1986), Schebesta (1938, p. 112), Turnbull (1965, p. 128), Bailey (1989, 
p. 100)
156  Schebesta (1941, p. 118; 1948, p. 419), Turnbull (1961, p. 118)
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were also common. There was no graphic art other than simple body 
painting, body adornment, and decoration of clothes.157
We can conclude that Mbuti culture was even more kungic than 
expected. All the cultural indicators point in the kungic direction. The 
further away they were from village influence, the more peaceful and 
egalitarian was their behavior.
7.14. Somali
The Somali live in the north-east of Africa at the Gulf of Aden. The 
climate is dry with temperatures ranging from below freezing point to 
above 40 °C. Droughts occur at irregular intervals. The environment is 
mostly semiarid plains and plateaus with little vegetation. Most of the 
population lived as nomads and herders, and milk was the staple food. 
There are only two permanent rivers in Somaliland. Agriculture with 
irrigation was practiced near the rivers. The coastal population lived 
off fishing, trade, and crafts. There was extensive trade with Arabia and 
with other parts of Africa.
The Somalis traveled around with camels and donkeys as pack 
animals. Lack of water was no big obstacle to traveling, because the 
camels could go long distances without water, and because the herders 
could drink camel milk on their travels. The sparse grazing resources 
for the animals set a limit to the size of troops that could travel together. 
The most important weapons were iron-headed spears. Horses were 
used in battle if available, but there were only few horses.158
Based on this information, we can expect the culture of the Somalis 
to be moderately regal. The relative ease of travel and the availability 
of metal weapons are factors that point in the regal direction. The 
occurrence of droughts at unpredictable intervals may also be a regal 
factor. However, the population density must necessarily be low, except 
near the coast and the rivers. This points in the kungic direction. The 
low-density nomadic population could not easily be incorporated into 
a larger political or military organization. The hot and dry climate also 
limited the fighting ability of the population.
157  Schebesta (1941, p. 243), Turnbull (1961, p. 76; 1983, p. 46), Arom (1983), Ichikawa 
(2004)
158  Lewis (1955, pp. 11, 75), Cassanelli (1982, p. 9)
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Prior to European colonization, the political organization of the 
Somalis was fluid and ever changing. The political leader of a family, 
clan, or tribe was chosen partly by majority decisions of the adult 
men, partly by inheritance, and partly by power, influence, and age. 
Higher-level political structures were either absent or unstable. City-
states and small sultanates were formed from time to time, but they 
often disintegrated again after some time. The political leader and the 
religious leader were seldom the same person. Arab immigrants had 
high prestige and considerable political and religious influence. Slavery 
was very common. However, slaves were reportedly treated well and 
many slaves were freed.159
War, feuds, raids, and plundering were frequent occurrences. The 
wars were of a relatively low scale with at most a few hundred deaths, 
but it is assumed that the territorial boundaries were ultimately defined 
by military strength.160
The religious belief of the Somalis was dominated by Islam due to 
a strong Arabic influence. The religion was a strong power, especially 
in moral and judicial matters. Legal matters were governed mainly by 
Islamic sharia law. Crimes were punished by the payment of a fine, for 
example 100 camels for homicide, which was paid partly by the offender 
and partly by his group. Other forms of punishment were rare.161
The literature gives no reliable information on fertility and population 
growth. Children were breastfed for two years, but were also given 
other food. Child mortality was high. Children were set to work from an 
early age. Children were well disciplined, but there are no reports about 
punishment of children. The marrying age varied from 12 to 20 for girls 
and 17 to 25 for boys. Child betrothal and forced marriages occurred but 
were not common. Men who could afford it practiced polygamy. The 
sexual morals were strict, except for the divorce rate, which was very 
high. Girls were infibulated to ensure chastity. Social contact between 
boys and girls was limited.162
Pictorial art was not very important because of the nomadic lifestyle 
of the majority of the population. Clothing and body adornment was 
159  Cassanelli (1982), Lewis (1955, pp. 11, 99; 1961, p. 198), Luling (2002)
160  Lewis (1955), Haggenmacher (1876, pp. 11, 31)
161  Cassanelli (1982, p. 17), Lewis (1955, pp. 107, 140; 1961)
162  Cassanelli (1982, p. 13), Lewis (1955, p. 135; 1962), Luling (2002, p. 71), Haggenmacher 
(1876, p. 27)
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simple, without excessive embellishments. Tools and objects were 
sometimes embellished with woodcarvings, showing simple figures 
and often repetitive geometric patterns. Dances were relatively simple, 
sometimes with a war theme. The most important art form was poetry, 
which was highly stylized and rule bound.163
The conclusion for the Somali is that the political organization 
is intermediate, whereas the justice system and the relatively mild 
punishments can be characterized as kungic. The religion, the sexual 
morals, and the widespread slavery are more on the regal side. The 
artistic expressions show mixed characteristics: the poetry in particular 
shows regal tendencies, while the clothing and body adornment look 
more kungic.
7.15. Warao
The Warao Indians lived mainly in the large delta of the Orinoco River 
in Venezuela, an area of approximately 18,000 km2. The environment 
was swamps, mangroves, tropical rain forest, and a labyrinthine system 
of rivers. The staple food was the sago-like pith of the Moriche palm, 
supplemented by fish and small animals. Food was plentiful but 
seasonal. Food storing was practiced where necessary. In later times, 
the Warao built their huts on stilts for protection against floods. They 
went everywhere by canoe. Their canoes were capable of sailing along 
the coast of Venezuela and to the nearby island of Trinidad, where they 
went for trading. Traveling over land was virtually impossible due to 
the dense forests, lack of dry ground, and many rivers. They had no 
pottery and no metal tools, except in later times where modern tools 
were obtained by trade.164
Warao culture was adapted to a very specialized niche. No foreign 
tribe had the necessary skills to navigate the swampy delta, and much 
less to gather food and survive there. This gave the Warao good 
protection. Whenever the Warao were attacked by neighbor tribes, they 
found protection in the swamps and dense forests.
We would expect the Warao to be able to attack neighbor tribes 
because of the ability to travel far in their canoes, although they lacked 
163  Cassanelli (1982, p. 267), Lewis (1955, p. 132), Luling (2002, p. 164), Puccioni (1936, 
p. 88)
164  Wilbert (1958, p. 272; 1993, p. 235), Wilbert and Layrisse (1980, p. 3)
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efficient weapons and the population density was low. However, they 
would have little incentive to leave the area that fitted their specialized 
niche, and outsiders would have little reason to attack them. Hence, we 
can predict that the niche specialization gave the Warao a moderately 
kungic culture.
The Warao were peaceful people who detested physical aggression. 
They were rarely involved in war, but there is evidence that they were at 
war with neighbor Carib, who allegedly cannibalized the Warao or sold 
them as slaves. There was no war between Warao subtribes. Internal 
conflicts were dealt with by public hearings or ritualized competitions, 
and territorial transgressions were prevented by threats of black 
magic.165
The Warao were divided into subtribes. Each subtribe consisted of 
a number of bands, which were led by an elite of elders, patriarchs, or 
chiefs, possibly including women. Shamans belonged to the elite, and 
chiefs were often shamans. There was only a loose organization of the 
subtribe and no political organization above the level of the subtribe.166
The political leaders had little power to discipline or coerce people. 
Shamans did, however, have considerable power because of their contact 
with spirits who could cause fortune or misfortune. The Warao believed 
in a supernatural world populated by spirits or deified ancestors. People 
were rewarded in the afterlife if they had been skillful at their work. 
There was no dogmatic system of beliefs.167
The Warao traditionally avoided contact with other tribes, except 
for trade of necessary products. In modern times, however, they 
intermarried with foreigners, adopted Spanish names, migrated, and 
accepted foreign culture elements quite quickly.168
The fertility was very high. A woman who survived into old age 
would have almost nine children on average. It must be mentioned, 
however, that this fertility rate was measured at a time when modern 
medicine had reduced the—previously very high—mortality, and 
165  Wilbert (1993, pp. 16, 244), Grohs-Paul (1979, p. 33), Heinen (1985, p. 14; 1994, p. 
359), Kirchoff (1948, p. 878)
166  Wilbert (1993, p. 31), Wilbert and Layrisse (1980, p. 7)
167  Wilbert (1993, p. 74; 1996, p. 257), Wilbert and Layrisse (1980, p. 8), Heinen (1994, p. 
358), Olsen (1996, p. 227)
168  Wilbert (1993, p. 93), Wilbert and Layrisse (1980, p. 180)
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where a large fraction of the population had settled into an agricultural 
lifestyle. It is possible that infectious diseases stabilized the population 
size in earlier times. Children were breastfed for three to four years. 
Infanticide was practiced.169
Girls were usually married in their teens or early twenties; boys 
were a few years older when they married. A few girls were married 
as children. Polygyny occurred. Most marriages were within the same 
subtribe. Promiscuity was common in connection with certain rituals 
and dances. A man could have sex with the unmarried sister of his wife. 
Premarital trial unions were common. Divorce was rare for couples 
with several children.170
Children were treated well, and parents made toys for their children. 
Children spent most of their time playing, but they also helped with 
light work. Children were rarely scolded, and teenagers were not well 
disciplined.171
Some religious artifacts were decorated, while tools, canoes, and 
huts were rarely so. People wore necklaces and other adornment. The 
main forms of art were songs, dances, and narratives. Singers had 
much freedom for variation and improvisation. Typical narratives were 
fables, stories about magical transformations, and stories about the 
supernatural world. There were no narratives or songs exalting powerful 
leaders, gods, or battles, but there were tales about past invasions and 
a few fables told about jaguars that symbolized the enemy Carib. The 
main occasions for large social gatherings were religious ceremonies. 
Ceremonies for marriages and other rites of passage were not very 
elaborate.172
The conclusion for the Warao is that the level of war, political 
system, discipline, treatment of children, sexual behavior, and art are 
all in agreement with the predictions for a kungic culture. The religion 
was relatively kungic, though it did have a disciplining function. The 
fertility was atypically high.
169  Wilbert and Layrisse (1980, pp. 25, 61), Kirchoff (1948)
170  Wilbert (1958, p. 274; 1993, p. 33), Wilbert and Layrisse (1980), Heinen (1994, p. 358), 
Kirchoff (1948), Suarez (1968, p. 128)
171  Wilbert (1993, p. 40), Grohs-Paul (1979, p. 51), Kirchoff (1948)
172  Wilbert (1970, p. 28; 1993, p. 136; 1996, p. 25), Olsen (1996), Suarez (1968)
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7.16. Yahgan
This section concerns the canoe Indians who lived in the southernmost 
part of South America, Tierra del Fuego, with the main focus on the 
Yahgan tribe. The climate was harsh and cold, with frequent storms. The 
territory of the canoe Indians was an archipelago of islands with high 
mountains and dense forests. The land was difficult to penetrate and 
provided only very little vegetable food. Therefore, the Indians lived 
as nomads traveling in bark canoes, eating mainly seafood. Their tools 
were made mainly of wood, bone, and shells. They had no metals and 
no pottery. As they had very few clothes, they always kept a fire for 
warmth.173
Figure 27. Yahgans 1896. Photo by Otto Nordenskjöld.  
From Nordenskjöld (1898).174
Fishing in this environment could sustain only a low population density. 
The Indians could travel in their bark canoes from island to island but 
not in open sea. Large-scale war was probably impossible because of 
the low population density and because the bark canoes were too small 
and fragile. Small-scale clashes were more likely to have taken place. If 
we have to make a prediction based on the geography and technology 
alone, we will expect the Yahgan culture to be moderately kungic. The 
173  Cooper (1917, p. 3; 1946, p. 81), Gusinde (1937, p. 403; 1974, p. 243), Lothrop (1928)
174 Public domain
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niche culture, harsh climate, low population density, and absence of 
technology suitable for war are factors that point in the kungic direction. 
The ability to travel far and the risk of territorial conflict that come with 
a nomadic lifestyle are factors that point in the regal direction.
The Yahgan had no social organization beyond the family. Several 
families might live together, or meet for social and ceremonial occasions 
or to feast on a stranded whale, but there was no common leadership 
and no group organization. War was unknown, but small-scale conflicts 
and feuds were common. Revenge was not always deadly. There were 
no weapons other than the usual hunting tools. There was no organized 
policing. Punishment occurred in the form of revenge from the wronged 
party assisted by his or her family, for example beating for marital 
infidelity. In most cases, however, public condemnation was sufficient 
to deter undesired behavior.175
They had few religious activities other than rites of passage and a 
few ceremonies. Some sources say that they believed in a high god,176 
but other sources deny this.177 Medicine men worked to cure diseases by 
means of self-induced trance or dreams, but they had little or no religious 
paraphernalia; they did not sacrifice, and they did not believe that 
supernatural beings could be influenced by prayer. They believed that 
diseases and death were punishments for wrongdoing. For this reason, 
we can say that the religion had at least some disciplining function.178
There were several tribes of canoe Indians with distinct tribal 
identities. They feared the neighboring Selk’nam, who lived on land 
rather than in canoes. They were surprisingly tolerant of Whites, 
considering that they had been treated very brutally by white seafarers, 
gold diggers, and settlers in the past.179
There are no reliable data on the fertility of the Yahgan, and the 
sources do not fully agree. Some sources tell that they had many 
children, but the mortality was also high. The population size may have 
been stable for hundreds or thousands of years. The population became 
175  Cooper (1917, p. 174), Gusinde (1937, p. 887; 1974), Lothrop (1928, p. 160), Bridges 
(1949, p. 79), Hyades and Deniker (1891, p. 16)
176  Gusinde (1937, p. 1040), Lothrop (1928, p. 35)
177  Bridges and Lothrop (1950, p. 98)
178  Cooper (1946, p. 102), Gusinde (1937, p. 1393), Lothrop (1928, p. 160), Bridges and 
Lothrop (1950)
179  Gusinde (1937, p. 28; 1974, p. 578), Cooper (1917), Nordenskjöld (1898)
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extinct after contact with Whites, mainly due to infectious diseases. 
Abortion and infanticide were known. Suicide was unknown.180
There are conflicting accounts of the sexual morals of the Yahgan. 
They tried to keep boys and girls apart from each other, but premarital 
sex was nevertheless common. Extramarital sex occurred. The marrying 
age was reportedly around 17 to 19 for boys and 15 to 16 for girls, but 
these figures may be inaccurate since they did not count their ages. 
Polygamy was rare in some areas, perhaps common in other areas. 
Authors disagree on whether divorce was frequent or rare.181
Children were treated with devotion. Weaning age was 3 years or 
older. Children were given miniature tools to play and practice with. 
Small children were never punished. Children were obedient and helped 
their parents with daily chores, but they were never forced to do hard 
work.182
Yahgan art was extremely simple. Body painting consisted of simple 
lines and dots without precision. There was little or no tattooing and 
body mutilation. Music consisted of just a few notes, sometimes only 
a single repeated note. There were no musical instruments other than 
percussion. Dances were imitations of animals. Legends were mostly 
fables, myths about culture heroes, and a few stories about revenge.183
The conclusion for the Yahgan is that the level of war, political system, 
discipline, treatment of children, and art are all in agreement with the 
predictions for a kungic culture. The religion was kungic, though it did 
have a disciplining function. The fertility was high.
7.17. Yanomamo
The Yanomamo lived in the Amazon rainforest in Brazil and Venezuela. 
They resided mainly in semi-permanent villages with 20 to 400 
inhabitants. Slash and burn agriculture was their main source of food. 
They were capable of living a nomadic life as hunters and gatherers, and 
it is speculated that they might have done so in pre-Columbian times, 
180  Gusinde (1937, p. 699; 1974, p. 437), Lothrop (1928, pp. 25, 163), Hyades and Deniker 
(1891, p. 189)
181  Cooper (1917, p. 164), Gusinde (1937, p. 633; 1974, p. 338), Lothrop (1928, p. 163), 
Bridges and Lothrop (1950, p. 106), Hyades and Deniker (1891, p. 377)
182  Gusinde (1937, p. 745), Bridges and Lothrop (1950, p. 107)
183  Gusinde (1937; 1966, p. 71; 1974), Lothrop (1928, p. 125)
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since their main crop—plantains—was brought to the Americas by 
Europeans. They traveled almost exclusively on foot on narrow paths 
that were almost invisible to foreigners. Many trails were impassable in 
the wet season. They went barefoot and almost naked. They had little or 
no means for sailing on the rivers, and they could cross big rivers only 
with difficulty. They had no domestic animals besides dogs. Their main 
weapons were clubs and bows and arrows. Arrow tips were mostly made 
of wood or bone, poisoned with curare. Metal tools were obtained by 
barter.184
The cultivation of high-yield crops made room for large village 
populations, but the dependence on hunting for acquiring protein made 
it necessary that each village had sufficient hunting territory. This makes 
us predict that wars were likely, and the wars would be aggravated by 
the availability of strong arrow poison. On the other hand, the difficulty 
of traveling through the rain forest and the low overall population 
density are factors that reduced the opportunities for war. Considering 
these opposing factors, we will predict an intermediate level of regality.
Figure 28. Yanomami. Unknown photographer, 2007.185
184  Ferguson (1995, p. 61), Chagnon (1977, p. 18; 1992, p. 56), Peters, J. (1998), Smole 
(1976, p. 32), Valero and Biocca (1970)
185 CC-BY-SA 3.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Yanomami_en_el_Estado_ 
Amazonas_(21).jpg
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The Yanomamo have a reputation for fierceness in war, but there has 
been considerable controversy among anthropologists over how fierce 
the Yanomamo actually were, why they fought, and whether their raids 
can be classified as war. It is undisputed, however, that violence was a 
frequent cause of death in some areas. The level of fighting was much 
higher in the lowlands, where villages had more inhabitants, than in the 
highlands.186
In their own understanding, the Yanomamo conducted raids against 
other villages for purposes of retaliation and to capture women. They 
were well aware that the enemy might move away as a consequence 
of a conflict, but they rarely mentioned the desire to make the enemy 
move away as a motivation for attack.187 An ethologist has suggested 
that we make a distinction between the proximate cause of Yanomamo 
warfare, which is the personal motivation, and the ultimate cause of the 
warfare, which is connected to the evolutionary function of securing 
a sufficiently large hunting territory.188 Since Yanomamo conflicts had 
territorial consequences, we will classify them with regard to regality 
theory as wars. 
The Yanomamo had no political organization above the level of the 
village, and the village headman had very little authority. There was 
no organized system of justice and punishment other than retaliation. 
Even rape and murder could go unpunished if there were no relatives 
to retaliate on behalf of the victim. Personal conflicts were handled 
by fighting duels. These duels were formalized and rule-governed. 
Afterwards, the issue was regarded as settled, regardless of the outcome 
of the duel. However, a duel might sometimes escalate into collective 
fighting or even war, especially if somebody died.189
The religious beliefs of the Yanomamo involved a close connection 
with animals and spirits. Many men were shamans. They took strong 
hallucinogenic drugs in order to get in contact with, or even become, 
spirits. They manipulated the spirits for purposes of curing diseases and 
186  Ferguson (1995), Chagnon (1992, p. 105), Good (1987)
187  Ferguson (1995, p. 7), Chagnon (1979, 1992, p. 113), Peters, J. (1998, pp. 24, 214), 
Valero and Biocca (1970, p. 31)
188  Eibl-Eibesfeldt (1989, p. 108)
189  Chagnon (1977, p. 118), Cocco (1972, p. 366), Lizot (1976, p. 83)
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harming their enemies. They had no supernatural rulers and only weak 
concepts of supernatural punishment after death.190
The fertility was controlled by breastfeeding, abortion, infanticide, 
and magical anticonception means. Birth spacing was two to five years. 
The overall fertility was four to eight children per woman. Extramarital 
sex occurred when detection could be avoided. It was common for a 
man to share his wife with his brothers. Rape was common.191
Most girls married soon after puberty. Girls might be married 
before puberty, but they did not live with their husbands until after 
first menstruation. Men married at age 18 to 30. They often married for 
economic and strategic reasons rather than romantic reasons. Girls had 
little self-determination about whom to marry. Polygyny and polyandry 
occurred. There was no marriage ceremony. Wife beating was normal. 
Divorce was common.192
Children were rarely disciplined, but boys were taught to be fierce 
and to retaliate. Children were given miniature tools and other toys. 
Girls were obliged to do work from a much younger age than boys.193
The Yanomamo produced little art. Body painting was made as much 
for magical reasons as for decoration. Different colors and patterns were 
used for war paint, hunting, and shamanism. Some patterns symbolized 
or imitated various animals. Piercings in ears, lips, and the nasal 
septum were decorated with long sticks or feathers. Arrow tips were 
often decorated, while clay pots were not. Dancing and singing were 
common. There were few or no music instruments. Myths and stories 
did not glorify war.194
The conclusion for the Yanomamo is that the level of war is 
intermediate, while the political organization, justice, discipline, 
religion, sexuality, and art all tend in the kungic direction. The strong 
male dominance may be interpreted as a regal indicator.
190  Chagnon (1977, p. 44), Smole (1976, p. 23), Zerries (1964, p. 237)
191  Chagnon (1977, p. 40), Peters, J. (1998, p. 119), Smole (1976), Cocco (1972), Lizot 
(1976, p. 22)
192  Chagnon (1977, p. 14; 1992, p. 145), Peters, J. (1998, p. 111), Smole (1976, p. 75), Lizot 
(1976, p. 27)
193  Chagnon (1992, p. 145), Peters, J. (1998, p. 131), Smole (1976, p. 74), Cocco (1972, p. 
292), Lizot (1976, p. 102)
194  Chagnon (1977, p. 110), Valero and Biocca (1970, p. 179), Cocco (1972, p. 124), 
Zerries (1964, p. 103), Wilbert and Simoneau (1990, p. 110)
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7.18. Yi (Lolo, Nuosu)
The Yi people live in the large mountainous region of southwestern 
China. The present study is focused mainly on the subgroup living in 
the Liangshan area and the period prior to the rise of communism in 
China.
The climate is temperate, but winters are hard. The subsistence was 
based mainly on slash and burn agriculture and animal husbandry. 
Transportation was difficult because of the steep mountains. There 
were no roads except narrow footpaths. Roads built by Han Chinese 
invaders were systematically destroyed to prevent invasion. The Yi used 
horses for transportation and in war, but many paths were difficult or 
impossible to travel on horseback. Most traveling was done by walking 
barefoot. There were many rivers, but few were navigable. The weapons 
included bows and arrows, iron-headed spears and tridents, and, in 
later times, primitive firearms.195
Attempting to predict a regality level based on this information, we 
get a somewhat mixed result. The rivers produce fertile valleys between 
the mountains and, although the agriculture was not intensive, it could 
sustain a considerable population. The efficient food production, the 
possibility of storing and transporting food, the large territory, and the 
availability of horses and metal weapons are all factors that make war 
likely. On the other hand, the harsh environment and the difficulty of 
traveling are factors that point in the kungic direction. The fertile valleys 
are separated by large mountains, steep cliffs, and torrential rivers, so 
that the average population density was low. The overall expectation is 
that the regality level will be intermediate.
The Yi in the Liangshan area had a persistent caste system. The ruling 
caste, known as the Black Yi, constituted about 10% of the population. 
The rest of the population belonged to the slave caste, known as the 
White Yi. The White Yi were of mainly Han Chinese descent, while the 
Black Yi were related to the Tibetans. These two castes were further 
subdivided into social classes. Newly captured slaves were lowest in 
rank. Over the generations, slaves could work their way up the hierarchy 
and become partly independent and even own slaves themselves. But 
195  LeBar, Hickey and Musgrave (1964, p. 1ff), Dessaint (1980), D’Ollone (1912), Ko 
(1949), Pollard (1921), Yueh-Hua (1961)
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the line between Black and White could never be crossed. Interbreeding 
between the two castes was prevented by all means. The caste system 
was dissolved centuries ago among other Yi groups living in areas with 
a stronger Han Chinese influence.196
The political organization of the Yi was not as regal as one might 
expect for a society based on slavery. Most decisions were taken by 
public deliberation in which even members of the slave caste had a 
say, and the leaders of villages and clans were chosen based partly 
on heritage and partly on merit. In some periods and in some areas, 
there were political leaders above the clan level, but these had limited 
influence in times of peace. For centuries or even millennia, the Chinese 
dynasties tried to control the Yi territory and used Yi chiefs as suzerains. 
But the Yi successfully rebelled time and again, so that, in effect, the 
Yi were mainly autonomous until the establishment of the People’s 
Republic of China.197
Political organization above the clan level—if any—was not strong 
enough to prevent the almost incessant feuds, raids, and attacks between 
enemy clans or ethnic groups. The inter-clan conflicts were, however, 
of a relatively low scale: certain rules were obeyed, and the opposing 
parties generally agreed to end a battle episode after a few hours when 
a winner had been found. Battles with more distant enemies, and in 
particular with the Han Chinese, were much more violent and merciless. 
Strangers who entered Yi territory without protection were habitually 
killed or enslaved.198
The available literature contains very little evidence of policing or 
punishment. Most crimes were punished by requiring that the offender 
pay compensation to the victim. Newly captured slaves were brutally 
tortured, but there is no other evidence of corporal punishment. Serious 
crimes were dealt with by persuading the offender to commit suicide. If 
he refused to do so, he would be banished but rarely killed.199
Religious rituals, linked to animism and ancestor worship, were 
controlled by priests and shamans. The priests (bimo) always belonged 
196  LeBar, Hickey and Musgrave (1964), Dessaint (1980), Ko (1949), Harrell (2001), Hui 
(2001)
197  LeBar, Hickey and Musgrave (1964), Dessaint (1980), D’Ollone (1912), Ko (1949), 
Harrell (2001), Ayi (2001), Hill (2001), Jingzhong (2001), Shimei and Erzi (2001)
198  LeBar, Hickey and Musgrave (1964), Dessaint (1980), Pollard (1921), Yueh-Hua 
(1961), Jingzhong (2001), Liétard (1913)
199  Hill and Diehl (2001), Shimei and Erzi (2001)
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to the White slave caste. Their skills were transmitted mainly from father 
to son. Major political and judicial decisions required consultation of a 
priest and performance of certain rituals. The disciplining function of 
religion was probably limited. A few sources talk about supernatural 
punishments, but there is no agreement between the different sources 
regarding the kind of punishments or even whether they took place 
before or after death. Beliefs in supernatural punishments, if any, may 
be due to Chinese influence or Christian missionaries.200
The Yi had a written language, which was mastered by the priests 
and only rarely by anybody else. Writing was used only for preserving 
religious rituals and formulas, not for trade or political administration.201 
We can assume that the priests had considerable influence. Whether they 
used this influence mostly in the interest of their own caste or mostly in 
the interest of the Black leaders, we do not know. 
There is no reliable information about the fertility or birth rate of the 
Yi. Children were breastfed for four to five years, but they were also 
given other food.202 Suicide was customarily committed for different 
reasons relating to war, conflict, peacemaking, crime, infectious 
diseases, and love.203
The marrying age ranged usually from 9 to 21 for both girls and 
boys, though children as young as 4 or 5 could be married. Married 
girls stayed home with their parents until their first pregnancy. During 
this period, they were free to have sexual relations with anybody they 
liked. For this reason, the firstborn child often had a father who was not 
the woman’s husband, but the latter had to accept the child as his own. 
Divorce was more common in the period before first pregnancy than 
after. Polygamy was rare.204
The sources tell us very little about the life of children and nothing 
about the disciplining of children. Children were treated well, and boys 
were taught to be brave. Parents did not make toys for their children, 
but various games are known. Girls helped spinning hemp from age 4 
and boys helped tending animals from age 7 to 8.205
200  Ayi (2001), Shimei and Erzi (2001), Liétard (1913)
201  Ayi (2001)
202  Yueh-Hua (1961)
203  Dessaint (1980), Ko (1949), Pollard (1921)
204  LeBar, Hickey and Musgrave (1964), Dessaint (1980), Ko (1949), Yueh-Hua (1961), 
Hui (2001), Liétard (1913)
205  Liétard (1913), Yu (2001)
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Clothing, tools, and houses were often embellished. The Yi were 
fond of colorful clothes as well as gold and silver. Before firearms 
made face-to-face battle superfluous, the inter-clan feuds were not 
only contests of strength, but also opportunities to compete on fancy 
clothing or flute playing. The sources show no evidence of the highly 
repetitive geometric patterns typical of regal art. Singing and dancing 
was common. Song texts were mostly about everyday topics, but there 
were also war songs.206
Evaluating the Yi culture, it is surprising how a slave system 
could persist for centuries when the political and religious means 
of disciplining the population were so weak. The caste system that 
allowed slavery may have been supported by ideology or religion, but 
the religion was managed by priests belonging to the slave caste. No 
slave rebellion has been reported. The agricultural production was also 
fully in the hands of the slave caste.207
The caste system and the pervasive slavery are the strongest 
indicators of regality in the Yi culture. The full-scale wars with the Han 
Chinese are also regal indicators, while the frequent inter-clan feuds and 
raids with limited casualties can hardly be considered regal indicators.
The political administration, the discipline, the religion, and the 
sexual morals appear to be mostly kungic. The use of body adornment 
in conflicts is a regal sign, but the adornment is hardly more elaborate 
than in other cultures. The almost complete absence of praise for gods 
or rulers in art and songs is an indication of a fairly kungic art.
Conclusion
We have now looked at eighteen very different societies of the past and 
compared their levels of internal and external conflict, their political 
systems, systems of justice and punishment, religions, group identities, 
fertility, occurrence of suicide, sexual morals, marrying ages, frequency 
of divorce, attitudes toward child labor, and art styles with predictions 
based on regality theory. The principles behind the predictions were 
explained in the beginning of this chapter. A statistical analysis of the 
results follows in chapter 8.3.
206  LeBar, Hickey and Musgrave (1964), Dessaint (1980), Pollard (1921), Liétard (1913)
207  Yueh-Hua (1961)

8. Statistical Testing of  
Regality Theory
8.1. Problems of cross-cultural statistics
We need to compare different cultures when we want to test the 
predictions of regality theory. However, the statistical comparison of 
different cultures is full of problems that we have to deal with. The first 
problem is the availability of data. Many data sources are available for 
modern cultures, but few for ancient cultures. The quality of the data is 
a matter of serious concern. Data collected from different cultures may 
not be fully comparable because of language problems, differences in 
definitions, or different frames of reference. There is a general problem 
with quantifying culture, because it is not always meaningful to put 
numbers on things like ideas, beliefs, emotions, or understandings. 
How can we know if concepts such as prestige or patriotism have the 
same meaning in different cultures?
The available data for contemporary modern western countries are 
generally of a satisfactory quality because the methods of data collection 
have been refined and standardized to a certain degree. But here we 
encounter another problem. Modern cultures are too similar. We need 
variation in the measured variables in order to get useful statistical 
results. Any similarity that we find between two countries may simply 
be due to cultural diffusion rather than to some causal factor that 
influences both countries in the same way.
The best way to overcome the problem of cultural similarity, known 
as Galton’s problem, is to look at the more isolated cultures of the past. 
© 2017 Agner Fog, CC BY 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0128.08
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No culture is completely isolated, but many of the non-modern and 
non-industrial cultures of the past were sufficiently autonomous to 
make cross-cultural comparisons useful. The Standard Cross-Cultural 
Sample, mentioned in chapter 8.2, is a database of cultures selected 
specifically with the purpose of minimizing Galton’s problem. The data 
in this database have been obtained from the ethnographic literature.
Unfortunately, the quality of the data in the Standard Cross-Cultural 
Sample is often problematic. Some of the variables are poorly defined 
or interpreted differently for different cultures. Some variables refer 
to concepts that make sense only in particular cultural contexts. Data 
are coded in the database as missing when a variable is irrelevant for 
a particular culture or the information is not available. In the course of 
the present study, it was discovered that data were often missing for 
non-random reasons. Special care was needed to reduce the systematic 
bias caused by such missing data.
Many of the problems with data quality and unclear interpretation 
of data are best dealt with by qualitative methods. A qualitative study 
can look into the life situation of the informants to put the information 
into a meaningful context. It allows us to discover new phenomena or 
mechanisms that were not anticipated when the study was planned. A 
qualitative study can give us a better understanding not only of what 
people do but also of the motives behind. For example, it is important 
for regality theory to study not only whether people fight but also why 
they fight. 
It has been suggested that a combination of qualitative and 
quantitative methods is a particularly fruitful way of doing cross-
cultural research.1 We shall do this here with a subsample of the 
Standard Cross-Cultural Sample. Relevant information is gathered for 
each culture in the subsample by studying the original ethnographic 
literature (chapter 7). The qualitative study assures that we can gather 
meaningful information that actually reflects what we want to measure. 
The advantage of this mixed method is that we get more reliable data and 
that we are able to better understand the context and mechanisms that 
lie behind these data. The disadvantage is that we have fewer cultures 
1  Harding and Seefeldt (2013)
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to compare, because it requires more work to gather the information 
about each culture.
A study with a large data set (large N) makes it possible to construct 
bigger statistical models with more independent variables and still 
have enough statistical power to get significant results; a smaller data 
set (small N) can support only a smaller model with fewer independent 
variables. Each method has its advantages and disadvantages. The 
present study uses several different statistical methods and data 
sources, and we must keep in mind the strengths and weaknesses of 
each method when interpreting the results. The following statistical 
studies are included here:
• A statistical study based on George Murdock and Douglas 
White’s Standard Cross-Cultural Sample (SCCS), which 
contains data from 186 non-industrial societies around the 
world. This study includes an exploratory factor analysis to 
identify the most relevant variables, a structural equation 
model to analyze the causal network in the proposed model, 
and a multiple correlation analysis of various variables against 
the central variables in the structural equation model. 
• A statistical test based on the societies that were analyzed in 
chapter 7. This is a subsample of the SCSS. The results of the 
detailed analyses of these societies are compared with the 
predictions of regality theory. 
• A study of individuals in contemporary cultures using data 
from the Survey of World Views Project, based on a survey of 
data from 8,883 persons in 33 countries. This study includes 
a factor analysis and various correlation analyses based on 
relevant factors that emerge from the factor analysis. 
• A comparison with previously published statistical studies of 
social, psychological, and cultural effects of collective danger.
• Various tests based on previous studies of tight versus loose 
cultures and other cultural variables presented in chapter 3.8.
We are using these methods to test the predictions of regality theory, 
explained in chapter 7. No other known theory generates the same set 
of predictions.
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8.2. Ancient cultures, large sample
Regality theory predicts effects both at the individual level and at the 
level of whole societies. The predictions of social-level effects should 
preferably be tested on distinct sociocultural groups. We prefer to 
compare different societies that have as little connection with each 
other as possible in order to avoid spurious correlations due to cultural 
diffusion or common descent (Galton’s problem). Since almost all 
contemporary cultures are heavily influenced by modern western 
culture, we have used ethnographic data from non-industrial cultures 
of the past that were less influenced by global trends. The available 
archaeological data are insufficient for statistical testing, so we have 
used data mainly from ethnographic studies of non-industrial cultures.
Description of the data
Murdock and White’s Standard Cross-Cultural Sample (SCCS) is a 
database covering more than a thousand variables recorded for 186 non-
industrial societies around the world.2 These societies are intended to 
form a representative sample of world cultures studied at a time when 
cultural independence was higher than today. The data are based on 
ethnographic records, many of which were collected by early explorers 
in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
The variables include information about subsistence ecology, 
intergroup relations, political organization, culture, beliefs, and 
child—rearing practices.3 Relevant variables from the SCCS were used 
in this study. Statistical calculations were done in the R programming 
language.4
The quality of the data in the SCCS is far from perfect, but it is the best 
available. The data have been collected from the original ethnographic 
literature and coded into a database. This process involves many 
potential sources of error, despite elaborate precautions. The native 
informants that were interviewed, the anthropologists or explorers 
2 “Standard Cross-Cultural Sample”. World Cultures, 2008, http://www.
worldcultures.org/
3  Murdock and White (1969), Murdock and White (2006), http://repositories.cdlib.
org/imbs/socdyn/wp/Standard_Cross-Cultural_Sample
4  Dow (2003)
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conducting the field studies, the coders who interpreted the original 
literature and coded it into predefined categories for the database, 
and the database designers who defined the variables and categories 
to include in the database—all of these people may have influenced 
the data by their own agendas, predilections, selectivity, taboos, and 
language problems. Most of the field studies were conducted many 
years ago, often by people without adequate scientific training, such as 
explorers and missionaries.
Re-reading some of the original ethnographic literature revealed 
several flaws in the database, mainly due to imprecise definitions of 
the categories in soft areas such as religion, morals, and psychology. 
The data in the SCCS appear to be severely influenced by the observers 
in the area of religion; some of the psychological variables depend 
on psychoanalytical interpretations; and the reliability of the data is 
questionable in taboo-ridden areas such as sexual behavior.5
Many data values in the SCCS are coded as missing, and it was 
suspected that data might be missing for non-random reasons. For 
some variables, more than half of the data values were missing. There 
is reason to suspect that the coders tended to err on the side of caution 
and entered the code for ‘data not available’ rather than ‘trait absent’ 
when a particular trait was not mentioned in the ethnographic literature 
for a particular society. This leads to a systematic bias, so that data are 
more likely to be coded as missing when a trait is absent than when 
it is present. This suspicion was tested statistically by correlating 
missingness for each of the variables against the factors that emerge 
from the factor analysis described below. This correlation was highly 
significant (p < 0.001) for several variables. It is quite understandable, 
for example, that the value for ‘leadership during battle’ is coded as 
‘data not available’ if there is no battle, but the statistical models do not 
work correctly if data are missing for non-random reasons. Hence, it is 
better to replace ‘data not available’ with no ‘leadership during battle’ 
here. Similar replacements were made for the variables ‘despotic bias in 
conflict resolution’ and ‘interpersonal violence’.
5  Broude and Greene (1976)
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Exploratory factor analysis
Regality theory predicts that many different variables are related to 
regality. If these variables are sufficiently strongly correlated, then they 
might form a single factor in a factor analysis. In other words, we will 
expect cultural indicators of regality, such as hierarchy and discipline, 
to load on the same factor as war and other indicators of collective 
danger. Collective danger and individual danger have different effects 
on regality but similar effects on r/K life history strategy, as explained 
in chapter 3.3. It will be interesting to see whether these turn out as two 
different factors or as a single factor.
The database includes more than a thousand variables for each 
society, but not all variables were relevant for the present study. Factor 
analysis requires that the number of variables must be less than the 
number of societies in order to avoid the covariance matrix becoming 
singular. It was therefore necessary to exclude a large number of 
variables and retain only those considered most relevant to the theory. 
Variables that had little or no relevance to the purpose of the current 
analysis, such as language and geographic region, were excluded. Also 
excluded were: categorical variables that could not be made ordinal, 
variables where more than half of the values were missing, and variables 
with low variance or high uniqueness. Unfortunately, many of the 
variables that are relevant to regality theory had to be excluded from the 
factor analysis because they had too many missing values, especially 
psychological variables and variables relating to childrearing.
Where a group of variables all relate to the same subject area, either 
the redundant variables were excluded or closely related variables were 
combined into one. After this reduction, ninety-one variables remained 
for the factor analysis (see table 8). These variables were normalized to 
unit variance.
Missing data was a big problem because the factor analysis model 
has no standard way of dealing with missing data. Missing values 
were replaced with appropriate values for three of the variables in the 
manner explained above. The factor analysis was performed twice 
on the same data set, using two different methods for dealing with 
the remaining missing data: (1) replacement with the mean, and (2) 
multiple imputation by the hot-deck method with population density 
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as auxiliary variable.6 The second method gave higher variance and 
poorer correlation than the first method on those variables that had 
many missing values. The results of the factor analyses are shown in 
tables 6 and 7 respectively for these two methods. 
Factor interpretation % variance explained
Political complexity and population density 7.9
War 5.2
Other conflict and violence 4.9
Agriculture 4.1
Urbanization 2.7
Animal husbandry 2.6
Fishing 2.1
Gathering 1.9
Table 6. Factor analysis of sociocultural variables in 186 societies.  
Missing data values were replaced by the mean.
The number of factors was chosen to be eight based on a scree plot. 
Oblique rotation (Promax) was used in order to allow factors to be 
correlated. Detailed factor loadings are shown in table 8.
Factor interpretation Occurrences 
in 25 runs
% variance 
explained
Standard 
deviation 
between runs
Political complexity and 
population density
25 9.8 0.9
Climate 25 5.1 0.3
War, conflict, and violence 25 4.9 0.3
Animal husbandry 25 3.3 0.7
Gathering 24 2.0 0.3
Fishing 23 2.8 0.9
Urbanization 21 2.8 0.1
Hunting 19 2.9 1.2
Agriculture 11 3.6 0.8
Uninterpreted 2 3.3 0.0
Table 7. Factor analysis of sociocultural variables in 186 societies.  
Same data as in table 6, but missing data values were replaced by 
multiple imputation in 25 runs.
6  Reilly (1993)
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Results
The first factor analysis (Table 6) shows that political complexity is highly 
correlated with population density, and these variables combine to form 
the strongest factor. The second factor represents intergroup conflict as 
well as its correlates. This factor has high loadings on variables related 
to war, army, and bellicosity (Table 8). The third factor has high loadings 
on both internal and external conflicts as well as individual violence. 
In other words, we have two factors that relate to conflict. These two 
conflict factors are both positively related to polygamy. Other indicators 
of life history strategy show only weak and inconsistent correlations 
with the two conflict factors.
It is interesting that the second factor (the war factor) has its highest 
loadings on prestige and rewards for warriors and cultural valuation 
of war (Table 8). This confirms the prediction of regality theory that 
warriors are rewarded by their group. Other theories of war rely on 
punishment of defectors, while rewards are too costly to be explained 
by traditional evolutionary theories (see chapter 2.2).
The two conflict factors merge into one in the second factor analysis 
(Table 7). The difference between the results of the two factor analysis 
methods is a mathematical artifact. The method used in the second 
factor analysis has a higher tendency to form factors around variables 
with few missing values. This is seen in the formation of a factor of 
climate variables, which have no missing values. While the first method 
probably gives more accurate results, the second method is useful for 
estimating the inaccuracy due to missing data.
It is noteworthy that the war factor is always distinct from population 
density and political complexity. This means that the level of war is not 
simply determined by population factors. The prediction that internal 
and external conflicts have different psychological and cultural effects 
gets weak support from the first factor analysis and no support from the 
second. We must conclude that the factor analyses do not give a clear 
answer to the difference between internal and external conflicts, due to 
mathematical problems and poor data quality. 
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Comparison with other studies
A similar factor analysis made earlier by Elbert Russell found a war 
factor that correlates clearly with social hierarchy, slavery, polygyny, 
achievement, and crime.7 Interestingly, the war factor in Russell’s study is 
also significantly correlated with a number of variables relating to sexual 
restrictiveness, tough treatment of children, and early socialization. The 
correlation with religious variables is weak. An interesting finding in 
Russell’s study is that people in warlike and hierarchical societies show 
a high level of boasting and display of wealth. The status competition 
and striving for wealth may lead to increased levels of theft and other 
crimes and conflicts.8 This finding may contribute to our understanding 
of the connection between external and internal conflicts. Another 
possible explanation is that, in warlike societies, boys are socialized 
for aggression.9 Other studies have found that the level of intergroup 
conflict is positively correlated with harsh and punitive treatment of 
children and socialization for aggression10 and a moralizing religion.11 
A comprehensive meta-analysis of wars throughout history has 
found a number of correlations of war with large civilizations and 
empires, weapon technology, grasslands, social stratification, slavery, 
authoritarianism, boastfulness, crime, punishment, discipline, sexual 
repression, games of chance and strategy, and artistic creativity.12
Some of the predicted correlations have also been observed in 
modern cultures. Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart find that existential 
insecurity is linked with religiosity and high fertility,13 Nicholas 
Carnagey and Craig Anderson find increased pro-war attitudes,14 and 
Richard Sipes finds a link with warlike sports.15
A caveat is in place here when interpreting factor analysis results. 
The factors and factor loadings are quite sensitive to the design of the 
factor analysis and, in particular, to the choice of variables included 
in the analysis. Other cross-cultural studies have found only weak 
correlations with a war factor, or no war factor at all.16
7  Russell (1972)
8  Russell (1972), Stewart (1971)
9  Ember and Ember (1994)
10  Ember and Ember (1994)
11  Roes and Raymond (2003)
12  Eckhardt (1992)
13  Norris and Inglehart (2011)
14  Carnagey and Anderson (2007)
15  Sipes (1975)
16  Rummel (1972), Sawyer and LeVine (1966)
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Variable 
number Variable name F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8
V64, V156 Population density 0.30 0.50 0.20 0.15
V61 Fixity of settlement 0.23 0.67 -0.25 0.13 0.20
V62 Compactness of settlement 0.30 -0.15 -0.18 -0.11
V63 Community size 0.91
V66 Large or impressive structures 0.39 0.25 -0.18 0.19
V149 Writing and records 0.66 -0.20 0.11 0.11 -0.11
V152 Urbanization -0.13 0.93
V203 Dependence on gathering -0.11 -0.44 -0.14 -0.21 -0.92
V204 Dependence on hunting -0.16 -0.74 -0.38 -0.27
V205 Dependence on fishing -0.11 -0.16 -0.21 0.94 0.22
V206 Dependence on animal husbandry -0.17 0.98 0.1
V207 Dependence on agriculture 0.19 0.92 -0.29 -0.27 0.27
V677 Migration -0.31 0.26 0.13 0.16
V732 Importance of trade in subsistence 0.13 -0.10
V1265 Occurrence of famine 0.22 0.11
V1267 Severity of famine 0.23 -0.12
V1684 Threat of weather or pest disasters 0.14 0.17
V1685 Chronic resource problems -0.12 -0.11 0.15 0.15
V1260 Total pathogen stress 0.21 0.42 -0.25
V854 Niche temperature 0.21 0.42 -0.24 -0.24
V855 Niche rainfall -0.17 0.41 -0.3 0.19 0.11
V921 Agricultural potential 0.19 0.30 0.13 -0.20 -0.13 -0.20
V1122 Total population 0.58 0.22 0.14 -0.13
V157 Political integration 0.91
V1132 Political integration, state 0.41 -0.12 0.15 0.12
V158 Social stratification 0.79
V72 Intercommunity marriage 0.10 -0.17 0.15 -0.39 0.12
V861, V79 Polygamy -0.26 0.37 0.38 -0.20
V82 Trend in autonomy 0.51 -0.20
V83 Levels of sovereignty 0.87 0.14 -0.11
V237 Jurisdictional hierarchy 0.92
V270 Class stratification 0.77
V272 Caste stratification 0.21 0.22 -0.15
V274 Type of slavery 0.11 0.22 0.22 0.12
V920 Proportion of slaves 0.14 0.12
V79, V1133 Polygamy, maximum harem size 0.13 0.22 0.28 -0.31 -0.26 -0.12
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V1134 Despotic bias in conflict resolution 0.41 0.32 -0.20
V1743 Sanctions 0.18 -0.17 0.28 0.12 0.13
V1650, V774, 
V892, V893, 
V670
Frequency of external 
warfare 0.14 0.24 0.39 -0.12
V892 Frequency of external war—Attacking 0.16 0.56 0.13 -0.19
V893 Frequency of external war—Being attacked 0.46 -0.13
V668 Wives taken from hostile groups 0.34 -0.12 0.10 0.14
V894 Form of military mobilization 0.27 0.53
V902 Leadership during battle 0.40 0.45 0.15
V903 Prestige, soldiers or warriors -0.13 0.82
V905 Rewards for killing enemy -0.22 0.73 0.17
V907 Value of war 0.72
V908 Military success 0.37 0.10
V909 Subjugation of terri-tory or people 0.61
V1654 Pacification -0.23 -0.23
V1649, 
V1748, V773, 
V891
Frequency of internal 
warfare 0.12 0.17 0.34 -0.11 0.13
V666 Interpersonal violence -0.15 0.51
V906 Expect violence to solve problems 0.54
V1776 Intraethnic violence -0.16 0.42 0.16
V1665 Homicide 0.17 0.56
V1666 Assault 0.13 0.63 -0.15
V1667 Theft 0.16 0.47 -0.18
V1676 Socially organized assault 0.36
V1677 Socially organized theft 0.40 -0.14
V1678 Socially organized trespass 0.23 0.20
V1721 Rich people -0.13 0.31 0.13 0.20
V1726 Communality of land -0.28 -0.16 0.40 -0.13
V24, V25 Bodily restrictiveness in infancy 0.12 -0.16 -0.16
V31 Infant crying response 0.24 -0.10
V33 Childhood pain infliction 0.26 -0.12 0.10
V41 Autonomy—encour-agement in childhood 0.17 0.14 0.15
V43 Covering genitals—age 0.18 -0.10 -0.11 0.30
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Variable 
number Variable name F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8
V44, V45 Weaning age -0.11 -0.10 0.19 -0.11 0.13
V53, V54 Role of father, infancy/early childhood -0.25
V242 Segregation of adoles-cent boys -0.18 0.40
V293 Duration of early childhood -0.14 0.24
V831, V832
Differentiation of 
adolescence from 
childhood
0.12 0.13
V453, V454, 
V455, V456
Corporal punishment 
of boys/girls 0.35 0.18
V667 Rape 0.30 0.12
V34 Postpartum sex taboo 0.21 0.13 -0.14
V671 Menstrual taboos 0.28 0.20
V672 Male avoidance of female sexuality -0.18 0.29 0.11
V827, V828 Sexual expression in adolescent boys/girls 0.20 0.26 -0.17 -0.13
V829, V830
Lack of sexual restraint 
in adolescent boys/
girls
V740 Marriage arrange-ments (female) 0.15 0.28 0.20 -0.11
V864 Rooming arrangement for wives 0.28 0.27 0.27 -0.14 0.11 0.11
V868
Multiple wives for 
leaders, headman, 
chiefs
0.14 0.37 -0.20
V664 Ideology of male toughness -0.11 0.32
V657 Flexible marriage mores -0.11 0.16 0.19 -0.17 0.12
V661 Female political participation -0.26 0.21 -0.17 0.16 -0.12
V665 Male segregation 0.41 0.15
V238 High gods 0.13 -0.13 0.33 -0.13 0.10
V713 Classical religion -0.22
V529, V530 Adolescent initiation ceremonies -0.13 0.12 0.33 -0.11 0.22 -0.25
V1188 Evil eye 0.14 0.12 0.44 0.11
V1694, 
V1695 Scarification -0.11 0.19
Total factor loading, 
square sum* 7.20 4.72 4.49 3.71 2.42 2.40 1.91 1.74
Table 8. Factor loadings for factor analysis of table 6.  
*Values below 0.1 are not shown in the table because they are 
insignificant, but included in the square sum.
 2398. Statistical Testing of Regality Theory 
Structural equation model
The purpose of a structural equation model is to study latent variables 
that cannot be observed directly, but only through their causes and 
effects. The theoretical constructs ‘regality’ and ‘life history strategy’ are 
latent variables that we cannot observe or measure directly.
Figure 29 shows a structural equation model based on the same 
data as used above in the factor analysis. Several indicators related to 
intergroup war are combined into a war variable. The regality dimension 
is inserted as a latent variable based on the war variable and a number 
of cultural indicators according to the theory. The r versus K life history 
strategy dimension is also inserted as a latent variable based on internal 
and external war as well as other dangers and cultural indicators 
of life history strategy. ‘Sexual morals’ is included as another latent 
variable, because sexual behavior could rarely be observed directly. The 
influences of cultural regality and life history strategy on sexual morals 
are included in the model.
Missing values are replaced with appropriate values for those 
variables where missingness correlates significantly with the factors in 
the exploratory factor analysis and where the reason for data missing 
is clear, in the same way as for the factor analysis. Missing values are 
replaced by the mean for the remaining variables.
Relevant variables according to the theory are included, but variables 
that fail to reach significance at the 0.05 level are removed. Unfortunately, 
most of the variables used by Robert Quinlan as indicators of parental 
investment fail to reach significance in the present model.17 A few 
variables that relate to parental investment remain significant, while 
only one variable related to art and three variables related to religion 
remain significant.
The removal of non-significant variables may have caused selection 
bias resulting in false significance. Ideally, the confirmatory test on 
the structural equation model should not use the same data set as the 
exploratory factor analysis. Unfortunately, no extra data set is available, 
since the number of relatively independent cultures is limited. This is a 
general problem in cross-cultural research.
The model is analyzed with the R package named ‘lavaan’.18
17  Quinlan (2007)
18  “Lavaan: Latent Variable Analysis”. The Comprehensive R Archive Network. 
http://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/lavaan/index.html
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Figure 29. Structural equation model showing the influence of collective 
dangers and individual dangers on cultural regality and life history 
strategy, as well as the influence of both of these variables on sexual 
morals. Rectangles indicate measured variables while ovals indicate latent 
variables. The directions of the arrows indicate the assumed dominating 
direction of causality, but the statistical results are insensitive to the 
directions of these arrows. It is impossible to distinguish between cause 
and effect with this method. Numbers on the arrows are path coefficients. 
Levels of significance are indicated as: * p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001. 
(Measures of fit: RMSEA = 0.076, 90% CI: 0.067–0.084, SRMR = 0.091, 
CFI = 0.61, AIC = 13782). By Agner Fog, 2017.  
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The structural equation model shown in figure 29 is based on the theory 
that war and other collective dangers influence the level of regality 
while both collective dangers and individual dangers influence the life 
history strategy. Both factors influence sexual behavior. Various cultural 
indicators of regality and life history strategy are included in the model.
The war factor emerges from the level of war and various indicators 
that we expect to be correlated with war. The results suggest that 
famine is a significant cause of war. The availability of efficient means 
of transportation (horses) appears to be a significant contributing factor 
as well.
The war factor is significantly correlated with rewards for successful 
warriors. There are few variables relating to cowardice and desertion, 
and these variables show no significant correlation. The database has 
no variable indicating punishment for defection in war. Therefore, 
we have more support for the theory that attaches importance to the 
rewarding of brave warriors than to the alternative theory that relies on 
the punishment of defectors only.
The cultural regality is modeled here as a latent variable that is 
influenced by war and other collective dangers. However, the regality 
is also influenced by unmeasured factors such as cultural traditions 
and subjective beliefs about dangers, including religious beliefs. A 
number of cultural indicators of regality are included in the model, and 
it is confirmed that they fit into the model with highly significant path 
coefficients.
The life history strategy is influenced by internal and external 
conflict as well as by other dangers. Only a few cultural indicators of 
life history strategy and parental investment are included in the model. 
Several other indicators of life history strategy were excluded because 
they failed to give significant coefficients.
Sexual morals are influenced by both the regality dimension and by 
the life history dimension, and reflected in various attitudes towards 
sexuality and marriage. No reliable measure of fertility was available, 
but we may assume that strict sexual morals lead to high fertility. 
The hypothesis is that strict sexual morals allow only reproductive 
sex within marriage, while sex for pleasure is suppressed. This puts 
pressure on young people to marry early and have many children 
because alternative outlets for their sex drive are blocked.19
19  Garcia and Kruger (2010)
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The results from the structural equation model confirm that cultural 
regality is connected with political stratification, caste stratification, 
despotism, and slavery. These results are highly significant. The 
connection with disciplining of children is weaker, but still statistically 
significant (p = 0.013). Few relevant variables relating to art are available, 
but the presence of large or impressive structures (such as large 
buildings) has a highly significant connection to cultural regality. Three 
variables relating to religion are also significant. Finally, it is confirmed 
that sexual morals are influenced in the strict direction by both cultural 
regality and life history r-strategy. No direct path between regality and 
life history strategy was found.
Various correlation coefficients are given in table 9. The correlation 
between regality and life history strategy is moderate but highly 
significant (p = 7∙10-4). Regality is also significantly correlated with 
population density and with various modes of subsistence.
Variable Regality Life history 
strategy
War
Regality 0.25*** 0.49***
Population density 0.52*** 0.11 0.20**
Political integration 0.73*** 0.21** 0.43***
Urbanization 0.48*** 0.04 0.31***
Agriculture 0.41*** 0.13 0.15*
Animal husbandry 0.43*** 0.09 0.17*
Hunting -0.49*** -0.10 -0.09
Gathering -0.50*** -0.13 -0.22**
Fishing -0.25*** -0.11 -0.15*
Warrior reward 0.10 0.12 0.58***
Warrior prestige 0.18* 0.15* 0.61***
Table 9. Correlation coefficients of selected variables against cultural 
regality, life history strategy, and war. Level of significance: * p ≤ 0.05, 
** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001.
While the structural equation model supports our theory, it is not a 
definite proof. It may be possible to construct other models that fit the 
data equally well.20
20  Breckler (1990)
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Multiple correlation analysis
A simultaneous multiple correlation analysis was made for several 
variables according to the linear model
v = k0 + k1 f1 + k2 f2 + k3 f3 + ε
where v is any of the variables in the standard cross-cultural sample. 
f1 represents cultural regality and f2 represents life history r-strategy, 
both obtained from the structural equation model. f3 is the population 
density, which was included in the model because it is a very likely 
confounding factor according to the results of the factor analysis. k0, k1, 
k2, and k3 are coefficients, and ε is the residue of unexplained variance. 
The levels of significance for k1, k2, k3 ≠ 0 were calculated.
The results of the multiple correlation analysis for various variables, 
v, are shown in table 10. There is a correlation of regality with agriculture, 
which disappears when population density is controlled for, as we can 
see when comparing tables 9 and 10, while the correlations of regality 
with other means of subsistence remain significant. The correlation 
of sexual morals with both regality and life history strategy remains 
significant when population density is controlled for. Polygamy is 
significantly related to life history strategy but, contrary to expectation, 
not to cultural regality in this test. The expected correlation between 
regality and suicide was not found. The variable named ‘classical 
religion’ is a mixture of very different religions and therefore not as 
specific as we would wish, but it is included in table 10 because it has a 
significant correlation with regality.
Variable Regality Life history 
strategy
Population 
density
Political integration 0.59*** 0.04 0.27***
Urbanization 0.26*** -0.07 0.46***
Agriculture 0.07 0.05 0.63***
Animal husbandry 0.47*** -0.01 -0.08
Hunting -0.21** 0.01 -0.55***
Fishing -0.20* -0.06 -0.06
Gathering -0.30*** -0.01 -0.37***
Sexual morals 0.42*** 0.42*** -0.11
Trend in autonomy 0.24** 0.02 0.19*
Urbanization 0.26*** -0.07 0.46***
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Class stratification 0.85*** -0.11** 0.04
Caste stratification 0.52*** -0.08 -0.08
Severity of famine 0.27** -0.03 -0.04
Heritable slavery 0.63*** 0.00 -0.17*
Polygamy -0.04 0.24** -0.13
Suicide -0.01 0.38*** -0.09
Formal sanctions 0.23** 0.10 0.14
Horses 0.22* -0.12 -0.18*
Classical religion -0.24** 0.10 -0.09
High gods 0.41*** -0.05 -0.15
Evil eye beliefs 0.55*** 0.03 -0.05
Table 10. Multiple regression of various variables against regality, life 
history strategy, and population density. Level of significance: * p ≤ 0.05, 
** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001.
8.3. Subsample, 18 cultures
A subsample of eighteen of the cultures represented in the Standard 
Cross-Cultural Sample (SCCS) was selected for further study, and the 
desired data were extracted from the original ethnographic literature 
rather than from the SCCS database. This method was intended to 
reduce the problems with data quality and to obtain information that 
was not available in the SCCS.
The literature listed as sources for the SCCS21 was supplemented by 
any additional literature published later. All coding of data was done by 
the author. Every conscious effort was made to avoid expectation bias. 
No funding was available for hiring extra raters or testing inter-rater 
reliability. A brief description of each society including an explanation 
of how it is evaluated and the literature used is provided in chapter 7.
The purpose of the subsample study is to test the prediction that 
certain environmental factors influence the level of intergroup conflict, 
which in turn influences the social and cultural indicators that we 
associate with regal and kungic cultures.
Many of the cultural traits that we would like to test—especially 
those that belong to soft areas such as religion, sexuality, discipline, 
treatment of children, and art—are poorly represented in the standard 
21  White (1989)
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cross-cultural sample. The relevant variables are either not included 
in the SCCS database, or they are unreliable, or they have too many 
missing values. The data in the database are coded into simple categories 
and values that may be poor representations of the complex behaviors, 
beliefs, and social structures in the cultures that we study. It is difficult 
to guess what the human realities are that lie behind a number in a 
database.
Firsthand observation and collection of the missing data is no 
longer a possibility, because the cultures in question have been heavily 
transformed by modernization if not completely annihilated or absorbed 
into modern cultures. We must resort to the original ethnographic 
literature and hope that we can find the missing data there. Using this 
literature has the advantage that the data are presented in a coherent 
and meaningful way. Therefore, it was decided to extract the relevant 
data from the original ethnographic literature for a subset of the cultures 
represented in the SCCS.
The subsample was selected on the basis of the following criteria:
1. The selected cultures must be geographically, culturally, and 
genetically distant from each other in order to minimize 
similarity due to cultural diffusion or common descent 
(Galton’s problem). 
2. The cultures should be different in terms of subsistence 
ecology. Where multiple cultures resemble each other too 
much, only one is included. 
3. The population of each society must have lived in relative 
isolation long enough to develop a distinct culture and 
language. 
4. The influence from modern cultures must be minimal. 
5. The culture is not pacified by any colonial authority or other 
external power. 
6. The culture must be well described by more than one 
ethnographer.
Many cultures had to be excluded for not meeting these criteria. In 
particular, criteria 4 and 5 were difficult to meet.
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The subsample consists of eighteen cultures that were selected for 
further study. The ethnographic literature for the selected cultures was 
studied in order to extract sociocultural information relevant to the 
theory. A number of cultural variables were evaluated in order to test if 
the correlations predicted by our theory could be confirmed.
The different types of conflict, such as war, raiding, and feuding 
are often difficult to distinguish, and this is a serious problem for the 
testing of regality theory. Feuding is usually motivated by the desire to 
obtain justice by retaliating against the perpetrator of some wrongdoing 
or against his or her family. This takes place mostly where there is 
no organized system of justice, which is typical for a kungic culture. 
Territorial war, on the other hand, is expected mainly in regal cultures, 
according to our theory. Any confusion between feuding and territorial 
war will thus tend to blur the statistics. Unfortunately, it is difficult 
to determine whether the main motive behind a raid is retaliation, 
plundering, capturing women, or territorial expansion. For example, 
anthropologists cannot agree whether Yanomamo Indians fight over 
women, hunting territory, or steel tools.22
It was decided to use environmental, ecological, and technological 
parameters, rather than the level of war, as the independent variable 
in order to avoid the difficulties in determining the level of war and 
distinguishing between different motives for conflict. A statistical 
correlation cannot distinguish between cause and effect, but it seems 
reasonable to assume that the environment influences the culture more 
than the culture influences the environment, even when the available 
technology is included as an environmental factor. The semi-fixed status 
of ecological environment and available technology makes statistics 
based on these factors less ambiguous in terms of distinguishing 
between cause and effect. 
The assumptions about environmental causation of conflict do 
not hold when the society is pacified by colonial rule or other foreign 
powers. This is the reason why pacified and modernized societies are 
excluded from our subsample.
To summarize, the prediction we want to test is that environmental 
and technological factors that enable intergroup conflict are positively 
22  Ferguson (1995, p. 7), Chagnon (1979), Gat (2017, chapter 4)
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correlated with those sociocultural variables that indicate a regal 
culture, as the theory claims. Other environmental factors that threaten 
a sociocultural group, such as unpredictable natural disasters, may also 
have an influence in the regal direction. 
The statistical tests use rank correlation. This is a non-parametric 
test that makes no assumption about linear relationships or normal 
distribution, unlike the previous tests. Kendall’s tau, τ, was calculated 
and the level of significance, p, was calculated for the one-tailed tests. 
There was no control for confounding factors. Most variables were 
evaluated on an arbitrary five-point scale as follows.
Expected conflict level. The expected conflict level is evaluated on a five-
point scale, where 1 indicates that intergroup conflict is unlikely because 
of environmental factors or niche specialization, and 5 indicates that 
environmental factors make large scale war possible and likely.
War or intergroup conflict. The observed level of intergroup conflict is 
interpreted as the frequency, intensity, degree of violence, and casualty 
rate of conflicts against other social groups that do not have the same 
self-defined ethnic or tribal identity. Territorial conflicts are given higher 
weight than plundering and retaliation of injustice. (In the coding used, 
1 = no intergroup conflict; 2 = only small raids, feuds, or vendettas; 
3 = rare or low scale intergroup conflict; 4 = intermediate intergroup 
conflict; 5 = frequent large wars).
Internal conflicts and feuds. Internal or intragroup conflicts are 
conflicts between people with the same ethnic or tribal belonging. 
Examples are conflicts between families over properties or marriage, or 
conflicts between leaders and followers. Feuds are series of retaliations 
over real or alleged wrongdoing. The theory predicts that intergroup 
conflicts, but not necessarily internal conflicts, are positively correlated 
with regal indicators. (Coded as 1 = rare internal conflicts; 5 = frequent 
internal conflicts).
Political system. A hierarchical political system with strong centralized 
power is expected in a regal society. In a kungic society, we will expect 
an egalitarian political system with little or no hierarchy, or in extreme 
cases no formal system of leadership at all. (Coded as 1 = no leadership, 
248 Warlike and Peaceful Societies
or simple political system; 2 = formal leadership; 4 = complex or varying 
political system; 5 = strong and highly hierarchical political system).
Justice and punishment. We expect a strict justice system and 
harsh punishments in a regal society, but a mild or lenient degree 
of punishment in a kungic culture. (Coded as 1 = mild or lenient 
punishment; 2 = somewhat mild punishment; 4 = somewhat strict 
punishment; 5 = very strict punishment).
Religion. We expect the religion in a regal society to support the 
power structure by mirroring or being part of the hierarchical political 
structure and by legitimizing or exalting the ruler. The religion in a 
regal culture often has a disciplining function by enforcing strict rules, 
possibly with supernatural punishments. The religion in a kungic 
culture is typically non-discriminatory and not connected with political 
power, discipline, elitism, dogmatism, or strict rules, according to the 
theory. (Coded as 1 = mild, unorganized, or non-authoritarian religion; 
2 = religion supports politics; 4 = some disciplining connected with 
religion; 5 = strict religion, legitimizes ruler).
Group identity. We expect people to be hostile to strangers and have 
a strong sense of ethnic or tribal identity in a regal society. We expect 
less distinction between ‘them’ and ‘us’ in a kungic culture. (Coded as 
1 = low sense of group identity; 3 = hostility to strangers; 5 = high sense 
of group identity).
Fertility. We expect people to have more children in a regal than in a 
kungic society. Kungic cultures may keep the birth rate down by means 
of postpartum sexual taboos, long breastfeeding periods, contraceptive 
means, abortion, or infanticide. (Coded as 1 = low fertility; 3 = medium 
fertility; 5 = high fertility).
Suicide. We expect the incidence of suicide to be higher in kungic 
than in regal cultures.23 This applies only to the types of suicide that 
Durkheim has labeled anomic and egoistic suicide,24 not to culturally 
23  Fog (1999)
24  Durkheim (1897)
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prescribed suicide or self-sacrifice in battle. (Coded as 1 = rare or no 
mention of suicide; 3 = suicide occurs; 5 = suicide is common).
Sexual morals. We expect regal societies to have strict taboos and 
rules regulating sexual behavior, including bans on premarital and 
extramarital sex. Kungic societies are likely to be more tolerant of a 
variety of sexual behaviors. (Coded as 1 = lax, permissive sexual morals; 
3 = mixed or intermediate sexual morals; 5 = strict sexual morals).
Marrying age. We expect the marrying age to be lower in regal than in 
kungic societies. The marrying age is recorded separately for men and 
women. Where the literature specifies a range for the marrying age, the 
median of this range is used in the statistics. 
Divorce. We expect divorce to be easier and more tolerated in kungic 
than in regal societies. (Coded as 1 = divorce is rare, difficult; 3 =divorce 
occurs; 5 = divorce is easy, frequent).
Children work. We expect children to work harder, and from an earlier 
age, in regal than in kungic societies. (Coded as 1 = children do not 
work; 3 = children do some work; 5 = children work a lot, or from an 
early age).
Art. Different cultures produce different kinds of art. We are considering 
many different forms of art, including carving, painting, sculptures, 
decorated clothing, body adornment, architecture, and other material 
art, as well as poetry, tales, drama, music, singing, and dance. We expect 
the artistic production of regal cultures to be highly embellished and 
perfectionist, possibly glorifying representatives or symbols of power. 
We expect kungic cultures to produce a more individualistic art with 
less conformity. (Coded as 1 = simple, individualistic art; 3 = somewhat 
embellished art; 5 = embellished, repetitive, stylized art).
The evaluation of these variables for the eighteen societies is 
summarized in table 11. A rank correlation of these variables against the 
predicted conflict level is shown in the table. A review of the analysis of 
each culture is given in chapter 7.
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Table 11 is sorted by expected conflict level. At the peaceful beginning of 
the table, we find isolated cultures, such as the Inuit and the Gilyak, and 
niche cultures, such as the Mbuti pygmies and !Kung bushmen. At the 
high-conflict end of the table, we find empires such as the Babylonians 
and the Incas. This corresponds to the regality scale with kungic cultures 
at the beginning of the table and regal cultures at the end. Values of p 
below 0.05 are considered statistically significant. We can see that most 
of the correlations are in the predicted direction and highly significant.
First, we notice that there is a strong correlation between the 
expected conflict level and the observed level of war and conflict. This 
is a strong confirmation of the hypothesis that the level of war in non-
modern societies is determined mainly by environmental factors. The 
cultures with a typical niche ecology, such as !Kung, Mbuti, and Warao, 
are all found to be peaceful and kungic. The same is the case for isolated 
cultures and cultures with scramble competition for food, such as Inuit 
and Yahgan. This indicates that competition over food sources is a major 
cause of conflict and that other reasons for violent intergroup conflict 
are less important in non-modern cultures.
The correlation for ‘internal conflicts and feuds’ shows a slightly 
negative, and non-significant, correlation with the expected conflict 
level. This confirms that the distinction between intergroup and 
intragroup conflicts is important, as predicted by our theory.
The correlations for ‘political system’, ‘justice and punishment’, 
‘religion’, ‘sexual morals’, ‘children work’, and ‘art’ are all highly 
significant with p levels below 0.01. These results give strong support 
to regality theory. ‘Group identity’ and ‘fertility’ are significant at the 
0.01 level. 
Suicide seems to be more common in kungic than in regal societies, 
as predicted, but the correlation is only marginally significant (p = 0.06). 
It should be noted here that it was difficult to find reliable data for 
suicide and that it was difficult to distinguish between the different 
motives for suicide.
Divorce shows a weak correlation in the expected direction, but not 
a significant one. This correlation is weakened by the higher incidence 
of polygamy in regal societies.
There was no noticeable correlation between marrying age and 
expected conflict level. The data for marrying age were quite inaccurate, 
but this is probably not the only explanation for the absence of correlation. 
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It appears that marrying age is determined more by economic factors 
and level of education than by ecology.
The significant correlation of sexual morals with regality is interesting 
because cultural differences in sexual morals are difficult to explain 
by other theories. We observe that the sexual morals are permissive 
in kungic societies and strict in most regal societies. But not all regal 
societies have strict sexual morals. For example, premarital sex is 
common among the unmarried Maasai warriors, and extramarital sex is 
common among the Hausa. High-ranking and prestigious men in regal 
cultures have the power to give themselves more sexual opportunities 
than the morals would otherwise dictate.
8.4. Contemporary cultures, large sample
Data and methods
The Survey of World Views project is a psychometric study based on 
a survey of data from 8,883 persons in 33 countries carried out in 2012. 
The participants were mainly college students who were rewarded for 
filling out an online questionnaire with 293 questions. The methods are 
described in detail by Gerard Saucier and coworkers.25 A copy of the 
raw data files was kindly provided by Saucier.
An exploratory factor analysis on the complete data set was 
performed first in order to identify relevant items with significant factor 
loadings. A scree plot, given in figure 30, shows that there are at least 
four important factors. These factors could be interpreted as follows:
1. Universalism ethics, benevolence, and self-direction
2. Cynicism, traditional family values, spirit beliefs, materialism, 
violence
3. Religiousness
4. Egalitarian society
25  Saucier et al. (2015)
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The factor interpretations were less clear when more factors were 
included. 
Figure 30. Scree plot for factor analysis of World Views Survey, 
2012. By Agner Fog, 2017. 
Construction of variables
Twelve composite variables were constructed for the purpose of 
the current analysis. Each variable was formed by a combination of 
questionnaire items. These items were selected based on their theoretical 
relevance and on their loadings in the exploratory factor analysis. Items 
with low factor loadings and items with ambiguous interpretations 
were not included. The composite variables are listed in table 12. The 
items were scored on various Likert scales with different numbers of 
points, some of them with a forced choice. All items and variables were 
scaled in order to obtain equal weighting.
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Variable name Items
Perceived 
danger
 (α = 0.52)
IV2: The present-day world is vile and miserable.
IV5: Our people are in danger: everyone is trying to divide us and hurt 
us.
ISM45: Foreigners have stolen land from our people and they are now 
trying to steal more.
Want tough 
leader (no α)
ISM35: We need tough leaders who can silence the trouble-makers and 
restore our traditional values.
Bellicosity
 (α = 0.42)
IV4: We should never use violence as a way to try to save the world. 
(reverse scored)
IV10: If violence does not solve problems, it is because there was not 
enough of it.
M1: I honor the glorious heroes among my people who sacrificed 
themselves for our destiny and our heritage.
Discipline
 (α = 0.71)
P11: I would never take things that aren’t mine.
P17: I cannot imagine that I would engage in lying or cheating.
P19: I shirk my duties. (reverse scored)
P23: I steal things. (reverse scored)
P25: I like order.
IC7: It is my duty to take care of my family, even when I have to sacrifice 
what I want.
FV08: Children should respect their grandparents.
MF04: Respect for authority is something all children need to learn.
MF05: People should not do things that are disgusting, even if no one is 
harmed. 
MF08: Justice is the most important requirement for a society.
Hierarchy
 (α = 0.71)
NO9: In this society, rank and position in the hierarchy (in the social 
order) have special privileges.
NO25: In this society, people in positions of power try to increase their 
social distance from less powerful people.
NO28: In this society, power is concentrated at the top, rather than being 
shared throughout society.
NO39: In this society, individuals generally attempt to be dominant over 
other individuals.
NO42: Power is shared throughout this society, rather than being 
concentrated at the top. (reverse scored)
Egalitarianism
 (α = 0.63)
ISM19: I support the rights and power of the people in their struggle 
against the privileged elite.
ISM33: There should be increased social equality.
ISM34: Wealthy people should have a higher tax rate than poor people.
MF02: When the government makes laws, the number one principle 
should be ensuring that everyone is treated fairly.
Conformity
 (α = 0.65)
P38: I stick to the rules.
AM3: Breaking the rules and regulations is an unpleasant activity.
ISM30: It is good to defy ‘traditional family values’ as feminists and 
homosexuals have done. (reverse scored)
EN4: My first loyalty is to the heritage of my ancestors, their language 
and their religion.
MF11: I would call some acts wrong on the grounds that they are 
unnatural.
MF21: When you decide whether something is right or wrong, to what 
extent are the following considerations relevant to your thinking?: 
Whether or not someone conformed to the traditions of society.
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VAL1: Rate the following values as a guiding principle in your life: tradi-
tion, that is, respect for tradition, humbleness, accepting one’s portion in 
life, devotion, modesty.
VAL4: Conformity, that is, obedience, honoring parents and elders, self-
discipline, politeness.
Xenophobia
 (α = 0.58)
ISM11: I believe in the superiority of my own ethnic group.
ISM21: My own race is not superior to any other race. (reverse scored)
ISM29: People of different races and nationalities should live in different 
places apart from one another.
MF14: When you decide whether something is right or wrong, to what 
extent are the following considerations relevant to your thinking?: 
Whether or not someone’s action showed love for his or her country.
Religiosity
 (α = 0.92)
DRI01: How often do you attend church, mosque, temple, or other 
religious meetings?
DRI02: How often do you spend time in private religious activities, such 
as prayer, meditation, or study of religious scriptures?
DRI03: In my life, I experience the presence of the Divine.
DRI04: My religious beliefs are what really lie behind my whole 
approach to life.
DRI05: I try hard to carry my religion over into all other dealings in life.
Ax17: Belief in a religion helps one understand the meaning of life.
Ax29: Religious faith contributes to good mental health.
ISM8: There is no God or gods. (reverse scored)
ISM12: I adhere to an organized religion.
ISM17: I believe in predestination—that all things have been divinely 
determined beforehand.
ISM22: Religion should play the most important role in civil affairs.
Cynicism
 (α = 0.72)
AM10: I don’t need to care about the problems of other people because 
nobody cares about me.
AM2: The true purpose of stories about honesty and goodness is to make 
people confused and stupid.
AM7: A person who helps others ahead of himself quickly comes to ruin.
IV12: Modern governments have overstepped moral bounds and no 
longer have a right to rule.
IV13: It is better to assume that people will deceive you than to always 
assume that they are telling the truth.
IV15: It would be pointless to reduce one’s possessions and live more 
simply.
Violence
 (α = 0.60)
AM8: When someone insults me, I can go for days thinking of nothing 
else but revenge.
IV1: Killing is justified when it is an act of revenge.
IV6: A good person has a duty to avoid killing any living human being. 
(reverse scored)
PA03: If a person insults me, it may happen that this person gets beat up 
(by me or someone else).
Patriarchy
 (α = 0.81)
FV01: The father should be the head of the family.
FV03: The mother’s place is in the home.
FV05: The father should handle the money in the house.
FV07: The mother should accept the decisions of the father.
MF10: Men and women each have different roles to play in society.
Table 12. Variables constructed from Survey of World Views items.  
α values are Cronbach’s alpha, which is a measure of internal consistency 
in the variable.
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The items included in each variable express the theoretical concepts 
less clearly than we could wish. This is a consequence of the current 
state of cross-cultural psychology, where it is not yet known which 
variables are most important.26 Theories about causal relationships are 
not very developed. Many of the questionnaire items were formulated 
without any clear underlying theory and definitely without any 
knowledge of regality theory. A discussion of the quality of each 
variable is in place here:
• The items included in ‘perceived danger’ are somewhat abstract 
and probably do not capture the full diversity of collective 
dangers and the distinction between individual and collective 
dangers that regality theory presupposes. 
• The variable ‘want tough leader’ depends on just a single item 
that expresses a rather extreme opinion. 
• The variable ‘bellicosity’ does not include any items relating 
explicitly to war, as there were no such items in the questionnaire. 
The Cronbach’s alpha is low, indicating some inconsistency. 
• The variable ‘discipline’ includes items relating both to behavior 
and opinion. It covers the concept well.
• The variable ‘hierarchy’ reflects only a subjective evaluation of 
the hierarchy of the culture in question, with no standard or 
reference specified. People tend to evaluate things with their 
own culture as a frame of reference. Evaluating a culture with 
the same culture as reference makes little sense.27 It is possible 
that participants have used some other culture as reference 
when answering the questions, but it is also possible that they 
have used their own idea of an ideal society as reference. Thus, 
a participant indicating that the level of hierarchy is high may 
actually mean ‘higher than I would like’. 
• It was expected that ‘egalitarianism’ would be the opposite of 
‘hierarchy’ and that these two concepts would load on the same 
factor with opposite signs. However, the exploratory factor 
26  Saucier et al. (2015)
27  Heine, Lehman, Peng and Greenholtz (2002)
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analysis showed, quite surprisingly, that egalitarianism and 
hierarchy loaded on different factors and that they had in fact 
a significant positive correlation with each other, rather than a 
negative one. This paradox may be due to acquiescence bias: 
some people tend to answer ‘yes’ to anything. The items under 
‘egalitarianism’ are general statements that are easy to agree 
with, and none of these items are reverse scored. The problems 
with ‘egalitarianism’ are further discussed on page 263. 
• The variables ‘conformity’ and ‘xenophobia’ contain enough 
relevant items to express the concepts adequately. 
• The variable ‘religiosity’ reflects the strength of religious beliefs 
and the involvement in religious activities, but perhaps not the 
strictness of religious observance or the disciplining function of 
the religion, which would be more relevant to regality theory. 
• The variable ‘cynicism’ was included because it turned up 
strongly in the factor analysis with significant correlations 
to relevant variables. Cynicism is related to a pessimistic 
worldview, but the relationship of this variable with regality 
has not been fully investigated yet. 
• The variable ‘violence’ does not adequately distinguish between 
organized or socially sanctioned violence and simple crime 
and rage, or between group-internal and external conflicts. 
However, it may be related to collective danger in its broadest 
sense. 
• ‘Patriarchy’ includes values and opinions that have been 
thoroughly described in the literature. The questions are 
appropriate and consequently the alpha is high.
Correlations of the variables
There are significant differences between countries for all of the variables 
defined here. For example, many of the variables correlate strongly 
with the gross domestic product (GDP) and the human development 
index (HDI) of the countries, as shown in table 13. Therefore, we need 
to control for country-specific effects in the statistical investigations of 
relationships between these variables. 
258 Warlike and Peaceful Societies
Variable Human development 
index
log gross domestic 
product
perceived danger -0.71*** -0.71***
want tough leader -0.71*** -0.75***
bellicosity -0.35* -0.37*
discipline -0.60*** -0.59***
hierarchy -0.28 -0.32
egalitarianism -0.46** -0.45**
conformity -0.73*** -0.75***
xenophobia -0.60*** -0.66***
religiosity -0.72*** -0.72***
cynicism -0.71*** -0.74***
violence -0.33 -0.39*
patriarchy -0.63*** -0.66***
Table 13. Correlation coefficients (r) of the country average of each 
variable with HDI and GDP. Levels of significance: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, 
*** p < 0.001.28
The country-specific effects are not limited to economic factors. 
Environmental factors and cultural differences are also very likely to 
influence these variables. We can get an indication of the influence 
of all country-specific factors on each variable by testing how much 
of the variance in each variable is accounted for by between-country 
differences. Table 14 lists the correlation of each variable with country 
differences. The correlation coefficients in table 13 are mostly higher 
than in table 14 because the former is looking at country averages while 
the latter is looking at differences between individuals.
Variable Correlation with country 
differences
perceived danger 0.19***
want tough leader 0.53***
bellicosity 0.34***
discipline 0.39***
hierarchy 0.40***
egalitarianism 0.29***
conformity 0.48***
xenophobia 0.53***
28  Data sources: United Nations Development Programme (2013), New World 
Encyclopedia (2016), International Monetary Fund (2012)
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religiosity 0.65***
cynicism 0.37***
violence 0.28***
patriarchy 0.55***
Table 14. Correlation coefficients (r) of each variable with country 
differences. Level of significance: *** p < 0.001.
The next step in our analysis is to study the correlations between the 
variables while controlling for country differences. Table 15 lists all 
pairwise correlations between two variables with country differences as 
control. We can see that most of the variables are correlated significantly 
with each other, even after controlling for confounding country differences. 
The averages of each variable within each nation are listed in table 16.
Variable
perceived 
danger
w
ant tough 
leader
bellicosity
discipline
hierarchy
egalitarian-
ism
conform
ity
xenophobia
religiosity
cynicism
violence
patriarchy
perceived 
danger 1
0.17 
***
0.11 
*** 0.01
0.22 
***
0.22 
***
0.12 
***
0.13 
***
0.09 
***
0.37 
***
0.19 
***
0.16 
***
want tough 
leader
0.17 
*** 1
0.08 
***
0.18 
*** 0.02
0.07 
***
0.37 
***
0.24 
***
0.27 
***
0.20 
***
0.07 
***
0.30 
***
bellicosity 0.11 ***
0.08 
*** 1
-0.35 
***
-0.07 
***
-0.27 
***
-0.10 
***
0.32 
***
-0.09 
***
0.51 
***
0.51 
***
0.19 
***
discipline 0.01 0.18 ***
-0.35 
*** 1
0.11 
***
0.36 
***
0.47 
***
-0.10 
***
0.29 
***
-0.29 
***
-0.41 
***
0.08 
***
hierarchy 0.22 *** 0.02
-0.07 
***
0.11 
*** 1
0.28 
*** 0.02
-0.11 
***
-0.05 
*** -0.01
-0.08 
***
-0.05 
***
egalitarianism 0.22 ***
0.07 
***
-0.27 
***
0.36 
***
0.28 
*** 1
0.14 
***
-0.22 
***
0.05 
***
-0.20 
***
-0.28 
***
-0.05 
***
conformity 0.12 ***
0.37 
***
-0.10 
***
0.47 
*** 0.02
0.14 
*** 1
0.23 
***
0.45 
***
0.05 
***
-0.08 
***
0.39 
***
xenophobia 0.13 ***
0.24 
***
0.32 
***
-0.10 
***
-0.11 
***
-0.22 
***
0.23 
*** 1
0.16 
***
0.45 
***
0.37 
***
0.36 
***
religiosity 0.09 ***
0.27 
***
-0.09 
***
0.29 
***
-0.05 
***
0.05 
***
0.45 
***
0.16 
*** 1 0.00
-0.07 
***
0.35 
***
cynicism 0.37 ***
0.20 
***
0.51 
***
-0.29 
*** -0.01
-0.20 
***
0.05 
***
0.45 
*** 0.00 1
0.59 
***
0.31 
***
violence 0.19 ***
0.07 
***
0.51 
***
-0.41 
***
-0.08 
***
-0.28 
***
-0.08 
***
0.37 
***
-0.07 
***
0.59 
*** 1
0.25 
***
patriarchy 0.16 ***
0.30 
***
0.19 
***
0.08 
***
-0.05 
***
-0.05 
***
0.39 
***
0.36 
***
0.35 
***
0.31 
***
0.25 
*** 1
Table 15. Partial correlation coefficients between all pairs of two variables, 
controlling for country differences. Levels of significance: *** p < 0.001.
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Nation
perceived danger
w
ant tough 
leader
bellicosity
discipline
hierarchy
egalitarianism
conform
ity
xenophobia
religiosity
cynicism
violence
patriarchy
Argentina 0.52 0.56 0.19 0.81 0.77 0.76 0.60 0.33 0.40 0.25 0.17 0.37
Australia 0.40 0.37 0.31 0.72 0.60 0.74 0.54 0.28 0.33 0.19 0.20 0.33
Bangladesh 0.70 0.80 0.41 0.78 0.76 0.83 0.68 0.67 0.64 0.50 0.36 0.59
Brazil 0.54 0.29 0.16 0.74 0.81 0.85 0.52 0.22 0.49 0.21 0.15 0.23
Canada 0.43 0.38 0.29 0.71 0.61 0.72 0.54 0.29 0.37 0.21 0.21 0.35
China 0.41 0.58 0.37 0.72 0.70 0.77 0.60 0.56 0.31 0.39 0.31 0.46
Egypt 0.62 0.63 0.31 0.70 0.70 0.78 0.65 0.44 0.70 0.38 0.30 0.62
England 0.44 0.47 0.35 0.71 0.67 0.72 0.54 0.29 0.30 0.29 0.24 0.33
Ethiopia 0.52 0.63 0.42 0.77 0.61 0.76 0.67 0.43 0.68 0.37 0.29 0.48
Germany 0.38 0.14 0.24 0.70 0.54 0.69 0.45 0.21 0.27 0.18 0.12 0.20
Greece 0.63 0.35 0.20 0.73 0.76 0.82 0.58 0.34 0.38 0.30 0.19 0.31
India 0.59 0.71 0.34 0.76 0.72 0.82 0.66 0.49 0.50 0.37 0.29 0.53
Ireland 0.36 0.34 0.20 0.76 0.67 0.78 0.53 0.22 0.31 0.17 0.14 0.23
Japan 0.38 0.64 0.39 0.59 0.62 0.65 0.57 0.36 0.22 0.32 0.32 0.42
Kenya 0.58 0.70 0.24 0.83 0.75 0.84 0.74 0.43 0.67 0.30 0.21 0.60
Korea 0.46 0.58 0.43 0.69 0.70 0.72 0.63 0.53 0.46 0.36 0.42 0.50
Malaysia 0.63 0.77 0.29 0.81 0.58 0.76 0.76 0.52 0.82 0.39 0.23 0.72
Mexico 0.52 0.51 0.23 0.80 0.71 0.78 0.66 0.42 0.51 0.32 0.20 0.43
Morocco 0.56 0.63 0.32 0.71 0.62 0.76 0.67 0.48 0.73 0.39 0.30 0.63
Nepal 0.63 0.80 0.44 0.81 0.77 0.80 0.68 0.43 0.55 0.42 0.25 0.48
Netherlands 0.40 0.34 0.23 0.73 0.56 0.77 0.53 0.19 0.28 0.21 0.16 0.21
Peru 0.50 0.53 0.22 0.76 0.78 0.72 0.58 0.37 0.41 0.30 0.23 0.36
Philippines 0.51 0.67 0.39 0.82 0.65 0.74 0.72 0.54 0.68 0.36 0.27 0.58
Poland 0.41 0.31 0.22 0.68 0.68 0.71 0.57 0.21 0.41 0.23 0.16 0.37
Russia 0.46 0.56 0.34 0.73 0.82 0.67 0.58 0.38 0.35 0.30 0.23 0.50
Singapore 0.46 0.49 0.35 0.73 0.66 0.73 0.59 0.37 0.45 0.30 0.24 0.46
Spain 0.54 0.29 0.27 0.72 0.74 0.78 0.52 0.29 0.22 0.30 0.23 0.23
Taiwan 0.43 0.47 0.36 0.68 0.65 0.80 0.58 0.43 0.40 0.33 0.31 0.36
Tanzania 0.72 0.87 0.36 0.80 0.67 0.75 0.71 0.54 0.69 0.47 0.28 0.61
Thailand 0.53 0.69 0.31 0.79 0.72 0.80 0.68 0.44 0.57 0.36 0.25 0.61
Turkey 0.62 0.46 0.36 0.73 0.80 0.81 0.61 0.28 0.42 0.34 0.23 0.42
Ukraine 0.46 0.76 0.33 0.74 0.78 0.73 0.61 0.43 0.40 0.30 0.23 0.56
USA 0.43 0.45 0.34 0.70 0.66 0.68 0.57 0.36 0.44 0.26 0.25 0.41
Table 16. Nation averages for twelve variables.
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Factor analysis on the variables
A factor analysis was carried out in order to search for a structure in 
the relationships between these variables. Mixed factor analysis was 
used in order to allow both quantitative variables and a qualitative 
variable (‘nation’) to be included.29 Missing values were imputed.30 The 
two strongest factors account for 9.5% and 6.5% respectively of the total 
variance. The contributions of the twelve variables to these two factors 
are shown in figure 31. Figure 32 shows how the nations are distributed 
along the dimensions of these two factors.
This analysis was repeated using multiple factor analysis. This is a 
two-step procedure which carries out first a principal component analysis 
on each group of items that make up the twelve variables in table 12, and 
then a factor analysis of the dimensions that result from the principal 
component analyses.31 The results of the latter analysis were almost 
identical to figures 31 and 32 and are therefore not shown here.
Figure 31. Mixed factor analysis. The figure shows the distribution of the 
variables along the two strongest factors. By Agner Fog, 2017. 
29  Pagès (2004), Lê et al. (2008)
30  Audigier, Husson and Josse (2013)
31  Lê et al. (2008), Bécue-Bertaut and Pagès (2008)
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Figure 32. Mixed factor analysis. The figure shows the distribution of 
nations along the two factors. By Agner Fog, 2017.
Most of the variables have a significant loading on factor 1, as predicted. 
We can regard factor 1 as reflecting the basic aspects of regality, with a 
central focus on perceived danger and the desire for a tough leader.
Factor 2 is more difficult to interpret. It is dominated by discipline 
at the positive end and violence at the negative end, both of which 
are indicators of regality as evidenced by their positive loading on 
factor 1. The two factors are almost orthogonal, and it appears that 
factor 2 distinguishes between different variants of regal cultures. The 
interpretation of this factor is further discussed below.
Discipline is unrelated to perceived danger, according to table 15, 
but positively correlated with the desire for a tough leader. Discipline 
is strongly correlated with conformity, and conformity is strongly 
correlated with the desire for a tough leader and moderately correlated 
with perceived danger.
The variable ‘hierarchy’ has only an insignificant effect in the factor 
analysis (Figure 31), but it has a significant correlation with perceived 
danger (Table 15). The weak effect of this variable is very likely due to 
the reference group effect discussed on page 256. The respondents are 
probably evaluating the degree of hierarchy in their own culture with 
that same culture as reference.
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It is puzzling that the variable ‘egalitarianism’ is positively 
correlated with hierarchy, while we would expect egalitarianism and 
hierarchy to be each other’s opposites (see table 15). Egalitarianism is 
negatively correlated with bellicosity and xenophobia, as expected, but 
positively correlated with perceived danger, contrary to expectation. 
However, perceived danger is positively correlated with bellicosity and 
xenophobia. An explanation for this paradox can perhaps be found in 
the strong correlation of egalitarianism with discipline. People who 
score high on discipline may be more likely to express agreement than 
disagreement with any statement. People with such an acquiescent 
response style will score high on egalitarianism because this variable 
has no reverse scored items. An acquiescent response style may be 
linked to hierarchy, collectivism, and uncertainty avoidance, according 
to one study.32
Perhaps some people express egalitarian opinions as a reaction 
against a level of hierarchy that they perceive as too high. This may 
also contribute to the positive correlation between egalitarianism and 
hierarchy. It is also possible that people who agree with egalitarian 
values are conforming to an egalitarian ideology expressed by their 
political leaders. An egalitarian society requires some discipline to 
suppress the pursuit of egoistic goals. Note that conformity is positively 
correlated with egalitarianism and discipline but not correlated with 
hierarchy (Table 15).
The two variables that are called bellicosity and violence here do 
not actually make a proper distinction between internal and external 
conflicts, because the survey questions failed to make this distinction. 
Given the mainly peaceful environment, it is likely that these variables 
mostly express internal conflicts.
Correspondence with other theoretical constructs
It can be useful to compare the factors in figures 31 and 32 with similar 
measures found by other scientists. Table 17 lists the correlations of these 
two factors with the various cultural and psychological measures that 
have been listed for different countries by other authors, as discussed 
in chapters 3.7 and 3.8. It is clear that all these measures, under 
different names, have something in common. They are all correlated 
32  Harzing (2006)
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in the predicted direction with factor 1, and all these correlations are 
statistically significant, except for Lazar Stankov’s harshness versus 
softness variable (p = 0.053, n = 18).
Other studies Regality factors
Author and theory Cultural measure
Factor 1:
Perceived 
danger and 
desire for tough 
leader
Factor 2:
Discipline 
versus violence
Uz: Cultural 
tightnessi
Tightness, domain specific 0.60** 0.06
Tightness, domain general 0.54** 0.33
Tightness, combined 0.78*** 0.15
Gelfand et al.: 
Tight versus loose 
culturesii
Tightness 0.60** 0.22
Inglehart and Welzel: 
Human development 
and valuesiii 
Secular/rational versus 
traditional values -0.44* 0.63***
Self-expression versus 
survival values -0.56*** -0.24
Welzel: Human 
empowermentiv 
Secular values -0.49** 0.32
Emancipative values -0.74*** 0.18
Stankov, Lee and 
Vijver: Personality, 
attitudes, values, 
normsv 
Conservatism versus 
liberalism 0.74*** -0.38
Harshness versus softness 0.46 0.46
Stankov and Lee: 
Social attitudesvi
Nastiness 0.66*** 0.14
Religiosity 0.79*** -0.46**
Morality 0.77*** -0.57***
United Nations
Life expectancy -0.65*** -0.40*
Human development index -0.76*** 0.35*
i  Uz (2015)
ii  Gelfand et al. (2011)
iii  Inglehart and Welzel (2005), Inglehart (2007)
iv  Welzel (2013)
v  Stankov, Lee and van de Vijver (2014)
vi  Stankov and Lee (2015)
Table 17. Correlation of factors from the present study with various other 
cultural measures at the country level. Levels of significance, two-tailed: 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.33
33  Data sources: Inglehart and Welzel (2005), Gelfand et al. (2011), Uz (2015), Stankov, 
Lee and van de Vijver (2014), Welzel (2013), United Nations Development 
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If we accept the suggestion of Irem Uz and coworkers that life expectancy 
is a useful measure of threat,34 then we can confirm that factors 1 and 2 
are both significantly correlated with threat. The human development 
index (HDI) is a less accurate measure of threat and danger. While factor 
1 is negatively correlated with HDI, factor 2 is positively correlated with 
HDI. This will be discussed later.
Discussion
The results of our analysis are useful for investigating relationships 
between important political and cultural phenomena, but it must be 
emphasized that it is not possible to infer causal relationships from 
correlations without time series data. The results are quite interesting 
despite the fact that many of the items in the Survey of World Views 
questionnaire are somewhat off the mark from the concepts that are 
relevant to regality theory. Future research will need to include 
questions, methods, and samples that are designed specifically to test 
the predictions of regality theory.
Most of the twelve variables that we defined in table 12 are 
significantly correlated with each other, as we can see in table 15.
The first and strongest factor in the factor analysis is centered 
around perceived danger and the desire for a tough leader, as shown 
in figure 31. This fits nicely with the central claim of regality theory that 
perceived danger leads to the desire for a strong leader, and that this 
affects many aspects of a culture. All the variables except hierarchy and 
egalitarianism have substantial loadings on this factor. Patriarchy has 
particularly strong loading because of the high internal consistency (α) 
of this variable. Factor 1 also has significant negative correlations with 
life expectancy and human development index, which can both be seen 
as rough measures of safety and absence of dangers.
Several scientists have tried to map cultural differences and have 
each developed their own methods and measures. It is interesting that 
all these different measures seem to be related. There must be some core 
phenomenon that is reflected in these different measures, and this is 
exactly what regality theory asserts.
Programme (2013), New World Encyclopedia 2016), Inglehart and Welzel (2013), 
Welzel (2016), United Nations Data Retrieval System (2012)
34  Uz (2015)
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The phenomenon that we call regality is expected to have a strong 
influence on many different aspects of culture, such as politics, religion, 
morals, and art, as shown in table 1 (chapter 2.6). This makes it very 
likely that attempts to map cultural differences will reveal some of 
these connections, regardless of which methods are used. Factor 1 in 
the factor analysis is a reasonably good indicator of the core aspects 
of regality, and this factor is correlated significantly with almost all 
the other cultural measures, as we can see in table 17. Some of these 
correlations are due to confounding economic factors, of course, but we 
can see from table 15 that significant correlations persist when economic 
and other country-specific effects are controlled for.
Factor 2 is dominated by discipline versus violence, as we can see 
in figure 31. A possible interpretation of this factor relates to the way 
conflicts are solved. Internal conflicts are solved by official legal or 
political means in countries with strong and efficient moral or legal 
systems. However, people tend to use violence in the absence of other 
means of conflict solving. Efficient ways of disciplining people are 
seen not only in regal societies, but also in highly developed societies 
regardless of regality. Countries with low loadings on factor 2 have 
less efficient legal or moral means for disciplining people. We saw the 
same phenomenon in the study of non-industrial cultures (page 246 
in chapter 8.3). There is a lot of internal violence in the form of feuds 
and vendettas in some moderately kungic cultures without strong 
legal systems. Regal societies, however, were able to suppress internal 
violence, but engaged in a lot of external violence against other societies. 
We can conclude that factor 2 is related to the disciplining aspect of 
regality, but also to other effects that have less to do with regality.
The distribution of nations across the two factors, shown in figure 
32, has notable similarities with cultural maps published by other 
scientists using other constructs and methods. Figure 32 is very similar 
to a map of the distribution of countries along two dimensions named 
conservatism versus liberalism and harshness versus softness, published 
by Stankov and coworkers,35 despite the non-significant correlation of 
their harshness/softness dimension with factor 2 of the present study 
(p = 0.056, see table 17).
The factor map of figure 32 also has striking similarities with Ronald 
Inglehart and Christian Welzel’s cultural map in figure 6 (chapter 3.7). 
35  Stankov, Lee and van de Vijver (2014)
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It is interesting that factor 2 is strongly correlated with Inglehart and 
Welzel’s secular/rational values, which do not measure conflict solving 
but industrialization and secularization of authority. Inglehart and 
Welzel’s map can be seen roughly as a mirrored and somewhat rotated 
version of our factor map. Regal countries are found at the lower left 
corner of figure 6 and kungic countries at the upper right. Countries 
with a strong disciplining system are found at the top of figure 6 and 
countries with weak discipline at the bottom.
The most conflict-ridden countries were not included in the Survey 
of World Views study because of technical and political difficulties.36 
Therefore, we cannot see the full effect of war in these statistics. 
Fortunately, Inglehart and Welzel’s study is more inclusive, and we can 
see that the most conflict-ridden countries tend towards the lower left 
corner of figure 6, which we have identified as the most regal.
The position of Germany at the kungic end of figure 32 and the upper 
right corner of figure 6 is evidence that the regality of a culture can 
change quite dramatically in just a few generations. In addition to the 
obvious explanation that Germans felt safe at the time the studies were 
made, we should also note that Germans are determined to distance 
themselves ideologically from the Nazism of their past.
Our evaluation of the present results must take into account that 
the survey has been made in modern cultures with student samples. 
Furthermore, the countries included here were dominated by relative 
peace and security at the time of the study. This is far from the 
environment under which the mechanism behind regality evolved. 
Nevertheless, we can see highly significant correlations between nearly 
all the variables we have studied. This confirms that the psychological 
mechanism of regality that evolved in a very different environment still 
operates in modern cultures today.
8.5. Evidence from existing studies
Many previous studies have found effects of collective danger that are 
relevant to our theory. Some of these studies are listed in table 18. All of 
these studies find correlates of collective danger that are in accordance 
with regality theory, though a few of them fail to find all the effects that 
we would predict.
36  Saucier et al. (2015)
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Several of the studies listed in table 18 use non-representative samples 
and unrealistic manipulations of danger, and measure only short-term 
effects. The cited studies are based on other theories than the one 
discussed here, or on no theory at all. We need similar studies based on 
regality theory in order to make more detailed predictions that can be 
tested, including predictions that differ from alternative theories.
8.6. Conclusion of the statistical tests
In this chapter, we have tested the predictions of regality theory 
systematically in several different ways. The effects at the individual 
level have been tested on contemporary societies only, while the effects 
at the social level have been tested on both contemporary and ancient 
non-industrial societies, using a combination of comparative historical 
analysis and various statistical methods. Few social science theories 
have been tested as thoroughly as this. Most of the predictions of the 
theory were confirmed. We now have empirical support for all the links 
in the causal chain hypothesized by our theory: 
• The geography, ecology, and available technology have a 
strong influence on the level of intergroup conflict in a non-
modern setting. 
• A high level of intergroup conflict influences the psychological 
disposition of the individual members of the society in the 
direction of a desire for a strong leader, bellicosity, xenophobia, 
conformity, discipline, patriarchy, and strict religiosity. 
• The emergent effects of individual psychological preferences 
makes the political system more hierarchical, makes the justice 
system more strict and punitive, and shapes the culture in the 
direction of a strong group identity, strict sexual morals, strict 
treatment of children, and a preference for perfectionist and 
highly embellished art. 
• The opposite situation, where the environment makes violent 
conflict difficult or unlikely, has the opposite effects, leading 
to peace and tolerance at both the individual and the social 
level.
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Thus, the central claims of regality theory are strongly confirmed by the 
data. A few less important predictions were only weakly supported or 
not supported at all. The prediction that anomic suicide is more common 
in kungic societies than in regal societies was only weakly supported for 
the non-industrial cultures. It was not supported for modern cultures in 
a country-level statistic (not shown here). The predictions for divorce 
rate and marrying age were not supported.
While the regality level is strongly connected with the political 
complexity and population density, it cannot be reduced to these 
factors alone. The first factor analysis (Tables 6 and 7) and the multiple 
correlation analysis (Table 10) indicate that significant effects remain 
when population density is controlled for.
None of the tests in the present study includes a time sequence 
which could be used to verify the direction of causality, but several of 
the studies cited in table 18 demonstrate the direction of causality based 
on single events, such as terror attacks or laboratory experiments.
In the study of non-industrial cultures (chapter 8.3), we can infer the 
direction of causality from the influence of the environment. This relies 
on the assumption that these cultures had little influence on their own 
environment.
Radical changes in the environment are so rare and case-specific that 
it would be difficult to make a statistical time series analysis to study 
the influence of the environment on whole societies, but individual 
case studies can be quite indicative. One example is the Moriori people 
mentioned in chapter 3.1. These people became isolated on the Chatham 
Islands because the islands lacked materials for building boats. The 
Moriori culture changed from violent to peaceful in a few hundred 
years. When the population was finally attacked by invading Maoris, 
the Moriori were easily wiped out because they lacked an efficient 
culture of defense.37
The problems and weaknesses of the different statistical studies are 
discussed in chapter 8.1. 
37  Endicott (2013)
9. Discussion and Conclusion
Figure 33. Kungic versus regal. Demonstration against the Vietnam 
War. Arlington, Virginia, USA, 1967. Albert R. Simpson, US Army 
Audiovisual Center, 1967.1
9.1. Summary of findings
Evolutionary theories of war and conflict are not new, but previous 
theories have several weaknesses. It is difficult to explain why 
warriors are willing to risk their lives fighting for their group. Previous 
1 Public domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Vietnamdem.jpg
© 2017 Agner Fog, CC BY 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0128.09
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explanations have relied on evolutionary mechanisms such as kin 
selection, group selection, altruistic punishment, or benefitting from the 
spoils of war,2 often attributing much more power to these mechanisms 
than the quantitative models bear out. Regality theory proposes a 
mechanism that better explains the parochial altruism of warriors 
without resort to such weak or controversial mechanisms as altruistic 
punishment or group selection.
Another problem with many of the previous theories is that they try 
to explain variation with a constant.3 Some theorists claim that humans 
are peaceful by nature, while others claim that humans are inherently 
ethnocentric and xenophobic, but few have explained the extreme 
variability in human societies from the extremely peaceful and tolerant 
to the unfathomable cruelty of warlike societies. Regality theory explains 
this variability by showing that humans have a flexible psychology that 
allows us to adapt to our life conditions. 
Humans will express an authoritarian reaction in the event of 
war or any other perceived collective danger that requires collective 
action. This includes the desire for a strong leader, strict discipline, a 
strong group identity emphasizing ‘us’ versus ‘them’, xenophobia, and 
intolerance. The social and political structure of the society will take 
shape according to these preferences. We will see a hierarchical political 
organization and harsh punishment of traitors and deviants. Such a 
society is called regal.
This mechanism provides an evolutionary solution to the collective 
action problem. The powerful leader can reward brave warriors and 
punish cowards and defectors. In the absence of such a leader, there 
would be more free riders than fighters. It is not worthwhile for anybody 
to fight for his group if everybody else is free riding on his actions. It 
is a better strategy to support a strong leader who can make sure that 
nobody is free riding (see chapter 2.2).
There is no reason to support a strong leader when there is no war or 
other collective danger. On the contrary, a strong leader is likely to be 
a tyrant who exploits everybody else. Therefore, people will show the 
2  Thayer (2004, chapter 3), van der Dennen (1995, chapter 1.2)
3  Thayer (2004, p. 234)
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opposite psychological tendencies in a situation of peace and security, 
preferring an egalitarian and tolerant society. This kind of society is 
called kungic. 
Most societies will be somewhere in between these two extremes. 
We can imagine a continuous scale from the extremely kungic to the 
extremely regal, and each society or culture can be placed somewhere 
on this scale depending on the level of perceived collective danger. The 
regal-kungic scale does not only affect the political climate. We have 
observed that a lot of different aspects of a culture reflect its level of 
regality. The characteristics of regal and kungic societies are summarized 
in table 1 (chapter 2.6).
This model can explain a lot of different social phenomena. Most 
importantly, it can explain why some societies are warlike and 
authoritarian while others are peaceful and tolerant. The hierarchical 
and highly disciplined structure in a regal society is good not only for 
defense, but also for offensive purposes. A regal country will attack 
any neighbor country if it has a good chance of gaining more territory 
through war.
9.2. Three epochs in human history
Different factors in the environment and subsistence pattern can make 
war or violent conflict feasible or impossible, as we have seen. We can 
roughly divide human history into three epochs where different means 
of subsistence have led to different dynamics for war and regality.
In the first epoch, humans depended on hunting, gathering, and 
fishing. The amount of violent conflict was determined mainly by the 
ecology and geography. Where food was concentrated in rich patches, 
we would have contest competition and frequent intergroup conflicts 
over access to the most attractive food patches. The population density 
would be higher around these rich patches so that larger groups were 
able to fight together. Geographic barriers and niche specialization were 
factors that could prevent war. Thus, we would find the relatively regal 
cultures in areas with rich food patches and the more kungic cultures 
in remote areas where food was sparse, where travelling was difficult, 
or where a small group had adapted to a special niche that neighboring 
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groups could not penetrate. When nomadic pastoralism was introduced, 
the dynamics were basically the same, but the groups that traveled 
together were larger, which increased their fighting ability.
In the second epoch, humans depended increasingly on agriculture 
to produce their own food. Where the lifestyle had previously been 
nomadic, it now became more and more sedentary. This development 
probably started with slash and burn agriculture, in which groups of 
humans traveled to a new place whenever the soil had been exhausted. 
The lifestyle became more and more sedentary with the Neolithic 
revolution, when fields were cultivated in fertile areas such as river 
valleys. The population grew in these areas. As villages grew into cities, 
it became possible to organize and build irrigation canals to increase the 
agricultural yield.
The more the production of food became concentrated in fertile areas 
near water sources, the more these areas became the subject of violent 
conflicts. A self-amplifying cycle of increasing regality, territorial 
expansion, increasing food production, and population growth was 
started. Villages and small cities grew and became city states, nations, 
kingdoms, and finally large empires. The political structure became 
more and more hierarchical and centralized while the culture focused 
increasingly on the importance of military virtues and new conquests.
When such an empire had finally reached the practical limits to 
expansion, the opposite development set in. The wars and conquests 
that had driven the regal spiral were no longer feasible, the state was 
economically bankrupt, and a kungic development set in. The empire 
started to disintegrate into smaller states, some of which were later 
absorbed by neighboring empires.
The level of regality in this second epoch was now determined 
not only by ecological and geographic factors but increasingly by 
the dynamical rise and fall of empires. This cyclical process, which is 
explained in chapters 4.1 and 4.2, led to an alternation between regal 
and kungic developments over periods of several hundred years.
The third epoch is one of industrialization and a globalized economy. 
Large scale territorial wars have become less common since World 
War II due to the influence of international organizations, alliances, 
deterrence, economic costs, and economic interdependence. Political 
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leaders may still have imperial ambitions, but their strategies are now 
based less on brute-force military dominance and more on proxy wars, 
economic structures, resource extraction, debt dependence, and the 
domination of culture, ideology, science, and mass media.4
We still have violent conflicts, but on a lower scale. In most cases, 
one or both parties in a conflict depend on foreign support (often 
clandestine). These conflicts can be characterized as proxy wars or 
foreign-supported attempts at inducing regime change. Most violent 
conflicts today are asymmetric wars where the traditional theories of 
war do not apply. The weaker party in an asymmetric conflict may 
turn to terrorism tactics when the traditional means of warfare are not 
available to them. The actual damage done by acts of terrorism is much 
smaller than in traditional warfare, but the regalizing effect can be very 
high because of the intense media attention (see chapter 4.4 and 6.1). 
In fact, the mass media play a major role in the regal-kungic 
dynamics of modern societies. Most people depend on the mass media 
for information about political violence and other dangers, because 
they do not witness these events themselves. The image presented by 
the mass media is often exaggerated, though, because the media are 
forced by fierce economic competition to focus on dramatic and highly 
emotional stories about crime, violence, and mayhem. The ‘mean world 
syndrome’ caused by media competition is in fact a major regalizing force 
in modern society (see chapter 5.1). Politicians sometimes contribute to 
this effect by fabricating threats and conflicts (see chapter 6.3).
The mass migration of refugees out of conflict zones can cause regal 
reactions in the countries that receive these refugees. In the future, 
climate change, natural disasters, overpopulation, and ecological 
collapse may have similar effects.
Economic factors also contribute to regal developments when an 
unstable economic system causes crises and growing global inequality. 
The regal effect of an economic crisis depends on who is blamed for the 
crisis and whether the politicians are perceived to be in control of the 
situation (see chapter 5.2).
4  Altheide (2014)
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Despite these regal influences, we are now seeing strong kungic 
developments in many parts of the world due to the improved living 
conditions, peace, and stability that are connected with the demographic 
transition (see chapter 3.4).
The state of the world today can be characterized by the observation 
that the pattern of war has changed (see chapter 4.4), but some wars are 
still being fought based on obsolete principles. Today, we are seeing 
mostly asymmetric conflicts which tend to be intractable and long-
lasting. Asymmetric wars are often fought with unconventional means, 
including terrorism. Most violent conflicts today can be characterized as 
proxy wars. The level of conflict is increased here by foreign support in 
the form of weapons, training, and other resources.
On the surface, these asymmetric wars and proxy wars appear 
to be conflicts over ideology or religion, but the political or religious 
extremism of the fighters is mainly a consequence of the conflict itself. 
The fighters in proxy wars become radicalized as a regal reaction to the 
violence and also as a result of manipulation by their leaders. Behind 
the scenes, the sponsors who are pulling the strings are more motivated 
by a need to secure their access to critical resources and by geopolitical 
strategy (see chapter 4.3, page 75). They use religion, ideology, and 
a rhetoric of good and evil mainly to rally support for their cause. The 
weaker party in asymmetric conflicts is in most cases fighting against 
the suppression and exclusion of a minority. The religious and ethnic 
identity of this minority is amplified by the conflict.
The third epoch that we are now in has lasted for less than a century, 
and the driving forces behind the social and political developments 
are changing faster than the theories about their workings. The 
globalized economy is still changing shape with new dynamic forms of 
international cooperation and competition, concentration of wealth and 
power, economic booms and busts, security and insecurity, economic 
regulation and deregulation, and new conflicts and alliances. Likewise, 
the political climate is changing, with new forms of dynamics formed 
by new forms of mass communication, competition for attention, 
economic influences on the mass media, and new forms of propaganda 
and deception. As scientists, we have a lot of work to do to catch up with 
these developments in order to understand in which direction these 
processes are taking our society.
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9.3. The regal/kungic dynamics and human  
social development
While it is certainly more pleasurable for ordinary people to live in 
a kungic society than a regal one, we should not forget the role that 
regal periods have played in the history of human development. Regal 
regimes have certainly caused unfathomable amounts of cruelty and 
human suffering, but without the historical periods of regality we might 
still be living in the Stone Age.
The first condition for technological innovation and development is 
a political and economic structure that allows division of labor, where 
some people produce food while others can devote their time to being 
artisans, intellectuals, and other specialists. Scientific progress requires 
a wealthy government that can support education and pay people for 
doing research.
A rich and powerful government is necessary for the construction 
of the large infrastructure that industrial development and large scale 
international trade depends on. However, this is not the friendliest 
environment for individual innovation and free enterprise. Throughout 
most of our history, rich and powerful governments have also been 
regal. Regal governments are likely to tax or confiscate new enterprises 
that appear to be profitable. Such governments are extractive in the 
sense of Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson’s theory, as explained 
in chapter 5.2. Furthermore, regal societies are typically intolerant of 
the deviance and experimentation that may be necessary for social and 
cultural innovation.
On the other hand, a kungic society with a lax system of justice may 
fail to protect private entrepreneurs against theft and blackmail, or fail 
to provide the accumulation of wealth necessary for investment in new 
businesses. The societies that have been most conducive to technological 
progress have been those that had a strong legal system to protect 
private property, but that also encouraged diversity and individual 
inventiveness.5
The present state of human technology and social organization is 
the result of a development that has depended on different levels of 
5  Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 43)
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regality at different times and in different places. Most states were 
created through violence.6 Regal periods have created larger political 
units, division of labor, and the accumulation of wealth that has been 
required for the investment in infrastructure, education, and science. 
Subsequent kungic periods have fostered individual creativity and 
inventiveness, and allowed the political, cultural, and religious deviance 
that was connected with inventiveness, while perhaps the previously 
accumulated capital made the investment in technological inventions 
possible. The most fruitful environment for technological and industrial 
innovation is one that combines democracy and individual freedom 
with a strong law enforcement system to protect private property. 
Different periods with different levels of regality have created windows 
of opportunity for different innovations and developments. The changes 
in regality level and the conflicts between regal and kungic forces have 
been the root of much artistic and cultural creativity and innovation.
Today, the possibility of establishing a well-functioning and 
reliable government and legal system no longer requires a strong 
regal government; but the decoupling between regality and efficient 
law enforcement is historically new, as it came with the third epoch 
described in the previous chapter.
The regal periods in human history have not only produced war, 
tyranny, imperialism, slavery, cruelty, and mayhem, but also formed 
the preconditions for the highly developed society that we live in today. 
Most of the basic principles of law that are necessary for a civilized society 
to function today were developed in regal periods. Classical music, as 
well as many of the magnificent pieces of art and architecture that we are 
impressed by today, was created under the regal regimes of the past. We 
admire old fairy tales without realizing that they were written to glorify 
sovereign kings and emperors and to make unambiguous distinctions 
between friend and foe, between good and evil. And we enjoy the fruits 
of past scientific, technological, and political progress without thinking 
of the incredible hardship that made it possible.
6  Tilly (1992)
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9.4. New explanations of well-known phenomena
Regality theory can contribute to a better understanding of many 
well-known phenomena, for example the rise and fall of empires, as 
discussed in previous chapters. 
Altruism is a behavior that has always been difficult to explain in 
evolutionary theory. Many different theories have been put forth, 
but none of the previously proposed mechanisms seems to be strong 
enough to explain why people are willing to sacrifice themselves in war. 
Regality theory offers a model that predicts a stronger effect than the 
previous theories can account for (see chapter 2.2).
Another common phenomenon that receives a new theoretical 
explanation is authoritarianism. The psychological concept of 
authoritarianism has often been criticized for being politically biased 
and poorly defined. For many years, there has been confusion and 
disagreement over whether authoritarianism was a fixed personality 
trait, a psychopathology, a reaction to fear and danger, a consequence 
of pessimistic world views, or just a divergent political opinion. 
Regality theory explains the phenomenon that psychologists have 
called authoritarianism as an evolved pattern of response to perceived 
collective danger. This new explanation removes the weaknesses of 
authoritarianism theory and gives a good explanation of the relationship 
between individual reactions and sociopolitical phenomena (see chapter 
3.5).
The question of whether humans are violent or peaceful by nature 
has often been discussed. Regality theory has the answer: it depends on 
the environment. The endless debates over whether human differences 
are due to genes or culture have often totally missed a third possibility, 
that the genes define a flexibility or plasticity that allows the individual 
to show different behaviors depending on the environment.
In folk psychology, people often believe that war and violent conflicts 
are caused by hate, fanaticism, nationalism, or religious extremism. 
Regality theory turns this argument upside down. Conflict leads to 
regality, which is typically expressed as xenophobia, fanaticism, an 
increased sense of national identity, and religious strictness and zeal. 
While the causal mechanism often goes both ways in a self-amplifying 
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spiral of violence, it is fair to say that xenophobia, fanatical patriotism, 
religious extremism, and so on are the consequences of conflict more than 
the causes of it. This insight has important implications for peacemaking 
efforts. Attempts to root out, for example, a particular expression of 
religious extremism by force will most likely be counterproductive and 
create more regality, while third-party interventions that guarantee 
peace and security will have a kungic effect and make the extremism 
slowly fade away.
The fundamental dogmas of a religion are quite resistant to change. 
However, people have a peculiar ability to interpret their religion in a 
way that matches their psychological propensities or political agenda 
so that they can justify almost any action—violent or peaceful—by 
reference to carefully selected parts of their religious principles.
The statistical results show a quite significant correlation between 
religion and various measures of war and regality in both modern and 
non-industrial societies. The religion of regal societies typically supports 
the hierarchical political power structure and serves a disciplining 
function by emphasizing supernatural rewards and punishments. This 
insight can improve our understanding of religious differences.
Regality theory improves our understanding of several other cultural 
phenomena as well, including some phenomena that are difficult to 
explain with other theories. One phenomenon that has hitherto been 
difficult to explain is sexual morals. The statistics presented above show 
that the level of regality explains remarkably well why different cultures 
have such strikingly different sexual morals. Cultural prohibitions 
against birth control can be seen as a means by which a regal society tries 
to increase the population growth. A ban against premarital sex is likely 
to force young people to marry early and have many children when all 
other outlets for their sexual drive are closed. Many regal cultures even 
have bans against such harmless, but non-procreative, sexual behaviors 
as masturbation and homosexuality. More research is needed to study 
the possible psychological mechanisms that connect regality with the 
desire to make rules for the sexual behavior of others.
The theory also improves our understanding of patriarchy. Regal 
cultures tend to be patriarchal and male-dominated, while kungic 
cultures have more equality between the sexes.
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Regality theory also offers a completely new way of explaining 
differences in artistic style and taste. Regal cultures have a marked 
preference for a highly embellished, refined, and perfectionist style, while 
the members of kungic cultures appreciate the more individualistic, 
imaginative, and less rule-bound artistic expressions. Art is a form of 
communication that reflects the social structure as the artist sees it or 
the social structure that the artist would like to see. This tendency to 
reflect the level of regality appears to be the same in many different 
kinds of art, including music, dance, literary fiction, drama, painting, 
body adornment, and architecture.
Finally, regality theory contributes to a better understanding of 
democracy. In international relations, it is often believed that democracy 
is the road to peace, but the statistics show that the democratization of 
a country almost always comes after the borders have been settled and 
peace established.7 This observation fits perfectly with regality theory. 
Unstable or contested borders are a collective threat that drives the 
political climate of a country in the regal and autocratic direction, while 
peace and secure borders will promote a kungic political culture, which 
leads to democracy. In other words: peace comes before democracy.
This also explains the paradoxical phenomenon that the voters in 
a democracy sometimes elect undemocratic candidates. A return from 
democracy to autocracy is possible in the face of national threats—real or 
fabricated. We can expect democracy to be adversely affected by border 
conflicts, proxy wars, fabricated dangers, highly emotional threats such 
as terrorism, and by a concentration of valuable resources in areas that 
can be monopolized and fought over.
9.5. Integration with other theories
A common way of promoting a new theory is to prove previous theories 
wrong. This naive form of falsificationism has not been very fruitful in the 
social sciences.8 While regality theory explains our observations better 
than alternative theories do, this does not mean that previous theories 
7  Owsiak (2013), Gibler and Owsiak (2017)
8  Lakatos (1974)
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should be completely rejected. Previous theories may still contain some 
important insights that might be remodeled and combined with the new 
discoveries in a synthetic process that makes our knowledge evolve and 
expand its explanatory power. Regality theory may improve previous 
theories by contributing to a deeper theoretical understanding of both 
individual behavior and social structures.
There is a long-standing debate in sociology about the relative 
importance of individual agency and social structure. The present 
book argues for a theory where individual preferences shape the 
social structure, and where the social structure determines the power 
relations between people and determines who is able to get into 
powerful positions and what interests they serve. The social structure 
and the environment also have a strong influence on the psychological 
preferences of individual people. A conflict-filled and dangerous 
environment fosters authoritarian preferences in people, while a 
peaceful and safe environment makes people prioritize egalitarian 
values. These individual preferences then feed back into the social 
structure in such a way that people tend to build hierarchical political 
systems in dangerous environments and egalitarian political structures 
in safe and peaceful environments.
The actor-centered explanation of historical events can be criticized 
for seeing only proximate causes. For example, Ronald Inglehart and 
Christian Welzel criticize explanations of democracy that can be reduced 
to the observation that democracy has been implemented because pro-
democratic actors were stronger than anti-democratic actors. It is always 
clear in retrospect that the winners were stronger than the losers, but 
this gives no insight into the social forces that explain why the winners 
were stronger. The actor-centered approach often tries to explain social 
processes by actions that are endogenous to the processes themselves 
without seeing the deeper structural mechanisms.9
The present theory improves the opportunities for a scientific 
understanding of history based on environmental and technological 
factors and intergroup relations. Rather than explaining a war as caused 
by the whims of a particular bellicose leader, we can start to study why 
this leader was bellicose and, more importantly, why he had enough 
9  Inglehart and Welzel (2005, p. 224)
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supporters to stay in power, and why the population did not overturn 
this despot and replace him with somebody more peaceful (see chapter 
6.4).
Many social developments are unpredicted or unintended. We cannot 
explain unintended developments adequately by idiographic accounts 
of the personal decisions of specific influential people. Unplanned 
developments are often the emergent effects of the actions of a large 
number of people, perhaps without anybody understanding how their 
own decisions contribute to the big picture of macroscopic change. 
Regality theory is only one among many theories that can explain 
emergent social developments. Other theories that may contribute 
to the understanding of unplanned developments include systems 
theory with feedback models, cultural selection theory, economic 
market mechanisms, social cognition theory, and media effects theories 
combined with media economy (see chapters 4.1, 5.1, and 5.2).
9.6. Policy lessons
Regality theory can be useful for guiding political decisions and for 
predicting the consequences of political actions.
There may be many reasons why one wants to push a society and 
culture in the kungic direction. A kungic development is the road to 
peace, tolerance, and democracy. It can also be an important tool for 
saving the environment. A kungic culture is usually coupled with a 
K-like life history strategy, which implies better education and reduced 
population growth (chapter 3.3). The current level of consumption of 
natural resources exceeds the carrying capacity of the planet, and so 
does the level of pollution.10 We have often observed that the protection 
of the environment has very low priority in the event of war but higher 
priority in times of peace. A kungic development combined with 
demographic transition is probably the most efficient way to avoid 
ecological collapse.
The following policies may be useful for pushing a society and 
culture in the kungic direction:
10  Steffen et al. (2015)
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• Protect the borders of countries. Prevent violent territorial 
conflicts. Borders should be created, removed, or moved only 
by peaceful negotiations, or decided by public referendum in 
the affected areas. Strong, fair, and accountable international 
organizations should oversee this. 
• Remove violence, particularly against civilians, and reduce 
threat perceptions.11 
• Resolve asymmetric conflicts, which tend to be intractable 
and produce terror. International mediation is often necessary 
for solving such conflicts in a way that is acceptable to both 
parties. 
• Prevent proxy wars and expose clandestine foreign support 
for conflicting factions. Do not buy oil, diamonds, drugs, or 
other valuable products from conflict areas. Prevent foreign 
support for violent regime changes. Prevent and expose the 
deliberate fabrication of conflicts by third parties. 
• Create economic stability and safety. The money system 
should not generate unpayable debt or inescapable debt 
dependence. Restrain the Matthew effect. Regulate the kinds 
of international trade that would lead to a race to the bottom. 
• Reduce the dependence on critical resources, such as oil, 
rare minerals, and water. Make sure that all people and all 
countries have fair access to vital resources. 
• Establish social security systems and safety nets that guarantee 
the basic necessities of life and health for everybody and make 
people feel safe. 
• Promote good education for all citizens. Support education 
for the poor. Make education attractive by providing jobs for 
the educated. 
• Support free mass media that do not have to rely on 
fearmongering and exaggeration of dangers for reasons of 
economic competition. This requires alternative sources of 
funding for ‘public service’ news media. 
11  Hirsch-Hoefler, Canetti, Rapaport and Hobfoll (2014)
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• Prevent overpopulation. The above policies will in fact 
advance the demographic transition and help to prevent 
overpopulation.
This theoretical discussion would not be complete without also 
describing policies that can be used to push a society in the regal direction. 
A society that is too kungic will be vulnerable to attacks from more 
regal forces. Karl Popper, citing Plato, expressed this as the paradox of 
freedom. Freedom in the sense of absence of restraining control ‘makes 
the bully free to enslave the meek’. Popper also explained the paradox 
of tolerance: ‘If we extend unlimited tolerance even to those who are 
intolerant, if we are not prepared to defend a tolerant society against 
the onslaught of the intolerant, then the tolerant will be destroyed, and 
tolerance with them’.12 The optimal position of a society on the regal-
kungic dimension depends on the dangers it faces from its neighbors as 
well as on the need for solidarity and collective action.
Regalizing policies have often been used to strengthen a government 
against the interests of the majority of the population, as we have seen in 
chapters 6.2 and 6.3. Such policies can also be used to strengthen a country 
against a likely attack from a militant neighbor, to increase solidarity 
in times of crisis, to nurture the will to cultural self-preservation, or to 
strengthen a military organization. Actions and inactions that can make 
societies more regal include the following:
• War, including proxy war and fabricated conflicts; political 
influence of the weapons industry; weak and corrupt 
international organizations. 
• An unregulated economy depending on debt, exploitation of 
other countries, increasing inequality, perpetual growth, and 
overconsumption of natural resources. 
• Climate change, overexploitation, and destruction of the 
environment. 
• Exaggerated stories about all kinds of dangers in the mass 
media; a highly competitive media market. 
12  Popper (1945)
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• Political control of artistic production, especially the 
suppression and destruction of kungic art.
Evidently, tyrants and despots have used regalizing techniques such as 
these over the millennia to increase their own power, even if they did not 
know why these techniques worked. The list of regalizing techniques 
provided here will hardly add anything to the repertoire of power-
hungry autocrats. It can, however, be useful to a political opposition 
and to the general population because it makes it easier to see through 
the hidden motives of rulers who want to strengthen their own power 
or abuse their power to enrich themselves.
The insights provided by regality theory can also be useful for 
identifying ineffective and counterproductive policies. For example, 
both parts in an asymmetric conflict should avoid escalating the 
violence because this will lead to further regalization and make the 
conflict intractable.
This theory also explains why so many attempts to establish 
democracy by force have failed. International interventions in trouble-
filled countries have too often had a focus on regime change. While 
the professed aim has been to establish democracy, the result has 
invariably been less liberating. No matter how tyrannical the leader 
of an undemocratic country is, he will have supporters who see any 
foreign-backed attempts to remove him by force as an attack on their 
country. This has a regalizing effect that is likely to make the country 
less democratic, not more. The analyses of conflicts need to focus on 
systemic causes rather than hunting down individual ‘bad guys’. 
Removing an ‘evil dictator’ by force will only regalize the population of 
his country and make sure his successor will be even more militant and 
despotic. Peace and stability must come before democracy.13
Counterinsurgency and counterterrorism have too often been 
counterproductive. They ignore the grievances that provide the driving 
force behind all insurgency. They also ignore the fact that, in most 
cases, there are no military targets that the insurgents can meaningfully 
attack with any chance of success, so they can see no other option than 
to attack less legitimate targets. This makes it easy for a suppressive 
regime to call them terrorists. We can be pretty sure that they have 
already tried less radical forms of protest with disappointing results. 
13  Owsiak (2013)
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It should be no surprise that insurgent movements become more 
radical and militant the stronger their grievances and the more they are 
suppressed. Their radical religious and political ideologies are likely 
to lose adherents if their grievances are dealt with in a sensible way. 
A suppressive and kleptocratic regime may be the main cause of their 
grievances. International intervention is unlikely to bring lasting peace 
if it only helps a despotic regime suppress the insurgents while ignoring 
their grievances. Intelligence organizations with their traditional focus 
on secret operations and paying secret informants are only likely to 
exacerbate the corruption that lies at the core of the conflict. Intelligence 
gathering should instead focus on identifying the root causes of a 
conflict.14
International policies that are likely to fail include the following:
• Blaming insecurity and political problems on specific political 
leaders; hunting down ‘evil dictators’ while ignoring the basic 
reasons why certain countries have despotic leaders. 
• Blaming conflict on religion. Fanatic religiosity is a 
consequence of conflict as much as, or rather more than, a 
cause of it. People will automatically become less fanatical and 
less bellicose when their environment is made more secure. 
Putting the blame on ‘Islamists’, ‘Zionists’, or ‘Crusaders’ will 
only make them feel that their religion is threatened and make 
them more regal. 
• Trying to solve international security problems by forcing a 
regime change in other countries by violent means. 
• Proxy war; covert support for coup attempts in other countries; 
opportunistic support for one faction or another in foreign 
countries based on one’s own economic and geostrategic 
interests. 
• Focus on violent conflict rather than state building; trying to 
impose democracy on other countries by force without focusing 
on the root causes of why the country has an autocratic rule; 
trying to establish democracy before stability.15
14  Chayes (2015, p. 154)
15  Inglehart and Welzel (2005, p. 297), Owsiak (2013), Ahram (2011, p. 139)
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9.7. Supporting evidence
Let us review the most important support we now have for regality 
theory:
1. First, we have a solid theoretical basis. Evolutionary theory 
has always had a problem explaining why people are willing 
to fight for their group. Many models have been proposed, 
but the effects always seemed to be too weak to account for 
the high costs and dangers of fighting. Regality theory offers 
a model with a stronger potential effect because it involves 
a strong leader who has the power to coordinate, reward, 
and punish. Common support for a strong leader makes sure 
that everybody will be fighting rather than free riding. A 
hypothetical genetic code that says ‘support a strong leader 
in times of collective danger, but not otherwise’ would be 
evolutionarily stable (see chapters 2.2 and 2.3). The actual 
observations are in good agreement with this model. 
2. The extensive research that has been carried out in connection 
with authoritarianism theory confirms that people become 
authoritarian when they perceive collective danger. This 
involves support for a strong leader and strict discipline (see 
chapter 3.5). 
3. Many previous studies have found various effects of collective 
danger that are in accordance with regality theory (see table 
18, chapter 8.5). 
4. Regality theory provides an explanation for the rise and fall 
of empires that is in very good agreement with the theory and 
observations behind Peter Turchin’s historical dynamics (see 
chapter 4.2). 
5. Many scientists have tried to map cultural differences. Different 
scientists have assigned different names to the cultural factors 
that they discovered, such as cultural tightness, harshness, 
traditional values, survival values, emancipative values, 
conservatism, and nastiness. All these constructs—whatever 
they are called—seem to be closely related to each other (see 
table 17, chapter 8.4). The fact that different scientists, relying 
on different theories and methods, make similar discoveries 
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suggests that there is a common underlying reality behind 
all these findings. Most of these different constructs are 
significantly correlated with regality at the country level. The 
various studies of cultural factors have found correlations 
with many different aspects of culture. These correlations are 
in very good agreement with the predictions of regality theory 
(see chapter 3.7 and 3.8). 
6. A large statistical analysis of 8,883 persons in 33 contemporary 
countries found highly significant correlations between 
perceived danger, desire for a tough leader, bellicosity, and 
several other variables in accordance with the predictions of 
regality theory (see table 15 and figure 31, chapter 8.4). 
7. A statistical analysis on ancient, non-industrial societies has 
been made based on data from the 186 cultures in Murdoch 
and White’s Standard Cross-Cultural Sample. A structural 
equation model supports the predicted relationships between 
war, leadership, rewards for warriors, various cultural 
indicators of regality, life history strategy, and sexual morals 
(see figure 29, chapter 8.2).
8. A subsample consisting of eighteen of these ancient, non-
industrial societies was investigated in more detail in a 
comparative historical analysis. The level of intergroup 
conflict in each of these societies was in very good agreement 
with the conflict level that could be predicted based on 
geographic, ecological, and technological factors. The level 
of hierarchy, discipline, and several other cultural indicators 
agreed very well with the predictions of regality theory for 
these societies and confirmed the direction of causality. A 
statistical summary of these results showed that most of the 
predicted relationships were highly significant (see table 11, 
chapter 8.3).
Such a broad and solid range of support is quite unusual for a social 
science theory. This is an excellent basis for further research and 
exploration of the many aspects of regality theory and the many social 
and cultural variables that are influenced by the level of regality, 
according to this theory.
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9.8. What regality theory can be used for
This book has explained how regality theory was developed with 
contributions from many different scientific disciplines. In this 
conclusion, it is time to suggest how regality theory can give something 
back to these disciplines. The following list shows examples of how 
regality theory can make useful contributions to other scientific 
disciplines:
• In history, to explain war and peace, despotism, the rise and 
fall of empires, and the development of democracy.
• In archaeology, to get an image of the social and political 
structure of a society based on physical remains. A regal 
culture is likely to leave large, impressive, perfectionist, and 
embellished artifacts made from durable materials, while the 
artifacts of kungic cultures are likely to be less rule-bound, 
to reflect individual fantasy, and to be made of perishable 
materials. This causes a sampling bias in the archaeological 
record (see chapter 2.6). 
• In social psychology, to explain authoritarianism, racism, 
xenophobia, punitiveness, and tolerance; to suggest a revision 
of the politically biased authoritarianism theory (see chapter 
3.5). 
• In conflict and peace research, to identify the conditions that 
lead to conflict or peace and to understand the social and 
psychological consequences of different kinds of conflict, 
including international war, civil war, proxy war, insurgency, 
revolution, terrorism, and spirals of violence. 
• In the history and sociology of religion, to relate changes in 
religious sentiments, beliefs, and rituals to social and political 
changes and ecological factors. 
• In art history, to relate artistic innovations and genres of art to 
social and political developments. 
• In cultural studies, to understand the connections between 
social conditions, political ideas, artistic style, music genres, 
religious movements, and so on. 
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• In sexology, to relate sexual behaviors, lifestyles, morals, and 
tolerance or intolerance to the social and political climate. 
• In media studies, to understand how the economic mechanisms 
in a competitive media market shape the quality of the media 
and the number of titillating or scary stories, and how this in 
turn may create a ‘mean world syndrome’ that influences the 
general level of regality in the society (chapter 5.1). 
• In political demography, to understand the connection 
between ecological environment, r/K life history strategies, 
demographic transition, and political changes along the regal-
kungic dimension. 
• In political science, to understand the social and psychological 
factors that make authoritarian or egalitarian ideas popular, 
and to predict the likely consequences of political decisions. 
• In futurology, to predict future developments in the political 
climate.
9.9. Further discussion
A forum for the discussion of regality theory is provided online at 
http://www.regality.info
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